Child soldiers and international law: progressing towards "an era of application" by Waschefort, Casper August
 
 
 
Waschefort, Casper August (2011) Child soldiers and international law: progressing towards "an era 
of application". PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of London 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/14248
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners.  
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior permission or 
charge.  
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in 
writing from the copyright holder/s.  
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the 
formal permission of the copyright holders. 
When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution 
and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", name of the 
School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination. 
	   1	  
 
 
 
 
CHILD SOLDIERS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROGRESSING 
TOWARDS “AN ERA OF APPLICATION”? 
 
 
 
Casper August Waschefort  
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the PhD degree to: 
 
 
The School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) 
University of London 
 
 
	   2	  
DECLARATION 
I, Casper August Waschefort have read and understood regulation 17.9 
of the Regulations for students of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented 
for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole 
or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or 
paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person 
has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination. 
 
 
 
 
_____________________    30 September 2011 
Casper August Waschefort 
 
 
	   3	  
ABSTRACT  
Academic legal literature has focused heavily on the creation and content 
of norms prohibiting the use and recruitment of child soldiers, rather than 
on how to apply these norms more effectively. In this thesis, I argue that 
this focus must now be redirected towards a greater emphasis on 
application. Effective application does not require major changes to any 
entity or functionary engaged in child soldier prevention; rather, it requires 
the constant reassessment and refinement of all such entities and 
functionaries, and here, some changes are required. International judicial, 
quasi-judicial and non-judicial entities and functionaries most relevant to 
child soldier prevention are critically assessed. Specific areas where 
these entities and functionaries can be improved in their effective 
application of child soldier prohibitive norms are identified, and the 
implementation of the suggested changes are analysed.   
 
However, prior to analysing the application of the relevant norms, I 
analyse the enforceability of these norms, to determine whether they can 
indeed be applied. In this regard, I find that although there are 
shortcomings in these norms, they are nonetheless enforceable. I further 
argue that the nature of the legal regime to which a specific norm 
belongs, impacts on the enforceability of the relevant norm. This is due to 
the nature of the obligations created, as well as the enforcement 
mechanisms that belong to the relevant legal regime – in this case, 
	   4	  
international human rights law, international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law.  
 
The conclusions of this study are based, in part, on interviews conducted 
with individuals engaged with child soldier prevention at the highest level. 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is used as a case study 
against which the study’s conclusions are tested; based on field research 
in the DRC. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION   
 
For most of human history, children’s participation in armed conflict was 
not a matter of concern. Indeed there are many accounts of children’s 
heroism in battle, notably the boy David defeating Goliath, the giant 
Philistine warrior. The origin of the word ‘infantry’ is said to be derived 
from the Latin word infans, meaning “a very young child or baby”.1 The 
infantry were those soldiers in the Roman legions who were too young, or 
of too low rank, to form part of the cavalry.2 Many small towns in the 
United States of America (USA) have monuments and statues in honour 
of children who fought in the American Civil War: for example, the grave 
of Avery Brown is a landmark in Elkhard, Indiana.3 Brown enlisted in 
Abraham Lincoln’s Union Army during the Civil War, aged eight years, 
eleven months, and thirteen days.4 More recently, significant numbers of 
children participated in hostilities during the Second World War; yet the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not prohibit the recruitment and 
participation of children in armed conflict.5  
 
By 1977, a shift in the mores of the international community had occurred 
and the first instruments directly prohibiting child soldiering had been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Soanes, C. & Stevenson, A. (eds.) Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2006). 
2 Ibid, the origin of the word ‘infantry’ is attributed to infanterie in French, and infanteria 
in Italian. The root of both these words is attributable to the Latin word infant, which 
means “a very young child or baby”.  
3 Banks, MD. ‘Avery Brown (1852 – 1904), Musician: America’s Youngest Civil War 
Soldier’ America’s Shrine to Music Newsletter (February 2001), also cited by Rosen, 
DM. Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism (2005), 5, note 12.  
4 Ibid. 
5 See Chapter 4.  
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adopted in the form of the Two Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions. 6  For more than a decade after the adoption of the 
Additional Protocols there were no further developments. During 1989, 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was adopted which 
(inter alia) prohibited child soldiering and mandated the creation of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child.7 Two vital decisions were taken at 
the Committee’s third session, during 1993. It was decided to submit a 
request to the Secretary General of the UN to appoint an expert to launch 
an in-depth investigation into the protection of children during armed 
conflict.8 It was also decided to entrust a member of the Committee with 
drafting a first preliminary text of a Protocol to the CRC on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict (CIAC Protocol).9 
 
Graça Machel was duly appointed in terms of a General Assembly 
resolution to investigate and report on the situation of children during 
armed conflict.10 Although her mandate included the plight of all children 
during armed conflict, it was her ground-breaking report, released during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Article 77(2) of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 
1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 17512; and article 4(3)(c) of 
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 1977 
(entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609. 
7 Convention on the Rights of the Child (entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 
UNTS 3.  
8 ‘Report on the Third Session’ Committee on the Rights of the Child CRC/C/16 (5 
March 1993) para 176 and Annex VI. 
9 Ibid, para 176 and Annex VII.  
10 General Assembly Resolution 48/157 (20 December 1993), 
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1996, that drew the international community’s attention to the problem of 
child soldiering.11 In her report, Machel states:  
 
The flagrant abuse and exploitation of children during armed conflict 
can and must be eliminated. For too long, we have given ground to 
spurious claims that the involvement of children in armed conflict is 
regrettable but inevitable. It is not. Children are regularly caught up 
in warfare as a result of conscious and deliberate decisions made by 
adults. We must challenge each of these decisions and we must 
refute the flawed political and military reasoning, the protests of 
impotence, and the cynical attempts to disguise child soldiers as 
merely the youngest "volunteers".12 
 
This sentiment resonated across the divide between civil society and 
state actors. If ever the participation of children in armed conflict was 
wholly accepted, the turning point had been reached by the time this 
study was released. This is evident today in that not a single state argues 
that the use or recruitment of children younger than fifteen is lawful. 
 
As recommended in the Machel report, the office of the Special 
Representative to the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict 
(SRSG) was created during 1998, and Olara Otunnu was appointed as 
the first SRSG.13 The SRSG has a multifaceted mandate that, in relation 
to children in armed conflict, includes: tracking progress, raising 
awareness, promoting information gathering, working closely with other 
role players, fostering international cooperation to ensure respect for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Machel, G. ‘Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed 
Conflict on Children’ UN Doc. A/51/306 (26 August 1996) (Machel Report). See Chapter 
5 generally.  
12 Ibid, para 316. 
13 Ibid, para 266-269.  
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children's rights and finally contributing to the coordination of efforts by 
governments and relevant UN bodies.14  
 
The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS), an NGO 
collaboratively formed by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
the International Save the Children Alliance, the Jesuit Refugee Service, 
the Quaker United Nations Office, and Terre des Hommes International 
Federation, was also founded during 1998. By this time Rädda Barnen 
(Save the Children Sweden), Quaker United Nations Office, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and others had already made 
significant contributions to the prohibition of child soldiering both on an 
advocacy and research basis.  Behind the driving force of the CSUCS, 
civil society spearheaded the campaign for the drafting and adoption of a 
protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict, 
originally the brainchild of the CRC Committee. The campaign called for a 
protocol that would lift the minimum use and recruitment age to a so-
called “straight-18” threshold. Accordingly, the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict (CIAC Protocol) was adopted during 2000.15 However, in 
my view the final product is very disappointing. The adopted text presents 
a compromise on the straight-18 threshold allowing states parties to the 
CIAC Protocol to voluntarily recruit children between sixteen and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 General Assembly Resolution 57/77, 12 December 1996.  
15 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (entered into force 12 February 2002) 2173 UNTS 222. See 
Chapter 3. 
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eighteen, but not allowing them to use children younger than eighteen in 
direct participation in hostilities.  
 
In another important development in 2000, the Security Council of the 
United Nations acknowledged that child soldiering “may constitute a 
threat to international peace and security”.16 It then took a mere four 
years from when child soldiering was placed firmly on the agenda of the 
international community by the Machel report, for the organ of the UN 
with principal responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security to recognize child soldiering as a problem potentially 
affecting such peace and security.  
 
By 16 January 2002, the date upon which the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone was established, there had never been a prosecution for the use 
and recruitment of child soldiers. To date, that Court has delivered three 
Trial Chamber judgements on the subject, 17  as well as appeal 
judgements in each of those cases, 18  while the high-profile Charles 
Taylor case is still underway.19 All of these cases relate to the war crime 
of child soldier enlistment, conscription or use. Furthermore, all four 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Security Council Resolution 1314 (11 August 2000) operative paragraph 9. 
17 Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Trial Chamber I, SCSL-04-15-T (2 March 
2009) (RUF case); Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, Trial Chamber I, SCSL-04-14-T 
(2 August 2007) (CDF case); and Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Trial Chamber 
II, SCSL-04-16-T (20 June 2007) (AFRC case). 
18 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, Appeals Chamber, SCSL-04-14-A (28 May 2008) 
(CDF appeals case); Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Appeals Chamber, SCSL-
04-16-A (22 February 2008) (AFRC appeals case); and Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and 
Gbao, Appeals Chamber, SCSL-04-15-A (26 October 2009) (RUF appeals case). 
19 The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, Prosecutor’s Second Amended Indictment, SCSL-
03-01-PT (2007). 
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defendants in the three cases that have proceeded to trial before the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) are charged with having committed the 
war crime of enlistment, conscription or use of child soldiers.20 In the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), numerous prosecutions, in 
national courts have been finalized.21 The first was during 2008.  
 
During 2005 a comprehensive Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 
(MRM) on child soldiering was established in terms of a Security Council 
resolution. 22  Otunnu, the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (SRSG) on Children and Armed Conflict, first proposed the 
creation of such a mechanism to the General Assembly during his 2003 
annual report.23 The MRM serves to “collect and provide timely, objective, 
accurate and reliable information” on those situations affecting children 
that have been identified by the SRSG as most urgently deserving 
attention, 24  which includes “recruiting or using child soldiers”. 25 
Accordingly, some direct engagement with the prevention of child 
soldiering is underway.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 (2006); Prosecutor v Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07 (2007); and Prosecutor v Jean 
Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08 (2008). 
21 See Chapter 6.  
22 Security Council Resolution 1612, (26 July 2005). 
23 Otunnu, O. ‘Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflict’ Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, A/58/328, (29 
August 2003), para 73-78. 
24 Security Council Resolution 1612, note 22 above, operative paragraph 5(c).  
25 ‘Annual Report of the Secretary-General on Children in Armed Conflict’, A/59/695 
S/2005/72, (9 February 2005), para 68. 
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The exact level of effectiveness of these measures is relatively unclear. 
What is clear, however, is that the recruitment and use of child soldiers 
internationally persists and no easily visible inroads have been made as 
yet. Indeed, at the time of writing, reports are coming in of the use and 
recruitment of child soldiers in Libya, a new country to be added to the list 
of states that use child soldiers.26 This is not to say that current measures 
are wholly ineffective, but it suggests, as is further discussed in Chapter 
2, that the scale of the problem may not be diminishing.   
 
1. SITUATING THE DEBATE  
The concept ‘childhood’ is disputed among cultures, and as a result, so 
too is the concept of ‘child soldier’. It is thus necessary to address the 
legitimacy of creating such age categories. By implication, it is also 
necessary to address the parameters of the concept ‘child soldier’ and 
international law’s response thereto. Prior to this analysis, however, the 
very notion that law can play a role in achieving “an era of application” in 
the prevention of child soldiering needs to be assessed.  
 
Child soldiering, as a social problem, is deserving of attention and 
academic treatment for two primary reasons. Firstly, the international 
community has responded in no uncertain terms that such practices are 
unacceptable and should cease. There is now significant agreement 
among states and civil society that it is simply wrong. Secondly, because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Sherlock, R. ‘Child Soldiers sent by Gaddafi to fight Libyan Rebels’ Channel 4 News 
(23 April 2011) <www.channel4.com> (accessed on 15 May 2011). 
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of the fact that the international community has so strongly condemned 
the military enlistment, conscription and use of children, child soldiering 
has been formally prohibited by international law. Formal legal structures 
and the work of international organizations such as the UN are also 
focused on the prevention of the use and recruitment of child soldiers.  
 
Legal research on child soldiering is more often than not status quo 
affirming. Commonly, it consists of a thorough legal analysis, including an 
analysis of international humanitarian law (IHL), international human 
rights law (IHRL) and international criminal law (ICL).27 Such analysis is 
usually also framed against the background assumption that current 
preventative measures are entirely ineffective. Finally, the ineffectiveness 
of the legal measures analysed is explained by highlighting the structural 
weaknesses of the international legal order. These structural weaknesses 
are generally agreed to be attributable to a lack of a central legislative 
authority binding all states, coupled with the lack of an executive authority 
with a standing force capable of enforcing the positive law, and lastly, the 
lack of a judicial authority with compulsory jurisdiction. Happold, for 
example, contends that “the consensual nature of the international legal 
system and its lack of centralized enforcement mechanisms has meant 
that several states have been able to continue to recruit and use child 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See literature review infra. 
	   16	  
soldiers by opting out of new legal developments and flouting those 
binding them”.28 
 
Such studies offer little insight into how children can be better protected 
from military use and recruitment. These structural weaknesses are very 
heavily entrenched in the international legal order. Although there is no 
single theory of international law to explain the system as a whole,29 it is 
certainly not controversial to argue that the establishment of such 
legislative, executive and judicial authority is highly unlikely in the near 
term in a system premised on sovereign equality, as contemporary 
international law still is.30 Under these circumstances, I argue that to 
make any real contribution to the knowledge on child soldier prevention, 
one has largely to work within the confines of such structural weaknesses 
and wherever possible, identify avenues to alleviate the effects of these 
structural weaknesses.  
 
i. Conceptualizing “an Era of Application” 
During 1999 the SRSG on Children in Armed Conflict at that time, Olara 
Otunnu reported to the General Assembly that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Happold, M. Child Soldiers in International Law (2005) 172. 
29 Indeed, D’Amato, a leading commentator on international law theory has stated that 
“…after four thousand years of being the sole and exclusive set of legal rules among 
nations, it is nothing short of remarkable that international law has not yet become 
thoroughly understood and explained” (D'Amato, A. ‘A Few Steps Toward an 
Explanatory Theory of International Law’ 7 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 1 (2009-2010) 1).  
30  Absolute sovereignty has undoubtedly been diminished by concepts such as 
humanitarian intervention, and membership of intergovernmental organizations, most 
notably the European Union. Nevertheless, sovereignty still forms the foundation of the 
international legal order.  
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The Special Representative believes that the time has come for the 
international community to redirect its attention and energies from the 
juridical task of the development of norms to the political project of 
ensuring their application and respect on the ground. An “era of 
application” must be launched. Words on paper cannot save children 
and women in peril. Such a project can be accomplished if the 
international community is prepared to employ its considerable 
collective influence to that end.31 
 
The year prior to recommending this refocus of attention towards “an era 
of application”, Otunnu had already reported that “the Special 
Representative believes that the most important and pressing challenge 
today is how to translate existing standards and commitments into action 
that can make a tangible difference to the fate of children exposed to 
danger on the ground”.32 Almost ten years later, on the occasion when 
Otunnu received the Harvard Law School Association Award and when 
he was no longer the SRSG on Children in Armed Conflict, he elaborated 
further on what “an era of application” entails.33 On this occasion, he 
placed specific emphasis on the need that an “era of application” be 
“embedded within formal, structured and binding compliance 
mechanisms”. This, however, has to be interpreted together with his 
earlier statement, quoted above, that a shift has to occur from norm 
creation to “the political project of ensuring their [norms] application and 
respect on the ground”. As such, “an era of application” is dependent on a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 ‘Promotion and protection of the rights of children: Protection of children affected by 
armed conflict Note by the Secretary-General’ A/54/430 (1 October 1999) para 165. 
32 ‘Promotion and protection of the rights of children: Protection of children affected by 
armed conflict Note by the Secretary-General’ A/53/482 (12 October 1998) para 140. 
33 Otunnu, OA. ‘Era of Application’ Remarks on the occasion of receiving the Harvard 
Law School Association Award (15 June 2007). 
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broad range of mechanisms that has the potential to contribute to child 
soldier prevention.  
 
My conception of an “era of application” overlaps very much with that of 
Otunnu. In his work, Cassel speaks of “rights protection”,34 whereas Dror, 
for example, focuses on “social change”.35 Rights protection is a narrower 
concept than social change, in that rights protection occurs on individual 
bases, without necessarily effecting deeper systemic problems that 
account for the occurrence of the social problem. In this study emphasis 
is placed on many mechanisms aimed at rights protection. This is done 
based on the argument that extensive rights protection is one of the 
primary components of broader social change. Such rights protection is 
central to “an era of application”. 
 
ii. The Potential Role of International Law in Preventing Child 
Soldiering  
After famously stating that "almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all 
of the time" Henkin also stated that "the forces that induce compliance 
with other law ... do not pertain equally to the law of human rights".36 
Unlike most other fields of international law, IHRL is primarily concerned 
with the manner in which a state treats people within its borders.  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Cassel, D. ‘Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?’ 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 
121 (2001) 126-134. 
35 Dror, Y. ‘Law and Social Change’ 33 Tul. L. Rev. 787 (1958-1959). 
36 Henkin, L. How Nations Behave (1979) 47 and 235.  
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interests of other states are thus not directly at stake, as would be the 
case in the law of international finance for example. Henkin thus argues 
that without opposing state interest, the incentive to comply with rules of 
international law falls away to some extent. Yet, the extraordinary amount 
of pressure that was placed on South Africa to abandon its policy of 
apartheid, an internal policy, serves as an example that compliance is not 
wholly dependent on opposing state interest.   
 
Sceptics of IHRL and IHL are quick to cite the massive failures of these 
regimes, such as the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, the Bosnian Genocide 
that followed soon thereafter and more recently the killing of tens of 
thousands of civilians during the closing phases of the civil war in Sri 
Lanka.37 The visibility of these failures is matched by the invisibility of the 
potential successes of these regimes. What these sceptics fail to 
appreciate is that efforts directed at the protection of human rights and 
those in armed conflict do not take much, if anything, away from any 
other field or discipline. While IHRL and IHL are less effective than one 
would hope, their pursuits are worthy and they do not have direct 
negative consequences.38 Kuper has stated that “it is arguable that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  The mass atrocities committed in Rwanda and Bosnia during 1994 and 1995 
respectively, are well documented and often referenced. However, the atrocities 
committed in Sri Lanka during 2009 are only just beginning to be brought to light. See 
the ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka’ 
(31 March 2011). 
38  For opposing points of view see Kennedy, D. ‘The International Human Rights 
Movement: Part of the Problem?’ 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 101 2002; Kennedy, D. The 
Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (2004) 3; Simon, WH. 
‘Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism’ 
46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 127 (2004-2005). 
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relevant law serves its purpose if it enables even one child to escape 
death or injury in armed conflict situations, and clearly it has succeeded in 
that respect...”.39  
 
Dror presents two dimensions to law and social change. He firstly speaks 
of instances where the law lags behind social change.40 He gives the 
example of the automobile. 41  When cars came about the law was 
designed to regulate horse-drawn cart traffic. These laws were ill-
designed for motor vehicle traffic. Thus, the social reality out-paced legal 
development, but over time, the law adapted to the social reality. In the 
municipal law context much research supports the notion that law lags 
behind social change.42 
 
Dror’s second dimension speaks of situations where law is used to 
“initiate and control directed social change”.43 It is this dimension of law 
and social change that is the subject of this chapter. Ultimately, viewing 
law as an instrument of social change is synonymous with Tamanaha’s 
instrumentalist view of law, “… the notion that law is an instrument to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Kuper, J. ‘Children and Armed Conflict: Some Issues of Law and Policy’ in Fottrell, D. 
Revisiting Children’s Rights: 10 Years of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(2000). 
40 Dror, Y. ‘Law and Social Change’ 33 Tul. L. Rev. 787 (1958-1959) 794-796. 
41 Ibid 795. 
42 See Rosenberg, GN. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 
(1991); Stoddard, TB. ‘Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to make Social 
Change’ N.Y.U. L. Rev. 72 (1997) 967, 972.   
43 Dror, note 40 above, 796-802.  
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achieve ends”.44 Both these approaches are outcomes-based. As such, 
neither of these approaches will be of much value should law not be able 
to direct social change significantly. International law’s ability to do so 
has, for the most part, been presumed by international lawyers, 45 
whereas international relations scholars have been far more sceptical.46 
As Schwebel has stated "compliance is a problem which lawyers tend to 
avoid rather than confront”.47 This is even more apparent in the context of 
IHRL.48  
 
Hathaway and others have attempted to gauge compliance with human 
rights norms quantitatively.49 In her extensive study, Hathaway relied “on 
a database encompassing the experiences of 166 nations over a nearly 
forty-year period in five areas of human rights law: genocide, torture, fair 
and public trials, civil liberties, and political representation of women”.50 
The aims of this study were to:  
 
…examine two separate but intimately related questions. First, do 
countries comply with or adhere to the requirements of the human rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Tamanaha, BZ. ‘The Tension Between Legal Instrumentalism and the Rule of Law’ 33 
Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 131 (2005-2006) 231. 
45 Kingsbury, B. ‘The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions 
of International Law’ 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 345 (1998) 346. Koh, HH. ‘Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?’ 106 Yale L.J. 2599 (1997) 2599-2600. 
46 Hathaway, OA. ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ 111 Yale L.J. 1935 
(2001-2002) 1937-1938. 
47 Schwebel, SM. ‘Commentary’ in Bulterman, MK. & Kuijer, M. (eds.) Compliance with 
Judgements of International Courts (1996) 39. 
48 Hathaway, note 46 above, 1937-1938. 
49 Hathaway, ibid, generally. See also Neumayer, E. ‘Do International Human Rights 
Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?’ The Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 
49, No. 6 (December 2005) 925. 
50 Hathaway, note 46 above, 1936.  
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treaties they have joined? Second, do these human rights treaties 
appear to be effective in improving countries' human rights practices –  
that is, are countries more likely to comply with a treaty's requirements if 
they have joined the treaty than would otherwise be expected?51 
 
The conclusions reached in this empirical study suggests that countries 
do not adhere to their IHRL treaty obligations on a significant scale and 
states are also not significantly more likely to comply with treaty 
requirements incumbent upon them as a result of the ratification of an 
IHRL treaty.52 Nevertheless, on a qualitative level Hathaway concludes 
“we must not jump to conclusions about the worth of human rights 
treaties based solely on the quantitative analysis above. Even if accurate, 
the results do not preclude the possibility that human rights treaties have 
a favourable impact on human rights”.53 
 
These findings are valuable and play an important role in the on-going 
debate as to the efficacy of IHRL treaties. However, such a broad-based 
empirical study also has severe shortcomings, which may prove fatal to 
the veracity of the results.54 The five treaty norms incorporated in the 
study all form part, in some way, of customary international law.55 As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid, 1939. 
52 Ibid, 2002-2020. 
53 Ibid, 2020. 
54 The first shortcoming of such a quantitative study, as Hathaway admits, is flaws in the 
data relied upon. Ibid, 1967. 
55 The prohibitions against genocide and torture are not only norms of customary 
international law, but there is general consensus that these norms have attained the 
status of jus cogens. In the case of genocide see Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreškić et al, 
Trial Chamber II, ICTY-IT-95-16 (14 January 2000), para 520; and Wouters, J. & 
Verhoeven, S. ‘The Prohibition of Genocide as a Norm of Ius Cogens and its 
Implications for the Enforcement of the Law of Genocide’ 5 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 401 
(2005). In the case of torture see Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija, Trial Chamber II, ICTY-
IT-95-17/1-T10 (10 December 1998), paras 155-157; and De Wet, E. ‘The Prohibition of 
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such, the states that are not party to the relevant treaties have 
comparable obligations incumbent upon them by virtue of customary 
international law. The most extreme example among the norms used in 
the study is genocide. No state would dare argue that they are not under 
an international law obligation not to commit genocide, regardless of 
whether that state has ratified any treaty prohibiting such conduct and 
regardless of the fact that the relevant state engages in the commission 
of genocide. Therefore, if states do not adhere more to their treaty 
obligations than they do to their customary international law obligations, 
the nominal variance between treaty norm observance by states who are 
subject to the relevant treaty norm vis-à-vis those who are not, may be 
explained.  
 
This study also largely fails to take account of the individual 
circumstances of the relevant state. For example, the US is not a state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications for National and 
Customary Law’ 15 Eur. J. Int'l L. 97 (2004). Fair and public trial is a broad concept 
including various individual rights from a human rights perspective. Some of the most 
fundamental of these rights have been identified as having crystallised into rules of 
customary international law. See Doebbler, CFJ. & Scharf, MP. ‘Will Saddam Hussein 
Get a Fair Trial’ 37 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 21 (2005-2006); and Doebbler, CFJ. 
Introduction to International Human Rights Law (2007) 108. In her study Hathaway 
defined civil liberties as "freedom of expression and belief, association and 
organizational rights, rule of law and human rights, and personal autonomy and 
economic rights” (Hathaway, note 46 above, 1975). This definition is also very broad, 
incorporating various rights, most of which undoubtedly form part of customary 
international law. Political representation of women was measured “using the 
percentage of men in each country's legislature” (Hathaway, note 46 above, 1975). 
There is wide support for the principle of non-discrimination being a jus cogens norm, 
some argue that the jus cogens dimensions is limited to racial discrimination (Dugard, J. 
International Law: a South African Perspective (2005) 43), others argue it is broader and 
includes discrimination based on sex (Makkonen, T. (revised and updated by Kortteinen, 
J) ‘The Principle of Non-Discrimination in International Human Rights Law and EU Law’ 
Erik Castrén Institute, University of Helsinki (August 2005) 3). Nevertheless, non-
discrimination based on sex undoubtedly forms part of customary international law. 
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party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), whereas the 
DRC is.56 However, the level of compliance by the US to the CRC is 
significantly higher than that of the DRC. Nevertheless, the CRC may 
have already had an impact on the rights of children in the DRC, where 
this is of course not the case with the US.  
 
Quantitative studies, by definition, are limited to treaty norms. In 
analysing the weaknesses of Hathaway’s study I am not attempting to 
argue that such statistical analysis is irrelevant, but that such findings are 
not conclusive. The point of convergence between quantitative and 
qualitative data presents a good starting point from which to assess the 
ability of IHRL and IHL to achieve social change.  
 
Neumayer’s quantitative study’s results on whether the ratification of 
international human rights treaties increases respect for human rights 
indicate: “in most cases, for [human rights] treaty ratification to work, 
there must be conditions for domestic groups, parties, and individuals and 
for civil society to persuade, convince, and perhaps pressure 
governments into translating the formal promise of better human rights 
protection into actual reality”.57 This finding is consistent with Cassel’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Convention on the Rights of the Child (entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 
UNTS 3. 
57 Neumayer, note 49 above, 952. 
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hypothesis of IHRL, which includes IHL in his use of the term,58 as a 
rope:  
 
Where rights have been strengthened the cause is usually not so much 
individual factors acting independently – whether in law, politics, 
technology, economics, or consciousness – but a complex interweaving 
of mutually reinforcing processes. What pulls human rights forward is not 
a series of separate, parallel cords, but a "rope" of multiple, interwoven 
strands. Remove one strand, and the entire rope is weakened. 
International human rights law is a strand woven throughout the length of 
the rope. Its main value is not in how much rights protection it can pull as 
a single strand, but in how it strengthens the entire rope.59 
 
Law, politics, technology, economics, and consciousness, are referenced. 
They, among innumerable others, also form strands in this rope. In 
adhering to an instrumentalist view of law, my approach to child soldier 
prevention in this study accords with Cassel’s metaphor of human rights 
as a rope. Indeed, the norms and enforcement mechanisms of IHL and 
ICL also form strands in this rope.  
 
iii. Universalism and Cultural Relativism: “The Politics of Age”60 
The notion of creating age distinctions for purposes of military recruitment 
has been challenged on two primary bases: first, it is argued that young 
people develop at different rates, so that a particular eighteen year old 
may be less independent and less capable of making informed decisions 
than a specific sixteen year old. This argument has been further 
advanced on the basis that children have a greater capacity for making 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Cassel, D. ‘Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?’ 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 
121 (2001). 
59 Ibid, 123. See also Tacsan, J. The Effectiveness of International Law: An Alternative 
Approach’ Int’l Legal Theory Vol II (1) (1996) 3. 
60 This title is quoted from Rosen, note 3 above, 132-158.  
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important decisions such as enlisting in an armed force or group than 
they are given credit for, although this in itself is not an argument against 
the creation of age barriers. Secondly, the competencies of a young 
person at a given age are determined differently in different cultures.61  
 
The first point of view takes no account of the fact that today the theory of 
cognitive ability (which associates age with cognitive ability), or some 
variations thereof, has become deeply entrenched in not only all 
municipal legal systems, but also international law in general.62  It is 
inescapable that, although arguably at different ages, all children will, up 
to a certain phase in her/his development, not be in a position to make an 
informed decision as to whether or not to join an armed force or group, 
while many are subject to forced recruitment and adult manipulation. 
International law cannot be based on a system whereby the unique 
developmental characteristics of each young person are considered to 
inform a determination as to whether or not the specific child can make 
an informed decision whether or not to enlist. This argument is certainly 
not new: it is endorsed in every municipal criminal justice system, where 
differentiation based on age is used across the board for purposes of 
determining criminal capacity, sentencing, and appropriate detention 
facilities. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Rosen, note 3 above, 132-158. 
62 See Chapter 3.  
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In assessing municipal legal systems, Lowe argues that a state’s freedom 
to create its own unique laws and legal systems plays a major role in 
creating a separate and unique identity and character for the relevant 
state. 63  The pursuits, he argues, of international law are quite the 
opposite.64  International law exists to create a minimum threshold of 
norms to which all states are bound and in so doing creates a degree of 
uniformity among states. 65  Thus, international law is, by definition, 
universalist. It goes without saying that a degree of dissent generally 
exists from a minority of states, or even a majority of weaker states, 
regarding a specific rule.66 This dissent has often manifested itself in a 
divide, or at least in a perceived divide, between western and non-
western states and ideas.67  
 
Within the human rights paradigm this has lead to tension between a 
universalist approach to human rights and a culturally relative approach, 
and the cultural relativity of age goes to the heart of this debate. Sen 
speaks of “world justice and the rule of law”.68 Some argue that the notion 
of child soldiering and the international attention it has generated of late is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Lowe, AV. International Law (2007) 157. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 In its most extreme form, this results in persistent objectors to the formation of 
customary international law. In general persistent objectors are not bound by the 
relevant rule, see for example the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case 1951 ICJ Reports 
115, 131; Asylum Case 1950 ICJ Reports 277; Nicaragua Case 1986 ICJ Reports 107. 
For a contrasting view see Judge Tanaka, Dissenting Opinion, South West Africa 
Cases, Second Phase 1966 ICJ Reports 6, 291.  
67  See for example, Heckman, JJ. Nelson, RL. & Cabatingan, L (eds) Global 
Perspectives on the Rule of Law (2010). 
68 Sen, A. ‘Global Justice’ in Heckman, Nelson & Cabatingan ibid 69. 
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an example of western conceptions of childhood and ideals of child 
protection being forced upon non-western states.69 In this regard, it is 
again useful to refer to Sen:  
 
I have also argued against considering the question of impartiality in the 
fragmented terms that apply only within nation states - never stepping 
beyond the borders. This is important not only for being as inclusive in 
our thinking about justice in the world as possible, but also to avoid the 
dangers of local parochialism against which Adam Smith warned nearly 
two and a half centuries ago. Indeed, the contemporary world offers 
much greater opportunity of learning from each other, and it seems a pity 
to try to confine the theorization of justice to the artificially imposed limits 
of nation states. This is not only because … "injustice anywhere is a 
threat to justice everywhere" (though that is hugely important as well).  
But in addition we have to be aware how our interest in other people 
across the world has been growing, along with our growing contacts and 
increasing communication.70 
  
Furthermore, in many instances non-western states have subscribed to 
legal provisions regarding the prohibition of the use and recruitment of 
child soldiers at a faster rate than western states.71 Additionally, there are 
no persistent objectors to the customary international rule prohibiting the 
use and recruitment of child soldiers. The African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child (hereinafter the ‘African Children’s Charter’) 
provides an apt example of the global response to child soldiering not 
only being accepted among some of the most traditional and culturally 
sensitive societies in the world, but even further developing such 
prohibitive norms.72 This Charter was the first convention to elevate the 
age threshold for the prohibition of the military use and recruitment of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Rosen, note 3 above, 4.  
70 Sen, note 68 above, 69-70.  
71 See Chapter 3.  
72 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990), OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force 29 November 1999). 
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children to eighteen, as opposed to fifteen.73 Furthermore, this convention 
provides:   
 
States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures 
to eliminate harmful social and cultural practices affecting the welfare, 
dignity, normal growth and development of the child and in particular: 
(a) those customs and practices prejudicial to the health or life of the 
child; and 
(b) those customs and practices discriminatory to the child on the 
grounds of sex or other status.74 
 
It might seem contradictory to seek to enforce a global standard in a 
culturally sensitive way. However, I argue that this approach is justified, 
as today there is no dissent from the basic premise of the global standard 
– that young children should not be soldiers.  
 
iv. Conceptualizing the ‘Child Soldier’ 
There are soft law instruments providing over-arching definitions of child 
soldiering, for example, the Paris Principles provide that “a child 
associated with an armed force or armed group” refers:  
 
…to any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited 
or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but 
not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, 
messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child 
who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.75 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ibid, article 22. 
74 Ibid, article 21(1). 
75  Article 2(1), Paris Commitments and the Principles and Guidelines on Children 
Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (2007). See also the Cape Town 
Principles on Best Practices on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the 
Armed Forces and on Demobilisation and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa 
(1997).  
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However, it is clear that the customary norm that has crystallised 
prohibiting the use and recruitment of child soldiers has much less 
proscriptive content. 76  Furthermore, in order to assess the legal 
obligations incumbent upon a specific state, one has to have regard to 
the treaty norms the state has made itself subject to by acceding to or 
ratifying relevant treaties. At present there are at least eight international 
treaties prohibiting the use and recruitment of child soldiers, as opposed 
to regional treaties.77 The obligations created by each of these treaties 
are different from one another, some only slightly and others more 
materially. What is more, different states have ratified different 
combinations of these treaties, further complicating the assessment of the 
exact nature of the legal obligations to which the relevant state is subject.  
 
There are two ways in which to address this phenomenon. Firstly, one 
can argue that if the law does not prohibit the enlistment of a child into the 
military, that child will not be deemed a child soldier. Alternatively, one 
can argue that the child remains a child soldier, but that no legal norms 
were violated in recruiting or even using that child in military operations, 
where the relevant state has not subscribed to a legal obligation to the 
contrary. IHRL provides that “…a child means every human being below 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See Chapter 3. 
77 See Chapter 3 and 4 generally for an analysis of such legal obligations. Additional 
Protocol I and Additional Protocol II, note 6 above; CRC, note 7 above; CIAC Protocol, 
note 15 above; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  (Rome Statute) 
(entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90; ILO Forced Labour Convention No. 29 
(entered into force 1 May 1932) 39 UNTS 55; ILO Minimum Age Convention No. 138 
(entered into force 19 June 1976) 1015 UNTS 297; and ILO Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention No. 182 (entered into force 19 November 2000) 2133 UNTS 161. 
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the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, 
majority is attained earlier.”78 The United Kingdom, for example, has not 
subscribed to any legal norm that bars it from recruiting persons of 
sixteen years of age or older into its armed forces, and indeed, the UK 
does recruit such persons. In contra, states such as Norway have 
subscribed to such international norms. If one were to favour an 
interpretation in terms of which the concept of the child soldier is one 
which inherently denotes the unlawfulness of the child’s enlistment, 
conscription or use, it would mean that a child would be deemed to be a 
child soldier if she/he is in the Norwegian Armed Forces, but would not be 
deemed a child soldier if she/he is in the British Armed Forces. This 
results in a situation in which one would have to examine the treaty 
obligations to which a particular state has subscribed in every instance in 
which one wished to use the term child soldier. Such a state of affairs will 
further be detrimental to the movement to progressively provide for more 
stringent prohibitive rules; which will also, over time, affect the content of 
customary international law. 
 
The term ‘child soldier’ is thus broad and legally imprecise, but its use 
seems to me unavoidable. All instruments that pre-date the Rome Statute 
use the terms ‘use’ and ‘recruit’ in defining the proscribed conduct. The 
Rome Statute and those instruments that were drafted after the Rome 
Statute use the terms ‘enlist’, ‘conscript’ and ‘use’, which are broader than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Article 1, CRC, note 7 above.  
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‘recruit’. This distinction is immaterial for the purposes of the present 
chapter, as well as chapters two and three. These chapters deal with 
child soldiering as a social phenomenon, which the international 
community wishes to regulate. The parameters of this regulation only 
become relevant in Chapter 3. The term child soldier is therefore 
employed extensively in the first three chapters, whereas in the later 
chapters, more precise and legally relevant terminology is employed, 
which is specific to the relevant legal norm under discussion in the given 
instance.   
   
The NGO community generally prefers concepts such as “a child 
associated with an armed force or armed group” over that of a ‘child 
soldier’.79 In order to be a soldier, one has to engage or potentially 
engage in armed conflict,80 whereas the NGO community and soft law 
instruments advocate for the non-use and recruitment of children in a 
broader context than direct military engagement only. However, the 
concept ‘child soldier’ can reasonably be interpreted as being broader 
than any of the relevant treaty norms or customary rules in existence. 
When considering international law, there is little use in employing 
concepts such as “a child associated with an armed force or armed 
group” unless one wishes to advocate for the adoption of broader or 
higher legal standards, which I do not wish to do. I will therefore use the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 This phraseology is also used in the Paris Principles, note 75 above. 
80 See Chapter 3. 
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term child soldier will be used instead of broader concepts such as those 
discussed.  
 
Like virtually any problem that is difficult to contain and address, child 
soldiering is multi-faceted. Today it is clear that children participate, on a 
significant scale, in gang activity, whether it is on the streets of Los 
Angeles or in the context of narco-gangs in Mexico and other parts of 
Latin America.81 Children are also extensively used in terrorist activities.82 
This study is limited to the use of children during armed conflict and the 
recruitment of children into military structures (whether formal or 
informal).83  This limitation is for two reasons. First, a comprehensive 
approach, which includes both traditional child soldiering and child gang- 
and terrorist participation, is too broad given the inherent limitations within 
which PhD research is conducted. Secondly, the response to child 
soldiering in armed conflict is very different to that of child gang and 
terrorist participation. Not only is the application of IHL limited to armed 
conflict, but the application of IHRL is different during armed conflict, in 
light of the fact that IHL is the lex specialis.84 The prevention of the use of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Edgar Jimenez Lugo, who is known as "El Ponchis”, is currently standing trial in 
Mexico for the murder, torture and decapitation of four people. His alleged crimes were 
all committed when he was fourteen years of age, and within the context of narco-gang 
warfare. Children participate in such gang activity on a significant scale. See Grillo, I. ‘In 
Teenage Killers, Mexico Confronts a Bloody Future’ Time (8 December 2010). 
82 Terrorist activities in this context refers to the nature of the tactics used, for example 
bombings of civilian markets with the intention to inspire fear in the minds of a civilian 
population, the term is not used to connote a political determination regarding the nature 
of a specific group.   
83 See for example Singer, PW. Children at War (2006) 116-131. 
84 There is some disagreement as to whether IHL is always the lex specialis, and IHRL 
the lex generalis, or whether one has to consider the case at hand before determining 
which regime’s norm is the lex specialis. See Chapter 3.  
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children in gang and terrorist activity is much more reliant on municipal 
policing and law enforcement. International law does not create 
obligations for entities such as gangs and groups utilizing terror tactics 
(outside of the context of armed conflict), whereas IHL does so in relation 
to state and non-state armed groups during armed conflict.85 Outside the 
context of armed conflict, the international law duties to which states are 
subject in suppressing crime related to gangs and terror groups emanate 
from IHRL, not IHL. Therefore, although there is a margin of over-lap, 
suppressing the use of children by gangs and terrorist entities requires a 
unique response. 
 
The phenomenon of girl soldiers has rightly received increased attention 
from within the child soldier discourse. The use of girl soldiers adds 
several unique dimensions to the problem: most significantly, sexual 
exploitation.86 Girl soldiers can broadly be divided into two categories. 
First, girls who are recruited to contribute to the war effort, in the same 
way as boys are recruited and used; and secondly, girls who are 
specifically recruited for the purpose of sexual exploitation, often called 
“bush wives” in the African context.87 Both groups are equally susceptible 
to sexual abuse by fellow soldiers, and specifically commanders. Male 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 See Chapter 3. In the age of the war on terror, the concept of terrorism has become 
less precise. News media and the US administration routinely refer to belligerents in the 
ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as terrorists. These conflicts are conflicts 
properly falling within the IHL paradigm. As such, children who are used and recruited 
into structures engaged in these conflicts form part of the subject matter of this study.  
86 Brett, R. ‘Girl Soldiers Denial of Rights and Responsibilities’ 23 (2) Refugee Survey 
Quarterly 32 (2004). 
87 See for example AFRC appeals case, note 18 above, 186. 
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child soldiers also sexually abuse young girls.88 In many aspects during 
the prevention of the use and recruitment of child soldiers the needs of 
girls require specific attention. This is particularly important during 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes. In this 
study, the particular experiences and needs of girls are acknowledged 
and addressed whenever this is relevant to the prevention of the military 
use and recruitment of children. This study has, however, at its heart the 
concept ‘child’, not boy or girl. I therefore make no gender distinctions 
with regard to the reasons why children should not be used and recruited 
as soldiers.89  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
If the international community was initially slow to take up the cause of 
child soldiering, so too were legal scholars slow to study this 
phenomenon. Mann’s 1987 article ‘International Law and the Child 
Soldier’, marked the first legal academic publication on this issue.90 In the 
context of child soldiering, the chronology of literature is important, as the 
contribution of any given source should be assessed contextually in 
relation to those legal standards that were in place at the time of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Honwana, A. Child Soldiers in Africa (2007) 91-92. 
89 I am of the view that the law cannot create a distinction based on sex for the purpose 
of prohibiting the enlistment, conscription or use of children. It is highly unlikely that such 
a differentiation will result in any greater enforcement. On the contrary, it is likely that 
such a differentiation will add a layer of complexity behind which armed groups can hide 
their use of boy soldiers. Furthermore, it was a hard fought battle in many states to gain 
the right for women to join the armed forces and positively contribute to the security and 
citizenship of their states. As it will be a step backwards to deny women the right to join 
the armed forces, it will equally be a retrogressive step to prohibit the enlistment, 
conscription or use of girl soldiers differently or for different reasons than boy soldiers. 
90 Mann, H. ‘International Law and the Child Soldier’ 36 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 32 (1987). 
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relevant publication. For example, the early sources on child soldiering, 
like Mann’s article and Goodwin-Gill and Cohn’s seminal study, were 
largely silent on international criminal law and prosecutions, as these 
developments regarding child soldiering post-date these publications.91 
Developments in international law more broadly also impact on works on 
child soldiering more specifically. For example, although the nature of the 
relationship between IHL and IHRL is still subject to debate, since 1996 it 
has been clear that IHRL continues to apply during armed conflict.92 This, 
of course, has implications for child soldier prevention, as the prohibitive 
rules emanate from both these sub-regimes of international law.  
 
A recent collection edited by Gates and Reich commences by noting that 
“surprisingly, little academic attention has been brought to bear on the 
issue [child soldiering]”. 93  This is particularly true in the context of 
international law.  
 
In as far as the prevention of the use and recruitment of child soldiers is 
concerned, for practical purposes publications can be divided into four 
categories: 1) publications that only provide a survey of the legal 
standards in place; 2) publications by non-lawyers that comment on 
international law’s prohibitions of child soldiering; 3) publications that only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Goodwin-Gill, G. & Cohn, I. Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts 
(1994). 
92 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
1996, 226 (11 July 1996). 
93 Gates, S & Reich, S. (eds.) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States: Security 
Continuum: Global Politics in the Modern Age (2009), vii. 
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focus on specific aspects of the child soldier phenomenon, e.g. girl 
soldiers, or the individual criminal responsibility of children in international 
law; and 4) comprehensive studies focusing on the positive law, as well 
as the enforcement of norms.  
 
i. Publications that Only Provide a Survey of the Legal Standards in 
Place  
Scholarly contributions that only surveyed the positive law were a 
necessary component in the evolution of the academic treatment of child 
soldiering. Again, Mann’s 1987 article serves as the best example. This 
article provides an in-depth survey of the rules prohibiting child soldiering. 
At that time only the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions 
prohibited child soldiering. Mann thus relied heavily on more general rules 
protecting civilians during armed conflict. As no attention was paid to this 
phenomenon at the time, the value of this meticulous study was 
immense. There are still contributions being published that survey legal 
obligations. On the one end of the spectrum, some of these contributions 
provide no added value to the knowledge;94 on the other end of the 
spectrum, novel and valuable interpretations of these rules are presented. 
Krill’s 1992 analysis of the co-application of IHL and IHRL after the 
coming into force of the CRC is an excellent example of such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 See for example, Seneviratne, W. ‘International Legal Standards Applicable to Child 
Soldiers’ 15 Sri Lanka J. Int'l L. 39 (2003). 
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contribution.95 This was the first publication to focus attention on the 
relationship between IHL and IHRL in preventing child soldiering; to date 
this issue has received almost no further attention.  
 
ii. Publications by Non-Lawyers that Comment on International 
Law’s Prohibitions of Child Soldiering  
This category is not included in an attempt to claim a monopoly for law in 
the prevention of the use and recruitment of child soldiers. In my view, 
international law is only one of many disciplines that may contribute 
thereto.96  
 
A number of monographs have been published from within disciplines 
such as psychology and international relations dealing with the prevention 
of the use and recruitment of child soldiers with reference to international 
law.97 Often these studies provide cursory accounts of international law, 
or in more extreme cases technical inaccuracies, which are then framed 
in the broader debate of child soldier prevention. The shortcoming of this 
approach is that international law is complex; one has to consider the 
nature of the relevant norms in order to draw any conclusions on how 
such norms can be effectively implemented. An example of such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Krill, F. ‘The Protection of Children in Armed Conflict’ in Freeman, M. & Veerman, P. 
(eds.) The Ideologies of Children’s Rights (1992). In this context, see also Cohn, I. ‘The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child: What it Means for Children in War’ 3 Int'l J. 
Refugee L. 100 (1991). 
96 See generally Meckled-García, S. & Çali, B. (eds.) The Legalization of Human Rights: 
Multidisciplinary Approaches (2005). 
97 See for example, Singer, note 83 above; and Wessells, M. Child Soldiers: from 
Violence to Protection (2006). 
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technically inaccurate treatment of international law can be found in the 
otherwise excellent work of Wessells, where he states that “numerous 
international legal instruments, such as the 1977 Additional Protocols to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, ban child recruitment. However, the most 
comprehensive and explicit legal prohibitions against child recruitment 
are set forth in the 1989 CRC”.98 This is said when in fact the prohibition 
contained in the CRC is a verbatim restatement of the prohibition 
contained in the First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, save for the 
words “state parties” in the CRC that replaced “parties to the conflict”, 
which in effect weakens the provision somewhat. Furthermore, the 
prohibition contained in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions 
is stronger in virtually every respect than that contained in the CRC. 
Similarly, with reference to the OPCRC, Singer has made the statement 
that “this measure specifically targeted the phenomenon by formally 
raising the minimum age of recruitment and use to eighteen years old”.99 
This is incorrect. The national armed forces of states are allowed in terms 
of the OPCRC to recruit children aged between sixteen and eighteen.100  
 
Wessells further fails to draw a distinction between the prohibition of the 
use of child soldiers and that of the recruitment of child soldiers. From a 
legal point of view this distinction is material. The former can, by 
definition, only occur during armed conflict, in which IHL is the lex 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Wessells ibid, 233. 
99  Singer, PW. ‘The Enablers of War: Causal Factors Behind the Child Soldier 
Phenomenon’ in Gates & Reich, note 93 above, 94. 
100 See Chapter 3. 
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specialis vis-à-vis IHRL, and as such the Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions come to the fore and the CRC takes a back seat. On the 
other hand, the recruitment of children often occurs during peace-time, 
and as such human rights law can play a primary role in this regard.  
 
The legal analysis contained in such publications serve a secondary 
purpose, as the publications relate more specifically to fields other than 
law. Such publications add little value to a study focused specifically on 
the international law response to child soldier prevention. 
 
iii. Publications that only Focus on Specific Aspects of the Child 
Soldier Phenomenon 
A significant proportion of commentators focus their work on isolated 
aspects of the child soldier phenomenon. Most commonly, this includes 
the relation between the child soldier phenomenon and refugees; 101 
peacekeeping;102 specific states and regions;103 arms control;104 DDR;105 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Happold, M. ‘Excluding Children from Refugee Status: Child Soldiers and Article 1F 
of the Refugee Convention’ 17 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1131 (2001-2002). 
102 Cohn, I. ‘The Protection of Children in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Processes’ 
12 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 129 (1999); Cohn, I. ‘U.N. Efforts to Promote Child-Conscious 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: A Step toward Improving the Lives of War-Affected 
Children’ 20 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 99 (2005). 
103 Cohn, I. ‘The Protection of Child Soldiers during the Liberian Peace Process’ 6 Int'l J. 
Child. Rts. 179 (1998); Honwana, note 88 above. 
104 Stohl, R. ‘Targeting Children: Small Arms and Children in Conflict’ (2002) The Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 9(1); Stohl, R. ‘Under the Gun: Children and Small Arms’ (2002) 
African Security Review 11(3).  
105 Cohn, I. ‘Progress and Hurdles on the Road to Preventing the Use of Children as 
Soldiers and Ensuring their Rehabilitation and Reintegration’ 37 Cornell Int'l L.J. 531 
(2004). 
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military training;106 international criminal law;107 and the individual criminal 
accountability of the child perpetrator.108 
 
There are many advantages to this approach. Commentators are able to 
delve deeper into specific aspects of the problem and in so doing are able 
to make real contributions to the knowledge on child soldiering. These 
approaches illustrate that child soldiering cuts across many facets of law 
and indeed many different disciplines. This approach clearly does not 
allow, however, for a broader investigation to be conducted into the 
requisites to effect social change in the context of child soldiering 
globally.  
 
iv. Comprehensive Studies Focusing on the Positive Law, as well as 
the Enforcement of Norms 
To date, very few commentators have taken this approach to their work. 
Some of the work by Goodwin-Gill and Cohn,109 Kuper,110 Rosen,111 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Kuper, J. Military Training and Children in Armed Conflict: Law, Policy and Practice 
(2005); Kuper, J. ‘Military Training and International Criminal Accountability’, in Arts, K., 
& Popovski, V. (eds.) International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children 
(2006). 
107 Waschefort, G. ‘Justice for Child Soldiers? The RUF Trial of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone’ International Humanitarian Legal Studies 1 (2010) 189-204. 
108 Dore, CL. ‘What to Do with Omar Khadr - Putting a Child Soldier on Trial: Questions 
of International Law, Juvenile Justice, and Moral Culpability’ 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1281 
(2007-2008); Happold, M. ‘Child Soldiers: Victims Or Perpetrators?’ 29 U. La Verne L. 
Rev. 56 2008. 
109 Goodwin-Gill & Cohn, note 91 above.  
110 Kuper, J. ‘Children and Armed Conflict – Some Problems in Law and Policy’, in 
Fottrell, D. (ed.) Revisiting Children's Rights: 10 Years of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (2000); and Kuper, J. ‘Children in Armed Conflict: The law and its 
uses’, Development Vol. 43, No.1 (2000), pp.32-39. 
111 Rosen, note 3 above.  
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Happold falls into this category.112 Interestingly, all four of these authors 
have taken very different approaches to the same problem.  
 
Goodwin-Gill and Cohn conducted their 1994 study with a focus on the 
use of child soldiers in El Salvador, Guatemala, the Israeli Occupied 
Territories, Liberia and Sierra Leone.113 Nevertheless, the study aimed at 
drawing conclusions applicable to most instances where child soldiers 
were used or recruited, as these authors argued: “we felt that the 
situations in these countries covered nearly the full spectrum of conflict-
types across a wide range of cultural, religious, and social settings”.114  
 
In her doctoral thesis on ‘International Law Concerning Child Civilians in 
Armed Conflict’, Kuper employed a similar approach.115 She conducted a 
case study on three distinct conflicts that occurred in Iraq between 1987 
and 1991. The rationale for focusing on this cluster of conflicts was that it 
“… arguably incorporates the three main categories of conflict identified in 
international humanitarian law…”116  
 
With regard to the prevention of the use and recruitment of child soldiers, 
the conclusions drawn by Goodwin-Gill and Cohn rest heavily on 
sociological and ecological factors that influence both the recruit and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Happold, note 28 above. 
113 Goodwin-Gill & Cohn, note 91 above, 5-6. 
114 Ibid, 6. 
115 Kuper, J. ‘International Law Concerning Child Civilians in Armed Conflict’ PhD Thesis 
(1996), 244-307; see also Kuper, J. International Law Concerning Child Civilians in 
Armed Conflict (1997), 169-215. 
116 Ibid, Kuper PhD Thesis, 19.   
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recruiter.117 As such, focus is placed on those factors specific to the 
relevant situation, and not those factors relevant to all situations where 
child soldiers are used and recruited. While there is considerable merit in 
such an approach, it fails to address the role that international law plays 
and can play in the prevention of the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers. International law and its implementation mechanisms, by 
definition, cannot focus on the unique aspects of each party to a conflict 
or each child.  
 
Much of Kuper’s work has focused on child civilians or the protection of 
children during armed conflict more broadly. Her work is of great value, 
as she has begun to address key issues with which most other 
commentators have not yet dealt. Specifically, she has focused her work 
on questions such as the role of law in effecting social change in the 
context of children during armed conflict, ways in which the relevant law 
can be strengthened, and initiatives in implementing the law.118 Indeed, 
she asks “why, with so much law, it seems generally so ineffective”.119 
Ultimately, she has begun to address the ineffectiveness of the law by 
making concrete “recommendations”.120 However, her primary focus is 
not the prevention of child soldiering, but rather the protection of child 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Goodwin-Gill & Cohn, note 91 above, 167-181. 
118 See generally, Kuper ‘Children and Armed Conflict – Some Problems in Law and 
Policy’, note 110 above; and Kuper International Law Concerning Child Civilians in 
Armed Conflict, note 115 above.   
119 Kuper International Law Concerning Child Civilians in Armed Conflict, note 115 
above, 216; and Kuper PhD thesis, note 115 above, 308. 
120 Kuper International Law Concerning Child Civilians in Armed Conflict, note 115 
above, 221-243; and Kuper PhD thesis, note 115 above, 315-345.  
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civilians during armed conflict. My work has a very similar aim to that of 
Kuper, but in the context of the prevention of child soldiering.  
 
Where virtually all commentators assume the virtue in trying to prevent 
the use and recruitment of child soldiers, Rosen takes a different 
approach. With reference to three case studies, “Jewish child soldiers of 
World War II”, “the child soldiers of Sierra Leone” and “Palestinian child 
soldiers”,121 he challenges the “assumptions” that “modern warfare is 
especially aberrant and cruel; that the world-wide glut of light-weight 
weapons makes it easier than in the past for children to bear arms; and 
that vulnerable children become soldiers because they are manipulated 
by unscrupulous adults”.122  
 
Rosen is uniquely placed in that he is trained as both a lawyer and an 
anthropologist. Nevertheless, his treatment of international law is very 
cursory, and his case studies are based on desk research only. His 
analysis centres on what he calls “the politics of age”.123 In this regard he 
challenges a number of notions upon which the differentiation between 
age groups for protective purposes is based, he argues that the 
development of a child cannot be predicted in clear terms;124 “the politics 
of age” is debated within a cultural and political context;125  and that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Rosen, note 3 above, 19-131. 
122 Ibid, 1. 
123 Ibid, 1-18 & 132-158. 
124 Ibid, 1-4. 
125 Ibid, 4. 
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children have a far greater agency than they are given credit for by both 
those driving international law and civil society in general.126 Rosen does 
not argue that the contemporary use of children in armed conflict is 
acceptable in all circumstances. However, where such use is 
unacceptable in his view, it is not inherently due to the fact that the child 
is a soldier, but rather due to the specific circumstances, for example, 
forced conscription. Consequently, Rosen does not deal in any depth with 
the issue of preventing child soldiering, whether through the 
instrumentality of international law or any other mechanism.  
 
Rosen is not the first to focus on what he calls “the politics of age” and to 
argue that the agency of children elevates their role as active and 
responsible decision makers. Van Bueren has argued that there is a 
tension between the protection of children and the participatory rights of 
children.127 Similarly, in an interview I conducted with Zermatten, Deputy 
Chairperson of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Zermatten 
expressed the view that there is an on-going paradigm shift from child 
protection to child rights. 128  What differentiates Rosen from these 
commentators is that he places himself on the extreme end of the 
spectral space between child participation (or agency) and child 
protection. Rosen expresses the view that  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Ibid, 131-138. 
127 Van Bueren The International Law on the Rights of the Child (1995), 335. 
128 Interview conducted with Mr Zermatten on 2 February 2011, Geneva, Switzerland.  
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The child soldier “crisis” is a modern political crisis, which is only partly 
related to the actual presence of children in war. In modern discourse it 
is difficult to disentangle humanitarian issues from political ones 
because humanitarian groups increasingly define themselves as 
political actors, and political groups use humanitarian rhetoric to further 
their own goals”.129  
 
This legal realist posture Rosen takes in relation to child soldiering has 
the implication that his work does not provide any conclusions on how 
greater enforcement of legal norms can be achieved, nor does it attempt 
to. In as far as the shortcomings of international law are concerned, he 
states, “although more international law has been created, the levels of 
compliance are increasingly low. A kind of “devil’s bargain” between 
humanitarian groups and state actors enables the proliferation of 
international law as long as compliance and enforcement remain 
feeble”.130 
 
More recently, Rosen has begun to explore the link between the 
increased agency of children and their individual criminal responsibility for 
deeds committed while being child soldiers.131 
 
Happold’s monograph, ‘Child Soldiers in International Law’, presents the 
most complete account of the legal protections in place to prevent the use 
and recruitment of child soldiers. This study is a comprehensive study of 
the child soldier phenomenon in international law, covering issues as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Rosen, note 3 above, 157. 
130 Ibid, 141-142. 
131 Rosen, DM. ‘Who is a Child? The Legal Conundrum of Child Soldiers’ 25 Conn. J. 
Int'l L. 81 (2009-2010). 
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broad as “the UN and child soldiers” and “child soldiers as asylum 
seekers and refugees”.132 Other than highlighting some positive steps 
already taken to achieve greater enforcement of legal norms on the last 
page of the book, Happold does not address the enforcement of legal 
standards. As such, this study is a well researched, written and argued 
contribution focusing on the parameters of the lex lata on child soldier use 
and requirement, as it was intended to be.133 No central argument is put 
forward to address the future effectiveness of the positive law in actively 
playing a stronger role in preventing the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers. 134  In conclusion, Happold highlights the weaknesses of the 
relevant international law, and states that: 
 
The child soldier phenomenon cannot be addressed simply by 
promulgation of new standards. Indeed, it could be argued that 
continued stress on a ‘straight-18’ standard serves to obfuscate the 
issue. As both the Secretary General’s Representative on Children and 
Armed Conflict and the Secretary General himself have stressed, what 
is needed now an “era of application”.135 
 
In many ways, my work commences where Happold’s study ended.  
 
As I have indicated, this study forms part of the last of the four categories 
of literature discussed. The available literature has dealt with the 
sociological and ecological factors that influence both the recruit and the 
recruiter’s decision-making process. The lex lata has further been 
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analysed in great detail. Furthermore, the agency of the child has been 
used as a base from which to argue that child soldiering is a problem of 
political origins and proportions, and as such the regulation thereof is not 
in fact the priority suggested by the dominant humanitarian rhetoric. Only 
Kuper has begun to address questions such as the role of law in effecting 
social change in the context of children during armed conflict, ways in 
which the relevant law can be strengthened, and initiatives in 
implementing the law. However, as noted above, her work has focused 
predominantly on child civilians during armed conflict, and not child 
soldiers. 
 
3. THESIS, RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES   
With reference to the establishment of the child soldier Monitoring and 
Reporting Mechanism,136 SRSG Otunnu contended that this mechanism 
“marks a turning point in our collective campaign for the ‘era of 
application’ – for transforming protective standards into compliance, and 
condemnation into accountability”.137  
 
At present, there are in existence at least eight binding international 
instruments directly prohibiting the use and recruitment of child soldiers. 
Moreover, every state in the world bar Somalia has ratified at least one of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 See Chapter 5.  
137 Otunnu, OA. ‘”Era of Application”: Instituting a Compliance and Enforcement Regime 
for CAAC’ Statement before the Security Council (23 February 2005). 
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these instruments. 138  In other words, regardless of the fact that the 
prohibition of the use and recruitment of child soldiers is undoubtedly a 
norm of customary international law,139 all states except Somalia are also 
under a treaty obligation to refrain from such conduct. Few substantive 
norms of international law can make this claim. As discussed above, 
these treaty standards are by no means perfect. Nevertheless, the 
international community has been unable to ensure compliance with even 
the weakest of these standards by some of its members.  
 
I argue that international law has a role to play in the prevention of the 
use and recruitment of child soldiers.140 Examples are discussed later in 
this study where the mobilization of international law directly resulted in 
not only the demobilization of active child soldiers, but also the cessation 
of their use and recruitment, even while hostilities were on-going.141 The 
thesis of this study is that in order for international law to be an agent 
through which “an era of application” can be entered in the context of 
child soldier prevention, the focus must now be shifted from norm 
creation to norm enforcement. As President Kennedy said regarding law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Article 38 of the CRC prohibits the use and recruitment of child soldiers. All states 
except Somalia and the USA have ratified this instrument. Nevertheless, the USA has 
ratified the OPCRC, which also prohibits the use and recruitment of child soldiers. 
139 See Chapter 3. 
140 International law is a broad concept; in this context it means all the rules that 
emanate from the accepted sources of international law, including soft law that is 
relevant to the prevention of the use and recruitment of child soldiers. Of particular 
relevance in this regard are rules belonging to international humanitarian law, 
international human rights law and international criminal law. 
141 See Chapter 6.  
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reform in the context of civil rights in the USA “…law alone cannot make 
men see right…”142  
 
Buergenthal, in commenting on the “evolving international human rights 
system”, has divided this system up into four sequential stages: “the 
normative foundation”; “institution building”; “implementation in the post 
cold war era”; and “individual criminal responsibility, minority rights and 
collective humanitarian intervention”.143 In line with Otunnu’s statement, 
this study is aimed at imagining an “era of application”, which would 
correspond with stages three and four of Buergenthal’s evolution. It is 
important to note that, although it may be significant, the capacity and 
resources that the international community will expend on child soldier 
prevention is finite.144 A rigid divide between these stages is unrealistic, 
as there will always be further development within each of these stages 
and a significant degree of overlap.145 What is more, this debate about 
evolution within IHRL is framed within the context of IHRL broadly. This is 
well evidenced from Buergenthal’s stages, as the fourth stage includes 
“minority rights”, and as such, the developmental course of these rights 
lags behind most of the corpus of IHRL. For present purposes, that begs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Kennedy, JF. ‘Civil Rights Address’ (11 June 1963). 
143 Buergenthal, T. ‘The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International Human 
Rights’ 19 Hum. Rts. Q. 703 (1997). See also Nikken, P. La Proteccion Internacional de 
los Derechos Humanos: Su Desarrollo Progresivo (1987). 
144 The amount of resources and capacity that are allocated to preventing the use and 
recruitment of child soldiers is proportional to the level of commitment of states to 
combat this problem. Nevertheless, it will never be infinite. As such, any departure from 
a norm creation paradigm to a norm enforcement paradigm requires the reallocation of 
resources and capacity away from the former to the latter. 
145 Note 114 above, 704. 
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the question where child rights more broadly, and child soldier prohibitive 
rules in particular, factor-in on this evolution of IHRL.    
 
The CRC, which directly prohibits the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers, is the most rapidly and widely ratified human rights treaty.146 
Additionally, as previously stated, there are no less than eight binding 
international instruments prohibiting the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers, from within four separate self-contained regimes within 
international law (IHL, IHRL, ICL and International Labour Law). Finally, 
such use and recruitment is a violation of customary international law.147 
Cumulatively these factors strongly indicate that the time is ripe to 
progress from an era of standard setting to an “era of application”, or from 
Buergenthal’s first two stages to his last two stages.  
 
There is a very big gap between the existence of normative standards 
and the strength of these normative standards. The relative weakness of 
normative standards can for practical purposes be divided into two 
categories. Firstly, those standards that are weak because the content of 
the norm fails to provide extensive protection, for example, instruments 
that prohibit the use and recruitment of children younger than fifteen, 
instead of eighteen. Secondly, those standards that are weak because of 
bad drafting, or language that is imprecise and hard to apply to a 
concrete situation, for example, those standards that state that “all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Article 38 of the CRC, note 7 above.  
147 See Chapter 3. 
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feasible measures” must be employed to ensure that a child does not 
take a direct part in hostilities. As these examples indicate, instruments 
prohibiting child soldiering suffer from both these forms of relative 
weakness.   
 
The first mentioned category poses less of a problem, as it does not 
directly affect the ability to enforce the norm. On the contrary, as the norm 
provides a lesser standard of protection than many would desire, it should 
be applicable to fewer situations, and only those situations where there is 
very broad agreement that it should be prohibited, and as such the 
enforcement of such norms should be easier. The argument can 
therefore be made that the international community should refrain from 
further norm creation until such time as the current norms enjoy a 
significant measure of enforcement. However, the second category 
directly impacts on the enforceability of the norms. If the norm itself 
inherently inhibits its own enforceability, the argument that emphasis 
should shift from norm creation to norm enforcement is likely to fail. 
However, there has never been an instance where the use of a child 
soldiers in hostilities was justified on the basis that “all feasible measures” 
were taken to ensure that the child would not be used in hostilities.  
 
This may cast doubt on whether, in the context of child soldier prevention, 
the evolution of IHRL has really entered Buergenthal’s third stage. 
Because of the nature of the law making process on the international 
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level, there is always compromise in agreeing to treaty norms. As such, 
no norms are perfect and there is a significant degree of overlap between 
the different stages.  
 
There are numerous weaknesses in those instruments that prohibit the 
use and recruitment of child soldiers, and they are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3. Some of these weaknesses may well impact on the level of 
enforceability of these norms, accordingly, this issue forms one of the 
central research questions in determining whether it is feasible, and 
indeed possible, to progress to an “era of application”.    
 
The thesis of this study is not that all capacity and resources should be 
reallocated to enforcement instead of norm creation, just as all capacity 
and resources are not currently allocated to norm creation. The thesis is 
that a critical mass of these resources and capacity should be reallocated 
to enforcement. I do not argue that we should simply accept the 
weaknesses of the positive law. Instead, I argue that we should now put 
greater emphasis on enforcing these imperfect, but necessary standards. 
 
I have identified two principal research questions:  
• Are the international law norms that prohibit the use and 
recruitment of child soldiers capable of enforcement in their current 
form?  
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• What changes should be effected to the manner of enforcement of 
these norms in order to achieve a more significant degree of social 
change? In other words, what is needed for an “era of 
application”? 
 
4. METHODOLOGY  
In its most basic form, sociology is the study of society, and since law is a 
product of society, designed, in part, to regulate the conduct of society, 
drawing a link between these disciplines is uncontroversial.  
 
i. Theoretical Framework: “Law and Sociology” 
Methodologically, the point of departure of this thesis is that in order to 
achieve social change with regard to a phenomenon as widespread and 
as complex as the military use and recruitment of children, one has to 
recognize that there are many relevant disciplines and that any single 
contribution to the greater body of knowledge must identify the 
parameters and limitations not only of the relevant contribution, but also 
of the discipline from within which the contribution emanates. In this 
regard, Dror has stated:  
 
One of the more important devices used to initiate and control directed 
social change is law, a device the use of which is prima facie (and, in 
most cases, perhaps mistakenly) believed to be cheaper and quicker 
than education, economic development and other instruments and ways 
of directed social change.148 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Dror, Y. ‘Law and Social Change’ 33 Tul. L. Rev. 787 (1958-1959), 802.  
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According to Tamanaha, “the instrumentalist view of law is the notion that 
law is an instrument to achieve ends. At the systemic level, it has often 
been said that law is an instrument to serve the public good, or an 
instrument to direct social change”.149 He further acknowledges that the 
instrumentalist view of law has led some to argue that the “law is an 
instrument of domination by one group over another within society … that 
lawyers instrumentally manipulate or utilize legal rules and processes to 
achieve the ends of their clients”.150 His critique of an instrumentalist 
approach to law is premised on the importance of balancing interests 
among parties. If a lawyer manipulates the law to further the interest of 
her/his client, then the legitimacy of law, it may be argued, is at stake, as 
the legitimate interests of the opposing party to the dispute will not be 
safeguarded. However, when the law is used instrumentally to achieve 
social change by preventing the use and recruitment of child soldiers, 
there is no tension between such social change and the legitimate 
interests of the offending party.  
 
Multi-disciplinary scholarship brings with it many advantages; however, 
one must also be aware of its demerits. Principally, in this regard, most 
scholars approach a subject from the point of view of the discipline in 
which they are trained. Very few scholars have the expertise to make any 
real contribution to a field of study other than her/his own. In many 
instances, as I have indicated above, this results in a rather superficial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Tamanaha, note 44 above, 231. 
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treatment of issues falling outside the expertise of the relevant scholar. In 
extreme cases, technical inaccuracies may result. This shortcoming can 
be seen in the treatment of the legal aspects of child soldiering in the 
works of Singer and Wessells, an international relations scholar and 
psychologist respectively.151 The research aims and language employed 
in the context of international law differ from that used in other disciplines, 
and this is also true among other disciplines. Ames is of the view that, 
when studying child soldiering, using the nation-state as the unit of 
analysis is virtually always a mistake”.152 Yet, in an international law 
context, states, by definition, form the entry point in addressing child 
soldiering, and must be included in the analysis. Nevertheless, this thesis 
is premised on the understanding that international law is but one 
contributor to the safeguarding of the rights of the child. The status quo is 
that children are used and recruited militarily on a wholesale basis. 
Changing this reality means effecting social change.  
 
Accordingly, I adopt a “law and sociology” approach, but not in the true 
multi-disciplinary sense.153 The approach to the work itself is legal – and I 
take an instrumentalist view of the law. However, linkages between this 
work and both existing and future works emanating from disciplines other 
than law can be identified, so as to clearly indicate what contribution this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 See page 39 above.  
152 Ames, B. ‘Methodological Problems in the Study of Child Soldiers’ in Gates, S. & 
Rech, Simon. Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (2009), 16. 
153  Cryer, R., Hervey, T. & Sokhi-Bulley, B. Research Methodologies in EU and 
International Law (2011), 86-88.   
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work makes to the greater knowledge and ideally to the efforts to make 
inroads into the use and recruitment of children. Furthermore, I hope that 
my work will be of pragmatic significance in achieving social change; the 
legal approach has sociological aspirations. The role of law in achieving 
such aspirations is the subject of further investigation in this study.  
 
There are two aspects that are unique in the way the positive law is 
assessed in the present work. Firstly, the law is always assessed within 
the paradigm of enhancing the role and rule of law.154 Secondly, IHL and 
IHRL are assessed as self-contained legal regimes, i.e. as fragmented 
aspects of international law. This allows for an analysis of the interplay 
between these legal regimes, both in terms of mutual reinforcement and 
potential norm conflict – an analysis which has not previously been 
undertaken in any detail. My underlying argument is that IHRL is always 
applicable, but that its application is affected by IHL, the lex specialis, 
during armed conflict.  
 
ii. Research Methods and Data Analysis  
As a whole, this study is “evaluative” in nature. However, in addressing 
the second part of the thesis, the substantive law and legal 
implementation mechanisms, a close “expository” study is conducted into 
the relevant international law norms.155 Accordingly, significant parts of 
Chapters 3 and 4 are “expository” in nature. Traditional desk research 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Chapter 2.  
155 Cryer, Hervey & Sokhi-Bulley, note 153 above, 9-10. 
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methods into primary and secondary materials were employed throughout 
this study, in relation to both the “evaluative” and “expository” aspects of 
the thesis. In addition, interviews were conducted in two separate 
contexts. Firstly, I undertook a field-research expedition for four months to 
the DRC from October 2008 to January 2009; additionally, I visited 
Geneva, New York City, Washington DC, and Boston during February 
2011 to conduct interviews with individuals involved at a senior level in 
the prevention of the use and recruitment of child soldiers.  
 
The practicalities of conducting field work in the DRC and interviewing 
high-level respondents in Switzerland and the USA is discussed below.  
 
DRC Field Research / Case Study  
I had worked in areas plagued by child soldiering before I commenced 
this study and was always very impressed by the level of commitment of 
most people working to prevent the use and recruitment of child soldiers 
in the field. As there is no lack of commitment at this level of the 
enforcement process, I decided to do field work with the aim of 
establishing what the real-world requisites are for the effective 
enforcement of child soldier prohibitive norms. Adopting an 
instrumentalist approach to law, and a “law and sociology” theoretical 
basis, enhances the value of field research. Abstract legal reasoning will 
not necessarily contribute to social change if there are obstacles to 
change, of which the abstract theorist is unaware.  
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At present, or recently, virtually every facet of the child soldier problem 
has occurred within the DRC, including:  
 
a) The existence of both international and non-international armed 
conflicts.  
b) The use and recruitment of child soldiers by state armed forces, 
non-state actors and proxy forces.  
c) The conduct of national prosecutions for the use and recruitment 
of child soldiers.  
d) The UN has a peace mission in DRC, the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (MONUC) that specifically incorporates child protection 
officers.  
e) The ICCs first case to have gone to trial (Lubanga case), was 
referred to the ICC by the government of the DRC and alleges the 
use and recruitment of child soldiers.  
f) Children have been used and recruited very extensively in armed 
conflict in the DRC.  
 
For these reasons, I identified the DRC as the best case study to offer 
insight into the current international law response to child soldiering. In 
relation to the thesis of the study, the case study makes three primary 
contributions. It offers insights into whether international law has a role to 
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play in preventing the use and recruitment of child soldiers. It presents a 
factual scenario against which to determine whether any headway has 
been made as of yet in the “era of application”. It provides space where 
the practicalities of conclusions can be tested. The fieldwork I conducted 
in the DRC played a central role in informing my overall understanding of 
the practicalities of the child soldier phenomenon, and played an 
important role in referring the formulation of the thesis and the structure of 
the study.  
 
The DRC is a very large state, with little to no infrastructure in many 
regions. At the time of my visit, there were three on-going low intensity 
armed conflicts or armed insurgencies where children were used and 
recruited as soldiers. All of these occurred in the North East and the East 
of the country. In the Nord Kivu and Sud Kivu provinces there were on-
going clashes, and indeed an escalation of violence that became the 
‘Nord Kivu War’. This war coincided with my visit. Various belligerents 
were involved on both sides, but essentially, it was an armed conflict 
between General Laurent Nkunda’s National Congress for the Defence of 
the People and the armed forces of the DRC.156  
 
Not very far north of this conflict, in the Ituri region of the DRC, low 
intensity clashes still occurred in the aftermath of the Ituri Conflict (1999-
2007), between the agriculturalist Lendu and pastoralist Hema ethnic 	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groups.157 Yet, a third armed insurgency was underway even further north 
from Ituri. The infamous Lord’s Resistance Army was operating from 
bases within the DRC at the time, as they still do frequently.158 Indeed, 
the bloody ‘Christmas massacre’ occurred during my stay in the DRC.159  
 
I decided to split my time between the Nord/Sud Kivu region, where the 
Nord Kivu War was on-going, and the Ituri region, using the regional 
capitals Goma and Bunia as my base. I further decided not to conduct 
any fieldwork in relation to the Lord’s Resistance Army for two primary 
reasons. There is no way to do it safely, and conclusions drawn in 
relation to a fringe group without any clear political agenda can only be 
helpful in relation to the prevention of the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers in other areas to a very limited extent.  
 
In determining the appropriate research methods and interview styles the 
most important factors were what the study aimed to do, and what it did 
not aim to do. It is not an anthropological study into the experiences of 
children in armed conflict. As such, I decided from the outset that I would 
not interview children (former or current child soldiers). They would not be 
able to inform me on how child soldiering should be prevented. 
Furthermore, I have experience interviewing former child soldiers in 
Liberia, in a context unrelated to the current study, and have found their 
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responses to be unreliable and of little academic value. This also 
prevented many potential ethical problems from arising in relation to 
interviewing children, specifically in a context where the interview relates 
to a child’s memories of extremely disturbing events, and information 
which could indicate the criminal liability of a child for deeds she/he 
committed. As such, the respondent pool was made up of people working 
for the UN, in various capacities, and NGOs focused on preventing the 
use and recruitment of child soldiers. The overriding ethical consideration 
that no participant must be harmed or be subjected to scrutiny as a result 
of participation in this study, was observed at all times.160 The east and 
northeast of the DRC are very dangerous regions. This was particularly 
so in the Nord Kivu region during 2008. From an ethical point of view, 
researchers should not conduct research in circumstances where there is 
a grave threat to their life or well-being. However, I have extensive 
experience working in areas affected by armed conflict specifically in 
Africa, and as a result I also have an extensive network of contacts in the 
region. These factors meant that I could conduct the fieldwork within 
acceptable parameters of safety and, in an ethically sound manner.   
 
Before departing for the DRC I was aware that my methodology would 
have to be flexible. However, I did not anticipate the level of difficulty I 
encountered in getting respondents to speak on the record. The end of 
2008 was a particularly volatile period in the DRC, and the UN, its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Boyden, J. ‘Anthropology Under Fire: Ethics, Researchers and Children in War’ in 
Boyden, J & De Berry, J. (eds.) Children and Armed Conflict (2004), 238-241.  
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agencies, and the NGO community had their hands full. These 
organizations were not keen on sharing information in relation to their 
deployment at the time, as it could have had safety implications for their 
personnel. Therefore, while I was provided with very good intelligence on 
the use and recruitment of children on the ground, this was all done off 
the record. Nevertheless, I managed to conduct a few very good 
interviews, and moreover, spending four months in war affected regions 
of the DRC provided me with an insight into child soldier use and 
recruitment, and specifically the practicalities involved in preventing such 
use and recruitment, that I could never have obtained from desk 
research.161  
 
Interviews  
Interviewing leading experts in the field of child soldier prevention 
presented me with the opportunity to elicit the views of these respondents 
on a range of issues associated with the thesis and research questions of 
this study. Although, these interviews always formed part of my 
methodology, they became more important after I was unable to conduct 
the number of interviews I anticipated during my fieldwork in the DRC.  
 
Each of the respondents was chosen on the basis of specific expertise 
and the capacities in which they engage with the prevention of child 
soldiering. I conducted interviews with:  	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• Radhika Coomaraswamy, the current SRSG on Children in Armed 
Conflict. Ms Coomaraswamy plays the central role internationally 
in protecting children during armed conflict. Her office has, since 
its creation, maintained a specific focus on the prevention of child 
soldiering.    
• Jean Zermatten, at the time Deputy Chairperson of the CRC 
Committee. Mr Zermatten, as a judge and academic, is an 
internationally acclaimed expert on the rights of the child.  
• Awich Pollar, member of the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child. In addition to being a member of the Committee and a 
lawyer, Mr Pollar is a former child soldier who fought in the 
Ugandan Bush War for President Museveni’s National Resistance 
Army.  
• Philip Alston, Professor of Human Rights Law, New York 
University. Prof. Alston has served in numerous capacities in the 
United Nations, most recently as Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. More importantly, 
Alston is a leading expert in the human rights system and his work 
specifically includes the treaty and charter based mechanisms of 
the UN. These mechanisms are particularly relevant to Chapter 5.    
• Joost Kooijmans, Special Assistant to the Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary-General on Violence Against Children, Ms 
Martha Santos Pais. The purpose of this meeting was to establish 
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the relevance of the mandate of the Special Assistant to the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Violence 
Against Children to child soldiering.  
 
Interview Design and Data Analysis  
As I anticipated that the respondents targeted in this study would be likely 
to share experience and knowledge beyond what can be contemplated in 
a structured or even semi-structured interview design, I adopted an 
unstructured design. Oppenheim uses the terms “data collection” and 
“heuristic” to differentiate between the functions of structured and 
unstructured interviews respectively.162 The aims of these unstructured 
interviews are not to draw a comparison between interviewees, but rather 
to obtain the viewpoint of an authoritative source.  
 
From a qualitative content analysis perspective, the opinions obtained 
during the interviews have been used and incorporated with direct 
reference to the author and her/his status in the field of child soldier 
prevention and not “collapsed together and reported as one”,163 described 
by Fontana and Frey as “polyphonic interviewing”.164  As the value of 
these interviews lies in obtaining authoritative opinions, or what has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162  Oppenheim, AN. Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement 
(1992), 66-67. 
163 Fontana, A. & Frey, JH. ‘Interviewing – the Art of Science’ in Denzin, NK. & Lincoln, 
YS. (eds) Handbook of Qualitative Research (1994), 368-369.  
164 Ibid.  
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called “incorrigibles”, rather than fact or “corrigible”,165 no triangulation of 
outside sources to verify facts is needed, and validation is not an issue.166  
 
In the context of the DRC, the term ‘case study’ is used in the narrow 
technical sense of the word.167 The nature of the fieldwork I conducted in 
the DRC is, in part, what Hakim terms “policy research” and as such, the 
contribution this aspect of the research aims to make is to assess 
“actionable factors”.168 The construct of policy research also enabled me 
to interview a respondent as a ‘role holder’ rather than a private 
individual, and as such her/his authority is contingent on the role she/he 
plays. Responses from all the respondents in this study have been 
assessed against the background of the role played by the respondent.  
 
5. THESIS STRUCTURE  
The distribution, use and causes of child soldiering in contemporary 
armed conflict are discussed in Chapter 2 – informing the reader of child 
soldiering as a social reality. The distribution of child soldiers is relevant 
to the prevention of child soldiering in that reliance is placed in this regard 
on international machinery on a geo-specific basis. The capacity in which 
child soldiers are used in armed conflict is similarly relevant to child 
soldier prevention, as different legal instruments prohibit only specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Gomm, R. Social Research Methodology – a Critical Introduction (2004), 185-186.  
166 Ibid, 187-188.  
167 Hakim, C. Research Design: Successful Designs for Social and Economic Research 
(2000), 59. 
168 Ibid, “policy research” has a strong emphasis on the practicality and real world effect 
of the findings.  
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degrees of participation in armed conflict by children. Finally, 
understanding the causes of child soldiering potentially allows for the 
identification of strategies aimed at child soldier prevention addressing 
the root causes of the problem, and not only its symptoms.  
 
Chapter 3 commences with an analysis of the relationship between IHL 
and IHRL. This relationship is particularly important in the context of child 
soldier prevention, as there is probably a larger degree of overlap 
between IHL and IHRL prohibitive norms in this regard, than any other 
proscribed conduct. The prohibition of the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers in terms of legal instruments forming part of IHL and IHRL is then 
discussed. Lastly, the customary law nature of the prohibition of child 
soldiering is also discussed. The purpose of this chapter is to address, in 
part, the second research question – whether the international law norms 
that prohibit the use and recruitment of child soldiers are capable of 
enforcement in their current form. 
 
Chapter 4 is aimed at the war crime of the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers. The primary contribution of this chapter is first an analysis of this 
war crime as formulated under the Rome Statute, and the scope for 
prosecution by the ICC. Second, the role the ICC can potentially play to 
prevent the use and recruitment of child soldiers. Accordingly, like 
Chapter 5, this chapter also addresses the first research question in part, 
but further also addresses the second research question: the changes 
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required for mechanisms within international law to achieve a more 
significant degree of success in combating child soldiering. 
 
The contribution of mechanisms forming part of the UN and the African 
Union (AU) to the prevention of child soldiering is analysed in Chapter 5. 
These UN mechanisms represent the core of the international 
communities’ response to child soldiering. Therefore, this chapter 
presents a critical analysis of those UN mechanism best suited to the 
prevention of child soldiering, with particular attention being paid to areas 
of potential improvement to the effectiveness of these mechanisms. 
Conversely, a descriptive account of mechanisms forming part of the AU 
are presented, as these mechanisms have never before been used in 
response to child soldiering, but have the potential to contribute to the 
prevention of the use and recruitment of child soldiers. This chapter is 
aimed specifically at addressing the second research question; that is, 
the prospects for more extensive rights protection through enhancements 
to the mechanisms that exist to apply international law.  
 
Chapter 6 is a case study on the prevention of child soldiering in the 
DRC, one of the countries the children of which have been most affected 
by this issue for several decades. The conclusions reached in previous 
chapters are compared to the practical situation in the DRC in order to 
establish the accuracy of these conclusions in relation to a concrete 
situation.   
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The central thesis of the study is that in order to enter an “era of 
application” in preventing child soldiering, focus must be shifted from 
norm creation to norm enforcement. Each of the two research questions 
addresses a component of the central thesis. In conclusion, Chapter 7 
recounts the findings in relation to each of the research questions in order 
to assess whether the “era of application” is indeed within our grasp. 
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CHAPTER 2  CONTEMPORARY CHILD SOLDIERING: 
DISTRIBUTION, USE AND CAUSES  
 
Child soldiering is a reality in many societies. However, speaking of the 
prevention of this phenomenon is, for those who have not been in armed 
conflict and have not dealt with the realities of child soldiering, an abstract 
concept. The reality of child soldiering is a social phenomenon that I 
argue can be addressed – and prevented – through the instrumentality of 
international law. To do this, international law must address the social 
reality and not the perception of the reality. This chapter analyses the 
distribution, the nature of the use, and the causes of child soldiering. In 
other words, where, when and why child soldiers are recruited and used 
in hostilities. 
 
The distribution of child soldiers is analysed in order to indicate the scope 
and geographical spread of the child soldier problem. This is important in 
the context of this study, as the mobilization of international machinery, 
such as the United Nations Security Council, is dependent on the scope 
of a problem. Furthermore, the geographical location of the problem is 
material in the application of international law. Regional legal regimes 
such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights are limited to 
specific geographical regions. As the “era of application” occurs within 
limited resources and capacity, such resources and capacity must be 
allocated to regions that are most affected by the phenomenon.   
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The contemporary use of child soldiers is an issue central to the social 
reality of what the international community wants to address when 
referring to “child soldiering”. Yet the definition of “child soldiering” is 
problematic for a number of reasons. In many conflicts in developing 
states, non-state armed groups often take the form of extended networks 
of people that operate on a nomadic basis. In other words, the entire 
family of combatants travels with the armed group. Children perform 
domestic chores, which directly benefits the armed group. Are they child 
soldiers, or is a more proximate role to hostilities required? While the 
positive law in this regard is discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, this chapter 
offers one insight in to this facet of the social reality. 
 
Finally, the causes of child soldiering may provide an entry point for 
addressing the phenomenon through the instrumentality of international 
law. If clear causes can be identified, the strategies for the enforcement 
of international law can be focused at addressing such causes.  
 
As these questions are anthropological and socio-geographical in nature, 
I will heed my own warning regarding multi-disciplinary work and set 
rather modest aims for this chapter.1 This Chapter accordingly provides 
context to the subsequent chapter that aims at addressing these social 
realities specifically. More generally, it provides context to the thesis as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Chapter 1, Methodology, 54. 
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whole. Indeed, this chapter is a good example of the brand of the “law 
and sociology” approach that I have adopted, and as such is more 
“expository” of the works of anthropologists and sociologists.2  
 
1. DISTRIBUTION OF CHILD SOLDIERS  
During the late 1990s it was estimated that there were 300 000 child 
soldiers internationally. Brett and McCallin have been credited with first 
citing this figure.3 During 1998 these authors acknowledged that “the total 
number of child soldiers in each country, let alone the global figure, is not 
only unknown but unknowable”.4 From the outset, this figure was nothing 
more than informed guess work. Nevertheless, to date a majority of 
academic contributions and reports by non- and inter-governmental 
organizations (NGOs and IGOs) indicate that there are approximately 300 
000 child soldiers.5 There are no reliable quantitative data that support 
this figure and, moreover, the term ‘child soldier’ lacks sufficient content 
to categorize a given number of people to that genus. The continuous use 
of this figure without any revision has lead many commentators to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Chapter 1. 
3 Hart, J. ‘The Politics of Child Soldiers’ 13 Brown J. World Aff. 217 (2006-2007), 217. 
4 Brett, R. & McCallin, M. Children: The Invisible Soldiers (1998), 31.  
5 The International Committee for the Red Cross has committed to a figure of 300 000 
<http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/p0824> (last accessed on 22 July 
2011). The ‘2001 Global Report on Child Soldiers’ Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 
Soldiers (2001) at 10 & 13 (hereinafter ‘2001 Global Report’) states that there are 300 
000 child soldiers, with 120 000 in Sub Saharan Africa. The Coalition moved away from 
committing to specific figures in its subsequent ‘2004 Global Report on Child Soldiers’ 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2004) (hereinafter ‘2004 Global Report’), 
where it was stated that regardless of the coming to an end of some of the worst 
conflicts in Africa during the reporting period there were still in the region of 100 000 
active child soldiers in Sub Saharan Africa. In a recent publication Singer still adhered to 
the figure of 300 000 child soldiers globally: Singer, PW. ‘The Enablers of War: Causal 
Factors Behind the Child Soldier Phenomenon’ in Gates, S. & Reich, S. (eds.) Child 
Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (2009), 93.  
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conclude that the number of child soldiers has been very stable for close 
to fifteen years.6 The conclusion may possibly be correct, but the manner 
in which the conclusion is reached is certainly not.  
 
Indicating the distribution of child soldiers within acceptable parameters of 
accuracy is challenging enough, not to mention speculating on the 
number of child soldiers globally. Nevertheless, in order to obtain a sense 
of the extent of the child soldier problem, the distribution as well as the 
number of child soldiers needs to be taken into account. Focusing solely 
on the distribution of child soldiers has the effect that the extent of the 
problem in a state with a very small number of child soldiers may be 
equated with that of a state utilizing a significant number of child soldiers. 
Conversely, focusing solely on the numbers of child soldiers may have 
the effect that states in which there are not many child soldiers receive 
little or no attention. Children are not used or recruited in equal measure, 
by the same methods, or for the same reasons, in each of these 
countries. A myriad of human rights violations are committed against child 
soldiers. Nevertheless, the treatment of children and the roles they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Some organizations have, however, adapted their figures. Human Rights Watch 
correctly indicates that no exact figures exist; however, until recently they nevertheless 
committed to a figure of 200 000. They further state that in some conflicts, such as Sri 
Lanka, more than a third of all child soldiers were female, 
<http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/fact_sheet.html> (last accessed on 22 July 2011). 
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) holds that there are 250 000 active child 
soldiers internationally, http://www.unicef.org/protection/files/Armed_Groups.pdf (last 
accessed on 22 July 2011) – UNICEF cites Otunnu, former United Nations Special 
Representative to the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict as authority 
(see Otunnu, OA. ‘“Era of Application”: Instituting a Compliance and Enforcement 
Regime for CAAC’, Statement before the Security Council, New York (23 February 
2005) at 3). The ‘2008 Global Report on Child Soldiers’ Coalition to Stop the Use of 
Child Soldiers (2008) (hereinafter ‘2008 Global Report’) did not commit to exact figures. 
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perform within military structures also differ widely. For example, one of 
the particularly egregious problems associated with child soldiering is the 
sexual abuse of children, specifically but not exclusively girls. The sexual 
misuse of children in Sierra Leone was the norm, whereas in Sri Lanka 
this practice was unheard of.7 
 
A study by Reich and Achvarina indicates that the ratio of child 
participants in armed groups in different conflicts that overlap temporally 
and are close in geographic proximity to one another is often very 
different. 8  Again, the accuracy of the figures relied on is highly 
questionable.9 Various single-country studies have been conducted on 
child soldiering. Often these studies include estimates of the number of 
children who participate or have participated in armed conflict in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Hogg, CL. ‘The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Child Recruitment’ 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Forum on armed groups and the involvement 
of children in armed conflict, Chateau de Bossey, Switzerland (4-7 July 2006), 13; 
Restoy, E. ‘The Revolutionary United Front (RUF): Trying to Influence an Army of 
Children’ Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Forum on armed groups and the 
involvement of children in armed conflict, Chateau de Bossey, Switzerland (4-7 July 
2006), 5 et seq. More recent evidence suggests that government forces raped Tamil 
women in the final stages of the conflict. However, the sexual abuse of child soldiers by 
the Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has not been indicated. See ‘Report of the 
Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka’ (31 March 2011), 
152-153 & 176. 
8 Reich, SF. & Achvarina, A. ‘Why do Children Fight? Explaining Child Soldier Ratios in 
African Intra-State Conflicts’ Ford Institute (2005). For example, this study indicates that 
in armed conflict in Sierra Leone (1991-2000) children represented 25% of total 
combatants, whereas, in armed conflict in neighbouring Liberia (1999-2003) children 
represented 53% of all combatants. Some caution is, however, called for in relying on 
these figures. The study is not based on fieldwork conducted by the authors, and 
includes figure on the number of child soldiers who participated in twelve countries. 
Never before have there been reliable figures on the number of child soldiers in any of 
these countries, not to mention, for example, the Angolan conflict (1975-1995) in which 
the study claims children made up between 10-15% of combatants, and that a total of 
8000 child soldiers were used. In this study the definitions accorded to the concepts 
‘child soldier’ and ‘armed conflict’ do not accord with those definitions as used in law.  
9 Ibid. In fairness to Reich and Achvarina, their quantitative analysis on the causes of 
child soldiering is of immense value. Although their ‘N’ was limited, this is defensible.  
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relevant conflict. The numbers in any one of these studies are estimates 
at best, as no vigorous quantitative study into the number of child soldiers 
in any conflict has been conducted. Relying on these various studies to 
inform a more global figure of child soldiers is very problematic. The 
methodologies of these studies differ largely and the definition accorded 
to concepts such as ‘child soldier’ and ‘armed conflict’ also differ among 
them. However, I do not dispute that children are used militarily and 
recruited on a massive scale.  
 
The geographical distribution and number of active child soldiers is a 
factual question bound by temporal constraints. Presenting a one-
dimensional account of the distribution and numbers of child soldiers in a 
single time frame yields no usable results. The dynamics of modern 
conflict are such that many conflicts are short-lived, with high casualty 
rates, e.g. the 1994 Rwandan genocide.10 The 1990’s are testament to 
the fact that the laws of probability do not exclude the occurrence of many 
brutal conflicts in a single short timeframe.11 Using the period 1994-1995 
to ascertain the civilian death rate in conflicts the world over will result in 
grossly unrepresentative results, as this period includes the genocides in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The Rwandan Genocide lasted for approximately 100 days (6 April to mid-July 1994) 
and it is common cause that at least 500 000 people were killed during this short period. 
Statistics generally put the death count between 800 000 and 1 million. See Des Forges, 
A. ‘Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda’ Human Rights Watch (1999); 
‘Rwanda: How the genocide happened’ BBC (1 April 2004) this publication subscribes to 
a figure of 800 000 deaths; and the ‘OAU Inquiry into Rwanda Genocide’ Africa 
Recovery Vol. 12 1#1 (August 1998), 4, this report subscribes to a figure of 1 million 
deaths. 
11 ‘Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century’ Human Security 
Centre, Lui Centre for Global Issues, University of British Columbia (2005). 
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Rwanda and Bosnia. 12  Similarly, the effectiveness of the campaign 
against child soldiering cannot be gauged without taking account of the 
decline in civil wars.  
 
i. The ‘Child Soldier Global Reports’ 
Table A The 2001 Global Report: countries that used child 
soldiers between June 1998 and April 2001  
	  	   Americas and Caribbean  19	   Yugoslavia (former) 
1	   Colombia 	  	   Middle East & North Africa 
2	   Mexico 20	   Algeria 
3	   Peru 21	   Iran 
	  	   Asia/Pacific  22	   Iraq 
4	   Afghanistan 23	  
Israel/Occupied Palestinian 
Territories  
5	   East Timor 24	   Lebanon 
6	   India 	  	   Sub Saharan Africa  
7	   Indonesia 25	   Angola 
8	   Myanmar 26	   Burundi 
9	   Nepal 27	   Chad  
10	   Pakistan 28	  
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
11	   Papua New Guinea 29	   Eritrea 
12	   Philippines 30	   Ethiopia 
13	   Solomon Islands 31	   Republic of the Congo 
14	   Sri Lanka 32	   Rwanda 
15	   Tajikistan 33	   Sierra Leone 
16	   Uzbekistan 34	   Somalia   
	  	   Europe and Eurasia 35	   Sudan  
17	   Russia 36	   Uganda 
18	   Turkey 	  	     
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The Rwandan Genocide took place between 6 April and mid-June 1994 (note 8 
above). The term ‘Bosnian Genocide’ can refer to two separate occurrences. The first 
and most general is the Srebrenica Genocide (or Srebrenica Massacre) where, during 
July 1995, approximately 8000 Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) men and boys were killed. 
The second usage of the term ‘Bosnian Genocide’ refers to ethnic cleansing that took 
place during the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). Both these occurrences overlap with the 
time period 1994 – 1995. 
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Table B The 2004 Global Report: countries that used child 
soldiers between April 2001 and March 2004  
  Americas and Caribbean 13 Yemen 
1 Colombia   Sub-Saharan Africa 
  Asia/Pacific 14 Angola 
2 Afghanistan 15 Burundi 
3 India 16 Central African Republic 
4 Indonesia 17 Chad 
5 Myanmar 18 Côte d’Ivoire 
6 Nepal 19 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
7 Philippines 20 Guinea 
8 Sri Lanka 21 Liberia 
  Europe and Eurasia 22 Republic of the Congo 
9 Russia 23 Rwanda 
  Middle East & North Africa 24 Sierra Leone 
10 Iran 25 Somalia 
11 Iraq 26 Sudan 
12 
Israel/Occupied Palestinian 
Territories 27 Uganda 
 
 
Table C The 2008 Global Report: countries that used child 
soldiers between April 2004 and October 2007  
  Americas and Caribbean   Middle East & North Africa 
1 Colombia 10 Iraq 
  Asia/Pacific 11 
Israel/Occupied Palestinian 
Territories 
2 Afghanistan   Sub-Saharan Africa 
3 India 12 Burundi 
4 Indonesia 13 Central African Republic 
5 Myanmar 14 Chad 
6 Nepal 15 Côte d’Ivoire 
7 Philippines 16 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
8 Sri Lanka 17 Somalia 
9 Thailand 18 Sudan 
    19 Uganda 
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Among the activities of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 
(CSUCS) is that it releases the ‘Child Soldier Global Reports’ at three-
year intervals. To date, three such reports have been released, dated 
2001, 2004 and 2008. These studies are the only studies that produce a 
global account of the geographical and temporal distribution of child 
soldiers. Each of these reports addresses child soldiering on a country-
by-country basis. The significance of these reports are not only that they 
represent the only comprehensive data source on the distribution of child 
soldiers, but also that a single entity is responsible for all three reports, 
resulting in a high degree of consistency in the methodologies employed 
among the reports. 
 
Valuable as these studies are, it is important to be aware of their 
limitations. The 2008 Global Report contained individual country reports 
for 197 countries.13 These country studies are based on desk research. 
Methodologically, the data on the distribution of child soldiers are more 
reliable than the statistical figures on the number of child soldiers in each 
country. Quite simply, it is much easier for non-governmental 
organizations, inter-governmental organizations and international 
organizations (IO) to obtain verifiable information that there are child 
soldiers in an area, than to establish how many child soldiers there are. 
Furthermore, when compiling these reports, the CSUCS relies on an 
expansive definition of ‘child soldier’, which uses eighteen as the age 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 2008 Global Report, 7. 
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threshold and does not require direct participation in hostilities as the 
majority of legal instruments do. 14  Thus, some countries that are 
indicated by CSUS as using or recruiting child soldiers do so without 
violating any international legal obligation.  
 
The 2001 Global Report indicated that children were used in armed 
conflict in thirty-six countries and recruited in “more than 85”.15 For the 
2004 reporting period, twenty-seven countries used child soldiers and “at 
least 60 countries” recruited children.16 Most recently, during the 2008 
reporting period, children were used in nineteen countries and recruited in 
“at least 86 countries”.17  
 
A noticeable decline in the number of countries where child soldiers are 
used is apparent, whereas the number of countries where children are 
recruited is more erratic. Nevertheless, no available data supports the 
inference that this decline is primarily due to international law’s prohibition 
of the use and recruitment of child soldiers. There are many variables 
involved. Most relevantly, the number of armed conflicts has drastically 
declined since the mid to late 1990’s.18 If there are fewer wars, there will 
be fewer wars in which children are used as combatants. While the ideal 
will be a reduction in conflict altogether, from a child soldier preventative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 2004 Global Report, 15.  
15 2001 Global Report, 10 & 27-28. 
16 2004 Global Report, 2-3 & 14.  
17 2008 Global Report, 2-3 & 12.  
18 ‘Human Security Report’, note 9 above. 
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point of view, the aim is a reduction in the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers despite the existence of conflict. The end of the Cold War has 
changed the dynamics of civil war in developing countries for good. 
States engaged in such conflicts no longer have the backing (financial 
and otherwise) of opposing superpowers to sustain their internal conflict 
and war economies. On the positive side, this has lead to a reduction in 
civil wars altogether.19 On the negative side, this has rendered the face of 
such civil wars more profit-oriented and criminalized.20  
 
In particular, many of the armed conflicts that were specifically known for 
the prevalence of child combatants have ended. These include Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, and since the 2008 Global Report the conflict in Sri 
Lanka has also ended.  The anecdotal decline in areas where child 
soldiers are actively used in hostilities corresponds loosely to such 
decline in armed conflicts. This alone may possibly account for the 
greatest reduction in child soldiers. This contention is further 
substantiated by the less pronounced decline in the number of countries 
which are not at war but which nevertheless recruit child soldiers. A 
further effect of the ‘new’ perception that the use of child soldiers is 
unacceptable is that offending parties now better hide their use of child 
soldiers.21 Given the late response to child soldiering by international law, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid, 150-158. 
20 Singer, PW. Children at War (2006), 49-52. 
21 Pollar, A. (member of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child and 
former child soldier). I Interviewed Mr Pollar on 1 February 2011 in Geneva, Switzerland. 
See also, Singer Children at War, 143-145; ‘Children and Armed Conflict’ Watchlist on 
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it is simply too early to draw any conclusions on the long-term effect of 
these measures.  
 
Child Soldier Distribution Trends: the ‘Global Reports’ 
The countries that used child soldiers in each of the Global Reports are 
named and categorised according to region in tables A, B and C.  
 
Early modern warfare marked a turning point in the utility of child soldiers; 
this period is characterized by the emergence of gunpowder weapons on 
the battlefield. Before firearms were used in armed conflict, younger 
children were often used in combat support roles, as opposed to direct 
combat.22 In the age of slashing and stabbing weapons, younger children 
would have been vulnerable to older, more experienced soldiers. 
However, a bullet fired by a child is as deadly as one fired by an adult.  
 
This further substantiates the well-supported argument that the 
technological advancement of weaponry, specifically the efficient and 
user-friendly nature of modern weapons, as well as the proliferation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Children and Armed Conflict Newsletter (November 2001); Mamou, J. ‘Soldier Boys and 
Girls’ Le Monde diplomatique (November 2001). 
22 See Rosen, DM. Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism (2005), 5-
6, who cites: Parker, DB. & Freeman, A. ‘David Bailey Freeman’ Cartersville Magazine 
(2001) about the boy soldier David Bailey Freeman who enlisted at age 11, initially as an 
aide-de-camp; Banks, MD. ‘Avery Brown (1852-1904), Musician: America’s Youngest 
Civil War Soldier’ America’s Shrine to Music Newsletter (February 2001) about the boy 
soldier Avery Brown who enlisted aged 8 (stated he was 12 upon enlistment) as a 
drummer boy; Talmadge, R. ‘John Lincoln Clem’ The Handbook of Texas Online (2001) 
about the boy soldier John Lincoln Clem who enlisted aged 10 as a drummer boy – he 
was known as the Drummer Boy of Shiloh; Thompson, R. ‘Village Honor It’s Boy Soldier’ 
Cincinnati Enquirer (6 November 1999) about the boy soldier Gilbert van Zandt, who 
enlisted aged 10. 
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weapons has had an effect on the number of child soldiers. 23  The 
development of gunpowder weapons is one of the key developments in 
this regard. However, the weapons used during early modern warfare 
were crude and hard to work with. The Kalashnikov of 1947 (AK47) is the 
weapon that gave birth to the modern child soldier. Thus, child soldiering 
came into its own with the advent of modern warfare (i.e. post World War 
Two). This period coincides with the release of the AK47 and the early 
emergence of ‘fourth generation’ or ‘post-modern’ conflict, as discussed 
below.24  
 
The distinction between the military recruitment and the use of children in 
armed conflict is very important to maintain, yet it is seriously under 
recognized by the NGO, IGO and IO sectors and in academia. In less 
developed states, separate statistics on the military use and recruitment 
of children are non-existent. This is not true of more developed states that 
use or recruit children.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Singer Children at War, note 18 above, 137; Singer, P.W. ‘Talk is Cheap: Getting 
Serious About Preventing Child Soldiers’ (2004) 37 Cornell Int’l L.J. 561 at 565; Stohl, R. 
‘Targeting Children: Small Arms and Children in Conflict’ 9 Brown J. World Aff. 281 
(2002 – 2003), 288; Dhanapala, J. ‘Multilateral Cooperation on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons: From Crisis to Collective Response’ 9 Brown J. World Aff. 163 (2002 – 2003) 
generally; Becker, J. “Small Arms and Child Soldiers” Presentation at workshop for 
“Putting Children First: Building a Framework for International Action to Address the 
Impact of Small Arms” New York (20 March 2001); Gamba, V. & Cornwell, R. ‘Arms, 
Elites, and Resources in the Angolan Civil War’ in Berdal, M. & Malone, DM. (eds) 
Greed and Grievance – Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (2000) 160; Musah, AF. ‘Small 
Arms: A Time Bomb Under West Africa’s Democratization Process’ 9 Brown J. World 
Aff. 239 (2002-2003); Stohl, R. ‘Reality Check – The Danger of Small Arms Proliferation’ 
6 Geo J. Int’l Aff. 71 (2005). 
24 The AK47 became commercially available during 1949.  
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The 2001 Global Report indicated that the UK “routinely sends 17-year-
olds into combat”.25 British soldiers under the age of eighteen were killed 
in combat in the Gulf War, as well as in the Falkland Islands conflict.26 
Between 1982 and 1999, ninety-two soldiers aged seventeen and sixteen 
died during military service with the British Armed Forces.27 It was also 
reported that, between March 1998 and March 1999, 36.38% of all new 
recruits into the British Armed Forces were younger than eighteen.28 
Similarly, in the US, children younger than eighteen served in combat 
units in the Gulf War, Somalia and Bosnia.29 By 1999 the Pentagon 
reported that less than one hundred soldiers younger than eighteen were 
serving with combat units.30 The recruitment practices of the UK and US 
have remained the same. Although both these states entered 
interpretative notes at the time of ratification, both states have ratified the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (CIAC Protocol) and no longer 
use children in armed conflict.31  
 
In some respects the child soldiering problem is more far-reaching than 
the Global Reports suggest. Many adult soldiers started out as child 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 2001 Global Report, 19. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid, 13. 
28 Ibid, 19. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (entered into force 12 February 2002) 2173 UNTS 222. See 
Chapter 4. 
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soldiers and the psychological wounds sustained by many children who 
have since been demobilised will take years to heal, if they ever do.  
 
Very often, child soldiering is seen as a uniquely African phenomenon, 
which is a false and misleading characterization. It is true that the 
greatest number of child soldiers was found on the African continent 
during all three of the reporting periods, and this remains true. However, it 
is apparent that, during the reporting period 2001-2004, children in more 
countries were actively used in conflicts in Asia than Africa.32 It has also 
been suggested that the child soldier problem was bigger in Latin 
America and Asia during the 1980’s than in Africa.33  
 
ii. UN Secretary-General’s List of Parties who Use and Recruit Child 
Soldiers 
In 2001, the Security Council called upon the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations to  
 
… attach to his report a list of parties to armed conflict that recruit or 
use children in violation of the international obligations applicable to 
them, in situations that are on the Security Council’s agenda or that 
may be brought to the attention of the Security Council by the 
Secretary-General, in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of 
international peace and security.34 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 2004 Global Report. Children were actively used in thirteen countries in Asia and 
twelve in Sub-Saharan Africa. Children were also used in Algeria, North Africa.  
33 2001 Global Report, 10.  
34 Security Council Resolution 1379 of 2001, operative paragraph 16.  Article 99 of the 
Charter of the United Nations provides that “the Secretary-General may bring to the 
attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the 
maintenance of international peace and security”.    
	   85	  
 
In 2009, the Security Council amended the Secretary-General’s mandate 
to list groups that use and recruit child soldiers, by also requiring the 
Secretary-General to include in his report “…those parties to armed 
conflict that engage, in contravention of applicable international law, in 
patterns of killing and maiming of children and/or rape and other sexual 
violence against children, in situations of armed conflict, bearing in mind 
all other violations and abuses against children…” 35  This Resolution 
further expressly requires that the Secretary-General now appends two 
annexes to his reports, the first dealing with situations on the agenda of 
the Security Council, and the second with situations not on the agenda of 
the Security Council.36 The Secretary-General has, however, been doing 
so on his own initiative since 2003.  
 
The focus of these reports is on naming armed groups that use or recruit 
child soldiers, including national armed forces, but not states as such, as 
is indicated by the words “parties to armed conflict” and “parties in 
situations of armed conflict” used in the relevant Security Council 
resolutions.37 In the table below I indicate in which states these armed 
groups are active. To date, eight reports have been filed containing such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Security Council Resolution 1882, operative paragraph 3.  
36 Ibid at operative paragraph 19(a). 
37 See Security Council Resolutions 1379 and 1882, operative paragraph 16 and 19(a) 
respectively. 
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annexes,38 yet, the criteria for inclusion on the list have changed four 
times.39 It is thus not possible to draw comparative conclusions from the 
data contained in the different reports. In the table below, the letters A, B, 
C, D, E and F indicate the category to which armed groups in the relevant 
state belong. These categories were defined in the reports themselves 
and through the relevant Security Council resolutions.40  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict’ Security Council (26 
November 2002) S/2002/1299 (2002 Secretary-General’s Report), 14; ‘Report of the 
Secretary-General on children and armed conflict’ Security Council (10 November 2003) 
A/58/546–S/2003/1053 (2003 Secretary-General’s Report), 20-23; ‘Report of the 
Secretary-General on children and armed conflict’ Security Council (9 February 2005) 
A/59/695–S/2005/72 (2005 Secretary-General’s Report), 36-39; ‘Report of the 
Secretary-General on children and armed conflict’ Security Council (26 October 2006) 
A/61/529–S/2006/826 (2006 Secretary-General’s Report), 34-38; ‘Report of the 
Secretary-General on children and armed conflict’ Security Council (21 December 2007) 
A/62/609–S/2007/757 (2007 Secretary-General’s Report), 40-45; ‘Report of the 
Secretary-General on children and armed conflict’ Security Council (26 March 2009) 
A/63/785–S/2009/158 (2009 Secretary-General’s Report), 47-51; ‘Report of the 
Secretary-General on children and armed conflict’ Security Council (13 April 2010) 
A/64/742–S/2010/181 (2010 Secretary-General’s Report), 48-51; ‘Report of the 
Secretary-General on children and armed conflict’ Security Council (23 April 2011) 
A/65/820–S/2011/250 (2011 Secretary-General’s Report), 52-55. 
39 The standard used during 2002 was “parties to armed conflict that recruit or use child 
soldiers” (2002 Secretary-General Report, 14). The 2003 Secretary-General’s Report 
contained two annexures, the first contained an “updated list of parties to armed conflict 
that recruit or use children in situations of armed conflict on the agenda of the Security 
Council” and the second “other parties to armed conflict that recruit or use children in 
armed conflict” (2003 Secretary-General’s Report, 20-23). The 2005, 2006, 2007 and 
2009 Reports used the same standard, the first annexure contained a “list of parties that 
recruit or use children in situations of armed conflict on the agenda of the Security 
Council, bearing in mind other violations and abuses committed against children” and 
the second a “list of parties that recruit or use children in situations of armed conflict not 
on the agenda of the Security Council or in other situations of concern, bearing in mind 
other violations and abuses committed against children” (2005 Secretary-General’s 
Report, 36-39; 2006 Secretary-General’s Report, 34-38; 2007 Secretary-General’s 
Report, 40-45; and 2009 Secretary-General’s Report, 47-51). The 2010 and 2011 
Secretary-General’s Reports include a “list of parties that recruit or use children, kill or 
maim children and/or commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against children in 
situations of armed conflict on the agenda of the Security Council, bearing in mind other 
violations and abuses committed against children” and a “list of parties that recruit or 
use children, kill or maim children and/or commit rape and other forms of sexual 
violence against children in situations of armed conflict not on the agenda of the Security 
Council, or in other situations of concern, bearing in mind other violations and abuses 
committed against children”. 
40 A: “updated list of parties to armed conflict that recruit or use children in situations of 
armed conflict on the agenda of the Security Council”. B: “other parties to armed conflict 
that recruit or use children in armed conflict”. C: “list of parties that recruit or use children 
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The first report, of 2002, is not included in the table, as that report only 
contained situations on the agenda of the Security Council at the time. 
This had the unhappy effect that conflicts where the most child soldiers 
were being used and recruited at the time were not included in the list as 
they were not on the agenda of the Security Council. These included 
Uganda, Sudan and Sri Lanka.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in situations of armed conflict on the agenda of the Security Council, bearing in mind 
other violations and abuses committed against children”. D: “list of parties that recruit or 
use children in situations of armed conflict not on the agenda of the Security Council or 
in other situations of concern, bearing in mind other violations and abuses committed 
against children”. E: “list of parties that recruit or use children, kill or maim children 
and/or commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against children in situations of 
armed conflict on the agenda of the Security Council, bearing in mind other violations 
and abuses committed against children”. F: “list of parties that recruit or use children, kill 
or maim children and/or commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against children 
in situations of armed conflict not on the agenda of the Security Council, or in other 
situations of concern, bearing in mind other violations and abuses committed against 
children”. 
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Table D Secretary-General Reports to the Security Council 
Indicating Groups who Use and Recruit Child Soldiers 
    2
00
3 
20
04
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
20
11
 
1 Afghanistan  A     C  C  E  E  
2 Burundi  A C  C  C  C      
3 CAR       C  C  E  E  
4 Chad     D D C  E  E  
5 Chechnya B             
6 Colombia B D D D D F F 
7 Côte d'Ivoire  A C  C          
8 DRC A C  C  C  C  E  E  
9 Iraq         C  E  E  
10 Liberia A             
11 Myanmar  B D C  C  C  E  E  
12 Nepal  B D D C  C  E  E  
13 Northern Ireland  B             
14 Philippines  B D D D D F F 
15 Somalia  A C  C  C  C  E  E  
16 Sri Lanka  B D D D D F F 
17 Sudan  B C  C  C  C  E  E  
18 Uganda  B D D D D F F 
19 Yemen              F 
  Total 15 11 12 13 14 13 14 
 
I do not rely on the Secretary-General’s reports to present a global 
account of the geographical distribution of child soldiers for a number of 
reasons. The SG reports name offending groups and not states as such. 
Because the categories have changed four times over the course of eight 
reports, no reliable comparison can be made between the reports. Most 
importantly, the Secretary-General is not tasked with listing all offending 
parties, but rather those on the agenda of the Security Council or those 
that the Secretary-General deems necessary to bring to the attention of 
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the Security Council. This is rather arbitrary, as is indicated by the 
inclusion of Northern Ireland in the 2003 report and the exclusion of 
armed groups in the Central African Republic, for example, in the same 
report. It is nevertheless of value to note that groups in nineteen countries 
have been included at least once in the eight Secretary-General’s reports 
to date. Excluding the first report, on average thirteen countries are 
represented in each report. Thus, even when comparing the results of 
these reports, there is no indication of either a decline or increase in the 
number of countries where child soldiers are used or recruited.  
 
These reports do, however, provide a valuable data source to triangulate 
the data contained in the Global Reports. The 2003 and 2004 Secretary-
General’s reports loosely overlap with the 2004 Global Report. Similarly, 
the 2006 and 2007 Secretary-General’s reports loosely overlap with the 
2008 Global Report. All the states listed in the Secretary-General’s 
reports are also listed in the corresponding Global Reports, except for the 
inclusion of Northern Ireland in the 2003 Secretary-General’s report. 
However, the Secretary-General’s reports are much more conservative 
than the Global Reports, save for the inclusion of Northern Ireland in the 
2003 report, which was questionable at the time. Accordingly, the Global 
Reports list many more states than the Secretary-General’s reports.  
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iii. Summary  
It is to be expected that from a regional perspective the less developed 
regions of the world will represent the greatest number of child soldiers. 
At the beginning of this section I stated that, in order to obtain a sense of 
the extent of the child soldier problem, one should take into account the 
distribution as well as the number of child soldiers. However, the numbers 
that are available are not reliable. Nevertheless, it is clear that, even in 
terms of the most conservative estimates, hundreds of thousands of 
children have served, or are serving, in armed forces or groups the world 
over. It is further apparent that countries where children are actively used 
in conflict are generally clustered together: for example, there were clear 
clusters in Central Africa, West Africa, East Africa and South-East Asia 
during the different reporting periods.41 From a regional perspective, child 
soldiering is by far most prolific in Africa and Asia.  
 
2. THE CONTEMPORARY USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS  
Children perform many different roles in conflict, such as combatants, 
porters, spies, bodyguards, cooks, domestic servants and sex slaves. 
This creates problems in assessing when a child is unlawfully used or 
recruited in terms of the positive law, or when a child is used as a child 
soldier as opposed to a child labourer. In this regard, there is a 
disconnect between most international law standards which proscribe 
child soldier use and recruitment, and the broader, soft law definitions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Honwana, A. Child Soldiers in Africa (2005), 45, applies the concept “war-scapes” to 
account for the influence armed conflicts exert on other conflicts in close proximity.  
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used by NGOs.42 The hard law standards generally require direct or 
active participation in hostilities, whereas indirect participation in 
hostilities is sufficient in terms of soft law standards.43  
 
i. Child Soldier Use as an Asymmetric Conflict Structure  
“Asymmetric warfare” denotes an armed conflict in which at least two 
opposing belligerents are engaged with a significant disparity in their 
military strength.44 Where such a conflict exists, both sides cannot be 
committed to traditional tactics of war. The side with the severe military 
disadvantage will inevitably lose. “Asymmetric conflict structures” refers to 
strategies and tactics used by one side to a conflict to level this uneven 
playing field.45 The classic example is the use of guerrilla tactics by the 
Boers during the two Anglo-Boer Wars. Today, terrorism is most closely 
associated with the term “asymmetric conflict structures”.46  
 
Ancker and Burke speak of asymmetric conflict structures as a classic 
action-reaction-counteraction cycle. 47  What this denotes is that 
asymmetric tactics by definition encompass a large degree of uncertainty, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See Chapter 1. 
43 See Chapter 4 and 5 generally for an analysis of the legal prohibition of the use and 
recruitment of child soldiers.  
44 See generally, Benvenisti, E. ‘The Legal Battle to Define the Law on Transnational 
Asymmetric Warfare’ 20 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 339 (2009-2010). 
45  Geiß, R. ‘Asymmetric Conflict Structures’ Volume 88, Number 864 International 
Review of the Red Cross (December 2006), 757. Recently ‘asymmetric warfare’ has 
been used more broadly so as to include specific strategies and tactics. Thus in the 
broad sense ‘asymmetric warfare’ can include ‘asymmetric conflict structures’.  
46 Ibid, 758.  
47 Ancker III, CJ. & Burke, MD. ‘Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare’ Military Review (July-
August 2003), 18. 
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thus one only knows how to react after the initial action and the same 
holds true of any counteraction. For example, the armed conflict between 
the United States (US) and Al Quaeda and associated forces in 
Afghanistan is very much an asymmetric armed conflict. The US has 
vastly superior military strength. Al Quaeda and associated forces 
therefore employ civilian suicide bombings as an asymmetric conflict 
structure in reaction. In counter action, the US escalates targeted killings 
by unmanned aerial vehicles. However, this is not necessarily how all 
such conflicts will play out. Should every reaction to an opposite action 
merely meet the threshold of the initial action, then there is no asymmetry 
to speak of. 
 
Again guerrilla tactics serve as an apt example. During the two Anglo-
Boer Wars such tactics were novel and were used only by one side to the 
conflict, hence it being asymmetric. However, guerrilla tactics during 
warfare are seen as standard today and completely acceptable. Thus 
once all sides began to benefit from these tactics they were no longer 
asymmetrical. Military strategists have developed war tactics and 
strategies to the extent that most armed forces will use conflict tactics to 
the very edge of permissibility in terms of IHL, i.e. military necessity 
versus humanitarian considerations. Thus, should an inferior force wish to 
employ asymmetric tactics, i.e. those not used by its opposition, such 
tactics, almost without exception, will be in violation of IHL.48 The party 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See Geiß generally, note 44 above. 
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that employs such tactics does so relying on an assumption that its 
opposition will refrain from doing so. A symmetric landscape will once 
again be established if the opposition does employ such tactics.  Of 
course, the exception hereto, is if the asymmetry is created as a result of 
the superior capacity of one participant to the armed conflict, for example, 
technology in the case of the US in the so-called “war on terror”, or vastly 
superior manpower, as was the case with Ethiopia in the 
Ethiopian/Eritrean war.  
 
Traditionally, the use of child soldiers was explained by simply stating that 
the bigger the age range, the more people there are to replenish the 
ranks. Today, children are often recruited not because they are soldiers 
that increase the force numbers, but specifically because they are 
children. Thus, the use of child soldiers, like terrorism, is an asymmetric 
conflict structure. The most common illustration of the contribution the 
unique physical attributes of a child can make to a war effort is the 
common use of children for intelligence gathering, i.e. as spies.49  
 
Beyond intelligence gathering, there are further asymmetries involved in 
the use of children on the battlefield. Good military strategists and 
tacticians use their personnel’s individual characteristics to their greatest 
benefit. For example, in Sri Lanka the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Between April 2004 and October 2007 the government armed forces of Burundi, 
Columbia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, India, Indonesia, Israel, Nepal and 
Uganda used children as spies, informants and messengers.  
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(LTTE) used female child soldiers to execute suicide bombings in urban 
environments. The reason for using specifically female child soldiers was 
that they were less subject to thorough body searches by the police.50 
The most high-profile example was the assassination, by suicide bomb, 
of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Thenmozhi Rajaratnam, is 
believed to have been younger than eighteen years old when she 
detonated the bomb.51  
 
A further example of the battle field advantages children carry with them 
is that often adult soldiers find it difficult to fire on children, accounting for 
the title of Dallaire’s book on child soldiering ‘They Fight Like Soldiers, 
They Die Like Children’.52 The first American military casualty in the 
US/Afghan war was US Army Special Forces Sergeant Nathan R. 
Chapman, who was gunned-down by a 14-year-old boy.53  
 
The use of children as an asymmetrical conflict structure has received 
almost no academic attention and further research into this phenomenon 
is of great importance. Such use of children adds to the demand for child 
soldiers, and is thus relevant to the prevention of the recruitment and use 
of child soldiers.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Ganguly, D. ‘Female Assassins Seen in Sri Lanka’ Associated Press (5 January 
2000); Ganguly, D. ‘Female Fighters Used in Sri Lanka’ Associated Press (10 January 
2000); Hogg, note 5 above, 13.  
51 See for example Frey, RJ. Fundamentalism (2007), 365. 
52 Dallaire, R. They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children (2010). 
53 Sanger, DE. ‘Bush, On Offense, Says He Will Fight to Keep Tax Cuts’ New York 
Times (6 January 2002). 
	   95	  
ii. Modern Armed Conflict, National Armed Forces and the Use and 
Recruitment of Child Soldiers  
During the era of modern warfare – the emergence of the ‘Kalashnikov 
generation’ – the dynamics of conflict worldwide have shifted from the old 
position (pre-World War II), where the targets of conflict were military 
personnel and wars were fought between nations, to the new position 
(post-World War II), where civilians are the primary targets and non-
international armed conflict represents the great majority of modern 
conflicts. According to a UNICEF study, before 1900 civilians represented 
5% of all conflict deaths, whereas during the 1990’s civilians represented 
90% of all war related fatalities.54  
 
Models to account for this changing nature of conflict have been 
developed, such as the “fourth generation conflict” model.55 In the context 
of child soldiering, Singer speaks of ‘post-modern warfare’.56 Breaking 
war down into generations can be misleading: as Echevarria argues, 
“...the generational model is an ineffective way to depict changes in 
warfare. Simple displacement rarely takes place, significant 
developments typically occur in parallel.”57 Such theories deal with war on 
a linear basis and, as such, Singer’s open-ended designation of post-
modern warfare is to be preferred. More often than not wars in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 ‘The State of the World’s Children’ UNICEF (2005), 40. 
55 Lind, WS. et al ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation’ Marine Corps 
Gazette (October 1989), 22. 
56 Singer Children at War, note 18 above, 49-52. 
57 Echevarria II, AJ. Fourth Generation War and Other Myths (November 2005), 10.  
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children are used as soldiers are fought on battlefields in developing 
countries; strategies and tactics used are more brutal and, on a 
increasing basis, legitimate ideology is being replaced with criminal and 
profit motives. For example, many theorists are of the view that the 
Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) real motivation in fighting the Sierra 
Leonean civil war was profit based.58 This is purportedly the reason why 
they used Kono, the diamond-mining district, as their base. In 
Afghanistan and Colombia, a vicious circle has emerged where poppy 
fields (for heroin production) and coca plantations (for cocaine 
production), respectively, are kept to fund the war and the war is 
perpetuated to protect the drug trade.59 In essence the profitability of the 
drug trade has resulted in a situation where the once defensible 
ideologies for the initiation of war have been replaced by a desire to 
protect the various groups’ interests in a multi-billion dollar industry. 
Similarly, in the DRC, a great emphasis in recent conflict has been placed 
on the control of coltan (columbite-tantalite) mining areas.60  
 
In all these countries mentioned, child soldiering is a problem. 61 
Asymmetrical tactics are premised on an assumption that one’s enemies 
will not follow suit. Recent experience has shown that this assumption 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Restoy, note 5 above, 2; Florquin, N. & Berman, EG. Eds Armed and Aimless: Armed 
Groups, Guns and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region (May 2005), 370.  
59 Singer, Children at War, note 18 above, 50-51; Wilson, S. ‘Columbian Fighters Drug 
Trade is Detailed’ Washington Post (25 June 2003); Kaldor, M. New and Old Wars 
(1999), 102; Dao, J. ‘The War on Terrorism Takes an Aim at Crime’ New York Times (7 
April 2002). 
60 Lasker, J. ‘Inside Africa’s PlayStation War’ (8 July 2008) http://towardfreedom.com 
(last accessed on 22 July 2011). 
61 See tables A, B and C. 
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frequently proves false in the context of child soldiering. Very often, the 
use of child soldiers by one party to an armed conflict results in their 
opposition also using child soldiers. The Sierra Leonean government 
forces had no answer to the military superiority of the RUF, a group 
infamous for their use of child soldiers. Ultimately, the Sierra Leonean 
government forces also resorted to child soldier use and recruitment.62  
 
With the advent of globalization, governments and aspiring governments 
in developing states have had to protect their status as ‘legitimate’ to a 
greater extent than in the past. The use of child soldiers by government 
forces is often seen as bad publicity, it may hamper investment 
cooperation and foreign aid from developed states. This has led such 
forces to hide their use of child soldiers, or to use intermediary groups 
that use child soldiers – so called proxies. The use of proxies enables 
governments to maintain the benefits of having children among their 
ranks while still maintaining their position as legitimate. In some cases, 
however, these aims of legitimacy have lead to the abandonment of the 
use or recruiting of child soldiers.63 
 
Between April 2001 and March 2004 the national armed forces of 
Burundi, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Myanmar, Rwanda, 
Sudan, Uganda and the US all used children younger than eighteen in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-T. 
63 See Chapter 7. 
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armed conflict (as direct or indirect participants). 64  Furthermore, 
government-backed militias (proxies) in Colombia, Somalia, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe also used such children in hostilities.65 Between April 2004 
and October 2007 the national armed forces of Chad, the DRC, Israel, 
Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan and Southern Sudan, Uganda, Yemen and the 
UK used children in armed conflict.66 During this period, the governments 
of Chad, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, India, Iran, Libya, Myanmar, 
Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda supported militias that 
used child soldiers.67 
 
Today armed conflict in developing states can generally be divided into 
those conflicts that are profit driven and criminalized, as discussed above, 
and the more traditional conflicts aimed at regime change. In the case of 
the former, few entry points exist to engage directly with belligerents to 
prevent child soldiering. Other avenues of prevention may be more 
appropriate. However, in the context of the second group, a greater 
premium is placed on the legitimacy of regimes in international politics 
than was the case during the Cold War. As such, direct engagement with 
such regimes provides a very strong and viable entry point. The same 
holds true for engagement with governments where the national armed 
forces of a state uses and recruits child soldiers. This is evident in the 
increasing propensity among states not to use and recruit child soldiers in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 2004 Global Report, 13.  
65 Ibid. 
66 2008 Global Report, 16.  
67 Ibid. 
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their national armed forces, but instead to support armed groups that do 
so. By so doing, states evade the negative implications of child soldier 
use and recruitment, while still enjoying the benefits thereof. It is 
important that preventative efforts be aimed specifically at proxy forces 
that use or recruit child soldiers.  
 
3. CAUSES OF CHILD SOLDIERING   
There are two facets to the causes of child soldiering. First, there are 
overarching causes of the phenomenon, which include social 
constructions like age thresholds and the actual ability of children to make 
decisions versus the social perception of not only a child’s ability to make 
decisions, but also the role of a child in society. Secondly, there are the 
more proximate causes of child soldiering, e.g. poverty.68  
 
There are two dimensions in relation to the causes of child soldiering. 
There are those factors that lead to a child to volunteer to join an armed 
group and those factors that lead to the members of an armed group 
enlisting or conscripting a child. In this regard, Andvig and Gates speak of 
the “demand and supply” of child soldiers.69 The factors that enhance the 
supply of child soldiers, i.e. that make children join armed forces and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  
69 Andvig, JC. & Gates, S. ‘Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict’ in Gates, S. & Reich, 
S. (eds.) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (2009) at 77-78. See also Cohn, I. 
& Goodwin-Gill, GS. Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict (1994), 23-
43 for a similar approach.  
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groups, like poverty and fear, are part of a systemic problem even deeper 
entrenched than the child soldier phenomenon itself.  
 
i. Overarching Causes of the Child Soldier Phenomenon  
On a daily basis child soldiers aged seven to seventeen are recruited and 
used in armed conflict. Some are abducted at gunpoint, others volunteer, 
yet others take up arms by their own accord without any adult 
interference.70  Nevertheless, there is a tendency to classify all such 
children generically as child soldiers.   
 
The extreme disparity between these situations has divided theorists on 
the causes of child soldiering. The first group argues that universal 
causes of child soldiering can be identified and highlight the similarities 
between contemporary conflicts.71 The second group highlights the sui 
generis nature of each situation and argues that such common causes 
cannot be identified across the board.72 Accordingly, these are referred to 
as the ‘common causes approach’ and the ‘sui generis approach’ 
respectively. This division is one that generally coincides with the 
narrative to which the particular commentator subscribes regarding 
her/his view of the child soldier phenomenon in broad terms. The 
‘humanitarian narrative’ is dominant in this regard and paints the picture 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Situations have occurred where adults tried to stop children from engaging in conflict, 
but failed, ibid, 30. 
71 Singer Children at War, note 18 above, 46; Brett, R. & Specht, I. Young Soldiers: Why 
They Choose to Fight (2004); Wessells, M. Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection 
(2006). 
72 Rosen, note 20 above, 132.   
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of child soldiers as innocent victims of adult manipulation and 
exploitation, whereas the conflicting narrative, the ‘conscious actor 
narrative’, holds that children are conscious decision-makers who 
exercise a choice to participate in conflict and, moreover, deserve 
recognition for their accomplishments as soldiers.  
 
Essentially those subscribing to the ‘humanitarian narrative’ focus on an 
aspect that ties children in conflict together: their vulnerability and 
susceptibility to exploitation. It therefore makes sense for them also to 
subscribe to the ‘common causes approach’. Conversely, those 
subscribing to the ‘sui generis approach’ by definition focus on the unique 
attributes and situation of each child, and accordingly this view lends itself 
to the ‘conscious decision narrative’.  
 
Some commentators argue that both narratives are present and 
applicable to varying degrees across many conflicts. 73  This group’s 
position is best suited to play a meaningful role in assessing the causes 
of child soldering for purposes of preventing the phenomenon. This is so 
due to the flexibility and adaptability of this approach. It is factually 
incorrect to equate the surrounding circumstances of all conflicts in which 
children act as soldiers with each other. It is equally incorrect to argue 
that there are no root causes that affect a majority of child soldiers and 
specifically their recruitment into conflict.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Wessells, note 68 above, 31-32; Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, note 66 above, 23-43.  
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The Common Causes versus Sui Generis Approach  
Rosen is a champion of the sui generis approach. He argues that “the 
specifics of history and culture shape the lives of children and youth 
during peace and war, creating many different kinds of childhood and 
many different kinds of child soldier”.74 The proponents of the common 
causes approach do not suggest that the factors they have identified can 
account for the presence of each and every child soldier in conflict. For 
example, as root causes, force and poverty have received a great deal of 
focus, yet it has been noted that in specific instances, such as in Liberia, 
children were the first eager volunteers in recruitment queues,75 and in 
El-Salvador upper-middle-class children volunteered at young ages.76 
Both approaches are present and applicable to varying degrees across 
many conflicts. As Wessells states, “children become soldiers through 
different channels and for different reasons”, in essence agreeing with 
Rosen.77 However, Wessells goes on to state that each narrative forms 
part of the bigger picture.78  
 
In adhering to specific narratives to account for child soldiering, a ripple 
effect is created that will ultimately affect issues such as the individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Rosen, note 20 above, 132.  
75 Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, note 66 above, 23. 
76 Ibid, 30.  
77 Wessells, note 68 above, 32. 
78  Ibid, Wessells also explicitly identifies a third narrative: that children’s sense of 
patriotic duty accounts for their presence on the battlefield. This narrative is said to be 
favored by particular governments – obviously those which employ the use of child 
soldiers.  
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criminal responsibility of the child soldier, should the relevant child soldier 
have committed crimes while being a child soldier. In stating that the 
historical and cultural effects on the child are different on a case-by-case 
basis, Rosen also challenges the dominant view that the great majority of 
these children are victims of adult manipulation.79  Child soldiers, he 
argues, deserve more credit for their participation in conflict, as in some 
instances fighting is the lesser evil as opposed to not fighting.80 The 
reverse of to this argument is that children, as conscious participants, are 
less deserving of protection, and should be treated as having individual 
responsibility for their deeds, in contrast with the dominant view which 
focuses on the child as victim.  
 
Wessells has acknowledged the multiplicity of contributory factors to the 
child soldier phenomenon, while still being able to identify concern areas 
or factors regarding the causes of child soldering.81 He states that even 
within one conflict child recruitment may vary greatly according to 
context. 82  An interesting paradoxical relationship exists in that the 
circumstances in one conflict can differ so much that two children take 
part without sharing any common motivational factor, whilst two different 
conflicts can influence each other to the extent that the use of child 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Rosen, note 20 above, 132. 
80 This statement seems to have two levels of applicability. The first is in the mind of the 
child, i.e. she/he should fight to make a difference. It is thus a putative application. The 
second is in the form of objective necessity – if the child does not fight, she/he will 
perish. Rosen presents this in his case study of Jewish Partisan children during the 
Second World War. Rosen, note 20 above, 19-56.  
81 Wessells, note 67 above, 31.  
82 Ibid, 32.  
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soldiers in the one can account for this phenomenon in the other,83 what 
Nordstrom calls “war-scapes”.84  
 
Forced versus Voluntary Recruitment  
The very high proportion of child members in some groups, like the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA), can be explained by the lack of appeal the group 
holds for voluntary recruits. The LRA has no clear political objective or 
ideology and is seen by the communities in the areas where they operate 
as a threat.85 There is not much appeal for voluntary recruits to join the 
LRA. As such, the LRA has relied very heavily on abduction and forced 
recruitment tactics. Children are much easier to recruit in this manner 
than adults. This goes a long way towards accounting for this group’s 
extreme reliance on child soldiers.  
 
The degree to which a young person can exercise an unfettered 
discretion in joining armed groups is disputed. In the most extreme cases, 
like the LRA, children are abducted and forced to be child soldiers. Yet, in 
a majority of cases, children join voluntarily. In fact, many children who 
speak of their participation in conflict after demobilization, even years 
after demobilization, still hold the view that it was a wise choice they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Honwana, A, note 40 above, 45.  
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85  Waschefort, G. ‘Child Soldiers: The Legacy of East African Conflict’ De Kat 
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exercised to join and that it benefited their lives greatly. 86  In some 
instances, the survival rate of child soldiers was higher than that of child 
civilians.87  
 
The question which then arises is whether children have the capacity to 
join an armed group truly voluntarily. Many argue that social factors such 
as violent environments, poverty or starvation, force the hand of children 
to the extent that exercising the choice to become a soldier was really 
never a choice. Yet others argue that adults too are influenced by the 
same factors,88 so the question posed is whether anybody exercises free 
choice in such circumstances? This argument must fail due to its 
treatment of children and adults as having the same decision-making and 
cognitive abilities and its failure to take into account the best interests of 
the child principle which, by definition, does not apply to adults.  
 
In an interview I conducted with Radhika Coomaraswamy, Under-
Secretary-General of the United Nations and Special Representative to 
the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, she argued that 
children younger than eighteen generally do not have a “death concept”, 
and that therefore recruitment and use of such children remains 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Peters, K. & Richards, P. ‘Why we Fight: The Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra 
Leone’ 68 Africa 2 (1998); West, H. ‘Girls with Guns: Narrating the Experience of War of 
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exploitative even if one is sensitive to the participatory rights of children.89 
This is the preferred construction. In essence, Coomaraswamy argues, 
children are unable to give informed consent.  
 
The Cognitive Development of Children  
Psychiatric and psychologically identified stages of development have 
been used to determine the cognitive development of a child, most 
notably Piaget’s theory of cognitive ability. 90  This involves drawing 
concrete lines between age groups based on general findings.91 In fact, 
both international and municipal law in general rely on such 
categorization of age groups to, for instance, determine criminal 
responsibility.92  
 
This approach has been challenged by some social scientists arguing 
that children are more capable in many respects than the theory of 
cognitive development would suggest, their findings being based on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 I interviewed Ms Coomaraswamy on 7 February 2011 in New York City, USA. I have 
the interview notes on file.  
90  See specifically Piaget’s work: Piaget, J. & Inhelder, B. The Growth of Logical 
Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence (1958); Piaget, J. & Inhelder, B. The Early 
Growth of Logic in the Child: Classification and Seriation (1964); Piaget, J. The Child's 
Conception of the World (1928); Piaget, J. The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932); and 
Piaget, J. The Child's Construction of Reality (1955).  
91  Piaget identified the following categories: sensorimotor stage (birth to age 2); 
preoperational stage (ages 2 to 7); concrete operational stage (ages 7 to 11); and formal 
operational stage (age 11 onwards). 
92 For example, Article 26 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  
(Rome Statute) (entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 excludes the criminal 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) over persons younger than 18. 
Every municipal criminal justice system also used such age delineations to determine 
the age of criminal responsibility. To use one example: in terms of s34 of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, British municipal criminal law provides that age 10 is the minimum 
age for criminal responsibility. Preceding the Crime and Disorder Act a rebuttable 
presumption existed in British common law, presuming that children between the ages 
10 and 14 were doli incapax. 
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ethnography.93 Rosen sides with the new social-scientific side of this 
debate, arguing for the voluntary nature of children’s decisions.94 Those 
arguing for the decisional abilities of children place a further emphasis on 
greater participatory rights for children.95 Freedom of association and 
freedom of expression are also used to argue for the autonomy of the 
child.96 Yet, Van Bueren states that “…to regard the issue as only that of 
protection versus participation is too simplistic as some children will not 
survive unless taken into the armed forces”. 97  When I interviewed 
Zermatten, deputy-chair (now chair) of the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, he emphasised that the paradigm shift from child protection to 
child rights has not yet been completed.98 
 
If it is true that all theorists will agree that at some developmental stage a 
child cannot make the informed decision to participate freely in conflict, 
there will be no pragmatic option but to apply the theory of cognitive 
development. This necessitates determining a yardstick age, to be used 
to determine whether a child has the ability to exercise free choice to join 
an armed force or group. This will be the case regardless of the fact that 
some children develop faster than others.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Prout, A. & James, A. ‘A New Paradigm for the Sociology of Childhood’ in Prout, A. & 
James, A. Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood (1990), 8.  
94 Rosen, note 20 above, 133. 
95 Van Bueren, note 85 above 19, 335; Children of War Report from the Conference on 
Children in War (1991) Raoul Wallenberg Institute Report No 10. 
96 Van Bueren, note 85 above, 335.  
97 Ibid. 
98 I interviewed Mr Zermatten on 2 February 2011 in Geneva, Switzerland. 
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Clearly, international law cannot function without determining a cut-off 
age. However, that cut-off age is subject to criticism on the grounds that 
neither the fifteen nor eighteen-year-old yardsticks were established in 
terms of age parameters based upon psychiatric developmental data. 
Instead these yardsticks were developed arbitrarily in terms of societal 
constructs of age and corresponding social roles. However, the best 
interest of the child is a trite principle of international law. It calls for a 
higher threshold that includes individuals with the decision-making 
competencies to voluntarily join armed forces or groups. This is so in 
order to protect those who do not posses comparable decision making 
competencies.  
 
ii. Proximate Causes of Child Soldiering  
With reference to the causes of child soldiering Singer speaks of 
“enablers of war”,99 whereas Ames breaks these causes up into four 
categories. 100  “Grievance factors” include poverty, loss of parents, 
ethnicity, political beliefs, etc. “Inducement factors” include pay, glory, 
future material gain, etc. “Solidarity factors” include group cohesion, 
village networks, and friends. “Accessibility factors” include presence and 
vulnerability of refugee camps. These factors are focused more at the 
supply than the demand of child soldiers.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Singer ‘Enablers of War’, note 3 above 93-107. 
100 Ames, B. ‘Methodological Problems in the Study of Child Soldiers’ in Gates, S. & 
Reich, S. (eds.) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (2009), 15.  
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In employing Andvig and Gates’ terminology “supply and demand”, a 
distinction is created between the factors that influence the decision to 
join an armed group, the supply, and the factors that influence the 
decision to enlist children, the demand. In abduction cases it is only the 
recruiter’s actions and decisions that are relevant. Nevertheless, with 
voluntary enlistment, factors associated with the decision of the adult 
actor to accept the enlistment of the child is still very relevant – 
specifically from an international law point of view as international law 
only concerns itself with the decisions and actions of the adult and not the 
child.  
 
The low cost, convenience and added value of child soldiers coupled with 
the impunity of commanders, results in broad-based child recruitment.  As 
Singer states, “the costs are outweighed by the benefits”.101 In the field, 
commanders have difficulty in replenishing their ranks and commanders 
are well aware of the actual or perceived benefits the use and recruitment 
of child soldiers hold. Therefore it happens that lower-level field 
commanders recruit children even where the leaders of the group 
denounce the use of child soldiers. This creates many obstacles for 
effective prevention.102 It is also often argued that children are easily 
programmable to execute the most horrible attacks.103  Commentators 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Singer Children at War, note 18 above, 52.  
102 Pollar, note 19 above; Wessells, note 67 above, 32.  
103 Briggs, J. Innocents Lost (2005) at xi; Singer Children at War, note 18 above, 87 
quotes a former Liberian militia commander as saying “Children make the best and 
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have paid little attention to the strategic use of child soldiers as an 
asymmetrical conflict structure. As I have previously argued, this presents 
the second dimension to the demand for child soldiers.  
 
A multitude of factors have been identified as causes of child soldiering. 
These include poverty, need for shelter, need for ‘family’, etc. There is no 
use in listing each of the factors that have been identified by theorists, as 
there is no systematic model that presents these factors in any specific 
order or even data that supports the contention that they do contribute to 
child soldiering. No existing model adequately takes into account the 
proximity of specific causes to the problem, nor is the interplay 
acknowledged between these seemingly independent causes.  
 
In their empirical study, Reich and Achvarina argue that “while poverty 
may remain a necessary condition for the advent of child soldiers, and 
thus may possibly have a threshold effect, it certainly does not offer an 
effective causal explanation for child soldier rates”.104 Similarly, these 
authors dismiss the suggested link between large pools of orphans and 
child soldiers. 105  They do, however, find that there is a strong link 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
bravest… Don’t overlook them. They can fight more than we people. It is hard for them 
to just retreat”. 
104 Reich, SF. & Achvarina, A. ‘Why do Children Fight? Explaining Child Soldier Ratios in 
African Intra-State Conflicts’ Ford Institute (2005), 40.  
105 Ibid. 
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between the access that these armed groups have to IDP and refugee 
camps and child soldiering.106  
 
Further similar research can be very beneficial to child soldier 
preventative strategies, as identifying poverty as a root cause of child 
soldiering has little effect. One cannot tackle global poverty as a child 
soldier preventative strategy. It is much more realistic for peacekeeping 
missions to provide greater protection to refugee camps. However, more 
research is called for in this regard as there seems to be a disjuncture in 
Reich and Achvarina’s reasoning. Firstly, people in refugee and IDP 
camps are, virtually without exception, poor. Those with means have the 
mobility to flea the area in which they are being persecuted and take 
refuge further afield. As such, one cannot dismiss poverty as a root cause 
of child soldiering. Indeed, in dismissing poverty as a key cause, Reich 
and Achvarina state that “richer countries may not have child soldiers in 
intrastate conflict. But neither do child soldiers serve in all poor ones”.107 
This reasoning leaves much to be desired, as by the same token, neither 
were all child soldiers refugees/IDPs nor are all refugee/IDP camps in 
conflict affected areas plagued by child soldier recruitment. Virtually all 
children who become child soldiers live in extreme poverty.  
 
This is not the entire picture. The specific causes of child soldiering 
cannot be considered without considering the contextual matrix within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Ibid.  
107 Ibid. 
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which they exert their various influences. Singer employs a more 
contextual approach by breaking the causes up into three critical factors 
which, he argues, form a causal chain:  
 
1) Social disruptions and failures of development caused by 
globalization, war and disease that have led not only to a greater 
global conflict and instability, but also to generational disconnections; 
2) Technological improvements to small weapons now permit these child 
recruits to be effective participants in war fare; and  
3) There has been a rise in a new type of conflict that is far more brutal 
and criminalized (“post-modern conflict”).108 
 
These factors form part of the greater context that facilitate the use of 
child soldiers, and are not the root causes. Thus, this contextual 
approach is applicable to both forced and voluntary recruitment. Similarly, 
Honwana’s application of the “war-scapes” concept to child soldiering 
also finds application.109  
 
4. SUMMARY   
The first of the two research questions identified in this study poses the 
question whether positive law together with its enforcement mechanisms 
can contribute social change in the context of the prevention of the use 
and recruitment of child soldiers. At the start of this Chapter I argued that, 
in order for international law to act as an agent of social change, attempts 
at the prevention of the use and recruitment of child soldiers should 
address the social reality of child soldiering, not the perceived reality. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Singer, note 18 above, 37-38.  
109 Honwana, note 40 above, 42. 
	   113	  
Each of the three sections of this Chapter serves to delineate this social 
reality.  
 
Investigating the distribution of child soldiers serves two purposes. It 
indicates the scope of the problem and suggests where preventative 
efforts should be focused geographically. I argued that the extent of the 
problem cannot be indicated quantitatively, as there are no reliable data. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that, geographically, child soldiering is a problem 
of global proportions, affecting hundreds of thousands of children. Works 
such as Becker’s are telling in this regard: “although precise figures are 
impossible to establish, the number of child soldiers in the region [Asia] is 
likely to exceed 75 000”.110 
 
Children function in a range of different capacities during armed conflict. 
Some participate directly in hostilities and others indirectly; yet others are 
recruited during peacetime. The use of child soldiers as an asymmetrical 
conflict structure indicates that the rationale for the use of child soldiers is 
not as one-dimensional as traditionally thought. There are more entry 
points in engaging with governments to end the use and recruitment of 
child soldiers than with non-state entities. Governments are still among 
the principal violators of the prohibition against the use and recruitment of 
child soldiers, whether the national armed forces directly engage in child 
use or recruitment, or the government supports a proxy force that does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Becker, J. ‘Child Recruitment in Burma, Sri Lanka and Nepal’ in Gates, S. & Reich, S. 
(eds.) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (2009), 108. 
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so. This creates a valuable entry point for the enforcement and 
application of international law rules prohibiting child soldiering that 
should be pursued in the “era of application”. 
 
Finally, the causes of child soldiering are a contested domain. 
Unfortunately, there is a strong argument to be made that many children 
join armed groups in their legitimate pursuit of self-preservation. 
Undoubtedly, there are many children who have survived because they 
joined armed forces or groups. For this reason alone, the supply of child 
soldiers in many regions remains very strong. This speaks to an even 
deeper structural problem than child soldiering. Nevertheless, 
international law does not prohibit a child from being a soldier; it prohibits 
the use and recruitment of children. As such, the law is aimed not at the 
supply of child soldiers, but at the demand for child soldiers.   
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CHAPTER 3 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND HUMANITARIAN 
LAW: AN INTEGRATED INTERNATIONAL LAW 
RESPONSE TO THE PREVENTION OF CHILD 
SOLDIERING 
 
The history of international humanitarian law (IHL) is vastly different from 
that of international human rights law (IHRL). Modern IHL’s first written 
incarnations appeared in the form of the Lieber Code and the first 
Geneva Conventions, of 1863 and 1864 respectively.1 By that time the 
law of war, as it then was, had enjoyed a very long history in customary 
practice.2 Indeed, custom has always dictated practice during armed 
conflict, and by 2000 BC the Egyptians and Sumerians had treaties in 
place regulating the initiation and conduct of armed conflict.3 The law of 
war aims at balancing military necessity and prevailing considerations of 
humanity. By the turn of the century, with the adoption of the Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907, a slow but steady movement was 
initiated, progressively shifting this balance towards prevailing 
considerations of humanity. Conversely, in the case of IHRL, a much 
more recent legal phenomenon, custom followed treaty obligations. The 
internationalization of human rights law emerged after the First World 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lieber Code, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field (1863); Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies 
in the Field, Geneva (22 August 1864).  
2 Bernhardt, R. Encyclopaedia of Public International Law Volume 2 (1992) at 933-936; 
Ober, J. ‘Classical Greek Times’ in Howard, M. Andreopoulos, GJ. & Shulman, MR 
(eds.) The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (1994). 
3 Friedman, L. (ed.) The Law of War (1972), 3; Bassiouni, MC. ‘Repression of Breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions under the Draft Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949’ 8 Rutgers-Cam L.J. (1976-1977), 185. 
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War and was only mainstreamed after the Second World War in the form 
of the Charter of the United Nations of 1945 and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.4 Hereafter, state practice followed 
suit resulting in a large body of customary international law.  
 
Today child soldiering is prohibited by various transnational and municipal 
legal regimes, among which IHL, IHRL and International Criminal Law 
(ICL) are most important. This chapter commences by analysing the 
relationship between IHL and IHRL, which has only recently begun 
receiving the attention it deserves, and no proper analysis of this 
relationship has previously been undertaken in relation to child soldier 
prevention. I anticipate that a thorough understanding of this relationship 
and the corresponding application of norms belonging to these regimes 
may yield significant results in the prevention of child soldiering. 
Hereafter, the proscriptive content of child soldier prohibitive norms 
belonging to IHL and IHRL are assessed separately. Finally, customary 
international law norms prohibiting child soldiering are assessed.   
 
1. THE CO-APPLICATION OF IHRL AND IHL IN THE PREVENTION OF 
THE USE AND RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS 
Child soldier prohibitive rules are ‘hybrid’ in nature, spanning the divide 
between IHL and IHRL.5 Prohibiting the use of children in armed conflict 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (1948). 
5 Schabas, WA. ‘Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human 
Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum’ 40 Isr. 
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is, by definition, dependent on the existence of armed conflict, and as 
such relates more to IHL. Yet, the recruitment of child soldiers is also 
prohibited during times of peace, when IHL is not applicable at all, and 
thus IHRL is responsible for prohibiting such recruitment. It is not, 
however, the characteristics of a specific norm that determine whether 
the norm belongs to IHL or IHRL, but also the nature of the instrument to 
which the norm belongs.  
 
The child soldier prohibition in the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) is almost a verbatim restatement of the corresponding norm in 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.6 Even though these 
norms are materially the same, the CRC norm, as an IHRL norm, creates 
obligations only on state parties and applies during peace and armed 
conflict, whereas the Additional Protocol I norm, an IHL norm, creates 
obligations on all parties to the armed conflict and applies only during 
armed conflict. Assessing the relationship between IHL and IHRL in the 
context of child soldiering is thus very important as there is potential for 
norm conflict between the IHL and IHRL regimes as they pertain to child 
soldier prohibition. The large majority of this section relates to the 
relationship between IHL and IHRL in general, and not child soldiering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
L. Rev. 592 (2007), 603. It is difficult to classify child soldier prohibitive norms as either 
IHL or IHRL norms. The prohibition of the use of child soldiers is more akin to the IHL 
regime, whereas the prohibition of the recruitment of children is more akin to the IHRL 
regime. Schabas contends that these norms are hybrid in nature. 
6 Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (entered into force 2 September 
1990) 1577 UNTS 3; and article 77(2) of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 
UNTS 17512. 
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specifically. This assessment is necessary in order to address potential 
norm conflict.  
 
It is trite law that IHL is reserved for the exclusive domain of armed 
conflict. In the early days of IHRL this led many to believe that IHRL is 
reserved for the exclusive domain of times of peace.7 Time has proven 
this assumption to be false.8 Nevertheless, IHRL instruments and state 
practice of that era were often premised on the inapplicability of IHRL 
during times of armed conflict. By 1968 it had become clear that IHRL 
does apply during armed conflict and so began the growth of substantive 
IHRL to cover situations of armed conflict.9 However, it was only during 
1996 that the ICJ found that IHRL continues to apply during armed 
conflict.10 
 
After the emergence of IHRL, commentators began drawing parallels 
between these two legal regimes.11 Over time these parallels resulted in 
a two-dimensional narrative along the lines that the influence of IHRL is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See for example Draper, GIAD. ‘Human Rights and the Law of War’ 12 Va. J. Int'l L. 
326 (1971-1972) 332 & 338. 
8 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case (Nuclear Weapons case) ICJ 
Reports (1996) para 25. 
9  ‘Human Rights in Armed Conflicts’ Resolution XXIII adopted by the International 
Conference on Human Rights, Teheran (12 May 1968). 
10 Nuclear Weapons case, note 8 above, para 25. 
11 Early commentators included Draper, GIAD. ‘Humanitarian Law and Human Rights’ 
Acta Juridica 193 (1979), 199 & 205; Kuntz, JL. ‘The Laws of War’ 50 AJIL 313 (1956), 
322; Meron, T. ‘A Report on the NYU Conference on Teaching International Protection 
of Human Rights’ 13 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 881 (1980-1981), 914-939. More resent 
commentators include Orakhelashvili, A. ‘The Interaction between Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or Convergence?’ 19 EJIL 
(2008), 161; Arnold, R. and Quenivet, N. (eds) International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law (2008). 
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progressively ‘humanizing’ IHL;12 and that these two bodies of law are 
developing towards a ‘convergence’ or ‘fusion’. 13  However, some 
commentators were more weary of these arguments – during 1967 
Bassiouni wrote that “the humanization of armed conflict has been the 
object of regulation and concern by every civilization for centuries”;14 and 
during 1979, Draper warned against this new movement towards the 
“fusion” of these legal regimes saying that IHRL and IHL are 
“diametrically opposed”.15  
 
Arguing that IHRL is humanizing IHL, speaks to the substantive content 
of IHL, whereas, the convergence of these regimes speaks not only to the 
substantive content, but also the formal nature of these regimes, which 
includes their respective objectives.  
 
i. The ‘Humanization’ of IHL 
IHL is the older of the two regimes, and like IHRL the existence of IHL is 
dependent on the promotion of principles of humanity – the name 
‘international humanitarian law’ is telling. As Meron states: “Chivalry and 
principles of humanity created a counterbalance to military necessity, 
serving as a competing inspiration for the law of armed conflict. Indeed, 
tension between military necessity and restraint on the conduct of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Meron, T. ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 239 (2000), 239-
278. 
13 Draper, note 11 above. 
14 Bassiouni, note 3 above, 185. 
15 Draper, note 11 above, 199 & 205. 
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belligerents is the hallmark of that law”.16 Meron goes on to argue that the 
balance between these two competing interests has shifted over time; 
where the bias used to be in favour of military necessity, that bias has 
shifted in favour of principles of humanity.17  
 
Nevertheless, there is a cause/effect problem with the broad-based 
argument that it is primarily the human rights legal regime that inspired or 
effected the change in this balance. Even though international law has 
become more individual-focused, it is still states that ‘create’ international 
law. As such, it is the interests, motives and principles of states that 
dictate the trends within new law and practice. If principles of humanity 
become more aligned with state interests, this development will trickle 
through to virtually all state actions, including the creation and new 
interpretation of law. Placing the IHRL regime firmly on the agenda is as 
much an expression of states’ values as is the progressive reform of IHL 
from a system stacked in favour of military necessity to one stacked in 
favour of humanitarianism.  
 
Nevertheless, the parallel development of these branches of law, that 
share an obvious relation to one another, has resulted in a situation 
where one branch can be influenced by the other. As the parameters of 
IHL are more restrictive, indeed it is generally considered to be the lex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Meron, note 12 above, 243. 
17 Ibid, 243-244.  
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specialis of the two,18 IHL which will be influenced by IHRL far more 
often. Still there are examples of IHL provisions that have been included 
in IHRL instruments. 
 
One further area where IHRL directly influences IHL is through the 
interpretation of IHL by bodies created by Human Rights instruments.19 
The only judicial bodies directly tasked with the interpretation and 
application of IHL are the international criminal tribunals, and this function 
accounts for only part of their duties.20  
 
ii. The Convergence of IHL and IHRL  
While the substantive content of the two regimes largely overlap, the 
raison d’être for their existence is different. IHL aims to regulate the 
conduct of hostilities and protect the victims of war, whereas IHRL aims 
to provide protection to individuals from the abuse of power by states (this 
includes the obligation to promote, protect, respect and fulfil fundamental 
rights). As function dictates form, the structure of each regime is tailored 
to achieve its specific goals.  
 
While the ius in bello realm of law concerns itself not with the lawfulness 
of conflict, but with its conduct and effects, there are developments within 
IHRL that view the existence of conflict a violation per se. As Schabas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Nuclear Weapons case, note 8 above, para 25. 
19 See for example “Mapiripán Massacre” v Colombia Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (15 September 2005) para 114. 
20 See Chapter 4.  
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states, there is a right to peace, albeit under-developed.21 This is affirmed 
by one of the resolutions adopted at the 1968 UN Conference of Human 
Rights, entitled ‘Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ which holds: 
“considering that peace is the underlying condition for the full observance 
of human rights and war is their negation”.22  
 
The neutral approach of IHL as regards the unlawfulness of any party to a 
conflict’s acts ius ad bellum is dependent on the principle of equality of 
belligerents. This principle is central to the enforcement of IHL. The 
equality of belligerents means “the rules of international humanitarian law 
apply with equal force to both sides to the conflict, irrespective of who is 
the aggressor”.23 One of the primary effects of this rule is that all parties 
to a conflict governed by IHL will be bound by IHL, including non-state 
actors. Sassòli and Olson have identified two constructions that account 
for this phenomenon. First and foremost, when states ratify treaties or 
practice custom they implicitly confer the necessary legal capacity on 
such non-state groups to incur obligations under IHL.24 Second, such 
obligations will also be founded on municipal law through municipal 
implementation. 25  However, obligations founded on the second 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Schabas, note 5 above, 593; see also Sassòli, M. & Bouvier AA. How Does Law 
Protect in War: Cases, Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in 
International Humanitarian Law (1999), 266.  
22 Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, note 9 above.  
23 Greenwood, C. ‘Historical Development and Legal Basis’ in Fleck, D. The Handbook 
of International Humanitarian Law (2008), 11. 
24 Sassòli, M. How Does Law Protect in War (1999), 214-217. It is well accepted that 
non-state groups incur such obligations. However, the reasoning is still somewhat 
unsound.  
25 Ibid. 
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construction are municipal law obligations not international and even the 
first construction is not wholly satisfactory. Be that as it may, it is well 
recognized that non-state parties incur such obligations. IHRL on the 
other hand only provides for obligations on states. As is the case with the 
contrary position within IHL, this can be traced to the fundamental aims of 
IHRL. Thus even where IHRL endeavours to dictate the actions of non-
state entities this is attempted through the instrumentality of a state, by 
creating obligations on the state. In order to comply with such an 
obligation a state party will then, for example, enact municipal criminal 
legislation that aims to direct the behaviour of non-state entities. 
Furthermore, IHRL is more concerned with vertical power relationships 
and IHL more with horizontal power relationships.26 
 
iii. Resolving Norm Conflict 
The polar opposite to arguments suggesting the convergence of IHL and 
IHRL is the conflict of norms within these legal regimes. This problem is 
only material if two norms apply to the same subject matter and there is 
an irreconcilable conflict between them;27 or else both may apply in 
harmony. There are numerous possibilities when there are two or more 
conflicting rules on the same substantive subject matter in international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Bowring, B. ‘Fragmentation, Lex Specialis and the Tensions in the Jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights’ 14 J. Conflict & Sec. L. 485 (2009), 490.  
27 Fitzmaurice, G. ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951 – 
4: Treaty Interpretation and other Treaty Points’ British Yearbook of International Law 33 
(1957), 237-238. 
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law.28 However, two specific methods will be discussed, as contemporary 
international legal practice prefers the second and international law 
scholars have recently drawn some attention to the first. 29  The first 
approach has its roots in the ‘more favourable principle’ founded in 
human rights law in terms of which the rule that provides the best 
protection must prevail. It has been suggested that this rule must be 
applied, mutatis mutandis, to conflicts between IHL and IHRL.30 The 
second approach calls for the application of the maxim lex specialis 
derogat legi generali. The lex specialis rule is a rule of interpretation, 
accepted in international law, which provides that “where two or more 
norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be given to the 
rule that is more specific”.31  
 
The ICJ advisory opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case 
is now widely regarded as the locus classicus dealing with conflict of 
norms among IHL and IHRL.32 The case has bearing on both the ‘more 
favourable principle’ as well as the application of the lex specialis rule. 
The Court was called upon by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations to render an advisory opinion. The General Assembly asked “is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Lindroos, A. ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine 
of Lex Specialis’ 74 Nordic J. Int’l L. 27 (2005), 41. 
29 Ibid; Schabas, note 5 above, 593; Sadat-Akhavi, SA. Methods of Resolving Conflicts 
between Treaties (2003) 213-232. 
30 Schabas, ibid, 593 & 599. 
31  Koskenniemi, M. ‘Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the 
diversification and expansion of international law, Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006; Report of the 
International Law Commission (ILC), Fifty-sixth session, UN Doc A/59/10, 408 para 5.  
32 Nuclear Weapons case, note 8 above, para 25. 
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the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under 
international law?”33 The right to life provision under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is raised as one of the 
possible treaty provisions that could render the threat or use of such 
weapons a violation of international law per se. This provision holds 
“every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”.34 The 
Court held “the test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, 
then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the 
law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct 
of hostilities”.35 
 
More Favourable Principle  
The more favourable principle is problematic in its application between 
norms belonging to two different branches of law, as opposed to between 
two human rights law norms. Within the ambit of human rights law, states’ 
obligations are generally founded on their agreement to be bound to such 
norms (or through customary international law). Their undertaking to be 
so bound draws no distinction between the scope of application of IHRL 
norms, except for limitations found within treaties. Yet, essentially states 
undertake obligations to be applied in the same jurisdiction and to be 
interpreted and applied within the same formal legal framework that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 General Assembly Resolution 49/75K (15 December 1994).  
34 Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force 
23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.  
35 Nuclear Weapons case, note 8 above, para 25. 
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determine such obligations, i.e. human rights law. The norms within that 
branch subscribe to the same overarching ratio. Thus, applying the most 
favoured principle within IHRL makes sense – determining that one rule 
applies in lieu of another has no bearing on the state’s consent to be 
bound, indeed the state agreed to bound to the two provisions equally.  
 
Applying the principle to IHRL and IHL inter se provides some problems 
with regard to the pacta sunt servanda principle, “the most basic norm of 
customary international law”.36 This principle provides that once a state 
has undertaken a commitment, it must be carried out in good faith as the 
state expressly agreed to be so bound.37 As has been acknowledged with 
regard to the lex specialis principle, treaties must be interpreted to give 
the best expression to the state’s consent.38 Applying the most favourable 
principle between IHL and IHRL in a given case might be contra states’ 
consent. This is well illustrated by the problem the ICJ faced in the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons case. The application of the most favoured 
principle would have resulted in a finding that the right to life provision 
under the ICCPR prevails over the conflicting IHL provisions. This would 
go completely contrary to the basic existence of the law of war.39 From an 
individualist perspective IHRL will almost inevitably provide better 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Gormley, WP. ‘The Codification of Pacta Sunt Servanda by the International Law 
Commission: The Preservation of Classical Norms of Moral Force and Good Faith’ 14 
St. Louis U. L.J. 370 (1969-1970), 371. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Akehurst, M. ‘The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law’ British Yearbook of 
International Law XLVII (1974-1975), 273; Lindroos, note 28 above, 36-37. 
39 Garraway, C. ‘“To Kill or Not to Kill?” Dilemmas on the Use of Force’, Journal of 
Conflict & Security Law 14 (2009), 500-510. 
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protection than IHL in a situation where there is a norm conflict between 
the two regimes. The ‘more favourable principle’ is accordingly not useful 
to determine the outcome of a norm conflict between these two regimes.  
 
Lex specialis derogat legi generali  
The Court’s finding in the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case that 
“the test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, [...] then falls to be 
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in 
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities”,40 
has two very important implications. First, in instances of armed conflict 
IHL is always the lex specialis. The finding in the Palestinian Wall Case 
supports this contention.41 Second, the lex specialis does not supplant 
IHRL in toto. The ICCPR remains applicable, as does the right to life, but 
arbitrary deprivation is then determined in terms of the prevailing lex 
specialis. As Koskenniemi states, this is in keeping with the principle of 
harmonization. 42  The ICJ had further opportunity to consider these 
matters in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory case (Palestinian Wall case) and the 
Armed Activities on the Territories of the Congo (DRC v Uganda) case.43 
In the Palestinian Wall Case the Court held:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Nuclear Weapons case, note 8 above, para 25. 
41  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory case ICJ Reports (2004) para 106. 
42 Koskenniemi, note 31 above para 9. 
43 Armed Activities on the Territories of the Congo (DRC v Uganda) case ICJ Reports 
(2005).  
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[...] the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in 
case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation 
[...].  As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law 
and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights 
may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may 
be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of 
both these branches of international law.  In order to answer the question 
put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches 
of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, 
international humanitarian law.44 
 
Schabas contends that this formulation is incorrect in law. His argument 
is based on his own paraphrased version of the Court’s dicta: “three 
scenarios are possible, namely the application of international human 
rights law, the application of international humanitarian law, and the 
application of both branches of law”.45 The Court found that the case at 
hand fell into the last category. Schabas states that lex specialis is not 
invoked if both branches apply, and that more properly lex specialis 
relates to the second category. His formulation of the three options is 
strictly-speaking not correct. The Court did not speak of the possible 
application of the branches of law, but instead the relevant rights being 
“exclusively matters of” the specific branches of law. Schabas is correct 
that in option two the lex specialis, being IHL is applicable. However, the 
basis for its application in option two is not its nature as being lex 
specialis, but instead the fact that it is the only branch that finds 
application with regard to the specific issue at hand – there is no conflict 
of norms as IHRL is not applicable and no rule of interpretation is 
required to decide the applicability of a regime. Schabas goes on to state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Palestinian Wall case, note 41 above para 106.  
45 Schabas, note 5 above, 597. 
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that where both systems apply simultaneously the construction will only 
work if the bodies of law are perfectly compatible.46 This is not correct. 
They will arguably never be perfectly compatible, as the two bodies 
create obligations for different groups, i.e. IHL creates obligations on non-
state groups and IHRL does not. In the final sentence of the Court’s 
judgment quoted, it is said that the Court will consider both branches of 
law, namely “human rights law and, as lex specialis, international 
humanitarian law”.47 This brings this judgment completely in line with the 
Nuclear Weapons case. In the DRC v Uganda case the Court did deal 
with violations of both IHL and IHRL, but did not deal with the clash of 
these branches of law. As such, that judgement is of less relevance and 
has lead some commentators to suggest that the Court is moving away 
from the lex specialis approach, to resolving norm conflict.48 However, 
this is pure speculation. By virtue of the Court not expressly dealing with 
the lex specialis approach it can equally be interpreted as the Court 
viewing the matter as having been dealt with. No alternative approach 
was used or implemented. Indeed, judgement in the Palestinian Wall 
case was rendered on 9 July 2004 whereas judgment in the DRC v 
Uganda case was rendered on 19 December 2005. It is unlikely that in 
the Court’s interpretation the law had developed to that extent in a mere 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ibid, 598. 
47 Palestinian Wall case, note 41 above para 106. 
48 Scobbie, I. ‘Principle or Pragmatics? The Relationship between Human Rights Law 
and the Law of Armed Conflict’ 14 J. Conflict & Sec. L. 449 (2009), 453. Prud’homme, N. 
‘Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?’ 40 Isr. 
L. Rev. 356 (2007), 385.  
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18 months. It is more likely that the court did not refer to the lex specialis 
approach as there was no irreconcilable norm conflict in that case.   
 
Where the ICJ held that IHL will always be the lex specialis, 49 some 
commentators leave room for IHRL to sometimes be the lex specialis.50 
The real distinguishing feature of this argument from that rendered by the 
ICJ is that the ICJ categorised IHL as an independent “norm system”,51 or 
“self-contained regime”. 52  Thus justifying that IHL as a whole is lex 
specialis and not the specific relevant norm. Proponents of this second 
approach postulate that this is incorrect, one must not look at the nature 
of the self-contained regime to determine which of two contesting, but 
overlapping, rules will prevail. Instead, one must look at the relevant 
specific rules to determine which one is the lex specialis vis-a-vis the 
other. This interpretation is sound, as lex specialis is not a substantive 
rule of international law, but instead a more mechanical construction of 
interpretation that lacks clear content.53 Lex specialis can be used both in 
the context of individual rules and different ‘self-contained regimes’. The 
question thus becomes which approach is appropriate in the case of IHL 
and IHRL.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Some commentators suggest that IHL supplants HRL completely, see Dennis, MJ. 
‘Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially to Detention of Combatants and 
Security Internees: Fuzzy thinking all around?’ 12 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. (2005-2006), 
472-475. 
50 Lindroos, note 28 above, 28, Sassòli, M. & Olson, LM. ‘The relationship between 
international humanitarian and human rights law where it matters: admissible killing and 
internment of fighters in non-international armed conflicts’ 90 ICRC Review Number 871 
(2008), 603-605. 
51 Lindroos, ibid, 28. 
52 Koskenniemi, note 31 above, 410-412. 
53 Lindroos, note 28 above, 36. 
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The rationale for holding that IHL, as a self-contained regime, is the lex 
specialis vis-a-vis IHRL, is that IHL is applicable only in the context of 
regulating the conduct of hostilities and the protection of victims of war. 
Thus, it is IHL’s narrow scope of application that renders it lex specialis. 
There is somewhat of a fallacy in this argument. Only in the event of 
conflict between two specific norms will the lex specialis nature of the one 
be assessed. Yet, instead of looking at the two relevant norms, the nature 
of the regime is reverted to to determine the order of the specific norms. 
When an IHRL norm is applicable to a matter that is relevant to either the 
conduct of hostilities or the protection of victims of war, and there is no 
corresponding IHL norm, the nature of the legal regime of IHRL will be 
immaterial. Thus, the content of the relevant norms should have an 
impact on the assessment. The limited scope of application of IHL 
remains a factor in determining which of two norms is the lex specialis, 
and may well be decisive.  
 
International law, with the exception of jus cogens and article 103 of the 
UN Charter, is a regime that knows no hierarchy. Yet, situations can and 
do arise in terms of which two valid, applicable and binding norms that 
are mutually exclusive compete for application. In a strict sense, the 
primacy of one norm over the other, regardless of the legal reasoning, 
disposes of this foundational aspect of international law, that there are no 
hierarchies. However, conflict of norms cannot arise where a hierarchical 
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structure is recognized – there will be no conflict as one norm will take 
precedence as a matter of law, except if both norms are of the same 
ranking in the hierarchical structure. How then can the resolution of norm 
conflict be achieved without resulting in the recognition of a hierarchical 
norm structure? The lex specialis rule ultimately gives greater effect to 
state consent - pacta sunt servanda. Within treaty law, where a state is 
bound by two conflicting norms it is presumed that the state intended for 
the rule that is more specific to the situation it applies to to be applicable. 
This construction does not necessarily affect the nature of the rule itself 
regarding hierarchy. For example, Sassòli argues that IHL should not 
always be the lex specialis where both IHL and IHRL are applicable. Thus 
in one situation one norm will be dominant, and potentially in another the 
other norm would be dominant. The rules are not inherently hierarchical. 
However, the ICJ dictum holds that IHL will always be the lex specialis. At 
least in the strict sense this can be seen as hierarchical preference.    
 
iv. IHL and IHRL: Potential Conflict of Norms  
Sadat-Akhavi defines conflict of norms: 
 
A conflict of norms arises when it is impossible to comply with all 
requirements of two norms. The impossibility if complying with two 
norms implies that the norms are mutually exclusive; they cannot 
coexist in a legal order. Compliance with one norm entails non-
compliance with the other.54  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Sadat-Akhavi, note 29 above, 1. 
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Although different treaties provide for different standards of protection, 
there is no conflict of norms between two norms prohibiting child 
soldiering that prevents such norms from applying in harmony. However, 
the potential for conflict of norms is not limited to the substantive content 
of the two relevant norms only. The working of the two legal regimes may 
make the norms mutually exclusive.  
 
The obligations the Protocol to the CRC creates on non-state actors are 
stricter than those imposed upon state actors in two material respects. 
First, non-state actors may not recruit persons younger than eighteen 
under any circumstances, whereas the Protocol allows for the recruitment 
of children aged sixteen to eighteen by state parties. Second, state 
parties must take all feasible measures to ensure that persons younger 
than eighteen do not take a direct part in hostilities, whereas non-state 
entities may not under any circumstances use children, directly or 
indirectly, in hostilities.  
 
The equality of belligerents is a foundational principle central to the 
enforcement of IHL, specifically in the context of non-international armed 
conflict (NIAC),55 and provides, “the rules of international humanitarian 
law apply with equal force to both sides to the conflict, irrespective of who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Sassòli, note 24 above, 214-217; Somer, J. ‘Jungle justice: passing sentence on the 
equality of belligerents in non-international armed conflict’ Volume 89 Number 867 ICRC 
Review (September 2007) at 655; Olson, LM. ‘Practical Challenges of Implementing the 
Complementarity between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law – 
Demonstrated by the Procedural Regulation of Internment in Non-International Armed 
Conflict’ 40 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 437 (2007-2009), 15. 
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is the aggressor”.56  Indeed, the existence of IHL is founded on equal 
treatment of parties regardless of the causes for the conflict, and 
specifically who the antagonists are. This in itself is an incarnation of the 
‘equality of belligerents’ principle. There is no norm conflict between the 
different standards of protection created by the Protocol. However, the 
fact that the Protocol creates different obligations on the basis of the 
status of the relevant group is in conflict with the IHL principle of the 
equality of belligerents. The lex specialis rule is applicable.57 In keeping 
with the dictum in the Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons 
case, the IHRL norms remain applicable even if IHL is the lex specialis, 
but must be interpreted so as not to conflict with the lex specialis. In the 
Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons case the impression 
was created that the right to life was completely supplanted by the more 
permissive rules of IHL. This has led many to mistakenly conclude that 
during armed conflict IHL supplants IHRL totally. In relation to the 
Protocol, the fact that there is conflict of norms does not mean that the 
Protocol finds no application. Instead, it must be applied in conformity 
with the lex specialis. This means that all parties must take all feasible 
measures to ensure that children younger than sixteen do not take a 
direct part in hostilities. This is the lowest common denominator. The 
continued application of the Protocol is evidenced in that the age 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Greenwood, note 23 above, 11. 
57 The rule is applicable between treaty and non-treaty standards, as in casu, see INA 
Corporation v Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran IRAN-US CTR Vol 8 (1985-I), 
378. 
	   135	  
threshold is sixteen, and not fifteen as is the case with all IHL child soldier 
prohibitive norms.  
 
The IHRL nature of the Protocol dictates that the obligation to enforce this 
stricter obligation on non-state groups lies with the state itself, as IHRL 
does not create obligations for non-state groups. Thus it may be argued 
that the equality of belligerents is not violated, due to the obligation being 
placed on the state. However, in effect, this creates a further inequality on 
the part of the non-state group. Not only does the non-state group not 
receive equal treatment of the law, but the duty to enforce this stricter 
standard lies in the hands of their opponents on the battle field, resulting 
in enforcement invariably remaining problematic.  
 
2. THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF CHILD SOLDIER PROHIBITIVE 
NORMS: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW  
IHL leads the way in prohibiting child soldiering. Although Geneva 
Convention IV has limited value from a child soldier prevention point of 
view, the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 
form the basis of international law’s response to child soldiering. Each of 
these conventions is discussed in the following section.  
 
Developments within the international criminal law (ICL) realm are the 
most recent and this branch of law is most active in relation to prohibiting 
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child soldiering. 58  The Rome Statute of the ICC criminalises child 
soldiering both in NIAC and IAC.59 War crimes are essentially IHL norms, 
the violation of which results in criminal sanction on the international 
plane. Nevertheless, ICL has expanded into a vast legal regime in its own 
right. Therefore, the war crime of child soldier enlistment, conscription 
and use, as well as associated developments in ICL is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 4. However, it should be noted that the SCSL has held that the 
war crime of child soldier enlistment, conscription and use has 
crystallised into a norm of customary international law.60  
 
i. The Geneva Conventions   
Norms prohibiting child soldiering are perhaps some of the best examples 
of the shift within IHL from military necessity/efficiency to 
humanitarianism. While humanity has always been a consideration in the 
‘laws and customs of war’, over time the balance between military 
necessity and humanity has shifted. In IHL of old, military 
necessity/efficiency enjoyed primacy and humanitarianism played a 
secondary role. The “humanization of humanitarian law”, as Meron terms 
it was perhaps a more gradual process. However, the Geneva 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 See Chapter 4 generally.  
59 Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (Rome Statute) (entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, relevant to 
international and non-international armed conflict respectively.  
60 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of 
Jurisdiction SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E) (31 May 2004) (hereinafter the ‘Child Recruitment 
decision’).  
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Conventions of 1949 marked the about turn.61 Child soldiers increase the 
military capacity of a given armed force, thus military necessity/efficiency 
provides no basis for prohibiting such conduct. The fact that child 
soldiering was first directly prohibited by the Protocols Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1977 perhaps indicates that this ‘humanization’ 
process is an on-going one which achieved a greater level of maturity by 
1977 as opposed to 1949.  
 
Only in a limited number of cases does Geneva Convention IV relate to 
protecting children from military recruitment, and indirectly so. 62  The 
terms ‘children’, ‘protected persons’ and ‘protected persons [...] over 
eighteen years of age’ are distinguished by these provisions. It has been 
argued that for the purposes of Geneva Convention IV ‘child’ or ‘children’ 
denotes a person under fifteen.63 Geneva Convention IV in fact creates 
many different categories according to age: children; young children; 
children under seven; children under twelve; children under fifteen; 
children and young people; protected persons over eighteen years of 
age; and protected persons under eighteen years of age.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Meron, note 12 above; although this trend to ‘humanize’ the law of armed conflict was 
first identified during the early 1960’s, Schwarzenberger, G. The Frontiers of 
International Law (1962) 256-273; Bassiouni, note 3 above, 185.  
62 Article 50 and 51 of Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287. 
63 Pictet, J. Commentary, IV Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (1958) ICRC, 395; Happold, M. Child Soldiers in International 
Law (2005), 56. 
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Like “children under seven” and “children under twelve”, “children under 
fifteen” creates a sub-genus of ‘children’. The concept “children” is used 
elsewhere in Geneva Convention IV. Interpretively, this indicates that 
‘children’ is a broader concept than “children under fifteen”. The category 
‘protected persons over eighteen years of age’ may be interpreted to 
mean that all people below eighteen years of age are protected persons 
by virtue of their age. The category ‘protected persons under eighteen 
years of age’ also exists and, prima facie, may oppose the former 
argument, as it may be suggested that there are also unprotected 
persons under eighteen. However, this category of persons only appears 
once in Geneva Convention IV, in this context: “In any case, the death 
penalty may not be pronounced on a protected person who was under 
eighteen years of age at the time of the offence.” 64  A viable and 
reasonable interpretation is that this provision only offers protection to 
persons who were ‘protected persons’ by virtue of their young age (under 
eighteen) at the time of commission of the crime. According to the 
Rapporteur “there should be no precise definition of the term children”.65 
This is a problematic position. The Geneva Conventions provide 
protection to people in various circumstances solely based on their age 
up to persons under eighteen.66 It is thus suggested that where the 
Geneva Conventions use the unqualified term ‘children’, depending on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Article 68 of Geneva Convention IV.  
65 O.R. XV. 465. CDDH/407/Rev 1, para 63. 
66 Of course reference is made here to measures aimed at protecting persons due to 
their young age, not old. 
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the circumstances, such children should include people under the age of 
eighteen.  
 
Academic commentators are quick to dismiss the relevance of Geneva 
Convention IV to child soldier prevention.67 It is generally argued that 
these Conventions were drafted in response to the Second World War 
(WW II) and child soldiering was not viewed as an IHL concern at the 
time.68 The provisions of the Geneva Conventions are disassociated from 
child soldier prevention, as these provisions are generally not framed as 
‘child soldier prohibitive norms’. A specific example is that all of the 
provisions of Geneva Convention VI that relate, albeit indirectly, to child 
soldier prohibition are limited to occupied territories. This is a significant 
limitation, and reflects the post WW II thinking. There are no situations at 
present where an occupying power is recruiting or using child soldiers 
from within the occupied community.  
 
Article 50 of Geneva Convention IV holds: “The Occupying Power shall 
take all necessary steps to facilitate the identification of children and the 
registration of their parentage. It may not, in any case, change their 
personal status, nor enlist them in formations or organizations 
subordinate to it”. 69  This provision has been explained as referring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 For example, neither Rosen nor Wessells mention a single article of the Geneva 
Conventions as relevant to child soldier prevention in their work; Wessells, M. Child 
Soldiers (2006) at 233; and Rosen, DM. Armies of the Young (2005), 139. 
68 Honwana, A. Child Soldiers in Africa (2006), 31. 
69 Article 50, Geneva Convention IV.  
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specifically to ideology based youth movements, such as those 
established in many countries of Europe under Nazi occupation and not 
to child soldier prevention.70 The protected class is ‘children’. Children are 
only protected from the Occupying Power. Thus, their own forces, and 
forces not hostile to them can enlist them in such movements. It is true 
that this article was intended to prohibit enlistment in ideology-based 
youth movements, however, the terminology employed by the article is 
“formations or organizations subordinate to it [the Occupying Power]”. 
Should it be established that armed forces of an occupying power fall 
within the broad scope of such subordinate formations or organizations; 
this article will prohibit the occupying power from enlisting children from 
within occupied territories into its armed forces.  
 
Article 51 of Geneva Convention IV holds: “The Occupying Power may 
not compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. No 
pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is 
permitted”.71 This article’s relevance to child soldiering is often explained 
away through the broadness of its scope of application.72 It is more 
specifically aimed at prohibiting the conscription of ‘protected persons’ in 
general, as opposed to children in particular. Pictet and Happold both 
point out that this article not only provides protection to protected 
individual persons, but “it is also concerned with the duties that those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Happold, note 63 above, 56. 
71 Article 51, Geneva Convention VI.  
72 Happold, note 63 above, 56. 
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individuals have to the states of which they are nationals”.73 It should be 
noted that the protection of an individual’s duty towards his state of 
nationality remains the protection of the individual person. Happold 
further points out that both article 50 and 51 are reaffirmations of the 
Hague Regulations of 1907.74 ‘Children’ are protected persons in terms of 
the Geneva Conventions; it is thus unconvincing to argue that this 
provision does not protect children from military recruitment merely 
because it also protects other classes of protected persons from such 
recruitment. However, once again the protection afforded is limited in that 
it only extends to protection from the Occupying Power. In child soldier 
preventative terms the provision is also unique in using the term “serve in 
its armed [...]” instead of enlistment, recruitment or conscription.  
 
Article 51 of Geneva Convention IV further holds: “[...] The Occupying 
Power may not compel protected persons to work unless they are over 
eighteen years of age [...] In no case shall requisition of labour lead to a 
mobilization of workers in an organization of a military or semi-military 
character”.75 Protected persons may thus be compelled to work, but not 
in organizations of a military or semi-military character. However, 
protected persons younger than eighteen years of age may not be 
compelled to work in any capacity. From a child rights/protection point of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ibid, 56; Pictet, J. Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1955) 
Geneva: ICRC Vol IV, 46. 
74 Happold, note 63 above, 56; Article 45 of The Hague Regulations Concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907).  
75 Article 51, Geneva Convention IV. 
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view this is a significant extension of the Hague Regulations of 1907. 
Lastly, by employing the language “an organization of a military or semi-
military character”, this article, more directly, also prohibits the Occupying 
Power from forcing such protected persons from serving in paramilitary 
groups distinct from, but in cohort with the Occupying Power.  
 
The three major shortcomings of Geneva Convention IV’s actual 
protection of child soldiers are first and foremost that it only protects the 
occupied people from an occupying power. Second, this also means that 
protection is limited to international armed conflicts (IAC). Third, there is a 
distinct lack of specificity in the provisions76 since commentators have 
long argued that the fact that none of the Geneva Convention provisions 
are aimed specifically at child soldiering relegates the Geneva 
Conventions to a position of irrelevance. Geneva Convention IV finds 
very limited application to child soldier prevention. Because reference is 
never made to child soldiers, awareness of the problem is not promoted 
at all and such an application of Geneva Convention IV requires more 
judicial initiative. The provisions of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions are in every way more suited to child soldier prevention. 
Thus, since the emergence of these provisions, the application of Geneva 
Convention IV is hardly at issue.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 However, had they been more specific it may well be that ‘child soldiering’ would 
positively have fallen outside the scope of these provisions and as such Geneva 
Convention IV. 
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ii. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions  
What sets IHL apart from IHRL is the fact that it must be triggered by 
armed conflict and so applies to regulate the conduct of the related 
hostilities and the protection of people, both civilian and military, during 
such conflict. The argument has been made that some provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols apply during “peace-time”, 
and that if any provision should so apply, the child soldier prohibition 
should. This argument is ill-conceived both with regard to the Geneva 
Conventions, and Additional Protocols, in general and with regard to the 
child soldier prohibitions specifically. Common article 2 to the Geneva 
Conventions state: 
 
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace-time, 
the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any 
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of 
them. 
 
Obviously, the argument is founded on the reference to peace-time, and 
in fact there are numerous provisions within the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol II that are applicable to times of peace.77 No modern 
treaty can function without provisions applicable during times of peace. 
For example, denouncing the Conventions will only take effect once 
peace has been attained, should the denouncing state be at war at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Articles 23, 26, 44, 47, 63 and Annex 1, Article 7 of Geneva Convention I; articles 44, 
48, 62 of Geneva Convention II; articles 127, 142 of Geneva Convention III; articles 14, 
38, 70, 144, 158, Annex 1, Article 7 of Geneva Convention IV; and articles 6, 18, 60, 66, 
83 of Additional Protocol I; Additional Protocol II makes no reference to ‘peace’. 
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time of the denouncement.78 However, there is not a single provision 
applicable to ‘peace-time’ that either regulates the conduct of hostilities or 
the protection of victims of war, i.e. the law of the Hague and the law of 
Geneva respectively. The fallacy in an argument that any substantive and 
proper IHL provision of the Geneva Conventions applies during ‘peace-
time’ is well illustrated by attempting to determine the nature of the armed 
conflict in deciding which Protocol to apply and whether common article 3 
is applicable. If there is no armed conflict, it cannot be international in 
nature, as such, the whole of the Geneva Conventions, save for common 
article 3, will not be applicable. Furthermore, common article 3 will also 
not be applicable, as it expressly only applies to “armed conflict not of an 
international character”. Furthermore, the last part of the provisions, 
“even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them”, was designed 
to make it implementable during times when de facto conflict exists, but 
the relevant States deny the existence of an armed conflict; as was the 
case during the conflict between China and Japan preceding World War 
II.79 As regards the argument that the child soldier prohibitive norms in 
particular should apply to times of peace, article 77(2) of Additional 
Protocol I expressly refers to “parties to the conflict.” Additional Protocol 
II’s roughly corresponding provision makes no such reference, but 
Additional Protocol II stands alone as the only instrument out of all the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols that makes no reference to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Article 63 of Geneva Convention I; article 62 of Geneva Convention II; article 143 of 
Geneva Convention III; and article 158 of Geneva Convention IV.  
79 Gutteridge, JAC. ‘The Geneva Conventions of 1949’ 26 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 298 (1949), 
298-299.  
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peace-time whatsoever. Thus, the child soldier prohibitive norms in 
Additional Protocol I/Additional Protocol II only apply during times of 
armed conflict. An enquiry into the existence of armed conflict primarily 
aims to determine whether the degree of hostilities/force/violence meets 
the threshold to amount to an ‘armed conflict’; and whether this armed 
conflict is international or non-international in character.80 
 
Prior to the coming into force of Additional Protocol II, the Geneva 
Conventions made no specific provision for NIAC save for common article 
3, which in turn made no specific reference to children or the regulation of 
participation in armed groups or forces. This is what sets Additional 
Protocol I and Additional Protocol II apart from each other: the first is 
applicable to IAC and the second to NIAC. Both Protocols make 
reference to ‘children’ and ‘children who have not attained the age of 
fifteen years’. Strictly speaking, where the term ‘children’ is unqualified, 
the possibility exists that such protection extends to those under eighteen 
as well. This is based on the same argument as in relation to the Geneva 
Conventions above. Furthermore, in recruiting among people older than 
fifteen, but younger than eighteen, Additional Protocol I endeavours to 
grant more protection to people the younger they are, and this protection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 For more information on establishing the threshold of armed conflict see the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights communication, Juan Carlos Abella v 
Argentina, Case No. 11, 137, Annual Report 1997, OAS Doc. OAE/Ser.L/V/II.98. Doc. 7 
rev (13 April 1998); and for more information on the nature of an armed conflict see the 
ICTY Appeals Decision in Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, App.Ch 
(2 October 1995), para 70. 
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is afforded in the section dealing with “protection of children”;81 thus 
giving further credence to the argument that those aged between fifteen 
and eighteen are still deemed children.   
 
With regard to the prevention of child soldiering in the context of IAC, 
Additional Protocol I holds:  
 
The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that 
children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a 
direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from 
recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting among those 
persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not 
attained the age of eighteen years the Parties to the conflict shall 
endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.82 
 
This provision is relatively weak in its protection of children and for legal-
analytical purposes it is divided in two parts: first, the prohibition of using 
and recruiting children younger than fifteen, and second, the provision 
stating that when recruiting children between fifteen and eighteen, 
preference should be given to older children.  
 
The language used in the second part of the provision is not contentious 
and needs little further explanation; it is therefore dealt with first. It is 
almost impossible to hold an armed force or group to account for a 
violation of this provision. Where the actual prohibition of the use and 
recruitment of child soldiers can be seen as a direct child protection 
measure, this provision is indirect. Should a group use or recruit children 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Article 77 of Additional Protocol I.  
82 Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I (own emphasis). 
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under fifteen, they will be in contravention of the Protocol as long as the 
child remains part of the group and younger than fifteen; this is what is 
called a ‘continuing crime’ in criminal law terms. This provision thus aims 
at the demobilisation of child soldiers which amounts to direct protection. 
However, where a group fails to give priority to older children when 
recruiting among those aged between fifteen and eighteen, such a 
remedy will not be available. It is not unlawful for the group to recruit and 
use children between fifteen and eighteen; it is ‘merely’ the group’s 
recruitment practice that violates Additional Protocol I. Thus it is not so 
much who is recruited but more the context in which they are recruited 
that is central to this provision. This part of the provision therefore offers 
very little protection to children.  
 
In the first part of the child soldier prevention provision two distinct forms 
of conduct are prohibited, first, “the Parties to the conflict shall take all 
feasible measures to ensure that children who have not attained the age 
of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities” and secondly “in 
particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces”. 
It is clear that the age of the protected children is below fifteen. With 
regard to the ‘use’ of children in hostilities, the parties’ (to the conflict) 
obligation is limited to taking “all feasible measures” to ensure that 
children do not take a “direct part in hostilities”. The prohibition on 
recruitment (as opposed to ‘use’) is not subject to either the “direct part in 
hostilities” qualifier or the “all feasible measures” qualifier. Children are 
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thus better protected from recruitment into armed forces than they are 
from being used in direct hostilities. It is important to note that children 
can be used in armed conflict without having been ‘recruited’ for purposes 
of the Additional Protocols (this is discussed further below). 
 
The elements of the child soldier prohibition in Additional Protocol I are 
analysed below. Although this analysis is undertaken under the heading 
‘Additional Protocol I’, they apply mutatis mutandis to all other relevant 
provisions that contain the same elements.  
 
Take all Feasible Measures  
Earlier drafts of article 77(2) of the Additional Protocol I contained the 
standard “all necessary measures”. The word ‘necessary’ was only 
replaced with ‘feasible’ in the final drafts of the provision. The feasibility of 
a measure in a given circumstance is a subjective determination when 
compared to determining what may be ‘necessary’ within the same 
circumstances. Bothe (et al) argues that the ‘feasible’ standard is a 
determination of what is practically possible or practicable, taking account 
of all circumstances at the time including the military success of the 
operations.83 Sandoz (et al) argue that the provision should be interpreted 
in line with the standard dictionary meaning of the word ‘feasible’.84 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See also Bothe, M., Partch, K. & Solf, W. New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts 
(1982), 372-373.  
84 Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C. & Zimmermann, B. (eds.) ‘Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949’ International 
Committee of the Red Cross (1987) 681-682.  
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dictionary definition they provide is “capable of being done, accomplished 
or carried out, possible or practicable”. Bothe’s understanding of the 
standard incorporates this definition, but goes further in holding that 
circumstances at the time must be taken into account when determining 
what is practically possible or practicable. The source of this 
understanding is statements made by various countries in relation to the 
adoption of article 57 at the Diplomatic Conference.  Accordingly, this 
article does not relate to child soldiering but also contains the ‘feasible’ 
standard. 85  The question remains whether the success of military 
operations, should be a factor in determining what is practically possible 
or practicable when taking account of the circumstances at the time. Both 
Mann and Kuper have adopted this definition in relation to child 
soldiering.86  
 
If the success of military operations is indeed a factor that should properly 
be taken into account when determining what is feasible, it may often not 
be feasible to demobilize children before military engagement during 
armed conflict. Thus, ideally this standard is what is practically possible or 
practicable when taking account of the circumstances at the time, but not 
including the success of military operations. It appears, however, that the 
inclusion of military necessity has taken hold in the definition of what is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 These countries were Algeria, Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. 
See Happold, note 63 above, 61 note 26 and Boudreault, LS. ‘Les reserves apportees 
au Protocole additionnel l aux Conventions de Geneve sur le droit humanitaire’ (1989-
1990) 6 Rev. quebecoise de droit int'l, 105. 
86 Mann, H. ‘International Law and the Child Soldier’ 36 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 32 (1987), 46; 
Kuper, J. International Law Concerning Child Civilians in Armed Conflict (1997), 102. 
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‘feasible’. This understanding is further supported by the declarations 
made by some states in relation to the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict (CIAC Protocol) that also contains this standard (see 
below).87 
 
This qualification is not ideal by any measure. However, the actual impact 
this qualification is likely to have on the prohibition of the use and 
recruitment of child soldiers is less severe than it may seem. The use and 
recruitment of child soldiers constitutes a continuing violation, or 
continuing offence in the ICL sense. Armed forces and groups obliged to 
take all feasible measures that children do not participate in hostilities are 
therefore obliged to do so in relation to each military engagement children 
participate in. The systematic use of children in armed conflict can never 
be justified on the basis that all feasible measures had been taken to 
prevent such participation.  
 
Take a Direct part in Hostilities  
This standard forms the basis of one of the central tenets of IHL: the 
principle of distinction. This customary law principle holds that parties to a 
conflict must distinguish between civilian and military targets, unless the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (entered into force 12 February 2002) 2173 UNTS 222. 
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civilian directly participates in hostilities.88 The war crimes related to the 
use of child soldiering employ the language “active participation in 
hostilities” whereas the current provision uses the term “direct 
participation in hostilities”. Chapter 4, dealing with international criminal 
law, analyses these concepts and aims to determine whether they 
represent the same standard; and to give meaning to the concept “active 
participation” as this is the concept relevant to ICL. Whether these 
standards are the same is a hotly disputed topic, as there is not even any 
consensus among the international tribunals on this issue. The Geneva 
Conventions refer to “active part in the hostilities”; 89  and Additional 
Protocol I refers to “direct participation in hostilities”, 90  however, the 
French text uses the term “participent directement” consistently. The 
French text carries equal authority to the English text.91 Thus, as is 
argued more comprehensively in Chapter 4, ‘direct’ and ‘active’ should be 
deemed the same. Where the analysis under Chapter 4 traces the 
position of tribunals who deal with child soldiering, specifically the SCSL 
and ICC, with regard to ‘active participation’; the present analysis more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88  Henckaerts, JM. Doswald-Beck, L. & Alvermann, C. Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: Rules (2007) 2-8.  
89 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.  
90 Articles 51(3), 43(2) and 67(1) of Additional Protocol I; and article 13 (3) of Additional 
Protocol II. 
91 Article 55 of Geneva Convention I; article 54 of Geneva Convention II; article 133 of 
Geneva Convention III; article 150 of Geneva Convention IV; article 102 of Additional 
Protocol I; and article 28 of Additional Protocol II. 
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generally analyses academic treatment of the concept ‘direct 
participation’.92  
 
“Acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual 
harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces” has 
long been the standard definition of ‘direct participation’.93 This definition 
certainly also lacks clarity, but until recently no authoritative source made 
any attempt at such clarity. During 2005 the Targeted Killings case was 
the first to do so;94 and more recently the ICRC published interpretive 
guidance notes on direct participation.95  
 
Perhaps expectedly so the Israeli Supreme Court was very broad in their 
interpretation of direct participation. The Court cited Schmitt, stating that 
grey areas should be interpreted in favour of direct participation. 96 
Schmitt argues that: 
 
One of the seminal purposes of the law is to make possible a clear 
distinction between civilians and combatants. Suggesting that civilians 
retain their immunity even when they are intricately involved in a conflict 
is to engender disrespect for the law by combatants endangered by 
their activities. Moreover, a liberal approach creates an incentive for 
civilians to remain as distant from the conflict as possible – in doing so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 While these concepts are the same academically, some tribunals like the ICC treat 
them as having different meanings. As such in the context of Chapter 4 account will be 
taken of the position of these tribunals when considering future prosecutions by them.  
93 Sandoz et al, note 42 above, 681-682, para 1944. 
94 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v Government of Israel et al HCJ 
769/02 (11 December 2005) (‘Targeted Killings case’). 
95 Melzer, N. Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
under International Humanitarian Law (2009). 
96 Schmitt, MN. ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict’ in 
Fischer, H. Crisis Management and Humanitarian Projection: Festshrift Fur Dieter Fleck 
(2004) 505-509. 
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they can better avoid being charged with participation in the conflict and 
are less liable to being directly targeted.97  
 
From a child soldier preventative point of view a liberal interpretation in 
favour of direct participation will be preferable. The further the child is 
removed from hostilities while still being deemed to directly participate, 
the more protection she/he receives. For example, where a child acts as 
a cook to the armed forces, a more strict interpretation of ‘direct 
participation’ will likely find that the child is not directly participating. 
Therefore, her/his use in hostilities will not be unlawful. A more liberal 
approach would likely have found that she/he is directly participating and 
as such her/his use in hostilities is unlawful. However, Schmitt’s position 
is nevertheless strongly contested.  
 
This standard is not used solely in the context of child soldiering, but in 
the protection of civilians as a whole. A liberal interpretation in favour of 
greater protection of child soldiers (which was not Schmitt’s rationale) will 
correspondingly place more civilians in harm’s way as direct participants. 
This distinction between civilians and combatants is not an end in itself, 
but a necessary determination to allow the law to protect civilians and 
allow armed forces to target combatants. It is this very balance that forms 
the basis of any argument over whether a ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ 
interpretation should be afforded to ‘direct’. Lastly, one would expect that 
the possibility of harm is a greater deterrent to civilians from becoming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Ibid. 
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involved in hostilities than “being charged with participation in the 
conflict”; thus this argument is not convincing.  
 
The Court in the Targeted Killings case did endeavour to provide 
examples of what direct participation is, but at the same time the Court 
acknowledges that a case-by-case determination is called for.98 In line 
with the Court’s acceptance of Schmitt’s liberal interpretation the Court’s 
only example of direct participation is “a person who [...] provides service 
to them [weapons], be the distance from the battlefield as it may”.99 This 
application is unacceptably broad in all circumstances, but its 
unacceptability becomes more apparent when considering the more 
extreme scenarios. For example, modern weapons are often very 
technical in nature and technologically advanced. In terms of this view, 
should such a weapon be shipped a thousand miles from the battlefield 
for calibration by a civilian expert, the opposing armed forces will act 
within their rights if they target this civilian technician.  
 
The ICRC has expanded on the definition of ‘direct participation’ originally 
contained in the commentary to Additional Protocol I: 
 
In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, a specific act must 
meet the following cumulative criteria: 
1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or 
military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict 
death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against 
direct attack (threshold of harm), and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Targeted Killings case, note 94 above para 34.  
99 Ibid para 35. 
	   155	  
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely 
to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of 
which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and 
3. the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the 
detriment of another (belligerent nexus).100 
 
The example presented by the Israeli Supreme Court does not meet any 
of the three threshold requirements stated by the ICRC. Direct 
participation is not necessarily limited to the execution phase of an act 
meeting the threshold criteria. Measures in preparation of the execution 
phase are also included in ‘direct participation’. Deployment to and return 
from the location forms part of such preparatory measures, if it constitutes 
an integral part of such a specific act or operation”.101 
 
The ICRC’s Guidance on Direct Participation has also created a new 
category of direct participants, those with a so-called “continuous combat 
function” (CCF).102 Direct participation in hostilities (DPH) is a question of 
function and not status. The CCF category determines direct participation 
in hostilities on the basis of status, and as such is unsupported in the 
positive law. Significantly, Alston points out that the relevant treaty 
language limits direct participation in hostilities to “for such time” and not 
“all the time”.103 As with the broad interpretation Schmidt affords to direct 
participation, the CCF category can enhance protection of child soldiers, 
as the protection will not be limited to the actual time that the child directly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Melzer, note 95 above, 46.  
101 Ibid, 65. 
102 Melzer, note 95 above, 46. 
103 Alston, P. ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions’ A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (2010) para 65. 
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participates. However, this category may lead to the targeting of people 
outside of the parameters provided for by IHL and should thus not be 
supported.  
 
In the context of child soldiering the act performed by the child must meet 
the threshold of harm, direct causation as well as the belligerent nexus; 
there is no numerus clausus of acts that constitute direct participation in 
hostilities.104 It is unfortunate that only children directly participating in 
hostilities enjoy the protection of instruments such as Additional Protocol 
II. While it is tempting to embrace concepts such as the CCF category to 
DPH created by the CRC, and in so doing extend that protection a little 
more, this should not be done as it has the potential to create deep 
structural damage to the IHL regime. Instead, the fact that only those 
children directly participating in hostilities are protected should be 
addressed through the development of international law.  
 
Shall refrain from recruiting them  
The words “accepting their voluntary enlistment” was deleted from an 
earlier draft of this paragraph. This begs the questions whether the 
provision is weakened by the deletion of these words, i.e. does 
‘recruitment’ encapsulate ‘enlistment’. In terms of the preparatory work on 
Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II the prohibition against 
‘recruitment’ contained therein does not prohibit voluntary enlistment. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See Chapter 4 for an example of direct participation in hostilities specifically in 
relation to child soldiering.  
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commentary to article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I also foresees the 
possibility of enlistment not prohibited by this provision.105 Furthermore, 
the Rapporteur of Committee III stated that in some instances it is not 
realistic to absolutely prohibit “voluntary participation” of children younger 
than fifteen.106 However, saying that ‘enlistment’ is not prohibited is not 
the same as saying ‘voluntary recruitment’ is not prohibited. Schabas 
states that the replacement of the word ‘recruiting’ in an earlier draft of 
the Rome Statute with ‘conscripting or enlisting’ “suggests something 
more passive, such as putting the name of a person on a list”.107 In other 
words, he holds the word ‘recruitment’ to include ‘voluntary recruitment’, 
but voluntary recruitment is not as passive as enlistment. A similar view 
was adopted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report 
to the Security Council on the establishment of the SCSL.108 Van Bueren 
argues that as Geneva Convention IV explicitly refers to ‘voluntary 
enlistment’, the use of the word ‘recruitment’ in Additional Protocol I and 
Additional Protocol II would suggest it has a different meaning, i.e. 
recruitment is less passive.109 Finally, in the Recruitment case, Justice 
Robertson, in his dissent, also held that enlistment is more passive than 
recruitment.110  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Sandoz et al, note 42 above, 900, para 3184. 
106 O.R. XV, p. 465, CDDH/407/Rev.1, para. 63. 
107 Schabas, W. An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2001) at 50.  
108 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’ UN S/2000/915 (4 October 2000), para 17-18. 
109 Van Bueren, G. The International Law on the Rights of the Child (1998), 337.  
110 Child Recruitment decision, note 60 above, para 27. 
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The substitution of the word “recruitment” used in earlier instruments such 
as Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II with the words 
“conscription or enlistment” used in more recent instruments such as the 
Rome Statute and Statute of the SCSL, suggests a development of the 
law. This would mean that recruitment, while overlapping with enlistment, 
is not as passive at the one extreme end of the spectrum as enlistment. 
Should this view be upheld, it would mean that the presence of children 
under fifteen in armed forces is not unlawful per se in terms of Additional 
Protocol I. Thus, as was alluded to earlier, the fact that a child 
participates in hostilities does not necessarily mean that child was 
recruited unlawfully. What is more, this would have the implication that 
when an armed force uses a child enlistee of ten to participate indirectly 
in an IAC that armed force would not act in violation of IHL.  
 
The commentary to article 4(3)(c) of Additional Protocol II holds that this 
article also prohibits recruitment where force is not present. In fact, it 
states that a child cannot enlist himself.111 Although this commentary 
relates to Additional Protocol II, which applies to NIAC, both Protocols 
use the word ‘recruit’ with reference to child soldier prevention. The 
meaning of the word cannot differ between the two instruments. It is not 
unheard of that children eagerly volunteer their services to armed 
groups. 112  Unfortunately, legal authority is stacked against the 
interpretation presented by the commentary to Additional Protocol II, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Sandoz et al, note 42 above para 3184 & 4557. 
112 See Chapter 2. 
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indeed if the ‘recruiting force’ merely included these children’s names on 
their list of soldiers, it is foreseeable that such acquisition of soldiers 
would not be prohibited by this provision.  
 
Their Armed Forces  
The concept “armed forces” is generally defined as “a country's army, 
navy and air force”.113 As such this concept excludes armed groups that 
do not represent the force of a nation. Within the ambit of Additional 
Protocol I there are a number of groups, distinct from state armed forces 
that can be a party to a conflict over which Additional Protocol I enjoys 
application. For example, non-state armed groups who participate in an 
IAC, and peoples fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation or 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination.114  
 
Aware of this problem, the drafters of Additional Protocol I set out to 
resolve it: 
 
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed 
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to 
that Party for the conduct or its subordinates, even if that Party is 
represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an 
adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal 
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the 
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.115 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 See for example, Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2004).  
114 Article 1(4), Additional Protocol I. 
115 Article 43, Additional Protocol I.  
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Thus non-state armed groups can be deemed ‘armed forces’ if they are 
organized; under a command responsible to a party to the conflict; and 
are subject to an internal disciplinary system. Non-state entities can be 
party to an IAC, and are bound by the rules of IHL, including the 
prohibition of the use and recruitment of child soldiers. Of course the 
degree of organization and quality of command and disciplinary systems 
can differ greatly. ‘Armed forces’ are construed relatively broadly.116 Non-
state entities are thus deemed parties to the armed conflict in their own 
right and not by virtue of a relationship to a party to the conflict that is a 
state.  
 
In summary, Additional Protocol I’s treatment of child soldiering is twofold, 
prohibiting ‘use’ and prohibiting ‘recruitment’. Both the prohibition of use 
and recruitment are subject to their own limitations. The terms “all 
feasible measures” and “direct participation in hostilities” limit the degree 
of protection afforded in relation to the ‘use’ of child soldiers. 
Furthermore, the words “refrain from recruit[ing]” and “armed forces” 
limits the extent of the protection offered in relation to the ‘recruitment’ of 
child soldiers. The fifteen-year-old yardstick is regrettable, as the two 
Protocols set the scene for instruments to come and the development of 
customary international law. Be that as it may, this limitation affects both 
use and recruitment and is unambiguous.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 See Verri, P. ‘Combattants armés ne pouvant se distinguer de la population civile’ 21 
RDPMDG No. 1-4 (1982), 345.  
	   161	  
iii. Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions  
Armed conflicts of a non-international character were long deemed as 
matters of internal concern to the state within which the conflict occurred. 
As such, consistent with the doctrine of state sovereignty, such states 
were left to their own devices in dealing with such conflicts, and those 
who participated therein. Theoretically IHRL was to be applicable in lieu 
of IHL, however, in practice a vacuum existed as no IHL rules outside of 
common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions were applicable, and a 
large body of human rights law could be derogated from. What is more, 
IHRL as an international law regime was normatively still very much in the 
process of development prior to 1977.  
 
By the early 1970’s when the need for the Additional Protocols was 
recognized, it had become apparent that IHL should take a greater 
interest in NIAC. However, by no means were such conflicts deemed 
deserving of treatment equal to that of IAC, as they were still largely seen 
as matters of internal concern. For this reason Additional Protocol II’s 
provisions are generally much less onerous than their corresponding 
provisions in Additional Protocol I, and the Geneva Conventions. Child 
soldiering is possibly the only exception to this rule, and is an extreme 
one at that. Additional Protocol II offers a great deal more protection to 
children than Additional Protocol I. Indeed, as is clear when considering 
the comparable human rights provisions (infra), this provision – one of the 
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first child soldier prohibitive provisions – still represents the nearest to 
absolute prohibition of child soldiering.  
 
The concept NIAC differs between Additional Protocol II and common 
article 3, and the threshold of violence required to activate the operation 
of Additional Protocol II exceeds that of Additional Protocol I and the 
Geneva Conventions in general.117 Additional Protocol II is not applicable 
to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots or 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence. With regard to child soldiers, 
Additional Protocol II holds: 
 
Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in 
particular: 
[…] 
(c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be 
recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in 
hostilities;  
(d) the special protection provided by this Article to children who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they 
take a direct part in hostilities despite the provisions of subparagraph (c) 
and are captured;118 
 
Again the provision is divided into ‘recruitment’ and ‘use’ and the 
threshold age is set at younger than fifteen. However, no part of this 
provision serves to limit the degree of protection offered to children 
younger than fifteen in so far as prohibiting their recruitment and use in 
hostilities is concerned.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 States often deny the existence of armed conflict, specifically in the context of 
internal armed conflict. For example, they are able enforce a greater level of municipal 
criminal law on their adversary. Thus, in practical terms, often neither Additional Protocol 
I nor Additional Protocol II finds application to a situation that meets the threshold criteria 
as being an armed conflict.  
118 Article 4(3), Additional Protocol II. 
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The words “shall neither be recruited [...] nor allowed...” are prescriptive. 
This provision is applicable to “armed forces or groups” compared to 
“armed forces” as used in Additional Protocol I. It is further prohibited to 
use a child to “take part in hostilities”, compared to “take a direct part in 
hostilities”. This provision amounts to an absolute prohibition of the use 
and recruitment of children younger than fifteen. The “all feasible 
measures” standard is also not used.119  
 
This does not mean that there are no weaknesses in this provision. Most 
commentators will undoubtedly first point to the retention of the younger 
than fifteen age standard. However, perhaps more important is the 
retention of the word “recruit”. As has been argued with reference to 
Additional Protocol I, recruit is not a concept broad enough to cover all 
means and methods by which children can become associated with and 
even members of armed groups. Most notably, enlistment is a broader 
concept requiring a more passive involvement on the part of the armed 
group in securing the services of the child. Thus, if the manner in which 
the child becomes part of the armed groups falls short of ‘recruitment’, the 
enlistment of the child will be lawful. However, under Additional Protocol I 
such an enlisted child would lawfully be subject to indirect participation in 
conflict, whereas in NIAC, such a child may not even be used to take part 
in hostilities indirectly. As has been discussed, non-state entities incur 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 See the discussion of ‘all feasible measures’ above. 
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IHL obligations on the international plane, both in the context of IAC and 
NIAC and are thus equally bound to IHL child soldier prohibitions. 
 
3. THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF CHILD SOLDIER PROHIBITIVE 
NORMS: HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
i. Convention on the Rights of the Child  
As IHRL traditionally concerns itself with the relationship between the 
state and its subjects, the international law duties and obligations 
established by IHRL provisions relevant to child soldiering fall on states. 
As will be discussed, IHRL instruments are addressed at “state parties” 
and not “parties to the conflict”, or any other construction that includes 
non-state actors. Thus, in order for states to comply with their 
international law obligations they must enact municipal legislation, both 
criminal and civil, proscribing the use and recruitment of child soldiers 
within that state’s municipal jurisdiction. IHRL is theoretically applicable at 
all times, although derogation from some provisions is permitted during 
states of emergency, and as has been discussed, IHL is the lex specialis 
during armed conflict. IHRL has developed child protection with regard to 
prohibiting the recruitment of child soldiers significantly in that child 
soldier recruitment is prevented during times of peace as well.   
 
The CRC is the IHRL treaty that received the most instruments of 
ratification and accession at the fastest pace ever and came into force on 
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2 September 1990.120 This is a unique IHRL instrument in that it contains 
provisions which are more akin to those contained in IHL instruments, 
specifically with regard to the prohibition of the use of child soldiers.121 
However, this extension of the subject-matter jurisdiction of IHRL does 
not affect the implementation and nature of IHRL as such. With regard to 
child soldiering the CRC holds:  
 
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons 
who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in 
hostilities.  
3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not 
attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting 
among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who 
have not attained the age of eighteen years, States Parties shall 
endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.122  
 
Unlike the Additional Protocols and Geneva Conventions the CRC 
defines a child as “...every human being below the age of eighteen years 
unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained 
earlier”.123 However, only with regard to child soldiering does the CRC 
deviate from this definition and provide for a lower age threshold, being 
younger than fifteen. Indeed, the ratio legis of paragraph 2 and 3 directly 
mirror article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I and as such creates exactly 
the same obligations as Additional Protocol I save for the scope of 
application (not limited to armed conflict) and parties bound (state parties 
only), this is due to the different nature of IHL and IHRL and is illustrated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 UN Treaty Collection http://treaties.un.org (last accessed on 2 September 2011).  
121 Detrick, S. A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (1999) at 655-656; Ang, F. A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child: Article 38 Children in Armed Conflicts (2005), 3.  
122 Article 38, CRC.  
123 Article 1, CRC. 
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by the use of “states parties” in the CRC and “parties to the conflict” in 
Additional Protocol I.124 In the context of IHRL the parties bound will 
always be “states parties”. The language is not a verbatim restatement of 
Additional Protocol I, but is so similar that there is no legal-technical 
difference between the obligations created, except for those differences 
attributable to the nature of the relevant legal regime.125  
 
The most material difference is that in Additional Protocol I the prohibition 
on the ‘use’ of children is separated from the prohibition on ‘recruitment’ 
by the words “in particular”. This may be interpreted to mean there is a 
greater obligation in terms of Additional Protocol I to prohibit ‘recruitment’ 
than ‘use’, which is not mirrored in the CRC. Unfortunately, as the CRC 
adopted the text of Additional Protocol II, the scope of prohibition of the 
use of child soldiers has not been extended to situations not amounting to 
armed conflict. The CRC uses the word “hostilities” in defining the 
prohibition of the use of child soldiers. Given the broader scope of 
application of IHL, this provision had the potential to prohibit the use of 
children during violent situations falling short of armed conflict, such as 
uprisings and internal disturbances. Furthermore, again due to the 
different nature of the IHRL and IHL legal regimes, article 38 places a 
duty on the states party to take all feasible measures to prevent the use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 See discussion below. 
125 As these provisions materially present the same level of protection, and as the same 
concepts are used: “all feasible measures”; “direct participation”; and “refrain from 
recruiting”, the treatment of these concepts relevant to Additional Protocol I as 
discussed above applies equally to article 38(2) of the CRC.  
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of children younger than fifteen years old from participating directly in 
hostilities. This includes preventing such children from participating in 
conflict on the side of non-state armed forces. The same is not true of 
recruitment, where the duty on the state party is solely to take all feasible 
measures not to recruit children younger than fifteen years old 
themselves.126 In my view, this is likely attributable to the direct import of 
IHL provisions into IHRL instruments without paying due regard to the 
formal nature of the different legal regimes. Finally, the incorporation of 
the ‘priority rule’, to give priority to older children when recruiting among 
those aged between fifteen and eighteen in the CRC, means that this rule 
is extended to potentially apply to NIAC as well.  
 
As the disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation (DDR) of children 
is an indirect child soldier preventative measure, article 39 of the CRC 
deserves mention, as it states:  
 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and 
psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: [...] or 
armed conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an 
environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child.  
 
Article 38 was the subject of considerable debate during the drafting of 
the CRC. Most of this debate revolved around three issues: the threshold 
age; whether a distinction should be drawn between "voluntary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 This different treatment of ‘use’ and ‘recruitment’ is somewhat comparable to the use 
of the qualifier ‘their armed forces’ used in Additional Protocol II. However, because 
IHRL only creates obligations on states parties, these provisions function somewhat 
differently.  
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recruitment" and "conscription"; and whether the provisions should 
specifically provide for recruitment for the purposes of training and 
education.127 In order to resolve differences between delegates, a text 
reflecting the provision in Additional Protocol I was agreed upon at the 
expense of legal development and greater protection to children. What is 
more, unlike Additional Protocol I, the CRC is not limited to IAC, but may 
also be applicable during NIAC, and indeed when no armed conflict 
exists. The CRC’s standard, however, falls short of the existing protection 
offered in such conflicts by Additional Protocol II and even Additional 
Protocol I considering that the CRC binds state parties only.128 
 
ii. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
Many states were dissatisfied with the failure of article 38 to develop the 
law. During 1991, at the first session of the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC Committee) it was decided that a day of the session 
would be dedicated to ‘children in armed conflicts’. 129  By 1994, the 
Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution establishing an open-
ended inter-sessional working group with the aim of drafting an Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement 
of Children in Armed Conflict.130 This Protocol was duly adopted and 
came into force on 12 February 2002. Like the CRC, this instrument 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Breen, C. ‘When Is a Child Not a Child? Child Soldiers in International Law’ 8(2) 
Human Rights Review (2007), 83-87 
128 Detrick, note 121 above, 655-656.  
129 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Report on the Second Session, UN Doc 
CRC/C/10, para. 61. 
130 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1994/91. 
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forms part of IHRL and as such creates obligations on “states parties”. 
Unlike the instruments already discussed, it deals exclusively with 
children’s participation in hostilities. Only the substantive provisions of 
this instrument are discussed here; the administrative and implementation 
provisions are discussed elsewhere.131 
 
Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (CIAC Protocol) 
provides: “States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that 
members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years 
do not take a direct part in hostilities”. This provision only deals with ‘use’, 
not ‘recruitment’. The qualifiers “all feasible measures” and “direct part in 
hostilities” have been retained, but the age threshold has been lifted to 
younger than eighteen. The obligation here does not include an obligation 
to prevent non-state actors from using children in hostilities; such 
instances are addressed separately. Thus, in as far as the use of children 
by state parties is concerned; the only area in which the level of 
protection afforded to children is increased is by raising the age threshold 
to below eighteen. In their declarations states parties have included their 
interpretations of when they may use children directly in hostilities without 
being in breach of article 1. In this regard the UK stated: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 See Chapter 5.   
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The United Kingdom understands that article 1 of the Optional Protocol 
would not exclude the deployment of members of its armed forces under 
the age of 18 to take a direct part in hostilities where: - 
a) there is a genuine military need to deploy their unit or ship to an area 
in which hostilities are taking place; and 
b) by reason of the nature and urgency of the situation:- 
i) it is not practicable to withdraw such persons before deployment; or  
ii) to do so would undermine the operational effectiveness of their ship or 
unit, and thereby put at risk the successful completion of the military 
mission and/or the safety of other personnel.132 
 
Vietnam’s declaration states:  
 
To defend the Homeland is the sacred duty and right of all citizens. 
Citizens have the obligation to fulfil military service and participate in 
building the all-people national defence. Under the law of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, only male citizens at the age of 18 and over shall be 
recruited in the military service.  Those who are under the age of 18 shall 
not be directly involved in military battles unless there is an urgent need 
for safeguarding national independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial 
integrity.133 
 
These provisions highlight the margin of appreciation afforded to states 
parties by utilising the subjective obligation of means that is created by 
the language “all feasible measures”; together with the high threshold of 
hostilities, i.e. “direct part in hostilities”. 
 
Article 2 of the CIAC Protocol provides: “States Parties shall ensure that 
persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily 
recruited into their armed forces”. This provision is again limited to ‘states 
parties’, and lifts the compulsory recruitment age to under eighteen. In 
previous provisions the language used is “... shall refrain from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Declaration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, upon 
ratification (24 June 2003) <http://treaties.un.org> (last accessed on 2 September 2011). 
133 Declaration of Vietnam, upon ratification (20 December 2001) <http://treaties.un.org> 
(last accessed on 2 September 2011). 
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recruiting...”, which creates a negative obligation, whereas article 2 
creates a positive obligation.  
 
‘Voluntary recruitment’ is addressed separately. According to UNICEF, 
“voluntary recruitment is understood to mean that children are under no 
compulsion to join armed forces and that safeguards are in place to 
ensure that any voluntary recruitment is genuinely voluntary”.134 As such, 
a distinction remains between ‘voluntary recruitment’ and ‘enlistment’, 
and the Protocol failed to extend protection to include enlistment. The 
Protocol states: 
 
1. States Parties shall raise in years the minimum age for the voluntary 
recruitment of persons into their national armed forces from that set out in 
article 38, paragraph 3, of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
taking account of the principles contained in that article and recognizing 
that under the Convention persons under the age of 18 years are entitled 
to special protection.  
2. Each State Party shall deposit a binding declaration upon ratification of 
or accession to the present Protocol that sets forth the minimum age at 
which it will permit voluntary recruitment into its national armed forces 
and a description of the safeguards it has adopted to ensure that such 
recruitment is not forced or coerced.135 
 
This implies that states parties must lift their voluntary recruitment age by 
at least one year from that set out in the CRC (younger than fifteen), i.e. 
the minimum allowable age is younger than sixteen, but it can range up to 
younger than eighteen. The minimum age is to be raised by depositing a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 According to UNICEF “Voluntary recruitment is understood to mean that children are 
under no compulsion to join armed forces and that safeguards are in place to ensure 
that any voluntary recruitment is genuinely voluntary”; UNICEF and Coalition to Stop the 
Use of Child Soldiers ‘Guide to the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in 
armed conflict’ (2003), 16. 
135 Article 3, CIAC Protocol.  
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declaration also setting out safeguards adopted to prevent forced or 
coerced recruitment.136 These safeguards, as a minimum, must ensure 
that the recruitment is genuinely voluntary; informed consent of the 
person's parents or legal guardians have been obtained; the candidate is 
fully informed of the duties involved in such military service; and reliable 
proof of age is provided by the candidate.137  
 
Unlike earlier child soldier prohibitions, this provision is silent on the 
nature and extent of the obligation owed by states parties. The qualifiers 
“States Parties”; “voluntary recruitment”, and “their national armed forces” 
are present, but the provision is silent on the strength of the obligation, 
e.g. whether “all feasible measures” is to be taken; or whether states 
parties “shall not” do so. Instead, the parameters of the prohibition 
contained in article 38 of the CRC are incorporated by reference: “taking 
account of the principles contained in that article [article 38 of the CRC]”. 
Incorporation by reference is not a new phenomenon in international 
treaty law, specifically related to IHRL.138 However, the possibility exists 
that a state can ratify the Protocol without having ratified the CRC. This is 
only possible with regard to the two states who have not ratified the CRC, 
the US and Somalia, and the US has already ratified the CIAC Protocol. 
Attached to their article 3 declaration the US added a section titled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136  States parties can raise their minimum voluntary recruitment age at any time. 
Furthermore, the requirement to raise the minimum voluntary recruitment age is not 
applicable to schools operated by or under the control of the armed forces of the States 
Parties. Articles 3(4) and 3(5), CIAC Protocol. 
137 Article 3(3), CIAC Protocol.  
138  See for example article 15 of European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 221.  
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“understandings”, where it is stated that “The United States understands 
that the United States assumes no obligations under the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child by becoming a party to the Protocol”.139  
 
Buergenthal argues that such incorporation by reference is only effective 
if the law so incorporated binds the relevant state party.140 However, his 
argument in this regard is relevant to article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights that incorporates “other obligations under 
international law”. This non-specific provision will obviously only refer to 
such obligations to which the relevant state is bound. In the case at hand, 
the incorporating law is not only specific as regards the instrument that is 
incorporated, but also the specific provision. As such, pacta sunt 
servanda will dictate that state parties do not assume obligations under 
other treaties, but that the principles contained in article 38 becomes part 
of the CIAC Protocol by reference. Thus, all state parties are subject to 
this reference;141 and the ‘strength’ of the obligation for states parties is to 
“refrain from recruiting” such persons. Moreover, the priority rule is also 
applicable.  
 
Being an IHRL treaty, this Protocol places obligations on the state. 
However, it also endeavours to regulate the use and recruitment of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Declaration of the United States of America, upon ratification (23 December 2002) 
<http://treaties.un.org> (last accessed on 2 September 2011). 
140 Buergenthal, T. ‘International and Regional Human Rights Law and Institutions: 
Some Examples of Their Interaction’ 12 Tex. Int'l L. J. 321 (1977); see also Meron, T. 
‘Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights: Reflections on 
Institutional Order’ 76 Am. J. Int'l L. 754 (1982) footnote 5. 
141 Ang, note 121 above, 33.  
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children by non-state armed groups. In such instances the obligation still 
falls on the state to prevent these groups from using and recruiting 
children. The standards proscribed for such non-state groups are 
markedly different to those applicable to the states themselves: 
 
1. Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should 
not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under 
the age of 18 years.  
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such 
recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal measures necessary 
to prohibit and criminalize such practices.142  
 
Such ‘armed groups’ includes all non-state armed groups.143 Non-state 
armed groups may not recruit persons younger than eighteen voluntarily 
under any circumstances, although states parties may do so, provided 
they have entered a declaration to that effect. Moreover, in the prohibition 
of the use of child soldiers, the qualifiers “all feasible measures” and 
“direct part in hostilities” are omitted. The word “should” instead of “shall” 
in “...armed forces of a State should not...” indicates the nature of the 
IHRL provision in that the obligation falls on the state to enforce the 
provision and does not create obligations on non-state armed groups 
comparable to those created by IHL.144  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Article 4, CIAC Protocol.  
143 Happold, M. ‘The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the involvement of children in armed conflict’ Yearbook of International Humanitarian 
Law (2000), 239. 
144 Helle is of the view that this is indicative of a moral obligation instead of a legal 
obligation in international law; Helle, D. ‘Optional Protocol on the involvement of children 
in armed conflict to the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ ICRC Review 839 (2000). 
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The unequal treatment of state parties and non-state armed groups 
means that states are allowed to recruit persons as young as sixteen on a 
voluntary basis; non-state groups may only recruit persons aged eighteen 
or older. In the context of ‘use’ of children the obligation on state parties is 
limited to taking “all feasible measures” and the degree of hostilities from 
which children are protected is “direct part in hostilities”. Non-state 
groups, however, “should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in 
hostilities	   persons under the age of 18 years”. This provision does not 
create an international law obligation on non-state groups (as IHL does), 
thus the duty lies on the states parties to enforce this grossly unequal 
standard. What this Protocol has done is allow states to create a further 
power imbalance between themselves and their non-state adversaries. 
States are in stronger power positions in a great majority of civil conflicts, 
increasing this power imbalance places further strain on non-state groups 
to rely on asymmetrical conflict strategies, of which the use of child 
soldiers is one example,145 and terrorist tactics is the best example.146 As 
was argued earlier, creating different obligations upon parties to hostilities 
based on status is inconsistent with the equality of belligerents. 
Therefore, in the context of armed conflict, where IHL is the lex specialis, 
the lowest standard applicable to all parties to the conflict should be 
applied.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 See chapter 2.  
146 Waschefort, G. ‘Drawing the Boundaries between Terrorism and Crimes Against 
Humanity’ SA Public Law 22 (2) 457 (2007); Geiβ, R. ‘Asymmetric Conflict Structures’ 
International Review of the Red Cross Vol 88 No 864 (2006), 758. 
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Article 38(2) of the CIAC Protocol indicates well that, regardless of its 
substantive content, this is an IHRL instrument, as the obligation remains 
that of the state.147 The reference to all feasible measures in this instance 
refers to the state’s duty to prevent non-state armed groups from using 
and recruiting children, and not to the nature of the duty on such armed 
groups, as there is no international legal duty incumbent upon them.   
 
iii. International Labour Organization Convention 182 
The CIAC Protocol was not the first IHRL instrument that increased the 
threshold age for ‘forced or compulsory recruitment’ to eighteen.148 The 
International Labour Organization Convention 182 came into force on 19 
November 2000 and holds that “Each Member which ratifies this 
Convention shall take immediate and effective measures to secure the 
prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter 
of urgency”;149 a child being all persons under the age of eighteen.150 The 
Convention goes on to define the worst forms of child labour to include 
“forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict”.151 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Grunfeld, F. ‘Child Soldiers’ in Willems, J. Developmental and Autonomy Rights of 
Children. Empowering children, caregivers and communities (2002), 285.  
148 Dennis, MJ. ‘The ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor’ AJIL 93(4) 
(1999), 944. 
149 Article 1, International Labour Organization Convention 182 (entered into force 19 
November 2000).  
150 Ibid article 2. 
151 Ibid article 3. 
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iv. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, also referred 
to as the African Children’s Charter is the only binding regional human 
rights law instrument regulating the use and recruitment of children in 
armed conflict. In many respects the African Children’s Charter is 
revolutionary and in some respects it provides the strongest protection for 
children in armed conflict; 152  indeed, it generally provides better 
protection than the CRC.153  Its child soldier prohibition holds “States 
Parties to the present Charter shall take all necessary measures to 
ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in 
particular, from recruiting any child”.154 A ‘child’ is deemed to be every 
human being below the age of eighteen years.155  
 
Although this instrument only came into force on 29 November 1999 it 
was opened for signature during 1990. As such, in drafting terms it is 
much more a peer of the CRC than the CIAC Protocol. Bearing this in 
mind, this provision prohibits the use and compulsory and voluntary 
recruitment of children under eighteen. What is more, the obligation on 
states parties is to “take all necessary measures”. This is an obligation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Viljoen, F. ‘Supra-national Human Rights Instruments for the Protection of Children in 
Africa: The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child’ (1998) 31 CILSA 199; Lloyd, A. ‘Evolution of the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African Committee of Experts: 
Raising the Gauntlet’ 10 Int'l J. Child. Rts. 179 (2002) at 184; Olowu, D. ‘Protecting 
Children's Rights in Africa: A Critique of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child’ 10 Int'l J. Child. Rts. 127 (2002), 131. 
153 Viljoen, F. ‘Why South Africa Should Ratify the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child’ 116 S. African L.J. 660 (1999), 661. 
154 Article 22(2), African Children’s Charter. 
155 Ibid article 2. 
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result rather than an obligation of means as contained in the 
corresponding provision of the CRC. This provision also treats ‘use’ and 
‘recruitment’ on a more equal footing, which is a welcome approach, as in 
practice this distinction can be somewhat contrived: children are often 
recruited to be used in direct participation in hostilities.156 The African 
Children’s Charter is the only instrument relevant to child soldiering that 
directly addresses the tension between a universalist and culturally 
relative approach to the age of childhood and the associated protection. 
The African Children’s Charter proclaims its supremacy over any custom, 
tradition and cultural or religious practices, in so far as they may be 
inconsistent with the rights contained in the African Children’s Charter.157 
However this is done while still taking account of nuances peculiar to 
Africa.158 
 
The African Children’s Charter has four primary shortcomings in as far as 
it relates to the prevention of child soldiering. First, it has retained the 
qualifier ‘direct part in hostilities’ in relation to the ‘use’ of child soldiers. 
Second, it prohibits ‘recruitment’ and not ‘enlistment’. Third, it does not 
contain a provision similar to article 39 of the CRC dealing with physical 
and psychological recovery and social reintegration for former child 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 See Chapter 2.  
157 Chirwa, DM. ‘The Merits and Demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child’ 10 Int'l J. Child. Rts. 157 (2002), 158; article 1(3) of the African 
Children’s Charter.  
158 Viljoen, note 152 above.  
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soldiers.159 Lastly, it does not protect children from ‘recruitment’ by non-
state armed groups.  
 
The founding of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child was mandated by the African Children’s Charter. 
This Committee is discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
A majority of the international instruments discussed, including the CRC, 
prohibits the use and recruitment of children younger than fifteen. Every 
other right enshrined in the CRC is afforded to children, being persons 
younger than eighteen. Regardless of the inherent contradiction hereof, 
the absurdity of this state of affairs is further illustrated by the fact that in 
practice child soldiers generally enjoy none of the other rights afforded to 
them by virtue of being children, or indeed human, for example, the right 
to health and education. While this work focuses on child soldier 
prevention specifically, it is important not to lose sight of the plight of child 
soldiers in relation to all rights children generally enjoy, but to which child 
soldiers are denied.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Lloyd, A. ‘Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and 
the African Committee of Experts: Raising the Gauntlet’ 10 Int'l J. Child. Rts. 179 (2002), 
184. 
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4. THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF CHILD SOLDIER PROHIBITIVE 
NORMS: CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW  
Matheson, speaking during 1987 as Deputy Legal Advisor at the US 
State Department (ex officio) explained that while the US was not ready 
to ratify Additional Protocol I it did deem many of its provisions as forming 
part of customary international law. 160  The provisions expressly 
mentioned included “that all feasible measures be taken in order that 
children under fifteen do not take a direct part in hostilities”. 161 
Furthermore, during 2004 the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL held that 
the international law crime of enlisting, conscripting or using child 
soldiers, as formulated under the Statute of the SCSL and the Rome 
Statute had crystallised into a customary international law crime.162 What 
is more, no party to the proceedings before the SCSL argued against the 
existence of such a customary rule at the time of the proceedings 
(although they will disagree on the scope and nature of the rule and the 
existence of such a rule was disputed at the time of the commission of 
the offence).163  
 
There is no denying that the prohibition of the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers has crystallised into a norm of customary international law. This 
section assesses the nature, scope and definition of this customary rule 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Matheson, MJ. ‘The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law 
Conference on International Humanitarian law: A Workshop on Customary International 
Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions’ 2 Am. U. J. 
Int’l L. & Pol’y 415 (1987), 421. 
161 Ibid. 
162 For an explanation and criticism of this judgement see Chapter 4. 
163 Ibid. 
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(or rules). The existence of a customary rule or rules relevant to child 
soldiering is important for two primary reasons: states not party to the 
relevant international instruments will also be bound, and customary law 
largely transcends the formal distinction between IAC and NIAC.164 The 
fact that non-party states are bound is founded upon the separate 
existence of the customary norm, i.e. such states will only be bound by 
the customary norm and states parties will be bound by both the treaty 
and the customary norm.165 Furthermore, states cannot withdraw from or 
denounce customary norms.166  
 
Customary law is “international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law”.167 To find the existence of a customary norm both usus 
as well as opinion juris sive necessitates is required to be present; that is 
state practice and the belief that such custom applies as a matter of 
law.168  
 
State practice has been defined as “any act, articulation or other 
behaviour of a state, as long as the behaviour in question discloses the 
State’s conscious attitude with respect to its recognition of a customary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 For example, 149 of the 161 customary international humanitarian law rules identified 
by the ICRC apply to both IAC and NIAC. See note 88 above.  
165  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (The Republic of 
Nicaragua v The United States of America) 1986 ICJ Reports at 95 (hereinafter the 
‘Nicaragua case’).  
166 Ibid at 113-114. Except for the case of persistent objectors, see Chapter 1, note 66.   
167 Article 38(b), Statute of the International Court of Justice, Annexed to the Charter of 
the United Nations (entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.  
168 Continental Shelf Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) 1985 ICJ Reports at 29-30. 
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rule”.169 This includes “real” and “verbal” acts, meaning treaty ratification 
and negotiating positions (travaux préparatoires) are included. 170 
Furthermore, such practices have to be attributable to states and other 
states must be able to learn of such behaviour within reasonable time.171 
There is no numerus clausus as to the manners in which state practice 
can be expressed, but it includes diplomatic correspondence, 
declarations on foreign or legal policy and national legislation. State 
practice must also be ‘general’, thus meaning common, widespread and 
representative.172 Opinio juris has been held to be conduct exercised by a 
State by reason of it being “a duty incumbent on them and not merely for 
reasons of political expediency”.173 This duty must be “a belief that this 
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring 
it”.174 It is thus a subjective determination on the part of the relevant state.  
 
The ICRC study on customary international humanitarian law found that 
there are two customary rules within the IHL branch of law that relate to 
the prevention of child soldiering. Firstly, rule 136: “children must not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Villiger, ME. Customary International Law and Treaties (1997), 16. 
170 Byers, M. Custom, Power and the Power of Rules (1999), 134; Mendelson, MH. The 
Formation of Customary International Law (1998), 204-207; for the contra view see 
Weisburd, AM. ‘Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties’ 21 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 1 (1988); D’Amato, A. The Concept of Custom (1971), 88. 
171 Ibid 16-17.  
172 Fisheries case (United Kingdom v Norway) 1951 ICJ Reports, 131; North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany v Netherlands) 1969 ICJ Reports, para 74. 
173 Asylum case (Colombia v Peru) 1950 ICJ Reports at 277; also see the Lotus case 
(France v Turkey) PCIJ (1927) Series A No. 10, 28. 
174 North Sea Continental Shelf case, para 77. 
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recruited into armed forces or armed groups”,175 and secondly, rule 137: 
“children must not be allowed to take part in hostilities”.176  
 
The study found an abundance of state practice supporting both the rule 
against recruitment as well as the rule against use.177  Finding state 
practice to the effect that states do not use and recruit children below a 
certain age is not a tall order in itself as clearly no state recruits or uses 
children younger than four, as an arbitrary example. Thus, in as far as 
state practice is concerned the real question becomes what the age 
threshold is. Although there is a significant movement towards a straight-
eighteen threshold, in terms of the ICRC study current state practice still 
holds younger than fifteen as the threshold age. However, custom is fluid, 
thus further legal development may well see a raise in the age threshold 
to younger than eighteen. I am, however, of the view that studies that aim 
to codify customary international law, such as this ICRC study, may 
potentially negatively impact on future interpretations of substantive 
customary norms, specifically in relation to the development of such 
norms.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Henckaerts et al, note 88 above, 482. 
176 Ibid, 485.  
177 Henckaerts, JM. & Doswald-Beck, L. International Committee of the Red Cross: 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume II: Practice (Part II) (2005) 
(hereinafter ‘Volume II’) 3109-3142. 
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General state practice dictates that there can only be one customary rule 
on one issue.178 This begs the question whether state practice can be 
discernibly divided between such practice giving rise to an IHRL rule and 
such practice giving rise to an IHL rule. The methodology of the ICRC 
study placed equal reliance on state practice founded on IHRL as it did 
on state practice founded on IHL. The Child Recruitment case followed 
the same reasoning. Such an approach is warranted as the ICRC study 
states that IHRL was included in state practice as “international human 
rights law continues to apply during armed conflicts”.179 On this basis it is 
accepted that state practice, in the guise of IHRL obligations, can bolster 
the threshold state practice required for the existence of a customary IHL 
rule. The question then is whether this is equally true vice versa?  
 
The overlap between IHL and IHRL, in the context of child soldiering is of 
such a nature that both bodies of law are often applicable to the same 
situation. However, unlike IHRL’s continued application during times of 
armed conflict, IHL does not continue to apply during times of peace. 
Therefore, strictly speaking, if the ICRC argument is followed, reliance 
should not be placed on state practice emanating from within IHL to find a 
customary rule in IHRL. Furthermore, the substantive content of state 
practice within the IHL and IHRL realms should also be considered. For 
example, the now established IHL customary rule that “children must not 
be allowed to take part in hostilities” has corresponding IHRL state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Villiger, note 169 above, 30; Sassòli & Olson, note 50 above, 605. 
179 Henckaerts et al, note 88 above, xxxi.  
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practice, and indeed is founded in part, upon such state practice to the 
same effect. It is impossible for this part of the substantive IHRL to apply 
during times of peace as it directly speaks to participation in hostilities. 
Therefore, the degree of overlap between the relevant state practice from 
within IHL and IHRL is directly proportional to each other. In contrast, 
recruitment (as opposed to ‘use’) is prohibited during times of peace. The 
degree of overlap between state practice within IHL and IHRL is thus 
reduced, and state practice from within IHL cannot contribute to the 
existence of a customary IHRL norm applicable during times of peace. 
However, it can so contribute in relation to that customary norm as it 
applies during armed conflict. Nevertheless, overwhelming state practice 
supports the existence of a customary rule to the effect that “children 
must not be recruited into armed forces or armed groups”, during times of 
peace and armed conflict. 
 
State practice supports the existence of two customary rules: the rule that 
children must not be recruited into armed forces or armed groups; and 
the rule that children must not be allowed to take part in hostilities. Due to 
the fluid nature, and the rule that there cannot be two customary norms 
on one substantive issue of state practice, there is no distinction between 
IHL and IHRL within the framing of the rules, but there is in their 
application. The opinio juris requirement is notoriously difficult to comply 
with. There is an obvious link between usus and opinio juris, as the latter 
qualifies the first although care must be taken that they are not equated 
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and opinio juris cannot be presumed on the basis of state practice.180 
Nevertheless, in the context of child soldiering, the sources confirming 
state practice are stacked overwhelmingly in favour of a finding that 
states do regard the prohibitions against the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers as “accepted as law”.  
 
Finally, as customary international law is composed of state practice and 
opinio juris, theoretically the substantive norms contained in treaties 
relate only to the content of customary law in as far as those treaties 
dictate state practice and opinio juris. In the context of, for example, the 
prohibition of the use of children younger than fifteen in armed conflict, 
state practice and opinio juris possibly supports the existence of a 
customary norm of greater proscriptive content than any of the treaty 
norms discussed. However, in practice the first port of call in defining a 
customary norm is often widely ratified treaty norms of similar content to 
that of the envisaged customary norm.  
 
Therefore, in my view treaties often play an undue or superfluous role in 
defining customary law. In some instances, state practice and/or opinio 
juris falls short of the treaty norms relied upon, resulting in the recognition 
of a customary law rule, the substantive content of which is not supported 
by state practice and/or opinio juris. In other instances, state practice and 
opinio juris exceeds the substantive content of the treaty norms relied 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 See the Nicaragua case and the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 108-109.  
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upon, resulting in the recognition of a customary law rule that is more 
restricted than the relevant state practice and opinio juris. Although there 
are many child soldiers internationally, a relatively small number of states 
account for all child soldiers. A great majority of states do not use children 
younger than eighteen in hostilities in any capacity. More states recruit 
children younger than eighteen, however, a majority of states also refrain 
from doing so. It is thus likely that state practice and opinio juris support a 
rule or rules of customary law prohibiting the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers with greater proscriptive content than any current treaty norm.  
 
Status of Ratification of relevant instruments181  
 
Instrument Entry into force Parties 
Geneva Convention IV 21 October 1950 194 
Additional Protocol I 7 December 1978 169 
Additional Protocol II 7 December 1978 165 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 2 September 1990 193 
African Children’s Charter 29 November 1999 46182 
ILO Convention 182 19 November 2000 171 
CIAC Protocol 12 July 2002 142 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Information correct as at 21 August 2011.  
182 The number of ratifying countries is lower due to the nature of the instrument – 
regional IHRL instrument. The total number of possible ratifications is 54.  
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5. CONCLUSION  
The first research question this study aims to address is whether the 
international law norms that prohibit the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers are capable of enforcement. Should it be necessary that these 
norms be revised in order for them to be enforceable, international law in 
relation to child soldier prevention will remain in the first of Buergenthal’s 
stages, “the normative foundation”.183 The era of application will also then 
remain out of reach until these norms are capable of enforcement.   
 
The relationship between IHL and IHRL is of great importance in relation 
to child soldier prevention, and has received very little attention from 
commentators. The differences between these regimes, and their 
relationship to one another, has been discussed. The effects hereof are 
numerous. Most importantly, IHL applies only during armed conflict and 
creates obligations upon state and non-state actors, whereas IHRL 
applies at all times, but creates obligations only upon states. There are 
further practical distinctions that relate directly to application, which will be 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. In a concrete situation, for example, 
Additional Protocol II provides stronger protection to a thirteen year old 
who is used in hostilities than the African Children’s Charter. However, 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the African Children’s Charter and there are no 
comparable IHL enforcement mechanisms. Reliance may therefore be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183  See generally Buergenthal, T. ‘The Normative and Institutional Evolution of 
International Human Rights’ 19 Hum. Rts. Q. 703 (1997); and Chapter 1.  
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placed on the African Children’s Charter provision instead of the 
corresponding Additional Protocol II provision.  
 
Great emphasis has been placed on the weaknesses of the substantive 
norms prohibiting child soldiering. However, these weaknesses mostly 
relate to the scope of protection offered, that is to say the number of 
children protected by the relevant provision. The only limitation that 
relates directly to the legal enforceability of these norms is the 
qualification that all feasible measures must be taken that children do not 
participate in hostilities. However, in order to rely on this qualification an 
armed force or group will have to show that all feasible measures were 
taken to prevent such participation in each and every military 
engagement where children were used. As of yet, no armed force or 
group has relied on this qualification to defend their use of child soldiers. 
Further refinement of these norms should be pursued with the aim of 
offering better protection to more children, however, the limitations of the 
legal provisions in force does not render them unenforceable. 
 
Customary international law largely transcends the distinction between 
IHL and IHRL. As was discussed, in some cases this approach is more 
warranted than in others. The drafting and adoption of the CIAC Protocol 
was a massive undertaking that was first initiated during 1991 and only 
came into force during 2002. Unfortunately, the text that was finally 
adopted is rather disappointing for the reasons discussed above. 
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Considering the magnitude of the process to get such a global instrument 
adopted, it is unlikely that the treaty provisions prohibiting child soldiering 
that are in force presently will be revised for many years to come. The 
development of customary international law presents an avenue through 
which child soldier prevention can be further refined. However, many 
enforcement mechanisms have subject-matter jurisdiction over specific 
treaty norms only. The progressive development of customary norms is 
still of great value, as some mechanisms do have subject-matter 
jurisdiction over such norms; customary norms are taken into account in 
the interpretation of treaty norms; and when the relevant treaty norms are 
eventually revised, the state of customary law will play a significant role in 
determining the proscriptive content of such treaty norms.  
 
The final research question this study aims to address relates to the 
manner of enforcement of these norms. Chapters 5 and 6 specifically 
address the enforcement of child soldier prohibitive norms. In particular, 
the requisite changes to enforcement mechanisms relevant to prohibiting 
child soldiering are addressed in order to achieve a more significant 
degree of social change – the requisites for an “era of application”.  
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CHAPTER 4 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: 
PROSECUTING INDIVIDUALS FOR THE 
ENLISTMENT, CONSCRIPTION AND USE OF 
CHILD SOLDIERS  
 
Ever since the child soldier phenomenon started receiving critical 
attention by the international community, the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) – and developments within the ICC – 
have been the most significant in entering an “era of application”. Indeed, 
Thomas Lubanga Diylo, the first person to be prosecuted by the ICC, is 
charged only with the enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers.1 
This Chapter deals with international criminal tribunals that operate within 
technical parameters of jurisdiction, and therefore takes a rather technical 
form. This is unavoidable, because in order for judicial mechanisms to 
reach their potential in addressing social problems such as child 
soldiering, the positive law must be correctly understood and applied. In 
the case of child soldiering, the judicial interpretation and enforcement of 
the positive law is in its infancy and therefore requires much analysis.   
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) will not issue any further 
indictments, and all matters in relation to which indictments were issued 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, (Warrant of Arrest), ICC-01/04-01/06 (2006) 
(Lubanga Warrant of Arrest). 
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have been disposed of, but one – the high-profile Charles Taylor case.2 
The jurisprudence of the SCSL has contributed significantly to the 
development of international criminal law (ICL) regarding child soldiering. 
Indeed, every case that has been finalised before this Court resulted in at 
least one conviction on the ground of the enlistment, conscription or use 
of child soldiers. Three of the four defendants in the three cases to have 
entered the trial phase before the ICC are charged with the enlistment, 
conscription or use of child soldiers.3  
 
Two aspects of international criminal justice are of specific relevance to 
child soldier prevention. First, the positive international criminal law (ICL), 
as it is likely to be applied by the ICC; and, second, the role of 
international prosecutions in achieving social change. Both aspects are 
addressed in this chapter; however, more emphasis is placed on the 
application and enforcement of ICL.  
 
1. THE ENLISTMENT, CONSCRIPTION AND USE OF CHILD 
SOLDIERS AS A WAR CRIME: BACKGROUND AND DRAFTING 
HISTORY 
The Statute of the SCSL criminalizes “other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law”, which includes “conscripting or enlisting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, Prosecutor’s Second Amended Indictment, SCSL-03-01-
PT (2007). 
3 Lubanga Warrant of Arrest; Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07 (2007) (Katanga and Ngudjolo Warrant of Arrest); and 
Prosecutor v Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08 (2008). 
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children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using 
them to participate actively in hostilities”. 4  The Statute of the ICC 
criminalizes “war crimes”, which include:  
 
(2)(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
international armed conflict, within the established framework of 
international law, namely, any of the following acts: 
[...] 
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into 
the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.5 
[...] 
(2)(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed 
conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework 
of international law, namely, any of the following acts: 
[...] 
(vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into 
armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.6 
 
 
For ease of reference the formulation of this crime as contained in both 
the Statute of the SCSL and the Rome Statute will be referred to as the 
‘child soldier crime’.  
 
In his report of 2000 on the establishment of the SCSL, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations (UN) stated that it was clear that child 
recruitment and use was prohibited in terms of customary international 
law.7 He went on to say that it is far less clear whether such use and 
recruitment had, at the times when the crimes relevant to the SCSL were 
committed, entailed individual criminal responsibility under customary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Article 4(c), Statute of the SCSL.  
5 Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi), Rome Statute. 
6 Ibid article 8(2)(e)(vii).  
7 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’ UN S/2000/915 (4 October 2000) para 17 (Secretary General’s Report). 
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international law.8 Accordingly, the article 4(c) crime proposed for the 
SCSL by the Secretary-General was formulated more restrictively: 
“abduction and forced recruitment of children under the age of 15 years 
into armed forces or groups for the purpose of using them to participate 
actively in hostilities”. 9  This formulation, in the Secretary-General’s 
opinion represented customary international law at that time. The 
President of the Security Council, however, unilaterally and without 
providing reasons, amended the formulation of the crime to reflect the 
wording of the Rome Statute.  
 
The temporal jurisdiction of the ICC is strictly prospective.10  The SCSL is 
an ad hoc tribunal, with retrospective jurisdiction. The doctrine of strict 
legality (nullum crimen sine lege/nulla poena sine lege) holds that one 
can only be held criminally responsible for a deed if that deed was 
prohibited as a crime at the time of commission.11 Although the stated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid para 17-18 “owing to the doubtful customary nature of the ICC Statutory crime 
which criminalizes the conscription or enlistment of children under the age of 15, 
whether forced or “voluntary”, the crime which is included in article 4(c) of the Statute of 
the Special Court is not the equivalent of the ICC provision. While the definition of the 
crime as “conscripting” or “enlisting” connotes an administrative act of putting one’s 
name on a list and formal entry into the armed forces, the elements of the crime under 
the proposed Statute of the Special Court are: (a) abduction, which in the case of the 
children of Sierra Leone was the original crime and is in itself a crime under common 
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; (b) forced recruitment in the most general sense — 
administrative formalities, obviously, notwithstanding; and (c) transformation of the child 
into, and its use as, among other degrading uses, a “child-combatant”.”  
9 Report of the Secretary-General, draft Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
article 4(c).  
10 Article 11, Rome Statute. 
11 International law has departed from the doctrine of substantive justice and accepted 
the doctrine of strict legality. This doctrine is entrenched in article 22 of the Rome 
Statute, and is also accepted by the SCSL, ICTY and ICTR. With regard to the SCSL 
see Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of 
Jurisdiction, SCSL-2004-14-AR72E (31 May 2004) para 25 (Child Recruitment decision) 
and Secretary General’s Report, para 22. Furthermore see Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, 
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aims of the drafters of the Rome Statute were to codify existing law, they 
were not subject to any legal limitation on developing and creating new 
treaty crimes. Conversely, to comply with the principle of legality, the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the SCSL had to be limited to deeds that 
were deemed criminal in customary or conventional international law 
binding on Sierra Leone at the time of its commission.  
 
i. The Child Recruitment Decision  
Sam Hinga Norman, a defendant in the CDF case, brought a preliminary 
motion before the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL.12 He challenged the 
Court’s material jurisdiction over the crime of “conscripting or enlisting 
children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using 
them to participate actively in hostilities” on four grounds: First, child 
recruitment was not a crime under customary law at the times relevant to 
the indictment.13 Second, this violates the principle of legality. Third, while 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) created obligations on states not to recruit 
children it did not criminalise such acts. Lastly, the Rome Statute is not a 
codification of customary international law.14  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction IT-94-1-AR-72 
(2 October 1995) paras 90-95 (Tadić jurisdiction’ judgement).  
12 Ibid, Child Recruitment decision.  
13 The phrase “times relevant to the indictment” lacks clarity. However, the indictment 
used the same phrase. Thus at the earliest it refers to 30 November 1996. 
14 Child Recruitment decision para 1.  
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The first time an international tribunal dealt with such a challenge to 
legality in relation to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the tribunal was in 
the Hostages case before the Nuremberg Tribunal.15 In that case the 
defendants argued that Control Council Order Number 10 was ex post 
facto law as it did not exist at the time of the alleged crimes. The Court 
found against the defendants and held that the alleged crimes were 
already crimes under international law, “some by conventional law and 
some by customary law”.16 Some may question whether this was indeed 
true at that time, nevertheless the Tribunal clearly deemed itself bound by 
the principle of legality.  
 
In Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Decision on Preliminary Motion 
Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment decision), the Court 
delivered a controversial three to one majority decision finding against the 
defendants.17 The Court held that the crime as formulated in article 4(c) 
had already entailed criminal responsibility as a customary norm by 30 
November 1996, and that the principle of legality would therefore not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Trial of Wilhelm List and Others Case No 47 United Nations War Crimes Commission. 
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals. Volume VIII (1949) (Hostages case) para 634-
635. 
16 Ibid. 
17 For a commentary in support of the majority decision see generally Smith, A. ‘Child 
Recruitment and the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ 2 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 1141 (2004), 
where this author argues: “given this preponderance of evidence demonstrating the 
existence of state practice and opinio juris, there can be little doubt that the majority 
decision was correct in holding that the conscription, enlistment and use in hostilities of 
children under the age of 15 attracted individual criminal responsibility as at November 
1996”. However, Smith fails to draw a distinction between establishing the existence of a 
norm of customary international law, and whether such a norm entails criminal 
responsibility.  
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violated.18 This judgement was based on an unconvincing exposé of 
international and municipal legal measures prohibiting the use and 
recruitment of child soldiers. There are particular aspects to the 
judgement that are unsatisfactory. First, in finding that the prohibition of 
the use and recruitment of child soldiers has crystallised into a norm of 
customary international law, the Court never compared the proscriptive 
content of article 4(c) with the proscriptive content of the prohibition in 
customary law, as supported by state practice and opinio juris. Second, 
the Court erred in its approach to determine whether a customary norm 
entails individual criminal responsibility in international law. Third, the 
Court largely confused the existence of a customary norm criminalizing 
child soldier use and recruitment with the principles of legality and 
specificity. These points of critique are further discussed below, given 
their relation to one another; the second and third points are discussed 
together.  
 
The Proscriptive Content of the Relevant Customary Crime  
In a strong and convincing dissent Judge Robertson closely assessed the 
content of the various provisions that formed the basis of the customary 
norm. He concluded that the more limited crime as initially formulated by 
the Secretary-General had crystallised under customary international law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Article 1(1), Statute of the SCSL.  
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by 30 November 1996, but not the more expansive crime as contained in 
article 4(c).19  
 
As previously stated, the formulation of the crime as found under the 
Rome Statute was imported into the Statute of the SCSL. The Rome 
Statute was the first legal instrument of any kind to have prohibited, not to 
mention criminalized, the enlistment of children instead of their 
recruitment. The text of the Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998 
and the Statute came into force on 1 July 2002. Even though the Statute 
of the SCSL was drafted after the Rome Statute, since this Statute has 
retrospective effect, it was the first instrument with legal force to prohibit 
and criminalize the enlistment of children instead of merely their 
recruitment. Throughout this Chapter much attention is paid to the fact 
that enlistment as opposed to recruitment is criminalized in the Statute of 
the SCSL.  The reason for this is that enlistment is a broader concept 
than recruitment.20  
 
The temporal jurisdiction of the SCSL commenced on 30 November 
1996, and although no express end date is provided, the civil war ended 
on 18 January 2002.21 Even though the Rome Statute was intended to 
contain customary international law crimes only, during 2000 Bassiouni, 
the Chairman of the Drafting Committee for the Diplomatic Conference on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Child Recruitment case, Judge Robertson’s dissent para 4.  
20 See Chapter 3. 
21 This date is also supported by the UN Secretary-General. See Secretary-General’s 
Report, para 27. 
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the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, stated that article 
8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute was “progressive”.22  Scharf, the US 
Representative at the Rome Conference stated during the conference 
that “the use of children under the age of 15 years in hostilities was not 
currently a crime under customary international law and was another area 
of legislative action outside the purview of the Conference”. 23  The 
commencement of the temporal jurisdiction of the SCSL thus predates 
the adoption of the Rome Statute by almost two years; the de facto end 
date of its temporal jurisdiction also pre-dates the coming into force of the 
Rome Statute. The Court made an error of law in failing to take account 
of the proscriptive content of the relevant customary norm at the times 
relevant to the indictment.  
 
The question remains what the effect would have been, should the Court 
have found, as Judge Robertson did, that a customary norm had 
crystallised by 30 November 1996, but that its proscriptive content fell 
short of the formulation in article 4(c). There are two feasible options. The 
Court may find that article 4(c) forms part of its subject-matter jurisdiction, 
but to an extent limited to the proscriptive content of the customary norm, 
as it existed on 30 November 1996.24  Alternatively, the Court may find 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  Bassiouni, MC. ‘The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: 
Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities’ 75 Int'l L. Stud. Ser. US Naval War Col. (2000) 3, 20. 
23 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Committee of the Whole, ‘Summary Record of the 4th 
Meeting’, A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4 (20 November 1998) para 54.  
24  The Court may also identify specific dates relevant to concrete cases of child 
enlistment, conscription or use and determine what the proscriptive content of the norm 
was on that date.  
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that it lacks the competence to prosecute individuals under article 4(c) 
altogether. I am of the view that the second option will be correct in law, 
as the first will lead to judges exercising powers beyond their mandate. 
Such a finding would have effectively barred the Court from prosecuting 
individuals for the child soldier crime, which would have had detrimental 
consequences for the Court, as well as the movement for the prevention 
of child soldiers. However, this could have been avoided by exercising 
better judgement at the time of the drafting and adoption of the Statute.  
 
As I argued in Chapter 4, the content of customary international law bears 
no direct link to treaty law, but is rather dependent on state practice and 
opinio juris – which is often influenced by treaty norms. As such, 
conventional law plays an indirect role in formulating the content of 
customary international law.25 Theoretically, state practice and opinio juris 
may have supported the existence of a customary norm materially the 
same as article 4(c), however, this was never argued by the Court.  
 
Differentiating Between the Existence of a Criminal Norm and the 
Principles of Legality and Specificity 
All war crimes emanate from IHL; however, all violations of IHL norms do 
not imply criminal responsibility. Thus the mere existence of a customary 
IHL norm prohibiting the enlistment, conscription or use of child soldiers 
does not mean that such conduct necessarily entail criminal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See Chapter 3. 
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responsibility. The questions whether the violation of an IHL norm entails 
criminal responsibility and whether the principle of legality is complied 
with are closely related, but are not the same. International law has 
developed rules that dictate the requisites for a norm that did not 
traditionally entail criminal responsibility to become one that does entail 
such responsibility. The principle of legality does not concern itself with 
such development of the law, instead it is a more technical rule that 
safeguards the rule of law values inherent in criminal law.26 To illustrate 
the difference between these inter-related rules consider the following: it 
is possible for a tribunal to find that a particular rule did indeed entail 
criminal responsibility at a given time, but that there is no way in which a 
defendant could have reasonably been aware of this.27 As such, the 
principle of legality would be violated should the person be prosecuted.  
 
No international instruments in force during the temporal jurisdiction of 
the SCSL contained a prohibition of child soldiering that expressly 
criminalised the conduct contained in article 4(c). After finding that the 
enlistment, conscription or use of child soldiers formed part of customary 
law, the SCSL nevertheless had to determine whether such conduct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Van Schaack, B. ‘The Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law: Legality & 
International Criminal Law’ 103 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. (2009) 101. 
27 I am not arguing that legality is dependent on the subjective knowledge of a particular 
defendant. The example relates to any defendant within the territorial and temporal 
jurisdiction relevant to the case at hand.  
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could result in criminal responsibility. For this purpose the Court relied on 
the following formulation provided in the Tadić Jurisdiction (Tadić) case:28  
 
The following requirements must be met for an offence to be subject 
to prosecution before the International Tribunal under article 3 [of the 
ICTY Statute]:  
(i) The violation must constitute and infringement of a rule of 
international humanitarian law;  
(ii) the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law, 
the required conditions must be met; 
(iii) the violation must be “serious”, that is to say, it must constitute a 
breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must 
involve grave consequences for the victim [...]; 
(iv) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or 
conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person 
breaching the rule.29 
 
This formulation was used in Tadić to lay down requirements that “must 
be met for an offence to be subject to prosecution”,30 which is not the 
same as determining when individual criminal responsibility attaches to a 
breach of IHL – as it was used in the Child Recruitment decision. Indeed, 
the fourth requirement specifically asks the question whether individual 
criminal responsibility attaches to a person who breaches the norm. It is a 
circular argument at best to state that one holds certain conduct to be 
criminal in terms of a test in which one of the questions are whether the 
conduct is criminal.  
 
In Tadić the Court does in fact go on to specifically contemplate the fourth 
requirement. 31  In so doing, the Court refers to various authorities 
supporting its ultimate finding that violations of common article 3 to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Child Recruitment decision para 26. 
29 Tadić jurisdiction judgement, paras 90-95. 
30 Ibid para 94. 
31 Ibid para 128. 
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Geneva Conventions do entail individual criminal responsibility. This 
includes various pieces of national legislation; municipal prosecutions for 
such violations; agreements between parties to the conflict; and Security 
Council Resolutions.32 Most tellingly, the Court held:  
 
[…] as it applies to offences committed in the former Yugoslavia, the 
notion that serious violations of international humanitarian law governing 
internal armed conflict entail individual criminal responsibility is also fully 
warranted from the point of view of substantive justice and equality ... 
such violations were punishable under the Criminal Code of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the law implementing the two 
Additional Protocols of 1977. The same violations have been made 
punishable in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by virtue of the 
decree-law of 11 April 1992. Nationals of the former Yugoslavia as well 
as, at present, those of Bosnia-Herzegovina were therefore aware, or 
should have been aware, that they were amenable to the jurisdiction of 
their national criminal courts in cases of violations of international 
humanitarian law.33 
 
It is important to keep in mind that the defendant did not raise legality as 
a bar to the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction by the ICTY.34 Given 
the importance of the principle of legality, the Court did address this 
concept briefly, but only after it had concluded that the relevant IHL 
norms do entail criminal responsibility.35  
 
The present case is clearly and materially distinguishable from the Tadić 
decision in that the enlistment of children under fifteen was not 
criminalized in Sierra Leone at the relevant times.36 Furthermore, where 
the Tadić Appeals Chamber had an abundance of materials in the nature 
of those referred to above to rely on, such material was lacking in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid para 128-136. 
33 Ibid para 135. The conclusion reached in the Tadić case has been reaffirmed by the 
ICTY in Prosecutor v Blaškić IT-95-14-A (2004), para 176 (Blaškić judgement). 
34 Ibid para 139. 
35 Ibid para 133-143. 
36 Ibid para 133. 
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Child Recruitment decision.37 The judgment for the majority did go to 
some lengths to highlight municipal legislation and Security Council 
Resolutions relevant to child soldiering. However, in most cases these 
sources either post-dated the temporality of the defendant’s alleged 
criminal conduct, or occurred in very close proximity to such conduct.  
 
At the commencement of this section I highlighted three points of critique 
against the judgement in the Child Recruitment decision. I have since 
substantiated my arguments that the proscriptive content of article 4(c) 
did not accord with that of the proscriptive content of the prohibition in 
customary law; and that the Court erred in its approach to determine 
whether a customary norm entails criminal responsibility. If these 
arguments are accepted, the principle of legality would be violated by 
implication, as the conduct relevant to article 4(c) would not be deemed 
criminal.38 However, for the sake of completeness the Court’s approach 
to the principle of legality is discussed below.  
 
After it is established that the prohibited conduct entails individual criminal 
responsibility, the concrete case before the court must still pass scrutiny 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Cassese, A. International Criminal Law (2008) 85 states that in assessing whether a 
breach of IHL is a war crime one is entitled to examine “military manuals; national 
legislation of states belonging to the major legal systems of the world; or, if these 
elements are lacking, the general principles of criminal justice common to nations of the 
world, as set out in international instruments, acts, resolutions and the like, and the 
legislation and judicial practice of the state to which the accused belongs or on who’s 
territory the crime has allegedly been committed”. 
38 This not to say that the questions whether a criminal norm exists and whether legality 
is complied with are the same. While it is true that if a criminal norm does not exist, the 
principle of legality will be violated by implication, the reverse does not hold true.  
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under the legality principle. If the principle of legality is absolute it would 
imply that in a case such as Tadić where a norm was for the first time 
regarded as entailing criminal responsibility, the principle of legality will be 
violated. However, the law is a dynamic, living body of rules capable of 
development; this is particularly true in the case of common law and 
customary international law. Greenwood contends that the legality 
principle will not necessarily be violated, as “that principle does not 
preclude all development of criminal law through the jurisprudence of 
courts and tribunals, so long as those developments do not criminalise 
conduct which, at the time it was committed, could reasonably have been 
regarded as legitimate”.39 Greenwood goes on to argue that the principle 
of legality will not be violated where the relevant conduct is universally 
considered as wrongful and doubt only exists as to its wrongfulness 
under a particular system of law. He specifically refers to Regina v R, a 
House of Lords decision, where it was found that a husband can be 
convicted of raping his own wife.40  
 
The Court further supported its finding that the principle of legality had not 
been breached, as a prohibition of child enlistment, conscription or use 
“...is found in the national legislation of the states which includes criminal 
sanctions as a measure of enforcement”. 41  It was never pertinently 
argued in the judgement that any state criminalised enlistment of children 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Greenwood, C. ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Tadić Case’ 7 EJIL (1996) 
265, 281.  
40 Ibid, note 58; Regina v R (1992) 1 AC 599 (House of Lords). 
41 Ibid para 42. 
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as opposed to recruitment, conscription or use,42 not to mention such 
criminalisation in Sierra Leone specifically. Significantly, not a single legal 
provision in effect prior to 30 November 1996 prohibited the enlistment of 
children under fifteen. The Court went on to say that: 
 
[...] Finally, one can determine the period during which the majority of 
states criminalised the prohibited behaviour, which in this case, as 
demonstrated, was the period between 1994 and 1996. It took a further 
six years for the recruitment of children between the ages of 15 and 18 
to be included in treaty law as individually punishable behaviour. The 
development process concerning the recruitment of child soldiers, taking 
into account the definition of children as persons under the age of 18, 
culminated in the codification of the matter in the CRC Optional Protocol 
II.43 
 
It is patently incorrect that “the majority of states” criminalised the 
“prohibited behaviour”, which includes child enlistment, between 1994 
and 1996.44  
 
The Court dealt with the principle of specificity in a cursory manner. This 
principle is directly related to the principle of legality. Where the latter 
holds that a crime must exist at the time of commission before someone 
can be prosecuted for the deed, the former determines the degree to 
which this pre-existing crime must be clear and defined. The Court 
argued that the Elements of Crimes (hereinafter EOC) formulated with 
regard to the Rome Statute together with the legislation of the world 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 As Judge Robertson stated in his dissent in the Child Recruitment decision at para 40, 
footnote 51, UNICEF was only able to list 5 states which had a specific criminal law 
against ‘child recruitment’ prior to July 1998. These states are Columbia, Argentina, 
Spain, Ireland and Norway. This does not necessarily mean that these states 
criminalised ‘enlistment’, as opposed to recruitment or conscription.   
43 Child Recruitment decision para 50. 
44 See note 42 above.   
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community specified the elements of the crime.45 Firstly, there was not a 
single state that formally criminalised the enlistment of children younger 
than fifteen years old as opposed to conscription, recruitment or use prior 
to 30 November 1996. Furthermore, the EOC of the Rome Statute was 
only adopted at the first session of the Assembly of States Parties to the 
Rome Statute during August 2002, after the temporal jurisdiction of the 
SCSL had ended.  
 
The principle of legality is not absolute. Throughout the history of ICL, 
tribunals have interpreted this principle rather expansively;46 perhaps too 
expansively. It is nevertheless important that the Court in the Child 
Recruitment decision deemed the doctrine of strict legality as binding 
upon it.47 It is submitted that the enlistment of a child under the age of 
fifteen years for a non-combat related activity could “reasonably have 
been regarded as legitimate” at the time of commission of the deed. 
Thus, the Court’s finding in this regard remains questionable.  
 
The Child Recruitment decision cleared the way for all prosecutions 
before the SCSL where the defendant was charged under article 4(c), 
which indeed includes every defendant indicted by the SCSL. The 
criticism levelled at this judgement does not taint any future prosecutions 
before the ICC. First, the ICC has prospective jurisdiction only. Second, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002) 
ICC-ASP/1/3. 
46 Van Schaack, note 26 above, 101-104. . 
47 Child Recruitment decision para 25. 
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is much more likely that the enlistment, conscription or use of children 
younger than fifteen had crystallised into a criminal norm of customary 
international law by 1 July 2002 rather than by 30 November 1996.  
 
2. ‘USING, CONSCRIPTING OR ENLISTING’ CHILDREN IN TERMS OF 
THE POSITIVE LAW 
The jurisprudence of the SCSL was ground-breaking in as far as bringing 
to account those responsible for the enlistment, conscription and use of 
children is concerned. Nevertheless, its value for future prosecutions in 
the context of the ICC should not be overstated. Although the crime 
proscribed by the SCSL is a verbatim restatement of the Rome Statute, 
there are various and significant differences between the approaches of 
the SCSL Statute and the Rome Statute to general principles of ICL. 
What is more, by definition the SCSL jurisprudence does not take direct 
account of the different features of child soldier prosecutions in the 
context of international and non-international armed conflict. This section 
is focused on contemporary ICL and its prospects in addressing child 
soldiering. The Rome Statute and ICC thus forms the basis of discussion; 
the SCSL and its jurisprudence is drawn on only in so far as it contributes 
to an understanding of the contemporary crime proscribing child 
soldiering and its scope of prosecution. 
 
The EOC of article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Rome Statute, proscribing the child 
soldier crime in international armed conflict, are: 
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1. The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into the 
national armed forces or used one or more persons to participate actively 
in hostilities. 
2. Such person or persons were under the age of 15 years. 
3. The perpetrator knew or should have known that such person or 
persons were under the age of 15 years. 
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
international armed conflict. 
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established 
the existence of an armed conflict. 
 
Similarly, the EOC of article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute, proscribing 
the child soldier crime in non-international armed conflict, are: 
 
1. The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into an 
armed force or group or used one or more persons to participate actively 
in hostilities. 
2. Such person or persons were under the age of 15 years. 
3. The perpetrator knew or should have known that such person or 
persons were under the age of 15 years. 
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
armed conflict not of an international character. 
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established 
the existence of an armed conflict. 
 
The only difference between the elements of the child soldier crime in IAC 
and NIAC is found in the first element and the fourth element. In the 
context of IAC the first element provides “into the national armed forces”, 
whereas in the context of NIAC the first element provides “into an armed 
force or group”. Similarly, the fourth element uses the language “an 
armed conflict not of an international character” in the context of NIAC, 
and “an international armed conflict” in the context of IAC. These 
elements account for the chapeau requirements, objective requirements 
(actus reus) and the subjective requirements (mens rea) of the child 
soldier crime, the remainder of this section is divided accordingly.  
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i. Chapeau Requirements  
Chapeau requirements are those requirements that must be met in order 
to charge a specific class of international law crimes. The concept of ‘war 
crimes’ as a distinct genus of international crimes is premised on the 
basis that the offence must be committed in the context of either an 
international or non-international armed conflict. 48  The chapeau 
requirements of war crimes are formulated under various statutes, most 
relevantly the Rome Statute. The Statute of the SCSL provides very little 
in this regard. The RUF case has provided some needed clarity on this 
issue. The Court held that there are two relevant chapeau requirements: 
the existence of an armed conflict at the time of the alleged offence; and 
the existence of a nexus between the alleged offence and the armed 
conflict.49 
 
The existence of such a nexus is a question of fact, and is to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. 50  However, the Sierra Leone 
conflict occurred within the context of non-international armed conflict, 
and the Court’s finding with regard to the relevant chapeau requirements 
is supported by the findings of the ICTR, also in the context of non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Green, LC. The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (2000) 18-19.  
49 Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Trial Chamber 1, SCSL-04-15-T (2 March 
2009) (RUF Trial judgement) para 107. See also Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa 
SCSL-04-14-T (2 August 2007) para 138 (CDF Trial judgement). 
50 Ibid. 
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international armed conflict.51 In the Tadić Appeals decision the ICTY 
held that, in the context of international armed conflict “it is sufficient that 
the alleged crimes were closely related to the hostilities occurring in other 
parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict”.52 The EOC 
sheds some light on the position before the ICC, without materially 
differentiating between international and non-international armed conflict:  
 
[…] 
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with 
an international armed conflict [armed conflict not of an international 
character]. 
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.53 
 
No legal evaluation on the part of the perpetrator as to the existence of an 
armed conflict or its character (as international or non-international) is 
required.54 A perpetrator is also not required to be aware of the facts that 
established the character of the conflict.55 The ICC has held that the 
Rome Statute criminalizes the same conduct regardless of the 
characterization of the conflict as international or internal;56 giving further 
credence to the movement to abolish this distinction.57 With regard to the 
existence and nexus between the armed conflict and the alleged crime, it 
was stated in the Lubanga Confirmation of Charges decision that:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Prosecutor v Kayhishema and Ruzindana ICTR-95-1-T (1999) para 186-188; and 
Prosecutor v Rutaganda ICTR-96-3-T (1999) para 102. 
52 Tadić Jurisdiction judgement para 70, see also Prosecutor v Delalić, Mucić, Delić and 
Landžo IT-96-21-T (1998) para 69-70 (Čelebići Trial judgement). 
53 EOC, article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii).  
54 EOC, introduction to article 8. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Prosecutor v Lubanga Confirmation of Charges ICC-01/04-01/06 (2007) para 204. 
57  Cassese International Criminal Law; note 37 above; also see Bassiouni ‘The 
Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law’, note 22 above. 
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[...] chamber follows the jurisprudence of the ICTY, which requires the 
conduct to have been closely related to the hostilities occurring in any 
part of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict. The 
armed conflict need not be considered the ultimate reason for the 
conduct and the conduct need not have taken place in the midst of 
battle. Nonetheless, the armed conflict must play a substantial role in 
the perpetrator’s decision, in his or her ability to commit the crime or 
in the manner in which the conduct was ultimately committed.58  
 
Without disputing the progressive aspects of the Rome Statute, in certain 
respects the Rome Statute is more restrictive than customary 
international law.59 The ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes “in particular 
when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes” (own emphasis). 60  This provision was 
entered as a compromise as some states were in favour of a ‘high 
threshold’ that would have seen the words “in particular” replaced with 
“...only when committed as part of...”.61 This provision does not provide 
elements or prerequisites to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court, but 
instead provides guidance to the prosecutor in his enquiry whether to 
launch an investigation into an alleged war crime.62  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Lubanga Confirmation of Charges decision para 287. See also Prosecutor v Katanga 
and Ngudjolo Confirmation of Charges ICC-01/04-01/07 (2008) para 247 (Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Confirmation of Charges decision). 
59 Cassese, note 37 above, 94. 
60 Article 8(1), Rome Statute.  
61 Dormann, K. ‘War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
with a Special Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of Crimes’ 7 Max Planck Y.B. 
U.N. L. (2003) 343, 349. 
62  Ibid. Kittichaisaree, K. International Criminal Law (2001), 133 agrees that this 
provision does not add a further element to war crimes, but states that it is a 
jurisdictional threshold. See also Von Hebel, H. & Robinson, D. ‘Crimes within the 
Jurisdiction of the Court’ in Lee, RS. The International Criminal Court: The Making of the 
Rome Statute – Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999) 79, 107-108.  
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Within the context of international armed conflict, child soldier enlistment, 
conscription and use is criminalised and categorized as “other serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict, within the established framework of international law...” 
(emphasis added).63   The equivalent provision in NIAC is the same 
except “international armed conflict” is replaced by “armed conflicts not of 
an international character”.64 This requirement is repeated in the EOC as 
well, where it is said that “the elements for war crimes ... shall be 
interpreted within the established framework of the international law of 
armed conflict...” (emphasis added).65 Article 8, as a whole, is categorized 
according to the nature of the conflict: international or non- international, 
and according to the applicable law, either conventional or customary.66 
Bassiouni is of the view that sub-articles 2(b) and 2(e) incorporate “what 
the drafters believed to be customary law”.67 However, he points out that 
these sections also reflect existing conventional law.68 Elsewhere in the 
same work, Bassiouni contends that the child soldiering provisions under 
article 8(2)(e)(vii) is “progressive”, indicating that this provision did not 
form part of customary international law.69  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Article 8(2)(b), Rome Statute. 
64 Ibid, article 8(2)(e). 
65 EOC, introduction to article 8. 
66 Bassiouni, MC. ‘The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law’ note 
22, 21. 
67 Ibid; see also Von Hebel & Robinson, note 62 above, 104. 
68 Bassiouni, ibid. 
69 Ibid, 20 and United Nations Diplomatic Conference, note 23 above, para 54.  
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Cassese’s view on the meaning of the term “within the established 
framework of the international law” is that the Court has a mandatory duty 
to determine contemporary customary international law each time it hears 
a charge under article 8(2)(b) or (e).70  Such a charge can only be 
sustained if contemporary international law recognizes it. Even though 
the crimes listed in these sub-articles were deemed to be of a customary 
nature by the drafters at the time of drafting,71 Cassese’s position is 
sustainable given that the EOC states that war crimes “...shall be 
interpreted within the established framework of international law...”. The 
question ultimately becomes whether the contemporary status of 
customary international law limits or expands the Court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction.72 I share Cassese’s view: a charge should only be sustained 
if that crime is recognized as such under customary international law. 
Should the Rome Statute be more conservative than customary law on a 
particular matter, the Rome Statute definition and elements should be 
applied. Effectively, this interpretation will be in favorem libertatis, 
although this is not necessarily the rationale for it.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 For the continuous evolution of customary rules of IHL see Meron, T. War Crimes Law 
Comes of Age (1998) 262-277.  
71 Bassiouni, note 22 above, 21.  
72 Article 21 of the Rome Statute states the applicable law thus:  
1. The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of 
armed conflict; 
[...] 
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ii. Objective Requirements  
In IAC the EOC provides “the perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or 
more persons into the national armed forces or used one or more 
persons to participate actively in hostilities”.73 Similarly, in NIAC the EOC 
provides “the perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into 
an armed force or group or used one or more persons to participate 
actively in hostilities”.74 Regardless of the categorization of the armed 
conflict, the EOC also provides “such person or persons were under the 
age of 15 years”. 
 
The actus reus element of the use, conscription or enlistment of children 
can be committed in three different ways.75 Firstly, enlistment is the least 
severe form of the crime; this entails the acceptance and enrolment of a 
person younger than fifteen when she/he volunteers. Secondly, 
conscription entails a degree of compulsion on the part of the recruiter. 
Finally, use is predicated on active participation in hostilities.76 All three 
incarnations of this crime are continuous crimes, 77  as such, the 
commission of the crime occurs for as long as the child remains enlisted, 
conscripted or used for active participation in hostilities; or until the child 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Element 1, EOC, article 8(2)(b)(xxvi). 
74 Ibid, article 8(2)(e)(vii). 
75  RUF Trial judgement, note 49 above, para 249: “Consistent with established 
jurisprudence, the Chamber adopts the definition of “committing” a crime as “physically 
perpetrating a crime or engendering a culpable omission in violation of criminal law”. 
The actus reus for committing a crime consists of the proscribed act of participation, 
physical or otherwise directly, in a crime provided for in the Statute, through positive acts 
or culpable omissions, whether individually or jointly with others.” 
76 Child Recruitment case, Judge Robertson’s dissent para 5 
77 Lubanga Confirmation of Charges decision, note 56 above, para 248. 
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is no longer younger than fifteen. Furthermore, each of the three 
incarnations of the crime is a complete crime.  
 
The contribution of the ICC to the development and understanding of 
child soldering in the ICL context is limited to the confirmation of charges 
decisions in the Lubanga case and the Katanga and Ngudjolo case.78 
Lubanga is charged with the enlistment, conscription and use of children, 
whereas Katanga and Ngudjolo are charged only with the use of 
children.79  
 
The actus reus of the crime of enlistment of children under fifteen has 
been a subject of confusion, perhaps because it is the most novel aspect 
to the formulation of the crime.80 Schabas states that the replacement of 
the word ‘recruiting’ in an earlier draft of the Rome Statute with 
‘conscripting or enlisting’ “suggests something more passive, such as 
putting the name of a person on a list”.81 The Secretary-General of the 
United Nations adopted the same approach in his report to the Security 
Council on the establishment of the SCSL.82 The SCSL was the first 
Court to pronounce on this matter. Trial Chamber 1 and Trial Chamber 2 
heard the CDF and AFRC matters (respectively) concurrently.83  Trial 
Chamber 1 found that enlistment encompasses both conscription and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Ibid; and Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation of Charges decision. 
79 Lubanga Warrant of Arrest; Katanga and Ngudjolo Warrant of Arrest. 
80 See the discussion of the term ‘recruitment’ in Chapter 3.  
81 Schabas, W. An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2001), 50.  
82 Secretary-General’s Report, note 7 above para 17-18. 
83 Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu SCSL-04-16-T (20 June 2007) para 735 
(AFRC Trial Judgement). 
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enlistment.84 On the other hand, Trial Chamber 2 held that enlistment 
means “accepting and enrolling individuals when they volunteer to join an 
armed force or group”.85 Trial Chamber 1’s interpretation was suspect 
from the beginning, as it renders the word ‘conscription’ superfluous. This 
issue formed one of the grounds of appeal in the CDF case. The Appeals 
Chamber correctly endorsed Trial Chamber 2’s finding in the AFRC 
case.86  
 
On the question of the role of the accused in the enlistment of children, 
the Appeals Chamber in the CDF case held “that for enlistment there 
must be a nexus between the act of the accused and the child joining the 
armed force or group... Whether such a nexus exists is a question of fact 
which must be determined on a case-by-case basis”.87 Furthermore, in 
the context of a non-state armed group enlistment cannot be narrowly 
construed as a formal process. It should rather be regarded in a broad 
sense so as to include any conduct that accepts a child as a part of the 
militia, which includes making him or her participate in military 
operations.88 The ICC has also held that enlistment is a “voluntary act”, 
whereas conscription is “forcible recruitment”, which means that consent 
can never be a defence against a charge of enlistment.89 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 CDF Trial judgement para 192. 
85 AFRC Trial judgement para 733. 
86 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa SCSL-04-14-A (28 May 2008) para 140-144 (CDF 
Appeal judgement). 
87 Ibid para 141. 
88 Ibid, para 144; RUF Trial judgement para 185. 
89 Lubanga Confirmation of Charges Judgement para 247. See also Child Recruitment 
case, Judge Robertson’s dissent para 5. 
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Giving meaning to the ‘conscription’ of children under fifteen is the least 
contentious in law of the three incarnations of the child soldier crime. This 
crime requires an element of force or compulsion to be applied by the 
recruiter to distinguish it from enlistment. 90  In some instances such 
compulsion would be by the force of law. 91  Conscription is usually 
associated with citizenship duties where governments require their 
citizens to serve in the governmental armed forces on a mandatory basis. 
This occurs within many western democracies such as Switzerland, even 
when not at war. Conscription in the context of the child soldier crime is 
broader than that, as conscription can occur in the context of an armed 
group distinct from the state.92 	  In the AFRC case it was stated that 
‘conscription’ encompasses coercive acts such as abductions and forced 
recruitment. 93  In distinguishing between enlistment and conscription, 
which turns on the degree of participation of the child in becoming 
associated with an armed group or force, the SCSL has consistently 
argued that this distinction is “contrived” as the ability of a child younger 
than fifteen to express free will and volition in a conflict setting is a 
questionable endeavour.94 This accords with Coomaraswamy’s view that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Lubanga Confirmation of Charges judgement para 246; Child Recruitment case, 
Judge Robertson’s dissent para 5. 
91 Child Recruitment case, ibid; AFRC Trial judgement para 734. 
92 Ibid, AFRC. 
93 Ibid; RUF Trial judgement para 186. 
94 RUF Trial judgement para 187; CDF Trial judgement para 192.  
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children do not have a “death concept”, however, she places the age 
threshold at younger than eighteen.95 
 
The phrase ‘use of one or more persons to participate actively in 
hostilities’ raises a number of issues that require analysis. First, can a 
child be so used in hostilities without having been either conscripted or 
enlisted? Added to this is the question whether a charge of enlistment or 
conscription can be sustained together with a charge of use of a child 
soldier; as this may violate the rule against duplicity.  
 
As it has been held that enlistment should be broadly construed so as to 
include any conduct that accepts a child as a part of the militia, it is clear 
that either enlistment or conscription will always occur before the use of 
the child for participation in active hostilities.96 In the Blockburger case 
the US Supreme Court set the test to determine whether a person can be 
charged with more than one crime where an act simultaneously breached 
various rules covering the same subject matter.97 Such charges will be 
sustainable “only if each statutory provision involved has a materially 
distinct element not contained in the other. An element is materially 
distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact not required by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 I interviewed Ms Coomaraswamy on 7 February 2011 in New York City, USA. See 
Chapter 1. 
96 It is nevertheless theoretically possible for a child to engage in hostilities without 
forming part of an armed group and without an adult being responsible for using the 
child, for example, a child spontaneously going to arms.  
97 Blockburger, US, Supreme Court, 1932, 284 US, 299 US S.Ct. 180, 304. This test 
was endorsed by the ICTY in Prosecutor v Kupreškić and others IT-95-16 TC (14 
January 2000) para 681 et seq; see also Mundis, D. ‘Blockburger Test’ in Cassese, A. 
(ed.) The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009) 257-258.  
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other.”98 Enlistment is a lesser crime than conscription, not an incomplete 
crime; the same is true of conscription vis-à-vis use. There is at least one 
distinct objective element that needs to be proven with regard to the use 
of child soldiers on the one hand and enlistment and conscription, on the 
other. It has to be shown that the child was used to participate actively in 
hostilities. It is thus submitted that a charge of both 
enlistment/conscription and use can be sustained against the same 
defendant with regard to the same victim.99 
 
One of the most contentious questions within IHL has long been what 
constitutes direct/active participation in hostilities. In Chapter 3 I 
discussed direct participation in hostilities in as far as it relates to IHL and 
IHRL. This section is focused on the parallel development of this concept 
within ICL.  
 
I have already argued that ‘direct’ and ‘active’ participation in hostilities 
amount to the same standard.100 While I maintain this point of view, on 
the same reasoning expressed in Chapter 3, there are developments 
within ICL that must be canvassed. The ICTR held, in the Akayesu case, 
that the wording is so similar that direct and active means the same in so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Čelebići Trial judgement para 412. 
99 These crimes should be charged in separate counts in the indictment. See CDF 
Appeals judgement para 139, where it is stated that “these modes of recruiting children 
[enlistment; conscription and use] are distinct from each other and liability for one form 
does not necessarily preclude liability for the other”. See also Lubanga Warrant of 
Arrest. 
100 Chapter 3. 
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far as it qualifies the degree of participation in hostilities.101 The SCSL,102 
the Targeted Killings Case and the ICRC guidance on direct participation 
in hostilities supports this view. 103  The Report of the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
provided:  
 
The words “using” and “participate” have been adopted in order to 
cover both direct participation in combat and also active participation 
in military activities linked to combat such as scouting, spying, 
sabotage and use of children as decoys, couriers or at military 
checkpoints. It would not cover activities clearly unrelated to the 
hostilities such as food deliveries to an airbase or the use of domestic 
staff in an officer’s accommodation. However, use of children in a 
direct support function such as acting as bearers to take supplies to 
the front line, or activities at the front line itself, would be included 
within the terminology.104 (emphasis added) 
 
Many commentators as well as the ICC itself have interpreted this to 
indicate that ‘direct’ and ‘active’ participation in hostilities present different 
standards. However, this interpretation is not sound. The words ‘direct’ 
and ‘active’ in this context are not used to qualify participation in 
hostilities, as is the case in the Rome Statute. Rather it qualifies 
“participation in combat” and “participation in military activities linked to 
combat”. Moreover, the quoted passage was not intended to define 
‘direct’ and ‘active’, but rather ‘using’ and ‘participate’. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101  Prosecutor v Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T (1998) para 629. See also Prosecutor v 
Semanza ICTR-97-20-T (2003) para 365. 
102 CDF Trial judgement para 131. See also RUF Trial judgement para 102. 
103 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v Government of Israel et al H.C.J. 769/02 
(11 December 2005) para 30. Melzer, N. Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (2009), 43. 
104  Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (14 April 1998) 21 note 12, cited in CDF Trial 
judgement para 193. 
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The ICC held in the Lubanga Confirmation of Charges decision that these 
standards are not the same: 
 
“Active participation” in hostilities means not only direct participation 
in hostilities, combat in other words, but also covers active 
participation in combat-related activities such as scouting, spying, 
sabotage and the use of children as decoys, couriers or at military 
check-points.105 
 
The incorporation of the language of the Preparatory Committee’s report 
indicates that the Court endorsed the argument based on the report. 
Having interpreted active participation more broadly than direct 
participation, the question remains exactly how widely the Court will 
interpret this provision in concrete cases.  
 
The ICC has held, in obiter dictum, that food deliveries to an airbase and 
working as domestic staff in the quarters of married officers does not 
meet the threshold of active participation.106 On the other hand, it was 
held in ratio decidendi, that the guarding of military objectives and acting 
as bodyguards meet the threshold. 107  The SCSL has held that the 
“concept of hostilities encompasses not only combat operations but also 
military activities linked to combat such as the use of children at military 
checkpoints or as spies”.108 Similar to the ICC, the SCSL has held that 
food finding missions and working as a domestic servant in officers’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Lubanga Confirmation of Charges judgement para 261. 
106 Ibid para 262. 
107 Ibid para 263. 
108 RUF Trial judgement para 1720. 
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quarters do not amount to active participation in hostilities.109 While acting 
as bodyguards; mounting ambushes; participation in armed patrols; 
committing crimes against civilians; guarding military objectives; and 
children acting as spies may all amount to active participation. 110 
However, it should be borne in mind that this is not a list that can blindly 
be followed, whether a specific case meets the threshold depends “on the 
particularities of each armed conflict and the modus operandi of the 
warring factions”.111 Similar to the ICC, the SCSL held in the AFRC case 
that: 
 
[...] the use of children to participate actively in hostilities is not limited 
to participation in combat. An armed force requires logistical support to 
maintain its operations. Any labour or support that gives effect to, or 
helps maintain, operations in a conflict constitutes active participation. 
Hence carrying loads for the fighting faction, finding and/or acquiring 
food, ammunition or equipment, acting as decoys, carrying messages, 
making trails or finding routes, manning checkpoints or acting as 
human shields are some examples of active participation as much as 
actual fighting and combat.112 	  
Thus, in contrast to the Lubanga Confirmation of Charges decisions and 
the RUF case, it was held, in obiter dictum, that finding or acquiring food 
may amount to active participation in hostilities. In the RUF case the 
Court argued that children did not carry arms openly while on food finding 
missions, thus it did not amount to active participation.113 This again 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Ibid para 1743. However, in the AFRC Trial judgement para 737, it was stated, in 
ratio decidendi, that “finding and/or acquiring food” may amount to active participation. 
110 RUF Trial judgement para 1714-1743. 
111 Ibid para 1720. 
112 AFRC Trial judgement para 737.  
113 RUF Trial judgement para 1714-1743. 
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shows that the determination whether acting in a given capacity amounts 
to active participation needs to be made on a case-by-case basis.   
 
Finally, within the context of international armed conflict the child soldier 
crime is formulated so as to criminalize the enlistment and conscription of 
children into “the national armed forces”. This formulation initially leads to 
uncertainty as to whether this crime can only be committed by the 
governmental forces of a state in the context of IAC. However, the ICC 
has held that this provision does not limit this crime to “governmental” 
armed forces.114 The rationale was firstly that the ICTY has construed the 
term “national” to refer not only to nationality as such, but also to 
belonging to the opposing forces in armed conflict. 115  Secondly, to 
interpret “national” to mean “governmental” undermines the object and 
purpose of the Statute of the Court. 116  Finally, Additional Protocol I 
provides an interpretive basis upon which to interpret “national armed 
forces” to include non-state groups with certain characteristics of a 
government.117 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Lubanga Confirmation of Charges judgement para 280. See also Cottier, M. ‘Article 
8(2)(b)(xxvi)’ in Triffterer, O. Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (2008) para 232. 
115 Lubanga Confirmation of Charges judgement, ibid. Prosecutor v Delalić et al IT-96-
21-A Appeal Judgement (2001) para 98. In Delalić, the ICTY’s finding was made in the 
context of article 4(1) of Geneva Convention IV. 
116 Lubanga Confirmation of Charges judgement para 281. 
117 Article 43 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 
1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 17512.  See also ibid paras 
272-285; Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation of Charges decision para 249. 
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iii. Subjective Requirements  
Mens rea denotes “a state of mind, a psychological element required by 
the legal order for the conduct to be blameworthy and consequently 
punishable”. 118  The Rome Statute contains a provision devoted 
exclusively to mens rea, and regulates mens rea in relation to all crimes 
over which the ICC has jurisdiction: 
 
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible 
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 
only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.  
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: 
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; 
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events. 
3. For the purposes of this article, "knowledge" means awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events. "Know" and "knowingly" shall be construed accordingly.119  
 
The main question is what degree of mens rea is required to sustain a 
conviction before the ICC. In essence fault is comprised of dolus (intent) 
and culpa (negligence). Intent is divided into dolus directus,120  dolus 
indirectus121 and dolus eventualis.122 Culpa comprises of negligence and 
gross negligence (culpa lata).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Cassese, note 37 above, 53.  
119 Article 30, Rome Statute.   
120 The perpetrator foresees and desires the consequences of her/his actions. 
121 The perpetrator foresees secondary consequences that will set in as a certainty in 
consequence to her/his actions, although these consequences are not desired she/he 
nevertheless committed the act and those consequences do set in. 
122 The perpetrator foresees the possibility of harmful consequences, and reconciles 
her/himself with the possibility of such consequences and nevertheless proceeds with 
the relevant activity. For an extensive discussion of these definitions see Van der Vyver, 
JD. ‘The International Criminal Court and the Concept of Mens Rea in International 
Criminal Law’ 12 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 57 (2004) 62-63. 
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Cassese is of the view that international criminal law generally requires 
intent in the strict sense;123 but recognizes lesser forms of mens rea in 
limited cases, e.g. dolus eventualis is inherent in command responsibility 
and common purpose/joint criminal enterprise. 124  Cassese draws a 
distinction between ‘intent’ and ‘dolus eventualis’, he has further criticised 
the fault requirement as included in the Rome Statute for requiring a 
stricter form of dolus than dolus eventualis (he would argue that “intent” 
(dolus directus) is required and “recklessness” (which he seems to 
equate to dolus eventualis) is insufficient).125 There is a tendency among 
ICL commentators to use the terms ‘dolus eventualis’ and ‘recklessness’ 
as synonymous, when there is in fact a technical difference between the 
terms.126 Van der Vyver argues that the Rome Statute is sound in this 
regard as the ICC concerns itself with “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole”.127 Considering that 
the determination of the seriousness of a crime does not lie with actus 
reus alone, but includes mens rea, Van der Vyver’s position is to be 
preferred.  
 
The ICTY held in the Stakić case that dolus eventualis is sufficient to 
meet the intent requirement for the mens rea element for the crime of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Cassese, note 37 above, 60.  
124 Prosecutor v Blaškić IT-95-14-A (2004) para 42. 
125 Cassese, A. ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Preliminary Reflections’ 
10 Eur. J. Int’l. L. 144 (1999), 153-154.  
126 See generally Van der Vyver, note 122 above. 
127 Ibid, 64-65. It should however be noted that this provision is considered to be a 
provision to guide the discretion of the prosecutor, and not a jurisdictional threshold. 
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murder as a crime against humanity.128 The Trial Chamber specifically 
and correctly emphasised that dolus eventualis does not include a 
standard of negligence or gross negligence. With regard to the crime of 
extermination, the Court in Stakić dismissed the prosecutor’s contention 
that criminal liability can be founded when intention, recklessness, or 
gross negligence is present; stating that only dolus directus and dolus 
eventualis will be sufficient.129 This would also mean that dolus indirectus 
would be sufficient. The prosecutor’s contention was based on the ICTR’s 
finding in the Kayishema case. 130  However, little weight should be 
attached to ICTY jurisprudence where the Anglo-American perception of 
the fault requirement played a more significant role.131 The Blaškić case 
indicates the ICTY’s adherence to the Anglo-American fault requirement 
well. This judgement speaks of dolus eventualis as “...recklessness which 
may be likened to serious criminal negligence”, which is not the correct 
definition of dolus eventualis.132 The fault requirement as included in the 
Rome Statute can trace its roots to Civil-law lineage where, unlike the 
case in America, dolus is never equated to any form of culpa 
(negligence).133   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Prosecutor v Stakić IT-97-24-T (2003) para 587. 
129 Ibid para 642.  
130  Prosecutor v Kayishema ICTR-95-1-T (1999) para 146. See also Prosecutor v 
Musema ICTR-96-13-T (2000) para 215. 
131 Van der Vyver, note 122 above, 59. Van der Vyver further points out that the Anglo-
American conception of fault was not as readily adopted by the ICTR.  
132 Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaškić IT-95-14-T para 152. 
133 Ibid. 
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Unless the specific crime provides otherwise, the Rome Statute requires 
“intent and knowledge” for a conviction. Cassese argues that in terms of 
the standard of construction the grammatical construction must yield to a 
logical interpretation when the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis 
valeat quam pereat) so requires. The General Introduction to the EOC 
supports Cassese:  	  
[...] Where no reference is made in the Elements of Crimes to a mental 
element for any particular conduct, consequence or circumstance listed, 
it is understood that the relevant mental element, i.e., intent, knowledge 
or both, set out in article 30 applies. [...]" (emphasis added).  
 
However, the relative ‘weakness’ of the EOC must be highlighted. Article 
9 of the Rome Statute states that “Elements of Crimes shall assist the 
Court in the interpretation and application” and goes on to state that “the 
Elements of Crimes and amendments thereto shall be consistent with this 
Statute”. It may well be argued that the General Introduction is 
inconsistent with the Statute in this regard. What should be remembered 
is that if the requirements of intent and knowledge are to be interpreted in 
an either/or fashion, it does not only mean that intent alone will suffice, 
but also vice versa. Therefore I am of the view that both “intent and 
knowledge” should be present. Taking into account the Rome Statute 
definition of ‘knowledge’ the only effect of this provision is to limit the fault 
requirement to dolus directus and dolus indirectus.  
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There are various opinions as to which degrees of dolus this article 
encapsulates. There is general agreement that dolus directus and dolus 
indirectus are both sufficient. Piragoff and Cassese are of the view that 
dolus eventualis is also sufficient, whereas Van der Vyver opines that 
dolus eventualis is not sufficient.134 The wording of the text, which states 
“awareness that a ... consequence will occur” suggests that Van der 
Vyver’s position is correct. Thus, I am of the view that in terms of article 
30 of the Rome Statute, to sustain a conviction both intent and knowledge 
are required and that dolus directus and dolus indirectus are the only 
forms of intent that will suffice, unless otherwise provided. This approach 
will surely be deemed conservative, however, when the formulation of the 
Rome Statute is invoked and considering that the ICC is to hear “the most 
serious crimes of international concern” this conclusion is warranted.135  
 
The Statute of the SCSL provides no guidance on the requisite threshold 
of mens rea. However, it was held in the RUF case that the required 
mens rea threshold will be met if the prosecution proves that “the 
accused acted with intent to commit the crime, or with the awareness of 
the substantial likelihood that the crime would occur as a consequence of 
his conduct”.136 Thus, dolus eventualis is sufficient to meet the mens rea 
requirement before the SCSL. In the context of the child soldier crime, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Piragoff, DK. ‘Mental Element’ in Cassese, A. (et al) Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) 533; Cassese, note 37 above, 74; Van 
der Vyver, note 122 above, 66. 
135 Article 1, Rome Statute.  
136 RUF Trial judgement para 250.  
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order to meet the fault threshold, the SCSL has held that the person must 
be aware that the child is under the age of 15 and that the child may be 
trained for or used in combat.137  
 
The EOC does indeed provide otherwise (than the general mens rea 
provision in article 30 of the Rome Statute) in the context of the child 
soldier crime, “the perpetrator knew or should have known that such 
person or persons were under the age of fifteen”. A standard of 
negligence is thus imported into the child soldier crime.138  
 
3. THE POTENTIAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW TO 
COMBAT THE CHILD SOLDIER PHENOMENON  
Given its direct link to IHRL and IHL, the existence of ICL is warranted on 
the basis that such prohibitions entail criminal responsibility. Theories of 
punishment are thus central to the pursuits of ICL as a discipline. Such 
theories of punishment have long been debated in the context of 
municipal criminal law. Some commentators have transplanted these 
theories mutatis mutandis to ICL, 139  where others warn that the 
peculiarities of ICL must be borne in mind, and theories of punishment 
emanating from municipal criminal law must not be transplanted to ICL 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 CDF Appeal judgement para 141; RUF Trial judgement para 192. 
138 Schabas, WA. The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute 
(2010) 252. Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation of Charges para 251-252; Bothe, M. 
‘War Crimes’ in Cassese, A., Gaeta, P. & Jones, JRWD. The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume I (2002) 416. 
139 For example, Cryer, R. (et al) An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure (2010) 22 argues that the objectives of punishment do not differ that 
significantly between municipal criminal justice systems and ICL.  
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blindly and as a matter of course.140 Theories of punishment are varied. 
However, in viewing the ICC as a mechanism to achieve social change, 
two specific aspects of punishment are of importance: deterrence and 
capacity-building in municipal legal systems. 
 
i. The ICC as a Deterrent to the Enlistment, Conscription or Use of 
Child Soldiers  
In an “era of application” it is necessary that mechanisms such as the ICC 
play a role in deterring the commission of crimes such as the enlistment, 
conscription and use of child soldiers. As is the case with municipal 
criminal justice systems, the deterrence value of criminal prosecutions in 
international criminal tribunals has been the subject of extensive 
debate. 141  The deterrence debate has been conducted around the 
parameters of various deterrence theories. The primary pragmatic critique 
of international criminal prosecutions as a form of deterrence is 
“approaches that treat people as rational calculators”. 142  Justice 
Chaskalson, a former Judge President of the South African Constitutional 
Court, followed such an approach in his majority decision in S v 
Makwanyane. 143  Chaskalson argued that the death penalty is not a 
deterrent, as perpetrators do not weigh the punishment they may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 See for example, Drumbl, M. ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The 
Criminality of Mass Atrocity’ 99 North-Western L. R. (2004-2005) 539. 
141 See for example, Punyasena, W. ‘Conflict Prevention and the International Criminal 
Court: Deterrence in a Changing World’ 14 Mich. St. J. Int’l L. 39 (2006); Smidt, M. The 
International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of Deterrence? 167 Mil. L. Rev. 156 
(2001). 
142 Cryer et al, note 139 above, 26. For a more philosophical critique also see Cryer et 
al, 26.  
143 S v Makwanyane and Others 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
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potentially receive upon conviction at the time of the commission of the 
crime. Instead, they justify their actions by a belief that they will not be 
caught.144  
 
Yet, as Cryer (et al) argue, there can be little doubt that criminal justice 
systems implementing punishment disproportionately to the relevant 
crime and punishing innocent family members of perpetrators will have a 
more significant deterrent effect.145 While there is no place for such unjust 
criminal justice systems in a rule of law-oriented society, the example 
illustrates that criminal prosecutions potentially plays a role in deterrence. 
 
Deterrence is one of the Rome Statute’s central goals: “determined to put 
an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes”.146 The ICTY has indicated 
that deterrence is a proper aim of that Tribunal, but that it should not be 
over-emphasised.147 Unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC has prospective 
jurisdiction only, and therefore is likely to play a more meaningful role in 
deterrence. Judge Kirsch, the first President of the ICC, has been joined 
by many commentators in his view that “by putting potential perpetrators 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Ibid. This approach is an over-simplification of a complex issue and is better suited, 
and perhaps more accurate in the debate around appropriate punishment, as it was 
used in this case. 
145 Cryer et al, note 139 above, 26.  
146 Preamble, Rome Statute.  
147 Tadić Jurisdiction judgement, para 48; Prosecutor v Nikolić, ICTY IT-02-60/1 (12 
December 2003) paras 89-90. 
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on notice that they may be tried before the Court, the ICC is intended to 
contribute to the deterrence of these crimes”.148 
 
Cynics of the ICC, and international criminal justice more broadly, may be 
quick to cite the arrest warrant issued during March 2009 against 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir as an example of the shortcomings 
of the ICC. To date President al-Bashir is still at large and still in power. 
This, it may be argued, negatively affects the deterrent value of the ICC. 
However, today the apprehension, in terms of an ICC arrest warrant, of 
deposed Libyan Dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi is very likely, if not 
inevitable. It should also be added, that President al-Bashir has not been 
unaffected by the warrant for his arrest, for example, his international 
travel has been severely limited.149 From a deterrence point of view the 
value of prosecutions against defendants such as al-Bashir and al-
Gaddafi are two-fold. First, other heads of state are placed on notice that 
their actions are also subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC, even where the 
relevant state is not a state party to the Rome Statute.150 Second, the fact 
that leaders and heads of state are subject to such prosecutions likely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Parliamentarians for Global Action ‘A Deterrent International Criminal Court – The 
Ultimate Objective’ <http://www.pgaction.org/uploadedfiles/deterrent%20paper%20rev% 
20Tokyo.pdf> (last accessed on 3 September 2011), see this source also for comments 
by: Chief Prosecutor Ocampo, Bassiouni, High Commissioner Arbour (as she then was) 
and others. See also Scheffer, DJ. ‘The International Criminal Tribunal Foreword: 
Deterrence of War Crimes in the 21st Century’ 23 Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade 1 (1999). 
149 Stone, L. ‘Implementation of the Rome Statute in South Africa’ in Bhoke, C. & 
Biegon, J. (eds) Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (2011) 326. 
150 See generally: Lutz, EL. (ed.) Prosecuting Heads of State (2008). 
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has an impact on lower-level commanders who operate in the field. It 
seems that ICL has progressively more impact on deterrence.151 
 
During my fieldwork in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), I 
was routinely viewed with suspicion when I spoke about child soldiering 
to people who had been involved in the Ituri conflict as fighters (direct 
participants in hostilities). The complete opposite happened when I spoke 
to victims. Although this is expected to some extent, the level of 
engagement by victims was totally polarised to that of fighters. This, I 
soon discovered was primarily due to a fear on the part of former fighters 
that I was an ICC investigator, and a corresponding hope on the part of 
victims. I adapted the way in which I engaged with both victims and 
fighters, strongly indicating that I am an independent researcher, and I 
immediately noticed more balanced and less polarised responses from 
both groups. 152  Fear of prosecution does not necessarily result in 
deterrence. However, knowledge of the possibility of prosecution is a 
precondition for deterrence. While in the Ituri district of the DRC, I was 
very surprised at the level of awareness of the existence of the ICC, and 
the on-going prosecution of Lubanga. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151  Cryer et al, note 139 above, 26 quoting Harhoff, F. ‘Sense and Sensibility in 
Sentencing – Taking Stock of International Criminal Punishment’ in Engdahl, O. & 
Wrange, P. Law at War: The Law as it was and the Law as it should be (2008) 128.  
152 In some cases it was hard to convince people that I was indeed an independent 
researcher. Over time I built up a network with local people and relied upon them to 
vouch that I was an independent researcher.  
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i. The Role of the ICC in Building Capacity in Municipal Legal 
Systems  
Much has been written about the fact that the jurisdiction of the ICC 
operates complementary to that of municipal criminal jurisdictions. 
Indeed, without this feature the Rome Statute will probably have never 
come into force. The most important feature of this complementary 
relationship in as far as criminal deterrence is concerned is the municipal 
incorporation by states of the Rome Statute. 153  Indeed, the Rome 
Statute’s potential to prevent child soldiering lies more in the municipal 
incorporation of the Rome Statute, and resulting municipal enforcement 
of international criminal norms, than on prosecutions before the ICC. 
Most importantly, such municipal incorporation results in an increase by 
many-fold of the capacity of courts to prosecute people for crimes 
proscribed in the Rome Statute. As is further discussed in Chapter 6, the 
first municipal prosecutions for the enlistment, conscription or use of child 
soldiers has already been finalised in the DRC.  
 
Upon municipal incorporation, the jurisdictional scope of enforcement of 
crimes proscribed by the Rome Statute may be expanded in terms of the 
relevant municipal legal system. Two areas where this will be of primary 
relevance in relation to the prevention of child soldiering are the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Although I argue strongly in favour of the municipal incorporation of the Rome 
Statute, I do acknowledge that there are significant challenges to the effectiveness of 
prosecuting ICL crimes in municipal jurisdictions. Nevertheless, although the scope of 
this chapter and study do not allow for further analysis of this issue, I am of the view that 
these challenges can largely be overcome and are not fatal to such prosecutions. See 
generally Ferdinandusse, WN. Direct Application of International Criminal Law in 
National Courts (2005).  
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expansion of jurisdiction to include universal jurisdiction, and the age of 
criminal responsibility.  
 
Universal Jurisdiction  
Outside of the context of matters that appear before the ICC by way of 
Security Council referral, the jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to territorial 
and active personality jurisdiction. However, many states are empowered, 
in terms of their municipal law,154 to exercise universal jurisdiction in 
relation to specific crimes,155 including genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. 156  Some authority suggests that the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction in relation to war crimes is more limited in NIAC, but 
is proper in IAC generally.157 Universal jurisdiction has been defined as: 
“the right of a state to institute legal proceedings and to try the presumed 
author of an offence, irrespective of the place where the said offence has 
been committed, the nationality or the place of residence of its presumed 
author or of the victim”.158 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 In order to exercise universal jurisdiction, the municipal legal system of a state must 
provide for such jurisdiction, see R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate 
and others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and Others Intervening) 
(No. 3), [1999] 2 All E.R. 97, at 177 (H.L.). For the parameters of universal jurisdiction in 
terms of international law see also Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) ICJ Reports (2002) 3 et seq.  
155 For examples of countries that exercise universal jurisdiction see Green, LC. ‘”Grave 
Breaches” or Crimes Against Humanity’ 8 USAFA J. Legal Stud. 19 (1997-1998) 27-28. 
156 See Danilenko, M. ‘ICC Jurisdiction and Third States’ in Cassese et al, note 138 
above, 1879. 
157 Zimmermann, A. ‘Die Schaffung eines standigen Internationalen Strafgerichshofes: 
Perspectiven und Probleme vor der Sraatenkonferenz in Rom’ Zeitschrift fur 
Auslandisches Offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 47 (1998) 86-91. 
158 Brussels Principles Against Immunity and for International Justice, Principle 13, 
Combating Impunity: Proceedings of the Symposium held in Brussels from 11-13 March 
2002, 157. 
	   237	  
In relation to states who have incorporated the Rome Statute municipally 
and who exercise universal jurisdiction in relation to war crimes, the 
capacity as well as the reach of prosecution of ICL norms is vastly 
expanded. Both the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict, as well as the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Torture, have called upon states to expand their jurisdiction to include 
universal jurisdiction and to utilize such jurisdiction in order to bring an 
end to impunity.159  
 
It is undoubtedly so that the relative deterrent role ICL plays in relation to 
the commission of war crimes is related to the scope and number of 
prosecutions of war crimes. Therefore, if universal jurisdiction is utilized 
by more states progressively in relation to child soldiering, ICL will, over 
time, operate more effectively as a deterrent to the enlistment, 
conscription and use of child soldiers. Significant challenges however 
remain. Most importantly, before prosecution can be initiated, a state will 
have to secure custody of the alleged perpetrator in a lawful manner. For 
universal jurisdiction to effectively contribute to the prevention of child 
soldiering increased international cooperation in the suppression and 
prosecution of crime will also be required.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict UN Doc. 
A/HRC/12/48 (25 September 2009) para 1975(a). Nowak, M. ‘Study on the phenomena 
of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the world, including 
an assessment of conditions of detention’ Human Rights Council (5 February 2010) 
A/HRC/13/39/Add.5.  
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The Age of Criminal Responsibility 
The criminal responsibility of children, for crimes committed while being 
child soldiers is a very contentious issue.160 The ICC only has jurisdiction 
in relation to people who were eighteen years of age or older at the time 
of the commission of the crime. 161  However, the age of criminal 
responsibility in terms of the Statute of the SCSL is more complicated as 
it provides for three categories of perpetrators.162 First, the SCSL has no 
jurisdiction over people aged fifteen or younger at the time of the 
commission of the crime. Second, the SCSL has ordinary jurisdiction over 
persons aged eighteen years or older at the time of the commission of the 
crime. Finally, the Statute of the SCSL makes special provision for people 
aged between fifteen and eighteen at the time of the commission of the 
crime. In relation to such perpetrators the Statute of the SCSL provides: 
 
[…] he or she shall be treated with dignity and a sense of worth, taking 
into account his or her young age and the desirability of promoting his 
or her rehabilitation, reintegration into and assumption of a constructive 
role in society, and in accordance with international human rights 
standards, in particular the rights of the child.163 
 
The purpose for such jurisdiction was aimed at the rehabilitation and 
reintegration of former child soldiers. The SCSL is empowered to make 
the following orders in relation to youth perpetrators:   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 See for example: Happold, M. ‘Child Soldiers: Victims or Perpetrators’ 29 U. La 
Verne L. Rev. 56 (2008); Konge, P. ‘International Crimes & Child Soldiers’ 16 Sw. J. Int'l 
L. 41 (2010); Seneviratne, L. ‘Accountability of Child Soldiers: Blame Misplaced’ 20 Sri 
Lanka J. Int'l L. 29 (2008); and Rosen, DM. ‘Who Is a Child - The Legal Conundrum of 
Child Soldiers’ 25 Conn. J. Int'l L. 81 (2009-2010). 
161 Article 26, Rome Statute. 
162 Article 7(1), Statute of the SCSL. 
163 Article 7(1), ibid. 
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[…] care guidance and supervision orders, community service orders, 
counselling, foster care, correctional, educational and vocational 
training programmes, approved schools and, as appropriate, any 
programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or 
programmes of child protection agencies.164 
 
Shortly after the founding of the SCSL, during 2000, the Chief Prosecutor 
of the Tribunal David Crane announced at an event while addressing 
Sierra Leonean students “the children of Sierra Leone have suffered 
enough both as victims and perpetrators. I am not interested in 
prosecuting children. I want to prosecute the people who forced 
thousands of children to commit unspeakable crimes”.165 He made this 
decision on the basis of the Tribunal’s mandate, “to prosecute persons 
who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law”.166 
 
In the context of the administration of international criminal justice, I am of 
the view that children younger than eighteen should not be prosecuted. 
Therefore, the debate regarding the criminal responsibility of children for 
crimes committed while being child soldiers is more relevant in the 
context of municipal prosecutions. There is no inherent reason why states 
should not prosecute children. However, such prosecutions must be 
conducted in strict compliance with the relevant municipal legal system, 
as well as IHRL provisions regarding the administration of juvenile justice, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 7(2), ibid. 
165 Press Release: ‘Special Court Prosecutor Says He Will Not Prosecute Children’ 
Special Court for Sierra Leone Public Affairs Office (2 November 2002). 
166 Article 1, Statute of the SCSL. 
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and the rights of the child. 167  Children will likely not be criminally 
responsible for their actions due to factors excluding unlawfulness or 
wrongfulness, for example, extreme mental distress and intoxication.  
 
The prosecution of children, however, is unlikely to have a deterrent 
effect on voluntary recruits from joining armed groups, as these children 
more often than not see no other course of action than joining such 
groups. Such prosecutions will have no effect on deterring the 
conscription or use of children in armed conflict.  
 
4. SUMMARY   
More than any other single chapter in this study, this chapter directly 
engages each of the research questions posed:  
 
• Are the international law norms that prohibit the use and 
recruitment of child soldiers capable of enforcement, or should the 
norms be changed in order for them to be capable of 
enforcement?  
• What changes should be effected to the manner of enforcement of 
these norms in order to progress to “an era of application”?  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 See generally the obligations of states in terms of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, articles 37 and 40 are of 
relevance in juvenile justice.   
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A consideration of the inter-relationship between the research questions 
is necessary because one cannot divorce substantive ICL from the ICC 
as an enforcement mechanism. Notwithstanding my criticism of the Child 
Recruitment judgement, the child soldier jurisprudence that has since 
developed in the SCSL indicates well that this formulation of the crime is 
indeed capable of enforcement. The symbolic value of the ICC’s first 
prosecution relating to child soldiering to the exclusion of all other 
international crimes is significant, as it is an indication that the Prosecutor 
of the ICC deems the ICC a mechanism capable of contributing to the 
prevention of child soldiering.  
 
Questions remain as to the inherent ability of the Rome Statute, the ICC 
and ICL in general to act as a deterrent. Commentators are presenting 
positive research on this front. Should it be feasible, and after the ICC 
has built up a jurisprudence of its own, it may be possible to address 
deterrence from a quantitative point of view. For the time being, the 
limited qualitative work on this front may be varied, but it is premature to 
draw overtly negative findings in this regard. Basing the level of potential 
deterrence of the ICC on the experiences of its predecessor ad hoc 
tribunals is of limited value, as the ICC is the first permanent international 
criminal tribunal with prospective jurisdiction. More importantly, unlike the 
Statutes of such predecessor ad hoc tribunals, the Rome Statute is to be 
implemented by state parties into their municipal law.  
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In relation to the ultimate research question ‘what is needed for “an era of 
application”’, the capacity of the ICC may be expanded in the future, but 
the demand for justice will likely always outweigh the ICC’s ability to 
prosecute and dispense justice. International criminal tribunals are, by 
definition, in the business of dispensing ‘selective justice’.168 McCormack 
and Cryer argue, in their respective works, that such selectivity is two-
dimensional.169 The closed list of crimes that comprise the ICL regime is 
the first layer of selectivity, where the second layer relates to the decision 
as to whom will be prosecuted for violations. In the context of child 
soldiering the first layer has been overcome – the prohibition of the 
enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers is now a war crime in 
terms of ICL. Indeed, it is now recognized as a customary crime. This in 
itself is significant, specifically considering that the drafters of the Rome 
Statute set out to codify existing customary international law crimes, of 
which the child soldier crime was not one at the time. The more 
expansive definition of the crime, which includes ‘enlistment’ and 
‘conscription’ instead of ‘recruitment’ is also very welcome. Many are of 
the view that the child soldier crime should have employed an age limit of 
younger than eighteen.170  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168  See generally Cryer, R. Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the 
International Criminal Law Regime (2005). 
169 Cryer, ibid, 191, Cryer also cites McCormack, TLH. ‘Selective Reaction to Atrocity’ 60 
Albany Law Review (1996-1997) 681, 683. 
170 Several delegations supported the call from non-governmental organizations to lift 
the age threshold of the child soldier crime to younger than eighteen during the 
negotiation and drafting of the Rome Statute. This was, however, never strongly 
pursued, as it was clear that customary international law did not support such a 
standard. Cottier, note 114 above, 468-469.  
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Cryer refers to the second level of selectivity as “selectivity ratione 
personae”. 171  Here too developments thus far have been extremely 
positive. As stated, the first defendent to be tried by the ICC is charged 
solely with the enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers, so too 
are two more defendants standing trial before the ICC at the moment.172 
This level of selectivity is, however, endemic to international criminal 
tribunals. In order to enter “an era of application” states should 
incorporate the Rome Statute into their municipal law and should show 
the necessary political will to enforce the child soldier crime in their 
municipal courts. The level of effectiveness of such prosecutions can and 
should be further advanced by prosecuting offenders through the 
instrumentality of universal jurisdiction.  
 
This Chapter did not directly address modes of liability, as modes of 
liability in ICL are generic. Individuals can be prosecuted for the child 
soldier crime as direct perpetrators, on the basis of joint criminal 
enterprise, and finally on the basis of command responsibility, either as 
military or civilian commanders.173 Finally, child soldiers are often subject 
to various forms of treatment by their own forces that constitute separate 
complete crimes in ICL, including war crimes and crimes against 
humanity; for example, torture and sexual crimes. Although both boys 
and girls are subject to such sexual crimes, girls suffer such abuse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Cryer, note 168 above,191. 
172 Lubanga Warrant of Arrest; Katanga and Ngudjolo Warrant of Arrest. 
173 Articles 25 and 28, Rome Statute.  
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disproportionately to boys.  In a narrow sense, gender does not play a 
direct role in relation to the child soldier crime; however, it plays a very 
direct role in the plight of child soldiers.  The analysis in this chapter must 
be viewed against the backdrop of the multiple further crimes that are 
committed against child soldiers, and offenders must be prosecuted for 
these crimes in addition to the child soldier crime.    
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CHAPTER 5 INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE PREVENTION OF 
CHILD SOLDIERING: THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
THE AFRICAN UNION  
 
Outside of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the only international judicial and quasi-judicial 
mechanisms empowered to directly engage with child soldier prevention 
are mechanisms forming part of either the United Nations (UN) or the 
African Union (AU). The UN is an international organization, whereas the 
AU is a regional organization. Functionaries within both have a mandate 
to ensure that states protect, promote, respect and fulfil their international 
human rights law (IHRL) obligations.  
 
The ICC and the jurisprudence of the SCSL was the subject of analysis in 
the previous chapter. Neither of these mechanisms forms part of the UN.1 
The UN has, however, founded a number of ad hoc criminal tribunals. 
These tribunals form part of the UN proper; the most notable examples 
being the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Neither of these tribunals 
have subject-matter jurisdiction over crimes directly related to child 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although the ICC has a formal relationship with the UN, in terms of article 2 of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) (entered into force 1 
July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, it is nevertheless an autonomous institution. The SCSL was 
founded in terms of an agreement between the UN and the Government of Sierra 
Leone; however, this tribunal also has the status of an independent international 
organization. 
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soldiering. Nevertheless, the UN deserves mention in this regard, as 
these tribunals showcased to the international community the need for a 
permanent international criminal tribunal, and directly led to significant 
further developments within substantive international criminal law.  
 
A variety of mechanisms forming part of the UN directly engage with child 
soldier prevention. These mechanisms span the divide, from political to 
quasi-judicial, and indeed the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 
principal judicial organ of the UN, can also potentially adjudicate matters 
related to child soldier prevention.2 On the regional level, it is only the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) and the 
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(African Children’s Committee) that has the potential to directly engage 
with child soldier prevention. Both of these mechanisms have subject-
matter jurisdiction over the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child (African Children’s Charter),3 and both form part of the African 
Union. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For a dispute relating to child soldiering to be adjudicated by the ICJ a state party to 
the Charter of the United Nations (entered into force 24 October 1945) (UN Charter) 1 
UNTS XVI (who is ipso facto a party to the ICJ Statute) will have to submit such a 
dispute to the Court against another state. Both states will have to agree to the 
jurisdiction of the Court, and one state will have to allege that another state infringed its 
rights in using or recruiting child soldiers, and in so doing committed an internationally 
wrongful act against the state itself. Accordingly, the ICJ cannot be seen as a direct 
mechanism through which to prevent child soldiering.   
3 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (entered into force 29 
November 1999) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49(1990). 
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This Chapter is divided into three sections. First, the proper role of the UN 
in addressing child soldier prevention is analysed. Hereafter, those 
functionaries within the UN most relevant to child soldier prevention are 
critically assessed. The aim of this section is not only to critique these 
functionaries, but more importantly to attempt to identify ways in which to 
render them more effective. Finally, the African Court and African 
Children’s Committee are assessed within the African Regional Human 
Rights System.  
 
In writing this chapter I drew substantially on interviews I conducted with 
the current Special Representative to the Secretary-General on Children 
in Armed Conflict (SRSG), Radhika Coomaraswamy;4 the Chairperson of 
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee), Jean 
Zermatten (then Deputy-Chairperson of the Committee); 5  and CRC 
Committee Member and former child soldier, Awich Pollar.6  
 
1. THE PROPER LEVELS OF ENGAGEMENT WITH CHILD SOLDIER 
PREVENTION WITHIN THE UN 
The effective enforcement of even the most basic of laws and the 
existence of a law-abiding culture are often two of the first casualties of 
armed conflict. Correspondingly, during armed conflict the prospects of 
child soldier prevention deteriorate significantly. The Security Council has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I interviewed Ms Coomaraswamy on 7 February 2011 in New York City, USA. 
5 I interviewed Mr Zermatten on 2 February 2011 in Geneva, Switzerland.  
6 I Interviewed Mr Pollar on 1 February 2011 in Geneva, Switzerland.  
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acknowledged that child soldiering may potentially threaten the 
“maintenance of international peace and security”.7 This gives credence 
to the argument that conflict de-escalation and resolution is the proper 
method with which to combat the use and recruitment of child soldiers.8 
Moreover, ideally conflict avoidance can potentially, and arguably, be 
achieved by creating early warning mechanisms that monitor signs of 
impending armed conflict, allowing the international community (including 
the UN) to take action and avoid conflict. Prior to the Rwandan Genocide, 
for example, then UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, Bacre Ndiaye, reported the early warning signs of an 
impending genocide in Rwanda. 9  Yet, his pleas for action went 
unanswered. It is, however, very difficult, both legally and politically, to 
directly intervene in other sovereign states before armed conflict has 
commenced.10 Nevertheless, identifying early warning signs can place 
the international community on ready alert to respond appropriately to 
impending conflict situations. The fact that Ndiaye, a UN mandate holder, 
warned of the potential for genocide renders the international 
community’s failure to intervene in that situation even more inexcusable.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Article 24(1), UN Charter. 
8  Kuper, J. ‘Implementing the Rights of Children in Armed Conflict: Progress and 
Dilemmas’, Public Lecture, School of Oriental and African Studies, 5 March 2010; and 
Ironside, P. Protection Specialist, UNICEF Child Protection Section, Stationed in Goma, 
DRC. I interviewed Ms Ironside in Goma, DRC on 8 November 2008.  
9 ‘Report by B.W. Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur, on his mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 
April 1993’, E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1, (11 August 1993). 
10 Chesterman, S. Law and practice of the United Nations: Documents and Commentary 
(2008) 449. 
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The question remains, which strategy holds the most potential for child 
soldier prevention, a broad-based approach aimed at the prevention, 
resolution and avoidance of armed conflict (broad-based approach) or a 
narrower approach directly aimed at preventing child soldiering 
notwithstanding on-going armed conflict (direct approach)? Although 
many commentators and other role players insist that there are, and have 
since the mid-1990s, been 300 000 child soldiers globally, I am of the 
view that this figure was likely never accurate.11 This notwithstanding, 
there has been a marginal reduction in child soldier numbers since the 
mid-1990s.12  
 
There are clear examples where the direct approach has yielded positive 
results.13 Furthermore, when I discussed the pros and cons of the broad-
based and direct approaches with SRSG Coomaraswamy, she argued 
strongly that the direct approach is more successful and holds more 
potential for further success. Nevertheless, I attribute the marginal decline 
in child soldier numbers globally primarily to a reduction in armed conflicts 
where children made up significant proportions of fighters and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Chapter 2. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Numerous such successes have been achieved in the DRC. See Chapter 6 in this 
regard. More recently, on 16 June 2011, the Chadian Government, after engagement 
with the SRSG, signed an agreement with the UN, to phase out child soldiering. In 
particular “the Chadian Government has committed to: step-up efforts to ensure that the 
Chadian National Forces (ANT) and recently integrated armed groups are child-free; 
enable verification of military installations by the United Nations to monitor compliance 
with the action plan; align national legislation with its international obligations for 
children; take punitive measures against those who continue to violate the agreement; 
and to put in place other preventive measures”. See ‘Press Release of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict - Chad Signs 
an Action Plan to End Recruitment and Use of Children in its National Army and Security 
Forces’ OSRSG/061611-12. 
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combatants, including Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sri Lanka – three 
conflicts that have become synonymous with child soldiering.14 This does 
not mean that the broad-based approach is better suited. One first has to 
determine what caused the resolution of these conflicts, and what the 
potential is for the re-escalation of child soldiering elsewhere. In the case 
of Sri Lanka, the protracted civil war ended with the defeat of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces – and 
not through any form of external peace initiative.15 In Sierra Leone and 
Liberia peacekeeping forces from the UN and the Economic Community 
of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) played a more 
direct role in suppressing those conflicts. 16  It is debatable what 
contribution these forces made to resolving these conflicts. In fairness, 
these forces may have contributed to preventing these States from falling 
into a state of virtual perpetual armed conflict, as is the case in Eastern 
DRC. 
 
In Chapter 2 I differentiated between the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ of child 
soldiers.17 I argued that the supply of child soldiers will likely remain 
strong due to deeper systemic problems, for example extreme poverty, 
thus to be effective in preventing child soldiering, international law should 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Chapter 2. 
15 See ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri 
Lanka’ (31 March 2011). 
16 Jonah, JOC. ‘The United Nations’ in Adebajo, A. & Rashid, I. West Africa’s Security 
Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region (2004) 319-341, where this author 
discusses the peace operations by ECOMOG and the UN both in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia.  
17 Chapter 2. 
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operate to stem the demand for child soldiers, as it does. The broad-
based approach will, however, impact equally on the supply and demand 
of child soldiers. The Security Council, a principal organ of (and the most 
powerful mechanism within) the UN has assumed primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security.18 Indeed, the 
principle of non-aggression is one of the most central ideals of the UN.19 
The broad-based approach is essential in the context of child soldier 
prevention and may well yield more future positive results. However, this 
approach is already implemented across all spheres of the UN on a daily 
basis. Moreover, it forms the principle business of the UN. This is not to 
say that there is not still massive scope for improvement in efforts aimed 
at conflict de-escalation and resolution.  
 
As parallel processes, the broad-based and direct approaches are 
equally needed to suppress child soldiering. However, the direct 
approach has received much less attention, and more importantly, taking 
a vantage point from a child soldier prevention point of view, adds no 
substantial value to initiatives aimed at conflict de-escalation and 
resolution. Therefore, this Chapter presents an analysis of the direct 
approach.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Article 24(1), UN Charter.  
19 Ibid. 
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2. A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF UN INITIATIVES ENGAGED WITH 
CHILD SOLDIER PREVENTION  
The UN is a vast and enormously complex organization. The status of 
any given functionary within the UN is best determined in relation to the 
principal organ that has oversight over the given functionary, as these 
organs are the apex functionaries within the UN. The first important 
observation in this regard is that those functionaries that yield the most 
power have an advantage in as far as potential effectiveness is 
concerned. Although the Office of the SRSG of Children and Armed 
Conflict is not a particularly powerful functionary, it is the most important 
in relation to child soldier prevention, as it is the focal point within the UN 
of such engagement. Figure 6.1 on the following page, represents a 
limited organogram of UN functionaries directly or indirectly engaged with 
child soldier prevention.  
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Figure 6.1 (Graphic by Gus Waschefort) 
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There are more functionaries within the UN that relate to child soldier 
prevention. However, those represented in the diagram are the most 
active in this regard. The scope of this chapter calls for a selective 
approach as to which functionaries are included in the analysis. In 
determining the most appropriate functionaries, I balanced the relative 
power of each functionary with its potential for direct engagement with 
child soldier prevention. On this basis, the CRC Committee; the SRSG on 
Children and Armed Conflict; and the Security Council have been 
included in this analysis.  
 
The only UN institutions that can render decisions binding upon member 
states are the Security Council and the ICJ, both of which are principal 
organs of the UN.20 A number of the functionaries included in the diagram 
relate to child soldier prevention in narrow, specific circumstances. The 
work of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, for 
example, is relevant specifically to the protection of displaced children 
from military use and recruitment. Child protection has been prioritised 
across UN functionaries, including in peace missions.21 The mandate of 
each peace mission is unique, and an abstract analysis of child soldier 
prevention within the context of peace missions will be of limited value. 
Instead, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) forms part of the analysis in 
Chapter 6.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Article 7, UN Charter.  
21 See the section below on the Security Council.  
	   255	  
 
The UN has an exceptionally far reach, as it truly is a global organization 
– it currently has 193 members, including each fully recognized state 
internationally, except The Holy Sea. The newest member, South-Sudan 
became a member of the UN on 14 July 2011. 
 
i. Historical Background  
The quintessential human rights instrument of the 20th Century, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, only references 
the rights of children once, and rather vaguely.22 Yet, the founding of the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) predates even the UDHR – 
UNICEF was founded during 1946 to provide emergency food and 
healthcare to children in countries devastated in the aftermath of World 
War Two.23 The first UN child rights instrument and the fore bearer to the 
CRC was the Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1959.24 The plight 
of children during armed conflict was, however, only recognized for the 
first time by a UN organ during 1974, with the adoption of the ‘Declaration 
on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Article 25(2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 
217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (1948). The Declaration was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly on 10 December 1948. Indeed, it is not only the rights of children, but 
human rights in the broad sense that were not seriously prioritised during the drafting of 
the UN Charter. The UN Commission on Human Rights was not founded by the Charter, 
but instead it was founded during 1946 by the Economic and Social Council under 
article 68 of the UN Charter. See also Chesterman, S. et al Law and Practice of the 
United Nations (2008) 448. 
23 General Assembly Resolution 57 (I) of 11 December 1946. 
24 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, General Assembly Resolution 1386 (XIV), 14 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959). 
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Conflict’ by the General Assembly.25 1979, “the international year of the 
child” as proclaimed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) soon followed.26 None of these early 
developments addressed the use and recruitment of child soldiers.27 
Indeed, the 1974 Declaration expressly excludes children who participate 
in hostilities from special protection.28  Child rights only infiltrated UN 
structures on a significant level during 1989 with the adoption of the 
CRC.29 
 
The first UN institution to recognise the need to act in response to the 
involvement of children in armed conflict was the CRC Committee, 
established in terms of the CRC shortly after the adoption of the 
Convention. During 1992 the Committee held a ‘general discussion day’ 
on the question of ‘children in armed conflict’.30 The following year it was 
decided to submit a request to the Secretary-General to appoint an expert 
to launch an in-depth investigation into the protection of children during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed 
Conflict, General Assembly Resolution 29/3318 of 14 December 1974. The plight of 
children during armed conflict had long been recognized prior to this declaration even in 
certain ancient societies. The modern humanitarian law recognition of the plight of 
children during armed conflict is embodied in the Geneva Conventions (see Chapter 3 
for details). 
26 General Assembly Resolution 3l/169 of 1 January 1979. 
27 See Chapter 3 for a detailed analysis of applicable international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law.  
28 Preamble, 1974 Declaration.  
29 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, General Assembly Resolution 44/25 
(12 December 1989). 
30  ‘Report on the Second Session’, Committee on the Rights of the Child CRC/C/10 (19 
October 1992) para 64. 
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armed conflict, and report thereon.31 This recommendation was endorsed 
by the delegates to the World Conference on Human Rights, held in 
Vienna during 1993, and was included in the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action.32 
 
The Secretary-General submitted the request to the General Assembly, 
who then passed Resolution 48/157 during 1993 – the first General 
Assembly Resolution on children in armed conflict – mandating the 
appointment of an expert to conduct a study, and report on the situation 
of children in armed conflict.33 Ms Graça Machel was duly appointed.34 It 
is widely recognized that the UN’s direct involvement in child soldier 
prevention came as a result of the ground-breaking 1996 Machel Report. 
It was also the Committee who first conceived of, and took the initiative to 
draft a first text of a Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, between 1992 and 1993.35  
 
ii. The Committee on the Rights of the Child   
The CRC Committee is a UN treaty-body, established in terms of the 
CRC to assess states parties’ progress in meeting their obligations under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 ‘Report on the Third Session’, Committee on the Rights of the Child CRC/C/16 (5 
March 1993) para 176 and Annex VI in terms of article 45(c) of the CRC. 
32 ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ A/CONF.157/23 (12 July 1993) para 
50. 
33 General Assembly Resolution 48/157 of 20 December 1993. 
34 Ibid.  
35  ‘Report on the Second Session’, note 30 above para 75. ‘Report on the Third 
Session’, note 31 above para 176 and Annex VII. 
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the Convention. 36  The Committee’s mandate also extends to both 
Optional Protocols to the CRC, with the Protocol on Children in Armed 
Conflict (CIAC Protocol) being relevant for present purposes.37 This has 
the implication that the Committee has jurisdiction in relation to every 
state internationally, except Somalia. In order to achieve its mandate, the 
Committee is tasked with receiving reports from state parties, setting out 
the measures adopted by the relevant state to give effect to the rights 
contained in the CRC and the Protocols and on the progress made on the 
enjoyment of these rights.38 While acknowledging the shortcomings of 
rigid categorization, the UN’s human rights activities are divided between 
‘charter-based organs’ and ‘treaty-based organs’.39 Charter-based organs 
exercise their powers rather widely, and it is sometimes difficult to trace 
their actions to specific legal bases.40 On the other hand, treaty-based 
organs, such as the Committee, are confined in scope to the mandate 
bestowed upon it expressly by the relevant international instrument.41 
 
Technically the Committee’s functions are limited to monitoring state 
compliance.42 However, in practice its work extends beyond this. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The Committee was established under article 43(1) of the CRC. 
37 ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography’ (entered into force 18 January 2002) 
1577 UNTS 3. 
38 Article 44(1), CRC.  
39 Alston, P. ‘Critical Appraisal of the UN Human Rights Regime’ in Alston, P. (ed) The 
United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (1992) 4.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 In terms of article 44(1) of the CRC, states parties are obliged to enter a report within 
two years of the entry into force of the CRC for the relevant state, and thereafter every 
five years. With regard to the CIAC Protocol, states parties are to submit a report to the 
Committee within two years of the entry into force of the Protocol detailing the measures 
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Committee tends to interpret its role much less restrictively than a textual 
interpretation of its mandate would suggest.43 Besides monitoring state 
party reports, being the Committee’s main function, the Committee issues 
general interpretative comments on substantive provisions of the 
Convention. It also holds general thematic discussion days and it plays 
an active role in interpreting the Convention, and making 
recommendations to state parties on how to achieve the goals and ideals 
of the CRC and the Protocols by issuing “concluding observations” in 
response to reports filed and presented by state parties.  
 
As stated, the CRC Committee’s mandate is defined in terms of an 
international law instrument: the CRC. By implication, the shortcomings of 
the Committee relate either to the mandate of the Committee, or the way 
in which the Committee exercises its mandate, or both. The Committee’s 
limited mandate severely curtails its potential to be pro-active in securing 
compliance with the Convention and the Protocols – specifically as the 
Committee has no complaints procedures. Regarding the way in which 
the Committee exercises its mandate, the inability of the Committee to 
engage with actors other than state parties impacts on the success of the 
Committee. Furthermore, the Committee has a tendency to exceed its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
it has taken to implement the provisions of the Protocol. Thereafter states are to include 
in their five-year reports filed in terms of the CRC further information with respect to the 
implementation of the Protocol. 
43 Karp, J. ‘Reporting and the Committee on the Rights of the Child’ in Bayefsky, AF. 
The Human Rights Treaty System in the 21st Century (2000) 35-37. 
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mandate, and I am of the view that this may lead to the dismissal of the 
Committee’s recommendations by state parties.  
 
The Limitations of the Mandate of the Committee  
The CRC Committee is the only UN human rights treaty-body, the 
mandate of which does not incorporate an individual complaints 
procedure.44 It also does not provide for inter-state complaints. This is 
explained with reference to the fact that initially the philosophy was to 
create a non-antagonistic Committee that would work ‘with’ states to meet 
their obligations, instead of ‘against’ states.45 However, it is likely that this 
reasoning was used to justify the failure of creating such a complaints 
mechanism during the drafting of the CRC. Zermatten explained to me 
that the inclusion of such a complaints procedure was hotly debated 
during the drafting of the CRC, but over time it became clear that states 
would not ratify the Convention if such a mechanism were to be 
included.46 This gives further credence to Happold’s argument that those 
who participated in the drafting of the CRC were preoccupied with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Drahoslav Štefánek, D. (Chairperson-Rapporteur) ‘Report of the open-ended working 
group to explore the possibility of elaborating an optional protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child to provide a communications procedure’ A/HRC/13/43 (21 
January 2010) 19. 
45 Verheyde, M. A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child: Article 43-45: the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2006) 7-8; the 
Travaux Préparatoires of the Convention also supports this contention, see Detrick, S. 
(ed.) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the “Travaux 
Préparatoires” (1992) 539. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is 
the only other UN human rights treaty-body that did not incorporate an individual 
complaints procedure in terms of its original mandate. However, as of 2008 this 
Committee can also consider individual complaints (Optional Protocol (General 
Assembly Resolution A/RES/63/117)). 
46 Zermatten, note 5 above.  
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codifying existing state practice, instead of creating stronger, needed 
norms to safeguard the interests of children.47  
 
Recognising the weakness of not having a direct complaints procedure, 
the Committee began to encourage children and their representatives to 
use the complaints procedures of other treaty bodies where feasible and 
possible.48 Whether a treaty-body other than the CRC will provide an 
avenue for redress to a victim is dependent on considerations such as 
whether the relevant state has ratified the instrument, whether the 
substantive rights in the instrument covers the nature of the harm the 
victim had sustained, and whether the admissibility and jurisdictional 
threshold requirements relevant to the specific complaints procedure 
have been met. The complaints procedure of the Committee against 
Torture may, for example, be a viable avenue for redress in some cases 
of violent recruitment and use of child soldiers,49 but certainly not in all 
such cases.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Happold, M. Child Soldier in International Law (2005).  
48  Committee on the Rights of the Child – Working Methods, XI, individual 
Communications <www2.ohchr.org> (last accessed on 25 September 2011). “The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child has no mandate to accept and review individual 
complaints. However, the Committee recommends children or their representatives to 
refer to other treaty bodies [...]. Much the same can be said for the special procedures of 
the Commission on Human Rights, including the mechanisms for urgent action and 
appeals, including the Special Rapporteurs on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution 
and Child Pornography; on Torture; on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
or the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention”. 
49  Article 17, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (entered into force on 26 June 1987) (CAT) 1465 UNTS 85. 
Article 22 of the CAT further provides that a state party must enter a declaration to the 
effect that that state accepts the Committee’s jurisdiction relating to individual 
complaints. Furthermore, the Committee will not investigate a matter that has already 
been brought before another committee by the same petitioner, based on the same 
facts.   
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During June 2009 an ‘open-ended working group to explore the possibility 
of elaborating an optional protocol to the CRC to provide a 
communications procedure’ (CRC Working Group) was established by 
the Human Rights Council.50 The CRC Working Group first met from 16 
to 18 December 2009. The effectiveness of complaints procedures in 
quasi-judicial international human rights mechanisms is a point of 
contention. However, the complaints procedures of some treaty-bodies 
are more effective than others.51 Therefore, the effectiveness of such a 
procedure is, in part, dependent on the way it is formulated and the 
powers it is afforded. It was thus a massive failure not to have included 
such a procedure in the mandate of the CRC. This has the further 
implication that the Committee never engages with victims directly, which 
has far-reaching effects, even on the work of the Committee within its 
existing mandate.  Specifically, in making recommendations to state 
parties the Committee is privy only to the state party’s report, and the 
information and context as presented therein. Furthermore, instead of 
having a mandate to actively enforce the CRC, it has a more passive 
mandate to monitor state compliance with the CRC.52 This potentially 
diminishes the status of the Committee in the eyes of states.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/11/1 of 17 June 2009. 
51 The Human Rights Committee, established in terms of article 29 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force on 23 March 1976) (ICCPR) 
999 UNTS 171, is an example of a relatively effective treaty-body with a complaints 
procedure.  
52 Article 44, CRC.  
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The initiative to elaborate a Protocol to the CRC establishing a complaints 
procedure should be pursued as a matter of urgency – indeed, the CRC 
Committee has expressed its hope that the Human Rights Council and 
the General Assembly approve the final text of the Protocol before the 
end of 2011.53 The potential of such a procedure is largely dependent on 
the way it is formulated. As the Chairperson-Rapporteur noted, the 
accessibility of the procedure to children and their representatives is key 
to its success.54 Creating such a procedure now presents an opportunity 
to remedy the shortcomings in models for such communications that are 
already used.  
 
The Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group, Drahoslav Štefánek, 
released a revised draft of the Protocol during January 2011.55 This draft 
reflects a number of comments made by the CRC on the first draft.56 The 
draft provides for individual communications, by individuals or groups of 
individuals;57 collective communications;58 interim measures;59 inter-state 
communications;60 and an enquiry procedure for grave or systematic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Comments by the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the proposal for a draft 
optional protocol prepared by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Open-ended Working 
Group on an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child to provide a 
communications procedure, A/HRC/WG.7/2/3 (13 October 2010) 24. 
54 Ibid, 40. 
55  Revised proposal for a draft optional protocol prepared by the Chairperson-
Rapporteur of the Open-ended Working Group on an optional protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child to provide a communications procedure, A/HRC/WG.7/2/4 (13 
January 2011) (Revised Draft Protocol). 
56 Comments by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, note 53 above.  
57 Article 6, Revised Draft Protocol.  
58 Ibid, article 7. 
59 Ibid, article 8. 
60 Ibid, article 15. 
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violations.61 While the draft excludes the possibility for states to make 
reservations to the Protocol,62 unfortunately, states may, by declaration, 
exclude the competence of the Committee to hear individual 
communications that relate to either of the Protocols to the CRC.63 
Furthermore, an ‘opt-in’ clause limits the Committee’s competence to 
hear collective and inter-state communications to instances where the 
relevant state accepts such competence expressly, by way of 
declaration.64 This selective ratification regime effectively allows states to 
enter de facto reservations to each of the complaints procedures, except 
individual complaints in relation to the CRC only (as states can exclude 
the Protocols by declaration) and the enquiry procedure for grave or 
systematic violations. The draft makes no provision for states who are 
party to either of the current Protocols to the CRC, but not to the CRC, 
such as the US who is a party to the CIAC Protocol, but not to the CRC. 
The selective ratification regime effectively allows such a state to ratify 
the Protocol without being subject to any complaints procedure, except 
for the enquiry procedure for grave or systematic violations.  
 
Zermatten expressed the view that the proposed collective complaints 
procedure has great potential to be effectively used to prevent child 
soldiering.65 However, he also stated that many states are opposed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ibid, article 16. 
62 Ibid, article 24. 
63 Ibid, article 6(2). 
64 Ibid, article 7(1) and 15(1). 
65 Zermatten, note 5 above. 
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this procedure – including developed states. 66  Accordingly, it is 
unfortunately probable that many states will not accept the Committee’s 
competence in relation to such complaints. Collective communications 
are formulated in the following terms: “national human rights institutions 
and ombudsman institutions as well as non-governmental organizations, 
[…] may submit collective communications alleging recurring violations 
affecting multiple individuals of any of the rights [in the CRC and its 
Protocols]”.67 The proposed inquiry procedure for grave or systematic 
violations also has potential for addressing child soldier prevention:  
 
If the Committee receives reliable information indicating grave or 
systematic violations by a State party of rights set forth in the Convention 
[or its Protocols] the Committee shall invite the State party to cooperate in 
the examination of the information and, to this end, to submit 
observations without delay with regard to the information concerned.68  
 
One can only hope that the final text will maintain a better balance 
between securing support from states and creating a mechanism that will 
be effective in addressing violations by those very states, than was the 
case with the CRC. Nevertheless, civil society has an immensely 
important role to play in lobbying states to ratify the Protocol without 
excluding any part of its operation. Admissibility presents a final stumbling 
block to many victims in accessing the Committee. The Committee 
should interpret the exhaustion of local remedies and the unavailability of 
such domestic remedies expansively, so as to guarantee greater 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Ibid. 
67 Article 7(2), Revised Draft Protocol. 
68 Ibid, article 16(1). 
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protection to more children. 69  This argument is consonant with the 
recognition that the possibility for child victims of abuses such as military 
use and recruitment to gain access to municipal courts is a virtual 
impossibility in many parts of the world.70  
 
The Committee’s Approach to Exercising its Mandate 
During my interview with Awich Pollar, he argued that in relation to child 
soldiering, the major compliance gap exists in relation to non-state 
actors.71 In this regard he said that a lacuna exists in the mandate of the 
CRC, as the Committee engages with state parties, and that non-state 
actors do not really feature in the mandate of the Committee. This, 
however, is a limitation inherent to international human rights law (IHRL), 
and mechanisms that exist to promote and enforce instruments such as 
the CRC. In Chapter 3 I presented an in-depth analysis of the relationship 
between IHRL and IHL, which specifically emphasised the distinguishing 
features of these legal regimes. One such distinguishing feature is the 
fact that IHRL creates obligations upon states only, whereas, in the 
context of armed conflict, IHL creates obligations on state and non-state 
actors alike.72 The mandate of the CRC is to monitor state compliance 
with the CRC and its Protocols, and hopefully soon, to play a more pro-
active role in enforcing state compliance. This includes the obligation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ibid, article 9. 
70 This is one of the key problems I observed in the DRC. Even where there are 
mechanisms that can effectively address violations committed against children, the 
children most in need of these mechanisms do not have access to them for a variety of 
reasons.  
71 Pollar, note 6 above. 
72 See Chapter 3.  
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upon states to “undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and 
other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the 
[CRC]…”.73 The work of the Committee thus relates to non-state entities 
indirectly. The Committee aims to ensure that state parties prohibit non-
state actors from using and recruiting child soldiers. In many instances 
this is extremely difficult, as the state party is likely engaged in armed 
conflict with the very entity in relation to which the state must prevent the 
use and recruitment of child soldiers. However, there are many states 
that are allied to non-state entities known for their use and recruitment of 
child soldiers. In such instances the Committee can pressurize states to 
ensure compliance. However, within the contemporary framework of 
IHRL, it is not possible to extend the mandate of the Committee to include 
direct engagement with non-state actors. This is so primarily because 
such actors do not incur international law obligations in terms of the CRC 
or its Protocols and the CRC Committee’s subject-matter jurisdiction 
extends only the CRC and its Protocols.  
 
As stated above, the Committee actively interprets the Convention, in its 
“concluding observations” which it makes in response to state party 
reports. Often, however, the Committee’s concluding observations extend 
beyond the Committee’s mandate. At the Committee’s 48th session, for 
example, it considered the initial report on the implementation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Article 4, CRC. 
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CIAC Protocol by the United States.74 Among many recommendations, 
the Committee recommended:  
 
... the State party to review and raise the minimum age for recruitment 
into the armed forces to 18 years in order to promote and strengthen the 
protection of children through an overall higher legal standard.75 
[...] 
that the United States of America proceed to become a State party to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child in order to further improve the 
protection of children’s rights.76 
[...] 
that the State Party consider ratifying the following international 
instruments, already widely supported in the international community: [...] 
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction 1997.77 
 
The first two recommendations relate directly to the subject-matter of the 
Committee’s mandate. Although the US’s policy of recruiting children of 
seventeen on a voluntary basis is within the confines of the Protocol,78 
the Committee nevertheless encouraged the increase of the minimum 
age for voluntary recruitment to eighteen. The Committee is justified in 
making such recommendations, as these comments were made in 
relation to the CIAC Protocol, the preamble of which provides:  
 
Noting that article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child specifies 
that, for the purposes of that Convention, a child means every human 
being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the 
child, majority is attained earlier… Convinced that an optional protocol to 
the Convention that raises the age of possible recruitment of persons into 
armed forces and their participation in hostilities will contribute effectively 
to the implementation of the principle that the best interests of the child 
are to be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74  Report on the Forty-eighth Session, Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
CRC/C/48/3, (16 November 2009) para 25. 
75 Ibid, para 25(16).  
76 Ibid, para 25(23).  
77 Ibid, para 25(24)(c).  
78 10 U.S.C. § 505. 
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This Protocol is expressly included in the mandate of the Committee. As 
such there is no reason why the Committee cannot advocate for state 
parties to comply not only with the letter of the law, but also with the 
ultimate goals and aspirations of the instrument.  
 
Conversely, no provision of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction has direct bearing on any obligations owed by the US in 
terms of the Protocol.79 The enforcement of this Convention does have 
bearing on the protection of children during armed conflict. Nevertheless, 
the Committee’s recommendation goes beyond its mandate: “examining 
the progress made by States Parties in achieving the realization of the 
obligations undertaken”.80  
 
This of course raises some concerns related to pacta sunt servanda. The 
US ratified the Protocol knowing that it incurs specific obligations, and 
agreeing to the jurisdiction of a quasi-judicial treaty-body with a specific 
mandate determined by a legal instrument, nothing more. 
Recommendations such as the last one made by the Committee 
regarding the US report are not very useful, and are ultra vires the 
Committee’s powers. This treaty-body is already relatively weak, due to 
not having a complaints procedure. By making such recommendations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (entered into force on 18 September 1997) 
2056 UNTS 211.  
80 Article 43(1), CRC.  
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the Committee is likely making it easier for states to dismiss their 
recommendations, as these recommendations may come to be seen as 
the work of activists, and not interpretations of legal obligations by a 
quasi-judicial mechanism.  
 
It is very likely that the excessively wide interpretation the Committee 
employs in discharging its mandate is symptomatic of the very narrow 
and passive mandate it has been afforded. Once the new Protocol comes 
into force, the Committee should recreate itself around this more pro-
active mandate – by staying strictly within the mandate, and at the same 
time relentlessly pursuing compliance by state parties in terms of its 
mandate.  
 
iii. The Security Council 
The General Assembly was the first political organ of the UN to adopt a 
resolution on children in armed conflict, during 1993.81 Three years later, 
the Security Council began adopting resolutions in relation to specific 
countries in which it, inter alia, addressed child soldiering in the relevant 
country.82 However, the issue of children in armed conflict was placed 
formally on the agenda of the Security Council during 1998. Since then:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 General Assembly Resolution 48/157 20 of December 1993. 
82 The first such resolution was Security Council Resolution 1071 of 30 August 1996 in 
relation to the conflict in Liberia.  
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• The Council has adopted a series of seven resolutions on children 
in armed conflict83 (the resolutions that have thus far been adopted 
call various parties to action, including UN institutions and entities 
distinct from the UN. UN institutions must act in accordance with 
these resolutions, whereas they are of recommendatory 
persuasion to external entities);  
• The Council devotes a day of debate to children in armed conflict 
each year;  
• The Secretary-General reports annually to the Security Council 
itself on the situation of children in armed conflict, and directly 
names parties who act in violation of their obligations in using and 
recruiting child soldiers;84   
• Child protection has been integrated into the mandates of 
peacekeeping missions – and personnel are trained accordingly;85  
• The “well-being and empowerment of children affected by armed 
conflict” has been integrated into all peace processes. 
Furthermore, post-conflict recovery and reconstruction planning, 
programmes and strategies now prioritize issues concerning 
children affected by armed conflict;86  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Security Council Resolution 1314 of 11 August 2000; Security Council Resolution 
1379 of 20 November 2001; Security Council Resolution 1460 of 30 January 2003; 
Security Council Resolution 1539 of 22 April 2004; Security Council Resolution 1612 of 
26 July 2005; Security Council Resolution 1882 of 4 August 2009; and Security Council 
Resolution 1998 of 12 July 2011. 
84 Security Council Resolution 1379, para 16.  
85 Security Council Resolution 1379, para 2 & 10(a); Security Council Resolution 1460; 
para 9; Security Council Resolution 1539, para 7; Security Council Resolution 1612; 
para 12. 
86 Security Council Resolution 1882, para 15. 
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• Child protection has been “mainstreamed” in all relevant facets of 
the work of UN institutions;87  
• A Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) has been created 
in relation to children in armed conflict.88  
• A Security Council Working Group (SCWG) on children and armed 
conflict has been established.89  
 
Nevertheless, like the rest of this chapter, the purpose of this section is 
not to create a narrative account of Security Council engagement with 
child soldiering.90 Instead, it is to extrapolate those areas of engagement 
best suited to child soldier prevention and critically analyse the 
effectiveness of their work in this regard.  
 
In terms of its Chapter VII powers, the Security Council can adopt 
resolutions binding upon UN member states. 91  It is thus the most 
powerful entity that directly engages with child soldiering. Unfortunately, 
the Council is yet to adopt such a binding resolution in which it takes 
targeted action in relation to child soldiering. It does, however, have the 
potential to do so, as it held during 2000 that:  
 
…the committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law, including that relating to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Security Council Resolution 1539, para 8; Security Council Resolution 1612; para 18.  
88 Security Council Resolution 1612, para 2-3. 
89 Ibid, para 8 
90 For such an account see Happold, note 47 above, 34-53 
91 Article 24, UN Charter. For a detailed account of the Chapter VII Powers of the UN, 
see De Wet, E. The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (2004). 
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children, in situations of armed conflict may constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, and in this regard reaffirms its readiness 
to consider such situations and, where necessary to adopt appropriate 
steps.92 
 
This is a very significant step. First, as has been stated, for the Council to 
take targeted, binding action against parties who use or recruit child 
soldiers, it will have to issue a Chapter VII resolution – the situation 
therefore has to “constitute a threat to international peace and security”.93 
Furthermore, for the Security Council to refer a matter to the ICC it must 
adopt a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.94 The implication 
of Resolution 1314 is that the Security Council will be able to refer a 
matter to the ICC where the alleged crimes are limited to the use or 
recruitment of child soldiers, as such deeds may threaten international 
peace and security (in a concrete case, however, the Council must be of 
the view that it does threaten such peace and security). Popovski points 
out that Resolution 1314’s reference to international peace and security is 
not an empty threat.95 The Security Council has adopted resolutions 
under Chapter VII related to children in armed conflict since Resolution 
1314. For example, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1332 under 
its Chapter VII powers dealing with the situation in the DRC.96 Among 
other things, the resolution demanded “an effective end to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Security Council Resolution 1314 of 2000, para 9. 
93 Art 24(1), UN Charter.  
94 Article 13, Rome Statute. 
95 Popovski, P. ‘Children in Armed Conflict: Law and Practice of the United Nations’ in 
Arts, K. & Popovski, P. (eds.) International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of 
Children (2006) 44-45. 
96 Security Council Resolution 1332, of 14 December 2000. See generally Surhone, LM., 
Tennoe, MT. & Henssonow, SF. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1332 
(2011). 
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recruitment, training and use of children”.97 It did, however, not impose 
any targeted measures against violating parties who failed to end the use 
and recruitment of child soldiers.  
 
Regular and continuous engagement with child soldier prevention from 
within the Security Council occurs only in the context of the Monitoring 
and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) and the Security Council Working 
Group on children and armed conflict (SCWG).  
  
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism and the Security Council 
Working Group  
The MRM serves to “collect and provide timely, objective, accurate and 
reliable information” on six situations affecting children that have been 
identified by the SRSG as most urgently deserving attention,98 including  
“recruiting or using child soldiers”.99 The implementation of the MRM is 
focused at parties to conflict named in the Secretary-General’s report 
pursuant to Resolutions 1379 and 1882.100 A country-level task force is 
set up in each of these countries and must submit a bi-monthly report on 
“grave violations against children”. The country-level task forces are 
composed of a variety of actors from within UN functionaries and NGOs. 
These task force reports are transmitted to the SRSG, who then reviews, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Ibid, para 10. Arts, K. International criminal accountability and the rights of children 
(2006) 44, states that 165 children were returned to UNICEF as a result of this 
resolution.  
98 Ibid, para 5(c).  
99 Annual Report of the Secretary-General on Children in Armed Conflict, (9 February 
2005), para 68. 
100 For the operation of the MRM see, ibid, 58-64. 
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consolidates and compiles the reports into monitoring and compliance 
reports. She then submits these reports to the SCWG. As of 3 August 
2011, the MRM has been implemented in fifteen countries.101 The work of 
the DRC country task force is discussed Chapter 6.102  
 
The SCWG consists of all members of the Security Council and meets in 
closed session. The principal function of the SCWG is to review reports of 
the MRM. 103  In this context the SCWG is tasked with making 
recommendations to the Security Council on possible measures to be 
taken against entities that, in terms of the MRM, violate any of the six 
grave breaches specifically identified, including recruiting or using child 
soldiers. 104  The Council has, on numerous occasions, threatened 
persistent violators with targeted sanctions. 105  In its most recent 
resolution relevant to child soldiering, the Council requested, “enhanced 
communication between the Working Group and relevant Security 
Council Sanctions Committees, including through the exchange of 
pertinent information on violations and abuses committed against children 
in armed conflict”.106 Furthermore, the Council has directed the SCWG, 
with the support of the SRSG, to “consider, within one year, a broad 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict A/66/256 (3 August 2011) para 14. 
102 See Chapter 6.  
103 Ibid. 
104 To date the working group has considered reports from 32 different countries and 
made recommendations relevant to each one. 
105 Security Council Resolution 1539, para 5(c); Security Council Resolution 1612, para 
9; Security Council Resolution 1882, para 7(c); and Security Council Resolution 1998, 
para 9(c-d). 
106 Security Council Resolution 1998, para 9(c).  
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range of options for increasing pressure on persistent perpetrators of 
violations and abuses committed against children in situations of armed 
conflict”.107 This period will expire on 12 July 2012. In complying with this 
request, the SRSG has already briefed the Security Council Committee 
concerning Somalia and Eritrea proposing that grave violations against 
children be designated criteria for sanctions.108 The Security Council has 
acted in this regard, adding such violations as designated criteria for 
sanctions in relation to Somalia and Eritrea.109 The SRSG has, however, 
said “targeted and graduated sanctions should be applied against 
persistent perpetrators as a measure of last resort, when all other means 
have failed to end impunity for crimes committed against children”.110 
 
While effect has been given to the first part of Otunnu’s vision of creating 
a MRM, the second part, that reports produced by the MRM “should, in 
turn, serve as ‘triggers for action’...” is only just becoming a reality.111 I am 
still sceptically aware that designating grave violations against children as 
criteria for sanctions does not necessarily mean such sanctions will be 
imposed. The potential success of monitoring and reporting is wholly 
based on targeted action being taken once patterns of child soldier use 
and recruitment have been identified. To be effective in preventing child 
soldiering, I am of the view that the Security Council must follow-up what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Ibid, para 21. 
108 Report of the Special Representative, note 101 above, para 60. 
109 Security Council Resolution 2002 of 29 July 2011. 
110 Report of the Special Representative, note 101 above para, 59. 
111 Otunnu, O. ‘Protection of children affected by armed conflict Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict’, A/58/328, (29 
August 2003), para 82. 
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can still be construed as political rhetoric – threats of sanction, with 
targeted action – with actually implementing such sanctions. Within the 
framework of the Council’s Chapter VII powers, it should, where needed 
and only against persistent violators, adopt targeted action. Such action is 
similar to Resolution 1332 that was adopted in relation to the DRC and 
discussed above – but unlike Resolution 1332, targeted action, including 
sanctions, must be implemented against such persistent violators. 
Indeed, the first time the Council threatened violating parties with 
sanctions was during 2004. 112  Armed groups within nine specific 
countries have been consistently included in each of the Secretary-
General’s six lists of violating parties that have been published since 
2004.113 This indicates well that monitoring and reporting, an important 
component in the process of child soldier prevention must be followed up 
with targeted sanctions to be effective in preventing child soldiering. What 
stands in the way of such sanctions is political will,114 both by members of 
the Security Council in adopting such sanctions, and members of the UN 
in complying fully with Security Council resolutions.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Security Council Resolution 1539, para 5(c). 
113 See Chapter 2.  
114 Vandergrift, K. ‘International Law Barring Child Soldiers in Combat: Problems in 
Enforcement and Accountability, Question and Answer Session’ 37 Cornell Int'l L.J. 555 
(2004) 556.  
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iv. The Office of the Special Representative to the Secretary-General 
on Children and Armed Conflict  
The Machel report recommended that a Special Representative to the 
Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict (SRSG) be 
appointed.115 The first SRSG, Olara Otunnu was appointed during 1998, 
and served in that capacity until 2005. The current SRSG, Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, took office during April 2006.116 The SRSG is mandated 
to:  
 
(a) Assess progress achieved, steps taken and difficulties encountered 
in strengthening the protection of children in situations of armed conflict; 
(b) Raise awareness and promote the collection of information about 
the plight of children affected by armed conflict and encourage the 
development of networking; 
(c) Work closely with the Committee on the Rights of the Child, relevant 
United Nations bodies, the specialized agencies and other competent 
bodies, as well as non-governmental organizations; 
(d) Foster international cooperation to ensure respect for children's 
rights in these situations and contribute to the coordination of efforts by 
Governments, relevant United Nations bodies, […] regional and sub-
regional organizations, other competent bodies and non-governmental 
organizations.117 
 
 
In order to fulfil this mandate, the SRSG identified the following “core 
activities”: 
 
(a) Public advocacy to build greater awareness and to mobilize the 
international community for action; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Machel, G. ‘Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed 
Conflict on Children’ UN Doc. A/51/306 (26 August 1996) (Machel Report), para 266-
269. The mandate was created in terms of General Assembly Resolution 51/77 of 12 
December 1996. 
116 Ms Sham-Poo acted as SRSG on an interim basis from August-October 2005. 
117 General Assembly Resolution 57/77 of 12 December 1996, para 36.  
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(b) Promoting the application of international norms and traditional 
value systems that provide for the protection of children in times of 
conflict;  
(c) Undertaking political and humanitarian diplomacy and proposing 
concrete initiatives to protect children in the midst of war; 
(d) Making the protection and welfare of children a central concern in 
peace processes and in post-conflict programmes for healing and 
rebuilding.118 
 
The SRSG highlighted “participation of children in armed conflict” as a 
key focus area early on.119 To the credit of both people who have served 
as SRSG on children and armed conflict, they have engaged much more 
directly in efforts aimed at preventing child soldiering than their mandate 
may be interpreted.120 Indeed, as was stated earlier, Ms Coomaraswamy 
expressed to me that her role as SRSG is best fulfilled by addressing 
grave violations committed against children during armed conflict directly, 
as opposed to more broad engagement. Unlike the situation with the 
CRC, this does not create any problems, as the SRSG is not a treaty-
body, the mandate of which is determined in narrow terms by 
international law. Two areas in which the SRSG has been particularly 
successful in direct action against the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers are undertaking field missions and obtaining concrete 
commitments from armed forces and groups to cease the use and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Otunnu, O. ‘Protection of children affected by armed conflict Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict’ A/54/430 (1 
October 1999), para 2. 
119 Otunnu, O. ‘Protection of children affected by armed conflict Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict’ A/53/482 (12 
October 1998). 
120 The mandate of the Office speaks generally to the Office’s indirect role, as it utilizes 
language such as “assesses”, “raise awareness and promote” and “foster international 
cooperation”. 
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recruitment of child soldiers.121 Of course, such concrete commitments 
are only complied with in limited cases.122 On the indirect level, the SRSG 
remains active in raising global awareness, engaging with civil society, 
and enhancing legal and normative frameworks.123 NGO groups already 
champion most if not all of these areas of indirect engagement. 
Nevertheless, the office of the SRSG brings with it the authority of the 
Secretary-General of the UN. It may also be argued that this brings with it 
a degree of circumspection, as the UN is often perceived to be pro-
government by non-state armed groups in countries where the UN has an 
established peace mission.124  
 
The Secretary-General has, since 2001, been mandated to attach a list to 
his annual reports on children in armed conflict of parties to armed 
conflict that use or recruit child soldiers.125 In practice, it is the SRSG that 
compiles these lists. Popovski is of the view that “this was the end of 
tactful diplomacy”.126 In other words, he asserts that directly engaging 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 See Chapter 6. During her visit to the Central African Republic during May 2008, the 
SRSG obtained commitments from the Armée populaire pour la restauration de la 
République et de la démocratie (APRD) that they will release all children associated with 
their forces. On 7 July 2009 the APRD lived up to their commitment and released all 182 
children associated with their forces to UNICEF. See Coomaraswamy, R. ‘Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict’ 
A/64/254 (6 August 2009), para 61. 
122 Wessells, M. Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection (2006) 236-237; Singer, 
PW. Children at War (2006) 143-144; Happold, note 43 above 40-42.  
123 ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict’ A/66/256 93 (August 2011) para 20. 
124 See Chapter 6 where the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUC) serves as a good example not only of the UN being perceived as 
biased, but where the UN forces play an active role engaging enemy forces.  
125 Security Council Resolution 1379, para 16. This mandate has been slightly altered 
since; see Chapter 2.  
126 Popovski, note 95 above, 46.  
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with armed groups and forces and in so doing negotiating the end of the 
use and recruitment of child soldiers is mutually exclusive with naming 
and shaming violating parties. This argument is, however, premised on 
an assumption that violating states and armed groups will be less inclined 
to engage in “tactful diplomacy” when their names may be put on a 
published list of offenders, which is questionable. Indeed, violating parties 
might be more willing to engage with the SRSG and provide concrete 
commitments in order to be excluded from the Secretary-General’s list.  
 
Although the SRSG has achieved much by way of engaging with 
governments and arguing for the disarmament demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR) of children, this is still a very critical, time-sensitive, 
phase of ensuring compliance with child soldier prohibitions. The inherent 
value of legal norms to demand compliance may be lost if the relevant 
norms, or class of norms, have come to be seen as formal prohibitions, 
the violation of which has no adverse consequences. The successes of 
yesterday must not blind us from the suffering of today. As former 
UNICEF Executive Director, James Grant, said, “as our capacity to do 
good has increased, it is gradually becoming unacceptable ethically not to 
use that capacity, or to exclude nations, communities or individuals from 
the benefits of progress. Morality marches with changing capacity”.127 
Isolated and anecdotal success does not amount to having entered “an 
era of application”. The SRSG has functioned very effectively to date. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Grant, JP. ‘Child Health and Human Rights’ Address to the Committee on Health and 
Human Rights Lecture Programme, Institute of Medicine (1994). 
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This is probably largely due to the commitment and competencies of 
those who have held this position.  
 
The one area in which the SRSG should focus more attention is her 
function as a focal point among all UN functionaries engaged in child 
soldiering.128 Given the extent of the UN as an Organization, the scope 
for duplication of work is tremendous. Both Zermatten and Pollar 
indicated that the CRC Committee has no relationship with the SCWG.129 
The SRSG on the other hand, remains actively involved with both the 
CRC Committee and the SCWG. However, she should also facilitate a 
relationship between these entities, and other key entities engaged with 
child soldier prevention in light of the fact that these two bodies often 
engage with the same states on exactly the same subject matter; form 
part of the same organization; and share the same goals.  
 
4. AFRICAN UNION ENGAGEMENT WITH CHILD SOLDIER 
PREVENTION  
This section analyses the potential of the African Court to engage with 
child soldier prevention. The African Children’s Committee is included in 
the analysis as it is an African intergovernmental organization with the 
authority to transmit cases directly to the African Court. Neither of these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128  As she is mandated to “foster international cooperation to ensure respect for 
children's rights in these situations and contribute to the coordination of efforts by 
Governments, relevant United Nations bodies, […] regional and sub-regional 
organizations, other competent bodies and non-governmental organizations”, see 
General Assembly Resolution 57/77, para 36(d). 
129 Zermatten, note 5 above and Pollar, note 6 above. 
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bodies has generated any significant jurisprudence, and none specifically 
on child soldiering.  
 
i. The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child  
As was stated earlier, the African Children’s Committee was created in 
terms of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which 
provides that “States Parties to the present Charter shall take all 
necessary measures to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in 
hostilities and refrain in particular, from recruiting any child”.130 
 
The African Children’s Committee has been in existence since 2001, but 
was rather inactive until November 2008, when the Committee for the first 
time examined state reports. 131  The Committee’s mandate is much 
broader than that of the CRC Committee, and includes examining state 
reports, 132  undertaking fact-finding missions, 133  promoting the African 
Children’s Charter and the rights of the child in general.134 It also has a 
mandate to hear individual and inter-state communications.135  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Article 22(2), African Children’s Charter.   
131 Sloth-Nielsen, J. & Mezmur, BD. ‘Out of the Starting Blocks: The 12th and 13th 
Sessions of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 
(2009) 9 AHRLJ 336 342-5. 
132 Article 43-44, African Children’s Charter.   
133 Ibid, article 45(1). 
134 Ibid, article 42. 
135 Ibid, article 44. 
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A “Communication on violations of the Rights of the Child in the North of 
Uganda” is currently on the agenda of the Committee. A three-person 
working group has been established by the Committee to deal with the 
admissibility of this communication. This working group will report to the 
Committee during its next session. 136  Among other things, this 
communication relates to the use and recruitment of child soldiers in 
Northern Uganda.  
 
The Committee’s findings have the force of recommendations, and the 
ineffectiveness of the Committee is one indicator of the level of political 
will among state parties to engage further with child rights. The 
Committee has recently been rejuvenated and, by mid-2011, it had 
received eleven state reports.137 It is hoped that more extensive use will 
be made of the Committee, such as the individual communication in 
relation to Northern Uganda. However, the strongest role of the 
Committee in relation to the prevention of child soldiering relates to the 
status of the Committee as an “African intergovernmental organizations”, 
meaning it is one of the gate-keeper entities that hold the key for access 
to the African Court.138 It is this feature of the Committee that warrants its 
inclusion in this analysis.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 16th Session of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (ACERWC) 9-12 November 2010, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia ACERWC/Rpt. (XVI) 
para 49. 
137 See www.acerwc.org (last accessed on 24 September 2011).  
138 Article 5(1)(e) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights 
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and People's Rights (entered into 
force 25 January 2004) OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) (Court Protocol). 
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ii. African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights  
Outside of the war crimes tribunals the only international judicial 
mechanism that potentially has subject-matter jurisdiction over child 
soldier prohibitive norms is the African Court, established pursuant to a 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Court 
Protocol).139 The Court commenced its functions during November 2006. 
The child soldier prohibitive norm in question is article 22 of the African 
Children’s Charter. The African Court’s counterparts in Europe and the 
Americas have a much more established jurisprudence. In fact, to date 
the African Court has only rendered one judgement where the Court 
found the matter before it inadmissible, 140  and ordered provisional 
measures in relation to mass-violations of human rights having been 
committed by the Gaddafi regime during 2011 in Libya.141 Nevertheless, 
neither the European Convention on Human Rights,142 nor the American 
Convention on Human Rights contains substantive provisions prohibiting 
child soldiering.143 Furthermore neither of these regional systems have a 
regional human rights instrument comparable to the African Children’s 
Charter. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Ibid. 
140 Michelot Yogogombaye v The Republic of Senegal Application No. 001/2008 (2008) 
para 46. 
141 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Great Socialists People’s 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Order for Provisional Measures) Application Number 004/2011 
(25 March 2011). 
142 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (entered 
into force of 3 September 1953) ETS 5, 213 UNTS 222. 
143 American Convention on Human Rights (entered into force of 18 July 1978) OAS 
Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 UNTS 123. 
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Subject-Matter Jurisdiction  
The Court has jurisdiction over “all cases and disputes submitted to it 
concerning the interpretation and application of the [African] Charter, this 
Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the 
States concerned”.144 The Court thus has jurisdiction to interpret and 
apply the African Children’s Charter in cases where it is relevant. 
However, the question remains open whether the Court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction is broad enough to include the CRC. Even if the Court is not 
competent to apply and enforce UN human rights treaties, its subject-
matter jurisdiction remains the broadest of the three regional human 
rights courts.145 
 
The second draft of the Court Protocol contained the words “relevant 
African human rights instrument” instead of “relevant human rights 
instrument”,146 indicating that the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court 
was purposefully extended to include UN Human Rights Treaties. 
According to Viljoen the application of UN Human Rights treaties, such as 
the CRC, is problematic due to three main reasons:  
 
• Should the relevant UN treaty provide its own enforcement 
mechanism, the party bringing the case will be in a position to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Article 3(1), Court Protocol. See also article 7 dealing with applicable law.  
145 Viljoen, F. International Human Rights Law in Africa (2007), 444, note 141.  
146 Nouakchott Draft of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (1997) 
OAU Doc OAU/LEGAL/EXP/AFCHPR/PRO (2).  
	   287	  
‘forum shop’. In turn this could mean a separate jurisprudential 
development of the same treaty norm by two separate bodies.147  
• Where the relevant state party to the UN treaty did not accept an 
individual complaints procedure under that treaty, it may find itself 
answering to individual complaints through the workings of the 
Court Protocol.148  
• Persons in states party to the Protocol may submit alleged 
violations of a UN treaty to a court with the power to render binding 
judgements, whereas persons in states party to the relevant UN 
treaty, but not party to the Court Protocol, may not even submit 
individual communications to the applicable UN body, being the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child in the case of the CRC.149  
 
The first two points raised do not arise in the context of the CRC, as the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child established in terms of the CRC 
does not have direct enforcement capabilities nor does it provide for 
individual complaints (as discussed above, this may, however, soon 
change).150 However, the third reason has direct bearing on the CRC. 
Viljoen suggests two interpretations of the provision to prevent the 
“absurd” implications it may have. 151  Firstly, that the words “states 
concerned” should be interpreted to mean “all states parties to the [Court] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Viljoen, note 145 above, 446. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid.  
150 See Chapter 4.  
151 Viljoen, note 145 above, 446-447. 
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Protocol”. In the context of the CRC even such an interpretation would 
not prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction over the CRC, as the 
only state that can potentially ratify the Protocol without having ratified the 
CRC is Somalia. It is the only African state that has not as of yet ratified 
the CRC and it is foreseeable that should Somalia be in a position to 
ratify international instruments it will ratify the CRC before the Court 
Protocol.152 In fact, an equal number of African states are party to the 
CRC as are members of the African Union. 153  Viljoen’s second 
suggestion is that the word “relevant” should be so interpreted that UN 
treaties are not relevant or appropriate in the regional African human 
rights sense of the word.154  
 
On the other hand many commentators argue that UN Human Rights 
treaties are included in the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,155 which 
remains problematic. Both the text of the Court Protocol as well as its 
drafting history suggests that the Court does in fact enjoy such wide 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia announced on 20 November 
2009 their plans to ratify the CRC. The previous TFG signed the CRC on 9 May 2002 
(see News Note ‘UNICEF welcomes decision by the Somali Transitional Federal 
Government to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ UNICEF (20 November 
2009) (http://www.unicef.org last accessed on 24 September 2011)). 
153 In Africa only Somalia is not a party to the CRC and only Morocco is not a member of 
the African Union.  
154 Viljoen, note 145 above, 446-447. 
155  Duy Phan argues that all Human Rights treaties are included, but that this is 
undesirable (Duy Phan, H. ‘A Blueprint for a Southeast Asian Court of Human Rights’ 10 
APLPJ 384 (2008-2009) 398-399). Others argue that there is merit in such broad 
subject-matter jurisdiction (Samb, M. ‘Fundamental Issues and Practical Challenges of 
Human Rights in the Context of the African Union’ 15 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 61 
(2009) 69-69; Mukundi Wachira, G. ‘African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Ten 
years on and still no justice’ (Report of the Minority Rights Group International) (2008) 
19); Ubombana, NJ. ‘Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better 
Late than Never’ (2000) 3 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 45; Eno, 
RW. ‘The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 2 AHRLJ 223 
(2002) 226-227. 
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jurisdiction. Furthermore, a Protocol has been opened for ratification 
aimed at merging the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
the African Court of Justice (Merger Protocol).156 Although this Protocol is 
unlikely to enter into force, it is instructive to note that in terms of the 
Merger Protocol, the Court will definitely have jurisdiction in relation to UN 
human rights treaties such as the CRC.157 For the time being, primacy 
should be afforded to African regional instruments. UN treaties should 
only be interpreted and applied secondarily, if at all. The Court will surely, 
as a matter of course, deal with this issue early on. The discussion that 
follows is not dependent on which substantive child soldier prohibitive 
norm is applicable (African Children’s Charter or CRC), as these treaty 
norms have been discussed independently in Chapter 4. Rather the 
practicalities involved in the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over matters 
related to child soldiering are assessed.  
 
Locus Standi  
The African Court has both contentious and advisory jurisdiction.158 The 
following entities have access to the Court: the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission); the State Party which has 
lodged a complaint to the Commission; the State Party against which the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 The Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights was 
adopted by the Eleventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in Sharm El-Sheikh, 
Egypt (1 July 2008) (Merger Protocol). For more on the history of this Protocol see 
Kane, I. and Motala, AC. ‘The Creation of a New African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights’ in Evans, MD. and Murray, R. (eds.) The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: the System in Practice, 1986-2006 (2008) 406-440. 
157 Article 34(1), Merger Protocol.  
158 Article 4, Court Protocol.  
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complaint has been lodged at the Commission; the State Party whose 
citizen is a victim of human rights violation; and African Intergovernmental 
Organizations.159 State parties who have an interest in a matter may also 
request the Court to be joined to the proceedings.160 Lastly, relevant 
NGOs, with observer status before the Court, and individuals may be 
allowed to submit cases directly to the Court, provided that the relevant 
state party has made a declaration in terms of article 34(6) of the Court 
Protocol accepting direct access by such parties to the Court.161 
 
The likelihood of certain specific entities with standing to submit a matter 
to the Court is less than others. For example, it is unlikely that a state 
party against whom a complaint has been lodged at the Commission will 
submit the matter to the Court,162 as the Court’s judgement will be binding 
and enforceable, while the Commission’s is not. Nevertheless, matters 
regarding child soldier prevention can be brought before the Court by any 
party with standing. Importantly, the African Children’s Committee can 
also bring matters before the Court, as it is an African Intergovernmental 
Organizations.163 The African Children’s Committee should exercise this 
competency in serious matters regarding the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers. It is important to note that individuals have access to the 
complaints procedures of this Committee, thus the Committee can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Ibid, article 5(1)(e). 
160 Ibid, article 5(1). 
161 Ibid, article 5(3). 
162 The Commission was established in terms of Article 30 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (entered into force on 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217. 
163 The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child was 
established in terms of Article 32 of the African Children’s Charter. 
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forward an individual complaint to the Court even where the relevant state 
had not made a declaration granting direct access to individuals.  
 
In terms of child protection, direct access by NGOs and individuals surely 
offers the best potential avenue for protection. To date twenty-five out of 
a total of fifty-four countries have ratified the Court Protocol. Of these 
countries only four:  Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mali and Tanzania have 
entered a declaration allowing direct access to individuals and relevant 
NGOs with observer status before the Court.164 Where the relevant state 
had not made a declaration, the communication will first have to be 
submitted to the Commission. However, for a matter to be admissible 
before the Commission it has to be based on a violation of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)165 in addition to 
the other admissibility requirements as stipulated in article 56 of the 
African Charter. The African Children’s Charter is not a protocol to the 
African Charter, and accordingly, a violation of the African Children’s 
Charter does not amount to a violation of the African Charter.166  
 
The African Charter contains no explicit provisions on child soldiering. 
The question then is whether the matter has to be admissible before the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 As at 10 September 2011. 
165  Article 56(2), African Charter; Frederick Korvah v Liberia Communication 1/88, 
Frederick Korvah v Liberia, Seventh Activity Report 1993-1994, Annex IX. 
166 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa (entered into force on 25 November 2005) CAB/LEG/66.6 does extend 
the substantive content of the African Charter as regards state parties to this Protocol, 
by reason that it is a Protocol (Viljoen, F. ‘Communications under the African Charter: 
Procedure and Admissibility’ in Evans & Murray, note 146 above, 96). 
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Commission for the Commission to submit the matter to the Court. If it 
has to be, then the Commission will not be able to submit a 
communication to the Court that alleges the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers. The Commission’s entitlement to submit such matters to the 
Court is exercised ex mero motu. As such, the substantial likelihood is 
that this determination (i.e. whether the Commission must first determine 
admissibility, before submitting the matter to the Court) will be subject to 
the interpretation of the Commission and not the Court. There are three 
possibilities: the Commission will forward the matter to the Court without 
having dealt with it at all; the Commission would deal with the matter in 
part and then submit the matter to the Court; or the Commission will 
finalise the matter and then submit it. 167  The last option is widely 
supported by commentators.168 In order for the Commission to make a 
decision on whether to submit the matter to the Court, the Commission 
should apply its mind to the matter at hand. Thus, my position is that at 
the very least the Commission will have to dispose of the matter partially. 
This will include a finding on admissibility. As such and in effect, it is likely 
that the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction will be severely limited in 
instances where the matter is referred from the Commission – which will 
likely account for a great majority of cases that reach the court.  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 For a full discussion of the three possibilities see Viljoen, F. (ed) ‘Judiciary Watch 
Report: the African Human Rights System: Towards the Coexistence of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ (Nairobi: Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists, 2006). 
168 See for example Harrington, J. ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in 
Evans & Murray, note 146 above, 305. 
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The African Court has immense potential in the context of child soldier 
prevention. The realisation of this potential, however, is subject to 
numerous factors; the first being the number of states that enter 
declarations allowing direct access to individuals and NGOs with 
observer status.  
 
The Court’s remedial powers are very broad. It is entitled to make 
“appropriate orders to remedy the violation” and this includes payment of 
fair compensation or reparations.169 The Court is also entitled to adopt 
provisional measures. 170  In the context of child soldiering the most 
obvious orders would be for states to cease the use and recruitment of 
child soldiers; enforce such legal measures on non-state groups; order 
the DDR of specific children; and to pay reparations. The pessimistic 
reality remains that even though the Court delivers binding judgements it 
is still subject to observance by the executive of the relevant state. Where 
the executive fails to adhere to the Court’s findings, the judiciary of the 
relevant state should safeguard the sanctity of the Court’s ruling. 
However, in many states in Africa the separation of the executive from 
the judiciary is theoretical at best.171  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Article 27(1), Court Protocol.  
170 Ibid, article 27(2). 
171 Fombad, CM. ‘The Separation of Powers and Constitutionalism In Africa: The Case 
of Botswana’ 25 B.C. Third World L.J. 301 (2005) 302.  
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5. SUMMARY 
When Otunnu spoke of entering “an era of application” in relation to child 
soldier prevention, he did so ex officio, as a functionary forming part of 
the UN. As the international organization charged with the maintenance 
of peace and security, and the safeguarding of the fundamental human 
rights of those who cannot safeguard their rights themselves, such as 
child soldiers, the UN forms the core of the international community’s 
response. This was true in the context of norm creation – both the CRC 
and the CIAC Protocol were the products of initiatives internal to the UN. 
It must also be true in the context of norm application. In no way does this 
suggest that functionaries outside of the UN, such as the ICC and the 
African Court, play a second-tier role in preventing child soldiering. 
Instead, the UN should be the core, because, unlike other institutions, it 
enjoys the universal subscription of states.  
 
Each of the institutions discussed in this Chapter operate on various 
levels of efficiency in preventing child soldiering. In some cases, such as 
the CRC Committee, its lack of success is due, in large part, to a weak 
mandate. In others, such as the African Court and the African Children’s 
Committee, political will stands in the way of stronger engagement. Yet, 
other functionaries, such as the SRSG already operate at a very 
significant level of efficiency – this does not change the fact that child 
soldiering as a global phenomenon is not diminishing at a noticeable rate. 
Therefore, all these institutions and functionaries should constantly re-
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asses their engagement with child soldier prevention and refine their 
approaches. 
 
Some of the areas in which these institutions and functionaries can 
increase their level of engagement with child soldiering are significant, for 
example, adopting the Protocol to the CRC creating an individual 
communications procedure in the CRC Committee. Yet, other areas 
where the level of engagement with child soldiering can be increased are 
more mundane. For example, the SRSG should pay more attention to her 
role as a focal point for UN engagement with child soldier prevention, by 
facilitating a more streamlined relationship, or at least the exchange of 
reports and knowledge, between the CRC Committee and the SCWG. It 
must be kept in mind, however, that strengthening any one of the 
mechanisms analysed in this or any other chapter is unlikely to result in a 
significant decline in child soldiering. There are no “silver bullet” solutions 
to issues such as child soldier prevention. However, each mechanism 
that is strengthened and rendered more effective, even to a limited 
extent, strengthens a strand in Cassel’s rope that pulls human rights 
forward – and in this case, protects children from military use and 
recruitment – effecting social change incrementally.172 Entering “an era of 
application” does not require big changes to a few functionaries, but less 
significant changes to more functionaries, so that many strands of the 
rope are strengthened.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Cassel, D. ‘Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?’ 2 Chi. J. Int'l 
L. 121 (2001) 126-134. 
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CHAPTER 6  CASE STUDY: THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 
THE CONGO  	  
This Chapter serves a different purpose to that of the other chapters that 
make up this study. Instead of investigating the legal environment in 
which child soldiering is to be prevented, or rendering the mechanisms 
that aim to prevent child soldiering more efficient, this Chapter considers 
the engagement of these mechanisms with a contemporary country-
situation, where child soldiering is a significant problem. Most of the 
mechanisms included in this Chapter were previously discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Accordingly, the conclusions drawn with regard to each 
of these mechanisms in those chapters, which are aimed at rendering the 
relevant mechanism more effective in preventing child soldiering, can be 
assessed in relation to a practical situation. As such, the purpose of this 
chapter is not to draw new conclusions, but to test conclusions previously 
drawn. 
 
As is explained more fully below, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) was identified as the best country-situation for a case study, as 
virtually every incarnation of the child soldier phenomenon has occurred 
in the DRC during the last decade. Furthermore, the use and recruitment 
of child soldiers occurs daily in the DRC.  
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1. CONDUCTING FIELDWORK DURING ARMED CONFLICT IN THE 
DRC 
The DRC serves as the ideal case study in relation to child soldier 
prevention, as this country has experienced every dimension of the child 
soldier problem within the last decade. In order to do a case study within 
the factual context of events, I conducted a four-month field visit to the 
DRC from October 2008 to January 2009. I divided my time between the 
Ituri Region, in the North East of the country, where I was based in the 
regional capital, Bunia; and the Kivu Provinces (Nord and Sud), in the 
East of the country. I was based in Goma, in the provincial capital of Nord 
Kivu, during my stay in the Kivu Provinces.  
 
i. The Contemporary Conflict Landscape in the DRC 
The first Congo War began during November 1996 through the escalation 
of skirmishes on the mountainous borderlands of the DRC and Rwanda.1 
It ended barely seven months later, 2000 kilometers away, with Laurent-
Désiré Kabila’s march on Kinshasa, and eventual over-throw of President 
Mobutu Sésé Seko. The DRC has experienced continuous combat ever 
since it became independent on 30 June 1960. This is specifically true in 
the east and northeast of the country, and children have been used and 
recruited in every war fought in the DRC since independence. The 
Second Congo War, as well as numerous other conflicts that have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a full account of contemporary armed conflict in the DRC see Clark, JF. (ed.) The 
African stakes of the Congo War (2002).  
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occurred and are on-going in the DRC subsequently, have at various 
times had an international and non-international character.2  
 
Ethnicity has been the key factor in conflicts throughout the DRC for 
many years. At the core of the most recent conflicts lie the distinction 
between Hutu and Tutsi;3 and the distinction between Hema and Lendu.4 
There are further ethnic groups who align themselves with one of the 
above-mentioned groups, or with wholly separate identities, but who play 
less significant roles in armed conflict. Natural resources and politics 
create an even more volatile conflict landscape.5 The recent conflicts 
have primarily been categorized as the First Congo War; the Second 
Congo War; the Kivu Conflict; and the Ituri Conflict. These conflicts 
overlap with one another and converge to the extent that a single 
perpetual conflict emerges.  
 
Children are still recruited and used in active participation in hostilities in 
the DRC on a daily basis. Such use and recruitment occurs primarily in 
the context of the ongoing, low-intensity hostilities between the Hutu and 
Tutsi ethnic groups in the Kivu Provinces of the DRC, and the abduction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See for example, Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Uganda) 2005 ICJ Reports 168. 
3 The Hutus and Tutsis are two rival ethnic groups in the Great Lakes region of Africa. 
Hutus far outnumber the Tutsis, but the Tutsis have taken up more elite positions in 
society. There are arguments that there is no longer a discernable difference between 
these two groups. This rivalry formed the basis of the 1994 Rwandan genocide.  
4 The Hema and Lendu are two ethnic groups located in the Ituri region of the DRC. The 
Hema are pastoralists and have a population of approximately 160 000 people. The 
Lendu number approximately 750 000 and are agriculturalists. 
5 Ross, ML. ‘How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen 
Cases’ Volume 58, Number 1 International Organization (2004) 35. 
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of children by the [Ugandan] Lord’s Resistance Army in the northeast of 
the country.  
 
Many so-called genocidaires, the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide, crossed the border into the DRC soon after the genocide.6 The 
strongest armed group consisting of former genocidaires is the Forces 
démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), who are responsible for 
committing atrocities against people of Tutsi ethnicity on a continuous 
basis and who aim to ethnically cleans the Banyamulenge (ethnic 
Congolese Tutsis). 7  The Interahamwe, the principal architects of the 
Rwandan genocide, are also allied with the FDLR. Opposed to the FDLR, 
was the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). The 
CNDP operated under the leadership of General Laurent Nkunda until 
Nkunda’s capture by the Rwandan Armed Forces on 22 January 2009. It 
is believed that Bosco Ntaganda took over from Nkunda as leader of the 
CNDP. However, the CNDP has since largely been integrated into the 
National Armed Forces of the DRC, the Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). Many smaller factions, as well as the 
FARDC itself have been and are involved in these hostilities. Most of 
them use and recruit child soldiers. This includes Mai Mai groups, who 
are civilian defense forces operating across the eastern parts of the DRC. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Dunn, KC. ‘A Survival Guide to Kinshasa: Lessons of the Father, Passed Down to the 
Son’ in Clark, JF. (ed.) The African stakes of the Congo War (2002) 56. 
7 Vlassenroot, K. ‘Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of 
the Banyamulenge’ Volume 29, Number 93/94 Review of African Political Economy 
‘State Failure in the Congo: Perceptions & Realities’ (September - December 2002) 499. 
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The Lord’s Resistance Army has also, since 2007, been based primarily 
in the remote jungles of the Garamba National Park in northeastern 
DRC.8 This group continues to thrive purely on the basis of the vicious 
abduction of children.   
 
ii. The Challenges of Doing Field-Work in the DRC 
I started planning the logistics for my field-visit during early 2008. 
Although the conflict landscape in the DRC is always volatile and never 
predictable, it appeared, at the time that the de-escalation in hostilities 
would have lasted until after my field visit. Indeed, my visit took place 
after the January 2008 peace agreement. Nevertheless, by the time I got 
ready to depart for the DRC during October 2008, conflict escalated very 
significantly on two fronts. The 2008 Nord Kivu Conflict commenced on 
26 October 2008 and lasted until 23 March 2009, which included my 
entire stay in the Nord Kivu province. It was also during this time that the 
Lord’s Resistance Army intensified their operations within the DRC. In 
this context the 2008 Christmas massacre is the most notable example. 
During the Christmas period of 2008 the LRA orchestrated attacks on 
several small villages in north-eastern DRC, hacking to death an 
estimated 500 people and abducting 160 children. The LRA’s abduction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and armed conflict, A/64/742–S/2010/181 
(13 April 2010) (2010 Security Council Report) para 157-159. 
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of children had strongly increased since the second half of 2008.9 For the 
period September 2008 to the end of March 2009, the LRA were 
responsible for the murder of 990 Congolese nationals and the abduction 
of 747 people, mostly children.10 
 
While the escalation of armed conflict is never desired, it may appear that 
doing fieldwork during a period of such escalation in armed conflict is 
well-suited to achieving the research goals. The timing of my fieldwork did 
hold some advantages. For example, as is discussed below, re-
escalation in hostilities presents an opportunity to gauge whether 
successes that have been achieved in the Disarmament, Demobilisation 
and Reintegration of child soldiers is attributable to de-escalation in 
hostilities. These advantages are in fact few and far between. In 
addressing the protection, or lack thereof, of children in armed conflict, 
and improvements in such protection, Kuper has stated:  
 
Clearly it is not feasible to conduct reliable empirical research, to stand in 
the midst of conflict and count child soldiers and/or child casualties, or to 
observe the treatment of children generally. Nor could such observation 
be sufficiently objective and comprehensive to be useful. So, how is it 
possible to ascertain if the relevant international law has any effect? 
Perhaps the most that can be done besides the painstaking analysis of 
individual conflicts, is to assess what seems likely to have any impact, 
and to take note of instances in which progress is made, for example 
when an army agrees to stop using soldiers under 18 years, or a rebel 
group agrees to release children it has captured.11 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Fawke, M. ‘UNHCR visits Congolese towns attacked by Lord's Resistance Army’ 
UNHCR (2008) <www.unhcr.org> (last accessed on 28 September 2011). 
10 Redmond, R. (UNHCR spokesperson) comments made at press briefing at the Palais 
des Nations in Geneva (24 March 2009). 
11 Kuper, J. ‘Children and Armed Conflict: Some Issues of Law and Policy’ in Fottrell, D. 
Revisiting Children’s Rights: 10 Years of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(2000). 
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In a similar vein, the escalation of armed conflict does not present better 
opportunities for data collection; in fact it seriously hampers such data 
collection. My research design was such that I aimed to interview a broad 
range of actors working for international organizations, most notably the 
United Nations (UN), and civil society, who operate in the field. I 
managed to arrange interviews with various people within the United 
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (MONUC), the UN Peace Mission in the DRC. In only one of 
these meetings did the interviewee agree to me recording the interview 
and use the information publicly. This interview was with Estelle Nandy 
Ouattara, child protection officer in MOBUC’s Bunia office.12 Each of the 
other interviews conducted with MONUC staff was done on the basis that 
I was not to record the interview, or attribute the information to the 
individual interviewee. This was explained to me on the basis that, 
because of the escalation in armed conflict and the corresponding use 
and recruitment of child soldiers, the information is of strategic relevance 
and may not be published. However, MONUC had been criticised 
extensively during that same period within the media, and this likely 
contributed to the trouble I had to interview MONUC personal ‘on the 
record’. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Interview conducted with Ms Ouattara on 13 November 2008, Bunia, DRC. 
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I did manage to interview various people working within UN entities 
distinct from MONUC. In particular, I interviewed Ms Pernille Ironside, 
who was, at the time, a Child Protection Specialist for the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Eastern DRC.13  At present, Ironside is 
‘UNICEF Child Protection Specialist in Emergencies’, based in New York 
City. She is a great example that one person can make a huge 
contribution even in an organization as vast as the UN.  
 
Access to NGOs was equally difficult during this period, but for other 
reasons. With limited human and financial resources during periods of 
escalation in conflict, specifically if it occurs on an unpredictable level, 
NGOs have to utilize all their resources to their full capacity. As was 
communicated to me frequently, while NGOs fully support research such 
as this study, they simply do not have the time to commit to an interview. 
Of the NGOs, representative of whom I did manage to interview, the best 
data was obtained from Save the Children, Cooperazione Internazionale 
(COOPI), and the Salesian run Don Bosco Ngangi centre for war orphans 
and at-risk children. In this Chapter I particularly rely on interviews 
conducted with Marleen Korthais Altes, of Save the Children, 14  and 
Michel Andretti,15 of COOPI.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Interview conducted with Ms Ironside on 22 November 2008, Goma, DRC. 
14 Interview conducted with Ms Korthais Altes on 14 November 2008, Bunia, DRC. 
15 Interview conducted with Mr Andretti on 24 November 2008, Goma, DRC. 
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2. MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
FOR THE USE AND RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS IN THE 
DRC 
The DRC has been the first state, a national of which, is being tried by the 
ICC. It is also the first state to have prosecuted an individual for the use 
and recruitment of child soldiers in a municipal court. Chapter 4 dealt with 
the legal-technical aspects of international prosecution. The purpose of 
this section is to investigate the role such prosecutions may play in 
preventing child soldiering in the DRC.  
 
i. The International Criminal Court 
As was discussed in Chapter 4, the first case that has proceeded to trial 
before the ICC, Prosecutor v Lubanga, emanates from the DRC.16 More 
specifically, Lubanga was the leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots 
(UPC), as well as the Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo 
(FPLC), the military wing of the UPC and one of the principal armed 
groups involved in the Ituri conflict. As was stated, the conflict in Ituri was 
largely between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. The UPC/FPLC was 
a Hema organisation. It is alleged that Lubanga was the president of the 
UPC and the Commander-in-Chief of the FPLC, since September 2002 
and at least until the end of 2003. He is charged exclusively with the use 
and recruitment of child soldiers, and significantly he is charged with all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, (Warrant of Arrest), ICC-01/04-01/06 (2006) 
(Lubanga Warrant of Arrest); Prosecutor v Lubanga Confirmation of Charges ICC-01/04-
01/06 (2007) (Lubanga Confirmation of Charges decision).  
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three of the substantive crimes regarding the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers, being the enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers. It is 
specifically alleged that under Lubanga’s leadership the FPLC committed 
repeated acts of enlistment and conscription of child soldiers, and also 
repeatedly used children for active participation in armed conflict between 
July 2002 and December 2003.17  
 
The ICC has issued arrest warrants against four more individuals. The 
trial of Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, who are being tried 
jointly, has also commenced.18 They are both, inter alia, charged with the 
use of children younger than fifteen for active participation in hostilities, 
but not their enlistment or conscription.  
 
On 24 February 2003, two armed groups predominantly belonging to the 
Lendu ethnic group, the Front des nationalistes et intégrationnistes (FNI) 
and the Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI), launched an 
indiscriminate attack against the inhabitants of Bogoro, a small village in 
Ituri, the residents of which are mostly of Hema ethnicity.19 Ngudjolo Chui 
was the highest-ranking FNI commander and it is alleged that the mass-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In particular, it is alleged that members of the FPLC repeatedly used children for 
active participation in armed conflict in Libi and Mbau (October 2002), Largu (beginning 
2003), Lipiri and Bogoro (February and March 2003), Bunia (May 2003) and Djugu and 
Mongwalu (June 2003). See ibid, Lubanga Warrant of Arrest. 
18 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07 (2007) 
(Katanga and Ngudjolo Warrant of Arrest); and Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Confirmation of Charges ICC-01/04-01/07 (2008) para 247 (Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Confirmation of Charges decision). 
19  Ibid, Katanga and Ngudjolo Warrant of Arrest, and Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Confirmation of Charges decision.  
	   306	  
atrocities committed during this attack, were committed on his orders. 
Katanga was the ranking commander of the FRPI forces who participated 
in the attack. Had it not been for the attack on Bogoro, it is unlikely that 
arrest warrants for Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui would have been issued. 
They are nevertheless charged with war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed between January 2003 and March 2003, in the 
broader context of the hostilities in Ituri. 
 
The only one of the five people against whom the ICC has issued an 
arrest warrant, in the DRC situation, who is still at large, is Bosco 
Ntaganda.20 Between July 2002 and 8 December 2003 Ntaganda was 
Deputy Chief of General Staff for Military Operations, ranked third in the 
hierarchy of the FPLC (of which Lubanga was the leader at the time). Like 
Lubanga, Ntaganda is charged only with the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers, and he is also charged with all three substantive crimes, the 
enlistment, conscription and use of children for active participation in 
hostilities.  
 
Unlike the above defendants whose alleged criminal conduct was 
committed during 2002 and 2003 in the Ituri region of the DRC, the arrest 
warrant issued against Callixte Mbarushimana relates to crimes 
committed in the Nord Kivu and Sud Kivu provinces between January 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda, ICC‐01/04‐02/06 (2006) (Ntaganda Warrant of Arrest). 
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2009 and 20 August 2010.21 At the time, Mbarushimana was Executive 
Secretary of Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda – 
Forces combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR). Although child soldiers were 
used and recruited extensively in the Kivu provinces during this time, 
Mbarushimana is not charged with the war crime of child soldier use or 
recruitment.  The relevance of including Mbarushimana into this 
discussion is due to the fact that notwithstanding the fact that he is 
Rwandan, he is accused of committing crimes within the DRC and 
secondly, these crimes were perpetrated during my stay in the DRC.  
 
The Court has, as yet, not rendered a single judgment on the merits. As 
such, it is premature to gauge the effect the ICC may have on deterring 
crimes in the DRC. A number of valuable observations can, however, 
already be made. The situation in the DRC was referred to the Court as a 
state referral. 22  This at least shows a level of commitment by the 
Government of the DRC to ensure that justice prevails. There were, very 
likely, political considerations that influenced the decision of the DRC to 
refer the situation to the ICC, and indeed, these political considerations 
may have been decisive. However, it is only the country-situation that is 
referred by the state and not the individuals against whom arrest warrants 
will be issued. This largely mitigates the degree to which the ICC can be 
used by states to combat elements opposing the state.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10 (2010) (Ntaganda Warrant of 
Arrest). 
22 ICC Press Release ‘Prosecutor receives referral of the situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo’ ICC-OTP-20040419-50 (2004). 
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The emphasis the ICC, and in particular the Office of the Prosecutor, has 
placed on the use and recruitment of child soldiers as a war crime is of 
great significance. Of five people charged in the DRC situation, it is 
alleged that four enlisted, conscripted or used children in armed conflict, 
and two of these people are charged solely with the enlistment, 
conscription and use of child soldiers. In a country situation where killings 
and rape occur daily, along with the constant fear of renewed genocide, 
the fact that the prevention of child soldiering has emerged as the crime 
around which the fight against impunity has been rallied indicates that this 
crime is not a lesser crime when compared to other war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.  
 
The arrest warrant for Ntaganda was originally issued under seal, as the 
Court feared that “public knowledge of the proceedings in this case might 
result in Bosco Ntaganda hiding, fleeing, and/or obstructing or 
endangering the investigations or the proceedings of the Court”. 23 
However, the warrant has been unsealed since April 2008.24 The irony is 
that not only does Ntaganda, now a General in the Congolese Army, 
make frequent public appearances without being arrested by either the 
DRC authorities or MONUC/MONUSCO, strong allegations have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 ICC Press Release ‘Warrant of arrest against Bosco Ntaganda unsealed’ ICC-CPI-
20080429-PR310 (2008). 
24 Ibid. 
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made that Ntaganda operates as a senior commander in joint UN/FARDC 
operations.25  
 
While I was in the DRC, and in particularly in Ituri, I was surprised at just 
how aware of the ICC the local people I spoke to were. Indeed, this was 
true to the extent that I soon learned that the reluctance on the part of 
many local people to speak to me at all was due to a fear that I was an 
ICC investigator, and that speaking to me could lead ultimately to being 
prosecuted by the ICC. Yet, this awareness of the ICC and fear of 
prosecution among those who participated in atrocities, may soon be lost 
if those against whom arrest warrants have been issued are free to 
maintain their public personas without fear of arrest and surrender. The 
eventual effect the ICC may have on deterring crime, and entering “an 
era of application” in preventing child soldiering, is dependent on these 
initial years of operation of the Court.  
 
ii. Municipal Courts in the DRC 
During March 2006 the DRC became the first nation, and remains the 
only one to date, to prosecute an individual for the use and recruitment of 
child soldiers.26 The defendant, Major Jean Pierre Biyoyo, an FARDC 
commander, was initially sentenced to death. However, the sentence was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  Human Rights Watch Press Release ‘DR Congo: ICC-Indicted War Criminal 
Implicated in Assassinations of Opponents’ (13 October 2010). 
26 ‘Report of the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’ United Nations Security Council S/2007/391 (28 June 2007) 
(2007 Security Council Report) para 72. 
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later commuted to 5 years imprisonment, and Biyoyo escaped from 
prison three months later. During December 2008 Ironside told me that 
UNICEF, and the UN in general, were aware of Biyoyo’s whereabouts, 
and that he had re-joined his FARDC integrated unit in which he held the 
rank of Major. Yet, the authorities have not attempted to re-arrest this 
convicted escapee. The absurdity of this situation was further 
exacerbated by the promotion of Biyoyo, during 2010, to Colonel in the 
FARDC.27  
 
The UN Special Representative to the Secretary General on Children and 
Armed Conflict (SRSG), Ms Radhika Coomaraswamy specifically raised 
the issue of Colonel Biyoyo with the government during her country visits 
to the DRC during March 2007 and April 2009. 28  The authorities 
nevertheless still failed to take action. It thus appears that the 
Government of the DRC is motivated more by the positive appearance 
created by the ratification and promulgation of conventions and laws 
prohibiting the use and recruitment of child soldiers than by any genuine 
political will to end impunity and eradicate child soldiering.  
 
As the party most responsible for protecting children in the DRC, the 
National Government is the primary destination for change. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Interview conducted with Ms Ironside on 22 November 2008, Goma, DRC. 
28 Coomaraswamy, R. ‘Press Conference by Special Representative for Children and 
Armed Conflict’ UN Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New 
York (16 March 2007); Mission Report ‘Visit of the Special Representative for Children 
and Armed Conflict to The Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (14-21 April 2009) 7. 
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cornerstone of any national government’s response to child rights is the 
enactment of targeted legislation. A more positive development was the 
coming into force of the DRC Child Protection Code (2009). 29  The 
Secretary-General’s annual reports, filed pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1612, have specifically encouraged this development.30 The 
2008 report cited three municipal prosecutions related to the use and 
recruitment of children. 31  The defendants include Mai Mai Colonel 
Engangela (aka Colonel 106);32 FARDC Major Bwasolo Misaba;33 and 
the notorious Mai Mai commander Kyungu Mutanga (aka Gedeon). 
Gedeon is inter alia charged with the recruitment of at least 300 
children.34 The Secretary-General has previously identified two of these 
individuals as violating parties.35 The prosecution of Gedeon came in the 
wake of strong recommendations to that effect made by the Security 
Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 ‘Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’ Fiftieth Session of the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
CRC/C/COD/CO/2 (January 2009) para 3. 
30  ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the DRC’ 
S/2006/389 (13 June 2006) (2006 Secretary-General DRC Report) para 7 & 45; ‘Report 
of the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo’ S/2007/391 (28 June 2007) (2007 Secretary-General DRC Report) para 60. 
31 ‘Report of the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’ S/2008/693 (10 November 2008) (2008 Secretary-General DRC 
Report) para 77, 79 & 80. 
32 Colonel Engangela (AKA Colonel 106) has been charged with insurrection, with 
further evidence being collected to sustain charges of forced recruitment of children 
under 15, abduction and illegal detention. Colonel Engangela (AKA Colonel 106) was 
identified as Colonel Mabolongo (AKA Colonel 106), in 2007 Secretary-General DRC 
Report, note 30 above para 30. 
33 Major Bwasolo Misaba was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment for the recruitment of 
three children aged between 10-14.  
34 Kyungu Mutanga (aka Gedeon) is inter alia charged with the war crime of the military 
recruitment or use of children.  
35 Colonel Engangela (AKA Colonel 106) was identified as Colonel Mabolongo (AKA 
Colonel 106) in the 2007 Secretary-General DRC Report, note 30 above, para 38; 
Gedeon was identified as a child soldier recruitment violator in the 2007 Secretary-
General DRC Report, note 30 above, para 58 & 72.  
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Unfortunately, it appears that both within the context of international and 
municipal prosecutions, Government authorities in the DRC are inclined 
to protect individuals from prosecution and punishment where it serves 
their own interests. This is indicative of a weak rule of law, which renders 
the utilization of municipal machinery to prevent child soldiering less likely 
to succeed. It has previously been argued that the ICC operates on a 
basis of selective prosecution. As such, the necessary capacity to bring a 
majority of violating parties to justice should come from municipal courts 
and legal systems.36 This approach, however, is unlikely to succeed 
where the rule of law in the relevant state is very weak. On a more 
positive note, on 17 February 2011, the Superior Council of Judiciary of 
the DRC announced the nomination of 12 judges, assigned to a new 
tribunal to address cases related to children.37 However, it remains to be 
seen whether this tribunal would attain any success, notwithstanding the 
weak rule of law in the DRC and the numerous further systemic problems 
that render the protection that the law is supposed to offer children, 
ineffective.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See Chapter 4. 
37 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo S/2011/298 (12 May 2011) (Second 
Secretary-General MONUSCO Report) para 49. 
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3. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PREVENTION OF CHILD 
SOLDIERING IN THE DRC 
Virtually every relevant entity that forms part of the UN has engaged with 
the armed conflicts in the DRC. On the child soldier prevention front, the 
day-to-day activities of the UN peace mission in the DRC, the United 
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (MONUSCO), relates to child soldier prevention on many 
levels. Additionally, the SRSG on Children and Armed Conflict has 
consistently engaged with child soldiering in the DRC since the first 
SRSG was appointed during 1998. So too, has the Security Council 
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism, and as was noted in the previous 
section, the recommendations of this mechanism appear to have already 
shown a margin of success. Finally, in any country-situation such as the 
DRC, where there are thousands of child soldiers, and thousands more 
have recently been demobilized, a proper Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration (DDR) programme is essential for various reasons. 
From a child soldier prevention point of view, proper DDR is one of the 
primary ways in which to prevent the re-enlistment of children. This 
problem is acute in a situation like the DRC, where the DDR process 
occurs during ongoing hostilities. Accordingly, DDR activities in the DRC 
are also specifically assessed in this section.  
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i. Engagement by the UN Peace Mission in the DRC and UNICEF 
with Child Soldier Prevention 
The UN peace mission in the DRC was formerly known as the United 
Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). 
However, on 1 July 2010, the mission was renamed the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUSCO). This was done “in view of the new phase that has 
been reached in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”.38 The mandate 
of MONUSCO provides expressly that it must:  
 
Work closely with the Government to ensure the implementation of its 
commitments to address serious violations against children, in particular 
the finalization of the Action Plan to release children present in the 
FARDC and to prevent further recruitment, with the support of the 
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism.39 
 
The reason for discussing MONUSCO and UNICEF in the same section 
is that MONUSCO does not work with children directly, nor does it ever 
take charge of children. Instead, after relevant information is gathered 
within MONUSCO it is shared with implementing partners that are better 
able to work with children directly. Most notably, these partners include 
UNICEF, although various NGOs that operate autonomously from the UN 
System also partner with MONUSCO in this regard.  
 
In as far as child soldiers are concerned, the primary roles of the Child 
Protection Section are to gather and analyse data on instances of child 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Security Council Resolution 1925 of 28 May 2010, para 1. 
39 Ibid, para 12(e). 
	   315	  
soldiering; and advocate for and educate people on the end of the military 
use and recruitment of children and the criminalization of such use and 
recruitment. The Child Protection Section’s function as focal point for the 
sharing of information related to child soldier prevention in the DRC 
should not be underestimated. The lack of inter-agency and inter-
organizational coordination is one of the major challenges to the 
effectiveness of many humanitarian programmes. When I interviewed 
Marleen Korthais Altes, of Save the Children in Bunia, Ituri, one of the 
primary concerns she raised regarding the prevention of child soldiering 
in the DRC, was that there is no inter-agency database on child 
soldiering.40 This, she said, has two very negative effects. First, some 
work is duplicated in an environment where human resources are already 
over-extended. Second, in some instances a specific entity might be able 
to act on a situation which they are not aware of. Estelle Nandy Ouattara, 
Child Protection Officer in the Bunia MONUC office confirmed to me that 
no such inter-agency database exists.41  
 
MONUSCO boasts the largest Child Protection Section in any 
peacekeeping mission. This includes specialized staff based in eastern 
DRC, Province Orientale and in the mission’s Head Quarters in Kinshasa. 
In addition, there are international and national staff members who are 
child protection officers based in eight field offices: Goma, Beni, Bukavu, 
Uvira, Dungu, Bunia, Kisangani and Kalemie. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Interview conducted with Ms Korthais Altes on 14 November 2008, Bunia, DRC. 
41 Interview conducted with Ms Ouattara on 13 November 2008, Bunia, DRC. 
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It was reported that during 2010 MONUSCO/MONUC facilitated the 
release of 2006 children from armed groups.42 This figure includes 393 
children who were separated from FARDC units. Concern was, however, 
raised regarding the higher incidence of the re-recruitment of former child 
soldiers, specifically by integrated former CNDP units, and particularly in 
the Masisi territory.43 Between January 2011 and the beginning of May 
2011, the release of a further 376 children was documented by 
MONUSCO.44  
 
UNICEF’s approach in advocating for the protection of children’s rights, 
which is their mandate, is not issue-based, and aims not to categorise 
children.45 Furthermore, UNICEF has an exceedingly strong emphasis on 
inspiring a collective response to issues on its agenda and therefore 
places heavy reliance on partners on the implementation level: “UNICEF 
is expected to take a leadership role on child protection issues. This gives 
UNICEF a high degree of responsibility to act as an advocate, convener 
and partner, encouraging and not overshadowing the contributions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo S/2011/20 (17 January 2011) (First 
Secretary-General MONUSCO Report) para 53. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Second Secretary-General MONUSCO Report, note 37 above, para 49. 
45 ‘UNICEF Child Protection Strategy’ E/ICEF/2008/5/Rev.1 (3-5 June 2008) paras 37 & 
55. 
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others.”46 Advocacy and education accordingly play a central role in their 
initiatives.  
 
The five key “focus areas” identified by UNICEF in order to meet its 
mandate are child survival and development; basic education and gender 
equality; HIV/AIDS and children; child protection; and policy advocacy 
and partnerships. The two focus areas most directly relevant to child 
soldiering are child protection; and policy advocacy and partnerships, with 
basic education playing an indirect but significant role.  
 
UNICEF’s premise that “successful child protection begins with 
prevention” signifies their philosophy that sustainable social change can 
only be achieved if a grassroots environment for the child can be 
established with sufficient community engagement and support and 
adequate social networks.47 In this regard the importance of education is 
specifically recognized.48  
 
In the DRC UNICEF is instrumental in the implementation of most of the 
significant initiatives related to children’s protection from military use and 
recruitment, including the UN Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism, as 
well as the DDR programme in its relation to children. UNICEF 
approaches its mandate broadly and sees threats to child rights as all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46  Ibid, para 54; ‘Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies’ UNICEF 
<www.unicef.org> (last accessed on 28 September 2011) 3. 
47 UNICEF Child Protection Strategy, note 45 above, 56.  
48 Ibid, paras 3 & 7.  
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being interlinked. Correspondingly, they avoid categorising children, by 
for example applying the label ‘child soldier’. 49  With their resultant 
approach largely being focused on inspiring a collective response to 
issues on its agenda it is impossible to quantify their actual successes on 
the ground. However, in the DRC, besides making huge headway in other 
sectors of child protection,50 UNICEF, together with their partners, had 
begun the process of disarming and reintegrating 4 000 child soldiers 
during 2007.51  
 
With an approved budget of more than one billion, four hundred thousand 
US Dollars for the period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 MONUSCO can do 
more on the child protection front.52 From a political and mandate point of 
view it will be difficult for MONUSCO to directly enforce child soldier 
prohibitive norms. The same is true, to a lesser extent, of taking charge of 
children directly. However, MONUSCO can significantly increase training 
to grass-roots NGOs on which they rely to take charge of children. This is 
specifically true regarding the reintegration phase of the DDR process 
regarding children. During my fieldwork I observed a clear lack of skills 
regarding the reintegration and social/psychological recovery of former 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Interview conducted with Ms Ironside on 22 November 2008, Goma, DRC. 
50 For example, UNICEF together with their partners have provided shelter to 180,000 
families affected by armed conflict and/or natural disasters; the provision of safe water 
has been extended to 500 000 people by 2007; 86 therapeutic feeding centres servicing 
more than 45,000 children. 
51  UNICEF West and Central Africa Office, DRC country profile 
<http://www.unicef.org/wcaro/Countries_1749.html> (last accessed on 28 September 
2011). 
52 ‘Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2011 to 
30 June 2012’ A/C.5/65/19 (22 July 2011). 
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child combatants in centres where children are housed. Indeed, in an 
interview I conducted with a senior representative from COOPI, in Bunia, 
I was told that if better communication was not achieved between the 
civilian/humanitarian sector of MONUC (as it then was) and the military 
sector, limited results would be achieved in preventing child soldiering.53 
As the civilian/humanitarian sector is responsible for transmitting the 
correct information to partners, however, it is the military sector that 
operates in the field where they observe the presence of children with 
armed groups. Secondly, and more importantly, in delegating 
responsibility for matters such as taking charge of children, MONUC does 
not exercise proper control and safeguards to ensure that the 
organization is capable of delivering what is required. Indeed, I was told 
that there were many instances in which MONUC had delegated such 
responsibility to organizations that exist on paper only.  
 
NGOs such as the Don Bosco Ngangi centre for war orphans and at-risk 
children, in Goma, are doing remarkable work.54 The centre currently 
houses 3 500 war orphans, which includes a programme for the 
reintegration of former child soldiers and a further 1 500 refugees. The 
centre also runs a medical centre which cared for 19 000 thousand 
patients during 2009, and has recently expanded their capabilities and 
are now able to do electrocardiograms and basic x-rays. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Interview conducted with Mr Andretti on 24 November 2008, Goma, DRC. 
54  See Project Congo <http://www.projectcongo.org/donboscongangi.html> (last 
accessed on 28 September 2011). I also visited the Don Bosco Ngangi centre numerous 
times during my stay in Goma.  
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Nevertheless, the demand for such facilities far exceeds their 
availability. Also, the geographical location of such facilities 
determines whether they are available to specific children in need. 
The effect is that there are many grass-roots NGOs that take 
charge of children after their demobilization in desperate need of 
further skills development regarding the reintegration and 
social/psychological recovery of former child combatants. MONUSCO is 
well placed, together with other UN agencies and it funds UNICEF, in 
particular, to contribute to this gap.  
 
ii. The Special Representative to the Secretary-General on Children 
and Armed Conflict  
The SRSG’s first field-visit to the DRC took place during February 1999,55 
a mere sixteen months after the first SRSG was appointed. Most recently, 
the SRSG visited the DRC during April 2009.56  
 
Most of the initial head-way made by the SRSG came in the form of 
entering into dialogue with violating parties and in so doing obtaining 
concrete commitments to cease the use and recruitment of child soldiers. 
As early as 1999 the SRSG had obtained an undertaking from the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) in the DRC to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  ‘Protection of children affected by armed conflict Note by the Secretary-General’ 
A/54/430 (1 October 1999) para 93-94. 
56 ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict’ A/64/254 (6 August 2009) para 60. 
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demobilize the child soldiers within its ranks. Of the thirty-six 
commitments obtained by the SRSG during his initial three year mandate 
only nine were met. Neither the RCD nor any other group in the DRC falls 
within this groups of nine complying groups.57  A further tactic much 
utilized by the SRSG is naming and shaming violators. This tactic’s merit 
lies in negating armed groups aspirations to be seen as legitimate by 
exposing their unacceptable behaviour and methods. In her latest annual 
report, the SRSG listed seven violating parties within the DRC. 58 
Furthermore, the SRSG has placed a lot of emphasis on global advocacy; 
supporting and facilitating dialogue between UN actors and parties to the 
relevant conflict; advocating for the implementation of concrete 
preventative measures; eliciting commitments to end violations by 
violating parties; facilitating the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism; 
and advocating for the end of impunity in pursuit of fulfilling her mandate.  
 
The DRC is one of only a few situations that have remained on the 
agenda of the SRSG since the creation of the office. In undertaking 
country visits the role of the SRSG can best be described as inspiring. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Happold, M. Child Soldiers in International Law (2005) 40-41.  
58 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Children and Armed Conflict’ A/65/820–S/2011/250 
(23 April 2011) Annex 1. Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo 
(FARDC); Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR); Front des 
nationalistes et integrationalistes (FNI); Front de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI); 
Mai-Mai groups in North and South Kivu, Maniema and Katanga who have not 
integrated into FARDC; Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais (MRC); and Non-
integrated FARDC brigades loyal to rebel leader Laurent Nkunda. ‘Annual report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 
Radhika Coomaraswamy’ A/HRC/9/3 (27 June 2008) Annex 1. 
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facilitating and supporting measures aimed at the protection of children 
during armed conflict: 
 
It is important to stress that such visits are carried out to support the 
advocacy and programmatic work of operational partners on the ground, 
to raise the level of global awareness about their work, to help open 
further space for their protection dialogue and, where appropriate, to assist 
operational partners in unblocking political impasses to further advance 
protection agendas.59 
 
During the country visit the SRSG undertook to the DRC during 2007, she 
managed to obtain the following commitments from the DRC authorities:  
 
(a)  To take measures, in consultation with the United Nations, to tackle 
the issues of child recruitment and sexual violence; 
(b)  To take all necessary measures to re-arrest commander Biyoyo; 
(c)  To take effective action to fight impunity of armed groups, such as 
those led by Laurent Nkunda and the Forces démocratiques de 
libération du Rwanda; 
(d)  To take steps, in consultation with the United Nations, to fight 
impunity.60 
 
Yet, during 2011, the SRSG reported that the Government of the DRC:  
 
… has not been forthcoming in engaging with the United Nations on an 
action plan to end the recruitment and use of children by the Forces 
armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), despite 
advocacy by child protection actors, including the country task force on 
monitoring and reporting, over the last several years. While efforts have 
been ongoing to professionalize FARDC, these efforts have not 
consistently involved a formal process to remove all children from FARDC 
units. Many children continue to be recruited and remain associated with 
FARDC units, particularly within former Congrès national pour la défense 
du peuple (CNDP) units. Many children released in 2010 reported that they 
had been recruited several times, even after family reunification. This 
reaffirms the urgent need for a political commitment at the highest levels of 
the Government in order to move forward on the action plan and ensure its 
coherence with ongoing security sector reform efforts. In a positive move, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59  ‘Promotion and protection of the rights of children: Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict’ A/62/228 (13 
August 2007) (2007 SRSG General Assembly Report) para 26. 
60 Ibid, para 43. 
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new military directives were issued by the “Amani Leo” chain of command 
ordering the release of all children remaining in FARDC units. 
 
As stated previously, during my interview with SRSG Coomaraswamy, 
she was resolute in her view that the proper approach to preventing child 
soldiering is the direct approach, as opposed to more broad-based 
approaches that rely on addressing deeper systemic problems such as 
extreme poverty, and indeed, the existence of armed conflict.61 Direct 
engagement with violating parties in countries such as the DRC is the 
activity in which the SRSG engage most directly with child soldier 
prevention.  
 
On the positive front, while the FARDC is not yet ‘child free’, and although 
there was a significant increase in child use and recruitment during late 
2008, the mass and systematic recruitment of children by the 
Government Forces has ceased. Less success has been achieved in 
engaging with non-state entities. As Awich Pollar told me, such groups 
often profess not to use child soldiers whatsoever. 62  Where they 
acknowledge that there are children among their ranks, they are quick to 
give undertakings to demobilise these children, and cease the use and 
recruitment of child soldiers, but slow to comply with their undertakings.  
 
The SRSG has done a remarkable job in engaging with such groups and 
securing such commitments. However, where these groups persistently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See Chapter 5.  
62 I Interviewed Mr Pollar on 1 February 2011 in Geneva, Switzerland. 
	   324	  
fail to comply with their obligations, showing a blatant disregard for 
international law, the SRSG can do little more than increase advocacy on 
the matter and name and shame these parties in the Secretary-General’s 
annual report on children in armed conflict to the Security Council, which 
is prepared by the SRSG. This in itself has proven to be not as effective 
as was initially hoped. For example, to date the Secretary-General has 
appended lists of violating parties to seven of his annual reports to the 
Security Council. Of those parties included in the 2011 report, five have 
been included consistently in the last four reports, spanning a five-year 
period.  
 
A more forceful approach is required in order to induce compliance, not 
only with concrete commitments that have been made by these violating 
parties, but more importantly with international and municipal law. As was 
suggested in Chapter 5, the Security Council should take stronger action 
against such groups. Resolution 1332, adopted under the Chapter VII 
powers of the Security Council was a welcome development. 63  This 
resolution called for “an effective end to the recruitment, training and use 
of children”.64 However, it did not provide for any form of sanction, or 
targeted action, against persistent violators. This is, in my view, a 
necessary component to a concerted effort to enter “an era of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Security Council Resolution 1332 of 14 December 2000. See generally Surhone, LM., 
Tennoe, MT. & Henssonow, SF. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1332 
(2011). 
64 Resolution 1332 Ibid, para 10. Arts, K. International criminal accountability and the 
rights of children (2006) 44, states that 165 children were returned to UNICEF as a 
result of this resolution.  
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application”. Although the SRSG is the focal point within the UN on 
children in armed conflict, her ability to force compliance is proportional to 
the strength of the mandate she has been afforded. Like any other 
mechanism that contributes to the prevention of child soldiering, her office 
is also dependent on other mechanisms, in order to create a web of 
protection.  
 
iii. The Security Council Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism  
On 26 July 2005 the Security Council passed a Resolution calling for the 
creation of a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children and 
Armed Conflict (MRM).65 The same Resolution also called for the creation 
of a Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict 
(Working Group).66 The MRM focuses on six grave violations of child 
rights, one of which is recruiting or using child soldiers.67 No new entities 
were established in the creation of the MRM; instead several key 
institutions were included, drawing from their respective strengths and 
knowledge bases. Ultimately, the MRM functions on three distinct levels: 
“information-gathering, coordination and action at the country level; 
coordination, scrutiny and integration of information and preparation of 
reports at the Headquarters level; and concrete actions to ensure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Article 3 of UN Security Council Resolution 1612 of 26 July 2005. 
66 Ibid. 
67  ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict’ A/59/695–
S/2005/72 (9 February 2005) (2005 Security Council Report) para 68. 
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compliance, to be taken particularly by bodies that constitute ‘destinations 
for action’”.68  
 
At the base of the activities of the MRM within any given country lies the 
Country Task Force. During 2005 seven countries were selected as pilot 
countries in which to implement the MRM. There are groups who 
persistently violate international law by using or recruiting child soldiers in 
each of these countries, and the DRC was included.69 The DRC country 
taskforce was set up the following year and the activities of the MRM 
began. The taskforce is jointly chaired by the Country Representative of 
UNICEF and the Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary-General 
for DRC, 70  and its membership consists of MONUSCO, UNICEF, 
UNHCR, ILO, Save the Children UK and CARE.71 Assessing the role and 
success of the MRM in the DRC one needs to focus specifically on the 
three levels on which the MRM functions. The three levels of operation of 
the MRM are sequenced in such a way that the succeeding level is 
dependent on its preceding level.  Accordingly, only after information 
gathering can the coordination of information and preparation of reports 
occur, and only after this can concrete action be taken.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Ibid, para 67 
69 Ibid, annex 1 and 2, These countries included Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Sudan from Annex I and Nepal and Sri Lanka from 
Annex II. Furthermore, subsequently MRM Taskforces have also been set up in Chad, 
Myanmar, Philippines, and Uganda. 
70 This is in conformity with ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Children and armed 
conflict’ A/59/695–S/2005/72 (9 February 2005) para 83.  
71 ‘Getting it Done and Doing it Right: Implementing the Monitoring and Reporting 
Mechanism on Children and Armed Conflict in the DRC’ Watch List on Children and 
Armed Conflict (January 2008) 3.  
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With regard to “information-gathering, coordination and action at the 
country level”, the more parties involved, the more information can be 
collected and the better the verification of such information. However, 
proper data management is imperative. UN entities operating in the DRC, 
in particular MONUC and UNICEF have collaborated well in their efforts 
to contribute to the taskforce.72 However, given the vastness of the DRC, 
it is not possible for the UN to act in isolation. The taskforce has had 
some difficulty in getting NGOs involved.73  
 
The challenges facing this level do not end with collecting data. Data 
management and coordination between different agencies and 
organizations is a key concern. At the time that I conducted fieldwork in 
the DRC, information sharing between different agencies and 
organizations and even different sections within MONUC was handled on 
an ad hoc basis and dependent on informal agreements between staff 
members from the various organization, agency or section. As was stated 
above, both Marleen Korthais Altes, of the Save the Children in Bunia,74 
and Estelle Nandy Ouattara, Child Protection Officer in the Bunia 
MONUC office, 75  confirmed to me that at that time, there was no 
centralised data-base on the incidence of child recruitment in the DRC. It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 The 1612 Reports Officer is a UNICEF staff member seconded to MONUC thus 
facilitating better inter-agency coordination, ibid, 4.  
73 Ibid, 4-7.  
74 Interview conducted with Ms Korthais Altes on 14 November 2008, Bunia, DRC. 
75 Interview conducted with Ms Ouattara on 13 November 2008, Bunia, DRC. 
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seems that the country task force has, to a significant extent, filled this 
gap. Other initiatives such as the creation of Child Protection Working 
Groups in Goma, Bukavu and Bunia have created a greater dimension of 
inter- and intra-agency information sharing, with members from any 
interested UN agencies and international or national NGOs being 
permitted to join.76 These working groups exist specifically to facilitate 
information exchange as envisaged by Security Council Resolution 1612. 
Such initiatives mitigate the challenges posed by the fact that there is a 
plethora of data collecting entities in the DRC operating within the same 
areas without knowing the operational details of each other. These 
include the Kinshasa level protection cluster; the provincial protection 
clusters; the protection monitoring project; the Humanitarian Advocacy 
Group; the Joint-Initiative on Sexual Violence; and so forth. The DRC 
taskforce’s strength lies in these various entities’ ability to collect, compile 
and report on the six grave violations to the taskforce.77 However, to reap 
these benefits, the taskforce needs to better facilitate coordination 
between these data collection entities. When these entities act blind in as 
far as other agencies are concerned, duplication of data becomes a 
bigger issue, as does oversights. In the positive front, however, it appears 
that the DRC country task force has conducted themselves well in this 
role.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 2008 Secretary-General DRC Report, note 31 above, para 63. 
77 2005 Security Council Report, note 67 above, para 79. 
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The taskforce has relied heavily on MONUC/MONUSCO’s child 
protection section to report instances of grave violations as an 
intermediary between the taskforce and the relevant party who reported 
on the violation to MONUC. This state of affairs is not ideal; specifically 
with regard to sustainability should MONUSCO’s force be further 
reduced, in line with the changing circumstances in the DRC. 78 
Nevertheless, actionable information has been collected and handed up 
to the coordination level.  
 
As stated, the second level, the “coordination, scrutiny and integration of 
information and preparation of reports at the Headquarters level”, is 
dependent on the success of country level information gathering. This 
level is the least problematic of the three and deserves little discussion in 
the context of the DRC case study, as the functions performed on this 
level are not severely affected by the specific country relevant to the 
taskforce handing up the information. The findings of the latest report 
compiled by the DRC country task force that was submitted by the 
Secretary-General to the Security Council during 2010 highlights that 
there has been a noticeable increase in the grave violations being 
committed against children in the context of armed conflict.79 In total, the 
MRM documented 1 593 cases of child recruitment. Of this number, the 
FARDC was allegedly responsible for forty-two percent of cases; the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Ibid, para 81. 
79 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’ S/2010/369 (9 July 2010) (2010 Secretary-General DRC Report) 
para 15.  
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various Mai Mai groups accounted for twenty-six percent; the PARECO 
for sixteen percent; and lastly, the CNDP was responsible for ten percent 
of cases.80  Ninety-two percent of these cases of recruitment took place 
in the Kivu provinces.81 Finally a significant increase in the abduction of 
children for purposes of using them in armed conflict was emphasised. 
The Lord’s Resistance Army was identified as the primary culprit.82 
 
The final level, “concrete actions to ensure compliance, to be taken 
particularly by bodies that constitute ‘destinations for action’” falls within 
the ambit of the Security Council and its Working Group. The Working 
Group is tasked primarily with reviewing the reports of the MRM.83 
Reporting on these grave violations of child rights is the vehicle used by 
the MRM to bring such violations to the attention of ‘destinations for 
action’, thus the reports are the triggers for action. The main destinations 
for action are national governments, the Security Council, the General 
Assembly, the International Criminal Court, the Human Rights 
Commission; regional organizations; NGOs; and civil society. 84  The 
measure for success of the MRM does not lie in the report, but rather 
what comes of the report.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ibid, para 17. 
81 Ibid, para 22. 
82 Ibid, para 39-41. 
83 Article 8, Security Council Resolution 1612.  
84 2005 Security Council Report, note 67 above para 107. 
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The Security Council has called upon its Working Group on Children and 
Armed Conflict to make recommendations to the Council on the 
promotion and protection of the rights of children affected by armed 
conflict. 85  The Working Group, as primary conduit of information 
emanating from the Secretary-General’s country reports have performed 
efficiently in making recommendations on the basis of the country reports 
it reviews. As was stated earlier, the prosecution of Mai Mai commander 
Gedeon, for the use and recruitment of child soldiers in a municipal DRC 
court, came in the wake of strong recommendations to that effect made 
by the Working Group.  
 
By not making concrete actionable and targeted suggestions in the 
Resolution 1612 Secretary-General’s reports, a lot of the MRM’s potential 
is lost. The Working Group itself has also expressed this view.86 For 
example, although various parties have for years failed to observe their 
obligations in international law to not use or recruit child soldiers, the 
recommendations made in the latest report on the DRC submitted by the 
Secretary-General are limited to calls on the parties to comply with their 
obligations themselves. Targeted action is required against such violating 
parties; the recommendations to the Security Council should express the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Article 8(a), Security Council Resolution 1612. 
86 ‘Letter dated 8 September 2006 from the Permanent Representative of France to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’ S/2006/724 (11 
September 2006). 
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need for such action.87 Very significantly in this regard, in his latest report 
to the Security Council, dated 23 April 2011, the Secretary-General 
reported that:  
 
The Security Council Committee established … concerning the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo for the first time invited my Special 
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict to brief the Committee 
in May 2010. As a result, several individuals were included on the 
Committee’s list of individuals and entities against whom targeted 
measures will be imposed on the basis of verified information regarding, 
inter alia, their recruitment and use of children. Further, on 2 December, 
the Security Council imposed sanctions on Forces armées de la 
République démocratique du Congo Colonel Innocent Zimurinda for 
grave violations against children, including the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers, the killing and maiming of children, sexual violations and 
denial of humanitarian access.88 
  
This is a significant step, which is in accordance with the conclusions 
reached in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the development of the central 
monitoring and reporting database, as well as the country databases 
significantly adds to the data required to address child soldiering 
effectively.  
 
iv. The Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration of Child 
Soldiers in the DRC  
The DDR programme has a dual role in child soldier prevention. Firstly, it 
functions as a short-term preventative strategy in that children associated 
with fighting forces are removed from such. Secondly, it is a long-term 
preventative strategy in light of the role that DDR plays in conflict 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 This is consistent with the argument I presented in relation to the Security Council in 
Chapter 5.  
88  ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict’ A/65/820–
S/2011/250 (23 April 2011) (2011 Security Council Report) para 205. 
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reduction and prevention. The ‘National Program for Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration’ (PNDDR) was preceded by the 
regional ‘Ituri Disarmament and Community Reinsertion Program’ (DCR). 
Before the national programme was initiated, DDR activities, in relation to 
children, were carried out by UNICEF and NGOs with the assistance of 
MONUC’s Child Protection Section.89 The national programme is not a 
UN initiative, but was rather overseen by CONADER, a DRC state 
institution, funded by the World Bank and with assistance from the UN 
and other organizations. 90  CONADER was dissolved by presidential 
decree on 14 July 2007 and replaced with UEPNDDR.91 In the DRC the 
DDR programme does not exist independently. Because the peace 
process entails a reform of the national military, all combatants from 
opposing armed groups are not reintegrated into civilian life. Many are 
debriefed, retrained and integrated into mixed brigades of the reformed 
FARDC. This process is known as bressage. Thus there is a crucial point 
in the process where it is decided which route a specific candidate will 
follow. In the case of children that route will always be DDR.92 Child DDR 
ultimately entails that a given child should be released from the fighting 
forces, reunited with her or his family and ultimately reintegrated into her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 ‘Global Report on Child Soldiers’ The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 
(2008) at p 109. 
90 Commission nationale pour la démobilisation et la reinsertion.  
91  Unité d’exécution du programme national de désarmement, démobilisation et 
reinsertion. 
92 In terms of the Joint Operations plan children below 18 are automatically vetted out of 
the armed forces and are thus demobilized. 
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or his home community.93 During the recent past, there have been many 
different DDR initiatives with involvement from grassroots NGOs to UN 
agencies and with regard to children, UNICEF has played a most 
prominent role. However, a lack of inter-agency and inter-organizational 
coordination has resulted in little success being attained by these 
programmes.94 
 
In the case of foreign nationals, both adults and children, they are 
repatriated to their home countries after demobilisation and disarmament. 
There is a significant number of foreign child combatants in the DRC, with 
the majority coming from Uganda, The Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and the 
Central African Republic. The DDR of foreign nationals falls outside of the 
scope of the national DDR programme. MONUC oversees the DDR of 
foreign nationals under its Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, 
Reintegration and Resettlement programme (DDRRR).  
 
Since its inception, the DDR process has been plagued by delays and 
inadequate service provision.95 It was originally planned to be finalised by 
the time the national elections occurred on 30 July 2006.96 Initially the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93  ‘Children at War: Creating hope for their future’ Amnesty International AFR 
62/017/2006 (October 2006) 8. 
94 Knight, M. & Özerdem, A. ‘Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace’ Volume 41, 
Number 4 Journal of Peace Research (2004) 502. 
95 Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Quarterly Progress Report: 
DRC (July-September 2005) 3 & 5.  
96 Children at War: Creating hope for their future, note 93 above, 8. 
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total number of soldiers were put at between 300 000 and 330 000;97 with 
150 000 soldiers in need of demobilisation. 30 000 of this figure 
represented children.98 By the end of June 2006, CONADER’s figures 
suggested that 72 737 adults and 19 054 children had been 
demobilised.99 However, these figures do little to inform whether any real 
success had been attained. On the one hand it is unclear whether the 
150 000 figure was anywhere near accurate. In fact, most suggest it was 
inflated. There are also doubts about CONADER’s accuracy in their 
figures regarding the numbers that have been taken into the DDR 
programme. Finally, of the people who passed through the DDR 
programme it is unclear how many lied about being former combatants 
and also how many re-joined armed groups after having gone through 
DDR.  
 
There is a real incentive for people to join the DDR programme who 
either have no real intention to demobilize or who lie about ever having 
been combatants to benefit from the programme. The DDR programme 
provides the participant with an initial $US110 payment, the filet de 
sécurite (security net); a further $US 25 per month stipend for a one year 
period; and vocational training or other assistance in creating a livelihood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 This was the figure put forward by the signatories to the 2002 peace process. It 
should be kept in mind that at that time parties to the process were still at war with each 
other as such it is believed that these figures were inflated to create a stronger 
perception of the armed group’s military strength.  
98 Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Quarterly Progress Report 
DRC (April-June 2006). 
99 Ibid. 
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for the person within civilian life.100 However, after acting as an incentive 
to even those in no need of DDR, these payments have often not been 
made and further no vocational training has been provided to many 
people in the DDR programme;101 adding to the disillusionment of former 
soldiers, many of whom were opposed to the government in their past 
military endeavours. On 7 July 2006 CONADER announced the cessation 
of disarmament and demobilization phases to the programme, due to lack 
of funds. The remaining funds were allocated to the reintegration phase, 
leaving thousands of children behind who are in need of demobilization.  
 
It goes without saying that the DDR of children necessarily implies unique 
approaches and more sensitive methods to ultimately attain the 
successful reintegration of a given child. To this end, the Cadre 
Opérationnel pour les Enfants Associés aux Forces et Groupes Armés 
(Operational Framework for the DDR of Children) was drafted by an inter-
agency group coordinated by UNICEF.102  This operational framework 
provided CONADER with guidelines to the proper DDR of children.  
 
In terms of the Operational Framework, the first phase of both DDR and 
army integration is for commanders to take their subordinates to military 
regroupment centres. This initial shared phase is known as tronc 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100  ‘DRC: DDR and Reform of the Army’ Amnesty International AFR 62/001/2007 
(January 2007) 18.  
101 Ibid. 
102  This group further consisted of representatives of MONUC, ministries of the 
Transitional Government and NGO experts.  
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commun. However, because children are never offered direct cash 
payments they frequently lie about their age and attempt to be absorbed 
into the adult DDR programme. At these regroupment centres 
participants are disarmed, and those undergoing DDR are moved to 
CONADER/UEPNDDR orientation centres. Upon arrival those under 18 
are registered as children, they are housed separately from adults and 
are supposed to only spend a maximum of 48 hours at these centres.103 
Thereafter, they are entrusted to an accredited NGO who is charged with 
their well-being. Children are then taken to transitional care structures run 
by the given NGO. Generally children will spend 3 months at such 
structures whereafter they are reunited with their families if possible. In 
terms of the operational framework, children below the age of 15 are 
provided with basic education and those older than 15 with vocational 
training for one year.104  
 
To a large extent DDR programmes are outcome-based, and 
CONADER’s objectives in this regard are to “remove all children from 
armed forces and groups; facilitate children’s return to civilian life through 
reinsertion programmes; reinforce sustainable conditions for the 
protection of children through community ownership of protection 
mechanisms; develop specific strategies to reintegrate girls associated 
with armed forces and groups and prevent violations of children’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Children at War: Creating hope for their future, note 93 above, 21. 
104 For a full assessment of the child DDR process in the DRC see ibid. 
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rights.” 105  In order to succeed in these objectives, the Operational 
Framework necessitates CONADER to identify children to be 
demobilized; verify their histories; document, research and ultimately 
reunite these children with their families; reintegrate them with their 
families and communities; and finally, monitor the children’s situations.106 
Upon completion of the DDR process, children are issued demobilization 
certificates, proving their demobilisation and age. This practice has been 
noted as a success with regard to male children, but not with regard to 
female children.107  
 
During 2002, at the outset of the DDR programme, it was estimated that 
there were 30 000 children in need of DDR108 but as at September 2008 
that estimated figure stood at 3 500.109 CONADER’s figures suggest that 
by December 2006 30 000 children had been released by armed forces 
and groups and furthermore, between October 2006 and August 2007, a 
further 4,000 children were released.110 Thus, in terms of positive, yield 
the programme has attained some real success. However, the ‘release’ of 
children does not include their social reintegration into civilian life. By 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 ‘Struggling to Survive: Children in Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo’ Watch List on Children and Armed Conflict (April 2006) 46. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid, 47. 
108 Children at War: Creating hope for their future, note 93 above 1. 
109 ‘Report of the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’ United Nations Security Council S/2008/693 (10 November 
2008) para 19-20; however, the Secretary-General warned that that figure may have 
increased due to the re-escalation of hostilities in North Kivu from 28 August 2008 
onwards. 
110  ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the DRC’ 
S/2006/389 (13 June 2006); ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed 
Conflict’ A/62/609-S.2007/757 (21 December 2007). 
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December 2006 CONADER figures showed that of the 30 000 children 
released 14 000 were still to receive any form of reintegration assistance. 
This often means that those children are worse off than they were while 
associated with fighting forces since after demobilization but before 
reintegration many children had no form of income and nobody to look 
after them. This increased the number of homeless street children, as 
well as results in voluntary re-enlistment.  
 
The main point of concern is the apparent inability of the DDR 
programme to demobilize female child soldiers. Of the 30 000 children 
estimated to need demobilization, up to forty percent (12 500) were 
thought to be girls.111 Yet, only an estimated twelve percent of children 
having gone through the DDR process were female.112 With regard to 
CONADER as an institution, there were great concerns. Amnesty 
International stated that they “encountered pervasive pessimism among 
the child protection community about CONADER’s limited capacity to 
effectively coordinate a comprehensive DDR process given its weak 
institutional foundations, shortage of technical experience, lack of 
decentralization and widespread reports of corruption inside 
CONADER.”113  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 ‘Forgotten Casualties of War: Girls in Armed Conflict’ Save the Children UK (2005) 
11. 
112 2008 Global Report, note 89 above 110. 
113 ‘Struggling to Survive: Children in Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo’ Watch List on Children and Armed Conflict (April 2006) 47. 
	   340	  
The UEPNDDR succeeded CONADER immediately after the dissolution 
of CONADER on 14 July 2007. Ostensibly this substitution of 
organizations, at least in part, occurred as a result of the loss of faith in 
CONADER and the associated difficulties in securing further funding. This 
is evidenced by the fact that the UEPNDDR also functions on the 
Operational Framework established for CONADER during May 2004. 
Finally, regardless of successes attained to date, child soldier recruitment 
bears a proportional relationship to the intensity of hostilities. As a result 
of the escalation in hostilities during August 2008, the number of children 
associated with fighting forces in the DRC re-escalated.114 This figure 
stood at an estimated 3 500 before this escalation in hostilities.115 
 
4. SUMMARY  
In the course of this Chapter, I observed various positive developments in 
relation to the prevention of child soldiering in the DRC. Most significantly 
among these, are the DDR of thousands of child soldiers on an annual 
basis, the ongoing prosecutions before the ICC, and the better 
coordinated sharing of data that has been the result of the work of the 
country task force for the MRM. However, many of the results achieved to 
date are mixed. While the DRC was the first state to prosecute an 
individual for the use and recruitment of child soldiers, that individual has 
escaped justice and is serving in the National Armed Forces of the very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’ UN Doc. S/2008/693 (10 November 2008) at para 19-20. 
115 Ibid. 
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state that convicted him. Similarly, in the context of the ICC, Bosco 
Ntaganda, against whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant during 2006, is 
living a public life as a General in the FARDC without being arrested and 
surrendered to the ICC. Most distressing, for the thousands of children 
who are absorbed into DDR programmes on an annual basis, thousands 
more slip through the cracks, and are not absorbed into these 
programmes. Moreover, not only are significant numbers of children still 
recruited on an annual basis, many of those children that have been 
absorbed into DDR programmes are re-recruited.  
 
The practicalities in the DRC situation support my broad finding that in 
order to be more effective, all mechanisms engaged with child soldier 
prevention must be continuously refined. Virtually every mechanism that 
was included in this Chapter that is operational in addressing child 
soldiering in the DRC, can be rendered more effective through such 
continuous reassessment and refinement. The mechanism that is 
currently under-performing most significantly is the Security Council itself. 
It is worrying that the most powerful mechanism engaged with child 
soldier prevention is underperforming the most of all mechanisms 
engaged with such prevention. Consistent with the conclusions drawn in 
Chapter 5, the Security Council should take targeted action against those 
parties that persistently violate child soldier prohibitive norms. The 
sanctions imposed on Forces armées de la République démocratique du 
Congo, Colonel Innocent Zimurinda is the most significant step in this 
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regard to date. This notwithstanding, the effective prevention of child 
soldiering is dependent on contributions being made by every relevant 
mechanism, and not the refinement of one powerful mechanism.  
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CHAPTER 7  CONCLUSION 	  
The thesis of this study was defined in Chapter 1: in order for 
international law to be an agent through which “an era of application” can 
be entered in the context of child soldier prevention, the focus must be 
shifted from norm creation, to norm enforcement. In order to address this 
thesis, I identified two research questions:  
 
• Are the international law norms that prohibit the use and 
recruitment of child soldiers capable of enforcement in their current 
form?  
• What changes should be effected to the manner of enforcement of 
these norms in order to achieve a more significant degree of social 
change? In other words, what is needed for an “era of 
application”? 
 
Additionally, also in Chapter 1, I indicated that in this study I subscribe to 
an instrumentalist approach to international law, specifically in relation to 
the prevention of child soldiering. In approaching the thesis I 
differentiated early on between “rights protection” and “social change”.  
The specific conclusions drawn in this thesis regarding the better 
enforcement and application of international law relates more directly to 
the narrower concept of rights protection. Extensive rights protection, 
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however, is an avenue through which broad-based social change can 
ultimately be achieved.  
 
This Chapter is divided into three parts. Parts one and two address the 
first and second research questions, respectively. However, disjunctively, 
the conclusions reached regarding each of the research questions 
achieve little in plotting the central thesis of the study within the bigger 
scheme of eradicating the use and recruitment of child soldiers 
altogether. Therefore, part three not only serves to extrapolate the 
relevance of the conclusions reached regarding the two research 
questions, but does so analytically in relation to the nature of the child 
soldier problem, as detailed in the first two chapters of the study. Indeed, 
while Chapters 1 and 2 may feature less prominently in this Chapter; they 
are still indispensible to the success of the study. “An era of application”, 
by definition, speaks to the reactive role of law, which is consistent with 
the instrumentalist approach I have adopted. For law to be used 
effectively as an instrument to achieve a desired outcome, and for law to 
react effectively to an undesired social reality, a thorough understanding 
of the nature and extent of that social reality or phenomenon is at the very 
least greatly beneficial and more likely indispensible.  
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1. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS 
PROHIBITING CHILD SOLDIERING  
The various norms prohibiting the use and recruitment of child soldiers 
belonging to international humanitarian law (IHL), international human 
rights law (IHRL) and international criminal law (ICL) were individually 
assessed, in detail, in Chapters 3 and 4. The reason for this assessment 
is that the nature and content of these norms impact heavily on the 
potential for their enforcement. The relationship between IHL and IHRL 
also impacts on the enforcement of these norms. In this context, war 
crimes in terms of ICL is seen as forming part of IHL, as norms belonging 
to both these regimes are subject to similar chapeau requirements, the 
existence of armed conflict, and unlike IHRL, both these regimes bind 
non-state actors in addition to state actors. Thus, for purposes of this 
section, reference to IHL includes ICL, unless stated otherwise.  
 
i. The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law  
In the context of child soldier prevention, I have emphasised the 
importance of the relationship between IHL and IHRL for a number of 
reasons, key among these are: first, that no other substantive norms that 
exist in both IHL and IHRL are defined substantively exactly the same. 
This is the case with article 77(2) of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions and article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), the two leading child soldier prohibitive norms from IHL and IHRL 
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respectively.1 Yet, I argue that there still is potential for irreconcilable 
norm conflict between IHL and IHRL in relation to child soldier prevention. 
This serves well to indicate the complex nature of this relationship. 
Second, IHL applies during times of armed conflict, whereas IHRL applies 
both during times of peace and armed conflict. Third, IHL binds state and 
non-state actors, whereas IHRL binds state actors only. Lastly, the 
regime to which the relevant norm belongs will largely dictate what 
avenues for enforcement are available.  
 
The potential for norm conflict to which I refer relates to the different 
obligations the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (CIAC Protocol) 
creates on parties depending on their status (state or non-state actors) on 
the one hand, and the principle of equality of belligerents on the other.2 
 
The likelihood of this potential norm conflict occurring is not remote, and 
the analysis thereof is not purely abstract or academic. Although the 
CIAC Protocol is a human rights law instrument, it expressly endeavours 
to regulate the conduct of parties during armed conflict, as it prohibits the 
use of child soldiers in direct participation in hostilities. This instrument 
also prohibits the recruitment of child soldiers during peace-time, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Convention on the Rights of the Child (entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 
UNTS 3; and Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 
1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 17512. 
2 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (CIAC Protocol) (entered into force 12 February 2002) 2173 
UNTS 222. See Chapter 4. 
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however, the importance of this instrument is perceived to be its focus on 
alleviating the suffering of children during armed conflict. Therefore, in 
any military engagement between a state armed force and a non-state 
actor, where the relevant state has ratified this Protocol such a conflict of 
norms is inevitable. The Protocol will impose different obligations on state 
and non-state actors, and this will be irreconcilable with the equality of 
belligerents: “the rules of international humanitarian law apply with equal 
force to both sides to the conflict, irrespective of who is the aggressor”.3  
 
Further, status-dependent obligations add to the asymmetry that 
generally exists between state and non-state actors. This may prompt 
non-state actors to dissociate themselves from their IHL obligations, as 
they are not treated equally to state actors in terms of the law. It is 
important to keep in mind that one of the major challenges in preventing 
child soldiering is engagement with non-state actors. This norm conflict 
does not, however, render the norms contained in the Protocol 
unenforceable. If it is true that IHL is the lex specialis vis-à-vis IHRL, as is 
suggested by the International Court of Justice, then this norm conflict is 
to be resolved by applying the lowest common denominator to all parties 
to the conflict.  
 
Unfortunately both the CRC and the CIAC Protocol failed to achieve their 
potential in preventing the exploitation of children by armed groups and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Greenwood, C. ‘Historical Development and Legal Basis’ in Fleck, D. The Handbook of 
International Humanitarian Law (2008), 11. 
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forces. This, I conclude, is primarily due to a failure of the drafters of both 
instruments to appreciate the unique characteristics of IHRL as a legal 
regime, and specifically how these unique characteristics may contribute 
to the better protection of children from exploitation by military groups and 
forces. Much criticism was levelled against the CRC at the time of its 
adoption for directly adopting the IHL language contained in Additional 
Protocol I, and for failing to impose stricter obligations in relation to the 
prevention of the use and recruitment of child soldiers. However, it is not 
so much the failure of creating stricter standards that resulted in the CRC 
not achieving its potential, but rather the failure of not creating norms 
better suited to the IHRL sphere of international law. In particular, unlike 
IHL, the CRC could have prohibited the use of children during situations 
falling short of armed conflict, such as internal disturbances and riots. 
Furthermore, although the CRC does prohibit the recruitment of children 
during times of peace, the language of the instrument should have 
reflected this expressly. 
 
The prevailing consideration and motive in drafting the CIAC Protocol 
was lifting the standards of protection afforded to children, protecting 
them from military use and recruitment, while at the same time securing 
mass-state subscription to the instrument. Unfortunately, to achieve this, 
the drafters of the instrument provided for less proscriptive regulation of 
child soldier use and recruitment by state actors, than by non-state 
actors. In addition, neither of the problems I identified above in relation to 
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the CRC, being the prohibition of the use of children in situations falling 
short of the IHL definition of armed conflict and the prohibition of child 
recruitment during times of peace, was rectified in the CIAC Protocol. 
Nevertheless, the shortcomings of the CRC and its Protocol do not result 
in a situation where the relevant norms are inherently incapable of being 
enforced. Instead, these shortcomings have resulted in the net of 
protection being cast more narrowly.  
 
ii. Shortcomings of the Contemporary Prohibitions of Child 
Soldiering  
There are shortcomings in the existing legal norms, some more worrying 
than others. In particular, the following elements appear in the most 
widely ratified instruments prohibiting child soldiering, including the CRC 
and Additional Protocol I: that “all feasible measures” be taken that 
“persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years” not be used to 
“take a direct part in hostilities” and states parties must refrain from 
“recruiting” such persons. As was the case in the previous section, these 
shortcomings generally result in protection being offered to fewer 
children, rather than inhibiting the enforceability of these norms. 
Moreover, often these shortcomings appear much more devastating than 
they are. This is certainly true of the “all feasible measures” standard. 
Child soldier use is a continuous offence (continuous crime in criminal law 
terms), meaning the offence is committed for as long as a child 
participates directly in hostilities. The converse effect hereof is that a 
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child’s future status is not determined by whether all feasible measures 
were taken in the first instance where she/he was used for direct 
participation in hostilities. Instead, this assessment has to made de novo 
in each and every instance where the relevant child was used in direct 
participation in hostilities. It is highly unlikely that a child will be used for 
direct participation in hostilities on more than one occasion and that all 
feasible measures to ensure that the child does not so participate were 
taken in each instance. Moreover, it is highly exceptional that a child will 
be used in direct participation in hostilities only once. Thus, this standard 
has very little effect on the enforceability of these norms. This standard 
does however serve as a barometer for measuring the commitment of 
states to preventing child soldiering. Unfortunately, it was retained in 
relation to the regulation of child soldier use by state actors in the CIAC 
Protocol.4  
 
The development of customary international law has already addressed 
some of these shortcomings, and will continue to do so in the future. The 
child soldier war crime is the only crime in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) that was not prohibited in 
terms of customary law, in the form it exists in the Rome Statute, at the 
time of the drafting and adoption of the Rome Statute.5 Since then, in the 
Child Recruitment decision, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Article 1, CIAC Protocol.  
5 Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90. 
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has held that this formulation of the crime is representative of customary 
international law. 6   Paradoxically, while the legal interpretation and 
analysis offered by the SCSL is often questionable and never more so 
than in the Child Recruitment decision (this is an appropriate example of 
the adage ‘hard cases make bad law’), this Court’s work has had a 
tremendously positive effect on the development of child soldier 
prevention. Such positive developments include the recognition of the 
prohibition of the use and recruitment of child soldiers as a customary 
norm. The recognition of the Rome Statute formulation of the child soldier 
crime as forming part of customary international law extends the scope of 
protection previously offered to children from military recruitment, to 
include protection from military enlistment and conscription. This 
construct is broader than ‘recruitment’, and is broad enough to cover all 
instances of child soldier acquisition other than children taking up arms 
truly by their own initiative. Given the fact that there are only a very few 
states (as opposed to non-state actors) internationally that use children 
younger than eighteen (instead of fifteen) for direct participation in armed 
conflict, it is possible that there is an emerging rule of customary 
international law proscribing the use of children younger than eighteen in 
direct participation in armed conflict. Of course this is subject to the opinio 
juris element of customary international law also being present.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of 
Jurisdiction, SCSL-2004-14-AR72E (31 May 2004) (Child Recruitment decision). 
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The only judicial mechanism to have directly enforced a prohibition of the 
use and recruitment of child soldiers is the SCSL. The Statute of the 
SCSL proscribes exactly the same conduct as the Rome Statute, i.e. the 
use, conscription and enlistment of children.7 The enforceability of this 
prohibitive norm is well evidenced by the fact that of the eight people 
against whom judgements have been rendered by the SCSL, all were 
charged with child soldiering, and all but one was convicted on this 
charge. A verdict in Prosecutor v Lubanga, the first case to have 
proceeded to trial before the International Criminal Court (ICC) is due 
imminently. 8  Lubanga is charged only with the use, enlistment and 
conscription of children. Even though the success of the ICC is yet to be 
determined, there is certainly no lack of commitment on the part of the 
Office of the Prosecutor to pursue the prosecution of individuals for the 
use, enlistment or conscription of child soldiers.  
 
Although there are shortcomings in the instruments that currently prohibit 
child soldiering, elaborating new such instruments is highly unlikely for 
many years to come. The task of drafting and adopting the CRC and the 
CIAC Protocol were monumental. Furthermore, there is less incentive for 
states to ratify any new such convention, as they have already indicated 
their commitment to the protection of children, and in the context of the 
CIAC Protocol, in particular, the non-recruitment and use of children 
during armed conflict. Therefore, hopes for the refinement of these norms 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Article 4(c), Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
8 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 (2006). 
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rest on the development of customary international law. In this regard, 
mechanisms with the competence to interpret and apply customary child 
soldier prohibitions should, periodically, reassess the relevant state 
practice and associated opinio juris, so as to ensure that proper account 
is taken of the potential development of the customary norm.  
 
In summary, the norms proscribing the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers that are in existence at the moment are capable of enforcement. 
It is hoped that over time these norms will be refined, with a view to better 
protecting children. Nevertheless, a concerted effort is now required to 
address the application of these norms. The scope of application and the 
available enforcement mechanisms is determined by the legal regime to 
which the norms in question belong. The implications of the formal nature 
of the legal regime, be it IHL, IHRL or ICL, to which a particular norm 
prohibiting child soldiering belongs, does not limit the enforceability of the 
specific norm. Rather, it dictates the scope of application and available 
enforcement mechanisms to which the legal regime is confined more 
broadly.  
 
2. THE REFINEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISMS AIMED AT THE PREVENTION OF CHILD SOLDIERING  
The likelihood that major changes to a small number of mechanisms will 
achieve significant results is minimal. Certainly, in this study I did not 
identify any mechanisms that hold the potential to prevent child soldiering 
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on a broad-based scale by simply implementing extensive changes to the 
mechanism itself. Instead, all mechanisms that contribute to the 
prevention of child soldiering should be refined and reassessed on a 
continuous basis. Some mechanisms will however require more 
refinement than others. The mechanisms analysed in this study form part 
of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the ICC. The 
remainder of this section is divided among these entities and the various 
mechanisms that form part of them. Each mechanism analysed in this 
study is catalogued below, with specific emphasis being placed on the 
changes to the relevant mechanism that I argue will elevate its 
effectiveness in preventing child soldiering, should the changes be 
implemented.  
 
i. The Refinement of United Nations Mechanisms Aimed at Child 
Soldier Prevention  
The UN is a massive organization consisting of five principal organs and 
a host of agencies, funds and other entities. Collectively I refer to the 
entities that make up the UN System as ‘UN entities’. Many of these 
entities engage with child soldiering. However, the analysis in this thesis 
focuses on the Special Representative to the Secretary-General on 
Children and Armed Conflict (SRSG), the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC Committee) and the Security Council. The inclusion of these 
entities in this study was determined by two criteria, the relative strength 
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of the entity, and the entity’s potential for direct engagement with child 
soldier prevention.  
 
The Special Representative to the Secretary-General on Children 
and Armed Conflict 
The SRSG is the mechanism engaged with child soldier prevention that 
has arguably yielded the most tangible results to date. As was discussed 
in Chapter 6 for example, the phasing-out of the use and recruitment of 
child soldiers by the FARDC, the Armed Forces of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), was a direct result of negotiations with the 
DRC Government initiated by former SRSG Otunnu. These negotiations 
culminated in a five-point action plan to cease the use and recruitment of 
child soldiers in the ranks of the FARDC, and this plan has seen 
extensive implementation. The SRSG is one of very few mechanisms 
engaged with child soldier prevention, the positive results of which can to 
some extent be measured on a quantitative basis. The deterrent effect of 
the ICC may be very real, yet it does not yield results that can be 
measured in a similar fashion. Caution should be heeded not to elevate 
the role of the SRSG in preventing child soldiering purely on the basis of 
measurable results, and conversely, mechanisms the results of which are 
not similarly measurable should not by virtue of this alone be relegated. 
 
The SRSG has invested more time and resources into direct engagement 
with child soldier prevention, i.e. engagement that may yield measurable 
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results, than indirect engagement. In the context of indirect engagement, 
the SRSG is mandated to act as a focal point within the UN system with 
responsibility for the coordination of initiatives and mechanisms aimed at 
child soldier prevention emanating from all entities making up the UN 
system. In this context the SRSG should play a more meaningful role. 
Even though there is often considerable overlap in their efforts, there is 
little and often no cross-communication between the various UN entities 
engaged directly with child soldier prevention. There are various reasons 
why such communication should exist between these entities, including: 
they can benefit from each other’s data and experience, and such 
interaction will better enable the different UN entities to make strategic 
decisions regarding which matters to take up and which not to.  
 
The SRSG does engage with all of these entities, however, these entities 
may benefit greatly from engagement with each other. Given the level of 
effectiveness of the SRSG, criticism like this might seem trivial. However, 
this is wholly consistent with the broader conclusion reached in this 
section, that all mechanisms, regardless of their current level of 
effectiveness, should continuously be reassessed and refined.  
 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child  
The CRC Committee is a treaty-body forming part of the UN Human 
Rights Treaty System. In terms of the current mandate of the Committee, 
its primary function is monitoring state compliance with the CRC. The 
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Committee does have secondary functions, however, unlike any of its 
sister treaty-bodies, it does not have any form of complaints procedure or 
enforcement capacity. A process to elaborate a Protocol to the CRC 
establishing a complaints procedure is already in an advanced stage, and 
a second Draft Protocol has been produced providing for an array of 
different complaints procedures.  
 
The effectiveness of treaty-body complaints procedures is strongly 
contested. However, I am of the view that it is not the concept of a 
complaints procedure in the context of treaty-bodies that is inherently 
incapable of ensuring a degree of compliance with legal norms. This is 
evidenced by the varying degrees of success of the various treaty-bodies. 
In this regard the Human Rights Committee serves as an example of an 
effective complaints procedure. As the Protocol to the CRC that will 
establish a complaints procedure is still being formulated and negotiated, 
it is a matter of utmost urgency that this mechanism be formulated so as 
to ensure effective enforcement of the relevant legal norms. The latest 
Draft Protocol raises a number of concerns. In particular, while it 
disallows reservations, it incorporates what I term a ‘selective ratification 
regime’. This regime provides for states to opt-in to various different 
complaints procedures by making a declaration to that effect. In the most 
extreme cases, the Draft Protocol absurdly allows states that are ratifying 
parties to either of the Protocols to the CRC, including the CIAC Protocol 
but who are not ratifying parties to the CRC itself, such as the United 
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States, to ratify the Protocol and not be subject to any of the five 
procedures provided for in the Draft Protocol, except for the enquiry 
procedure for grave or systematic violations. This is consistent with the 
trend that has been set by the CRC, and the CIAC Protocol after that, to 
secure extensive state subscription at the cost of creating better norms, 
protecting more children and strengthening mechanisms that exist to 
secure the application of these norms. Those negotiating this instrument 
should reconsider this approach. Ultimately, the rights of children will be 
better safeguarded by a mechanism capable of effectively applying 
relevant norms, even when only a limited number of states are subject to 
the mechanism, than would be the case where the mechanism enjoys 
universal subscription, but is inherently flawed to the extent that it cannot 
effectively apply the relevant norms. 
 
The Security Council  
The issue of children affected by armed conflict was formally placed on 
the agenda of the Security Council of the UN during 1998, and since 
then, the Security Council has continuously engaged with this issue. Most 
significantly, the Security Council has established a comprehensive 
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children and Armed Conflict 
(MRM), and Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (Working 
Group). However, the MRM and Working Group have no power, in their 
own right, to enforce or apply international norms prohibiting child 
soldiering. Instead, they exist to inform the Security Council, which then 
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has the power to take action by, for example, imposing targeted sanctions 
against violating parties. The Security Council has adopted one binding 
Resolution under its Chapter VII powers, which demanded the end of 
child soldier use and recruitment in the DRC.9 This Resolution, however, 
did not go as far as creating targeted sanctions. There is clear evidence 
that a number of actors have persistently used and recruited child 
soldiers for a number of years. The potential of the Security Council to 
contribute to the prevention of the use and recruitment of child soldiers 
lies in its considerable power.  
 
The Security Council for the first time threatened persistent violators with 
targeted sanctions during 2004.10  This threat has been repeated on 
numerous occasions since then. By failing to act against such persistent 
violators, who have been identified by the Secretary-General in his 
annual report on children in armed conflict, the Security Council is likely 
reinforcing the view held by some that these are empty threats, and 
nothing more than political rhetoric. Regardless of debates around the 
different conceptions of childhood among different cultures, there are no 
violating parties today that justify their actions on the basis of any such 
arguments. Such violating parties use and recruit child soldiers as the 
benefits thereof outweigh the negative consequences; what Singer calls 
“the decisional calculus behind the use of child soldiers”.11 This will not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Security Council Resolution 1332, (14 December 2000). 
10 Security Council Resolution 1539, (22 April 2004) para 5(c). 
11 Singer, PW. Children at War (2006) 153. 
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the case should the Security Council impose targeted sanctions, the 
review of which is conditional on the relevant violating party engaging 
with the SRSG to implement a plan phasing out the use and recruitment 
of child soldiers within a fixed time period. Indeed, of all mechanisms 
engaged with child soldier prevention, I am of the view that the Security 
Council is best placed to affect this decisional calculus. This, however, is 
dependent on the Security Council taking the next step and following up 
its threats with action.  
 
ii. The Refinement of African Union Mechanisms Aimed at Child 
Soldier Prevention  
Within the African Union, both the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (African Court), as well as the African Committee of Experts on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s Committee) have 
subject-matter jurisdiction in relation to child soldier prohibitive norms. 
The African Court is the only regional human rights court that has such 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  
 
The African Children’s Committee has been in existence for ten years, 
but has produced no real results to date. The relevance of this Committee 
for present purposes is its status as an African inter-governmental 
organization, giving it the authority to transmit cases to the African Court. 
The African Court has as of yet only rendered two decisions, and no final 
judgements on merits. To enhance the future effectiveness of the Court in 
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preventing child soldiering, more states should make declarations 
granting individuals and NGO’s with observer status before the African 
Commission direct access to the Court. Of all the entities that have the 
authority to transmit cases to the Court, it is most likely that an individual 
or an NGO will transmit cases dealing with child soldier use and 
recruitment.   
 
iii. The Refinement of the International Criminal Court in Relation to 
Child Soldier Prevention  
In suggesting changes to enforcement structures, one of the 
considerations is the feasibility of changing the structure at all. In the 
context of the ICC the process for amendment is such that small changes 
are not going to be made to the Rome Statute or the structure of the ICC. 
In any event, such changes are not required. 
 
The potential of the Rome Statute to achieve far-reaching results rests on 
state parties incorporating the Rome Statute into their municipal law, and 
prosecuting violators themselves. States should legislate for the use of 
universal jurisdiction in relation to the prosecution of war crimes, including 
the child soldier crime. This will increase the scope for the prosecution of 
the ICL child soldier crime exponentially. At the same time, the potential 
of the Rome Statute, in both the municipal and international spheres, is 
dependent on the extensive subscription to the Statute by states. Efforts 
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to promote the ratification and municipal incorporation of the Rome 
Statute must be expanded.   
 
An enforcement gap exists regarding the enforcement of child soldier 
prohibitive norms on non-state actors. This is so primarily because 
international law obligations are generally state-focused. IHL and ICL 
have a more significant role to play in this regard, as unlike IHRL, these 
regimes create obligations on such non-state actors. Traditionally, 
however, there was no mechanism to enforce these obligations 
incumbent upon non-state actors. However, the ICC does have 
jurisdiction in relation to such actors, and will in all likelihood contribute to 
narrowing this gap. In terms of IHRL the state in which such a non-state 
actor operates has a duty to prevent them from using or recruiting child 
soldiers. In practice this is, however, often impracticable as the state 
which is the duty-bearer is engaged in armed conflict with the relevant 
non-state actor and moreover, there are numerous inherent difficulties in 
enforcing legal norms during on-going armed conflict.   
 
3. CONCLUSION: SHIFTING FOCUS FROM NORM CREATION TO 
NORM ENFORCEMENT, THE REQUISITES FOR AN “ERA OF 
APPLICATION” 
The two research questions serve different purposes in that the first 
question relates to the viability of the thesis of the study, whereas the 
second question analyses how the thesis is to be achieved. Should the 
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conclusion of the first question have been negative, it would have been 
fatal to the thesis of the study. The conclusion was, however, positive. 
The second question calls for further analysis, and a broader range of 
conclusions. The thesis of the study is “that in order for international law 
to be an agent through which ‘an era of application’ can be entered in the 
context of child soldier prevention, the focus must now be shifted from 
norm creation to norm enforcement”. The conclusion to the first research 
question confirms that it is viable to shift focus to norm application instead 
of norm creation. The second question addresses the way in which to 
achieve “an era of application”. This “era of application” is the next step in 
combating the use and recruitment of child soldiers. It is, however, not the 
last.  
 
International law plays a dual role in addressing matters such as child 
soldiering. First, it plays a reactive role in the sense that violations of the 
relevant norms are redressed. Second, it plays a less tangible, 
anticipatory role in preventing violations from occurring altogether. This 
happens on a micro and macro scale. On the micro scale, the deterrent 
value of criminal prosecution plays a role in preventing the commission of 
at least some crimes in some circumstances. On the macro scale, the 
existence of specific rules of international law prevents the commission of 
some actions altogether. For example, during 1942 US President 
Roosevelt authorised the mass internment of people of Japanese 
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ancestry, including a great number of US citizens.12 In total in the region 
of 120 000 people were interned.13 On the same authority, people of 
Japanese ancestry were also excluded from designated areas, including 
the entire State of California and Oregon.14 Since the commencement of 
the “war on terror” there have been many calls from the far-right fringes of 
society for the internment of Muslim people in the US.15 Yet, unlike the 
internment of people of Japanese ancestry during World War Two, these 
calls have been dismissed as emanating from fringe groups and not 
representing the views of the majority. Indeed, in a society based on 
fundamental human rights, such internment is unthinkable.16  
 
As is clear from the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5, the “era of application”, 
as envisaged in this thesis, occurs very much in relation to the reactive 
role of law. This approach still fails to take account of deeper systemic 
problems that result in children joining armed groups, such as extreme 
poverty. Circumstances exist where it is sometimes the lesser of two evils 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This was done on the authority of Executive Order 9066. See also Korematsu v 
United States 323 US 214 (1944). In this case the US Supreme Court, on a split verdict 
of six to three, upheld Executive Order 9066 as constitutional. Justice Roberts, Justice 
Murphy and Justice Jackson gave strong dissenting opinions. Justice Murphy stated in 
his dissent “I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism”. 
13 Ng, WL. Japanese American internment during World War II: a history and reference 
guide (2002), xi. 
14 Ibid, 21. 
15 See for example, Malkin, M. In Defense of Internment: The Case for Racial Profiling in 
World War II and the War on Terror (2004). 
16 In view of the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, it may be argued that 
internment is not as unrealistic as I suggest. Although detention at Guantanamo Bay is 
not based on legal process, it is nevertheless based upon intelligence implicating the 
specific detainees. The legality of such detention is undoubtedly questionable, but it is 
not tantamount to the mass internment of people based on ethnicity alone, as was the 
case with Japanese internees during World War Two. See Olson, LM. ‘Guantanamo 
Habeas Review: are the D.C. District Court's Decisions consistent with IHL Internment 
Standards?’ 42 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 197 (2009-2010) for an analysis of detention at 
Guantanamo Bay in terms of IHL standards.  
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for a child to be a child soldier as opposed to a child civilian.17 Social 
change should not be limited to ending impunity and preventing the use 
and recruitment of child soldiers, but should also create an environment 
where choosing to be a child soldier is not more conducive to self-
preservation than choosing to remain a civilian. To achieve this the social 
milieu should be adjusted to the extent that it is not only commanders 
who are discouraged from recruiting children, but the children themselves 
see no benefit in joining armed groups. To again use the language of 
Andvig and Gates, social change should not only address the “demand” 
of child soldiers, but also their “supply”.18 Such social change speaks to 
the anticipatory role of law. 
 
As I stated earlier, social change is incremental. Achieving broad-based 
social change cannot be considered until extensive rights protection 
occurs. This implies that where the social phenomenon that is the subject 
of concern is a problem on a significant scale, international law’s 
anticipatory role will only be effective once its reactive role has diminished 
the scope of the phenomenon. As is evidenced in Chapter 2, the use and 
recruitment of child soldiers is a problem of global proportions. The “era 
of application” that is the subject of this thesis is the next step in 
combating the child soldier phenomenon. Once this “era of application” is 
achieved, more work will still be required in preventing child soldiering. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Chapter 2. 
18 Andvig, JC. & Gates, S. ‘Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict’ in Gates, S. & Reich, 
S. (eds.) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (2009), 77-78.  
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This work will need to focus more on the deeper systemic problems that 
cause children to join armed groups and forces, and at the same time, will 
also need to focus more on the anticipatory role of international law. 
Norms forming part of international law are applied and enforced in both 
the municipal and international sphere. The municipal incorporation of 
international norms is one of the best avenues through which to secure 
application of these norms, and states should as a matter of course 
implement the international obligations to which they subscribe into their 
municipal law. However, the strength of the rule of law in the relevant 
state will largely determine whether the municipal law can effectively be 
applied. Children are generally used and recruited during armed conflict 
in states where the rule of law is very weak. Many of these challenges, as 
well as successes are evident from the case study of the DRC, contained 
in Chapter 6.  
 
In the final analysis, as I did in Chapter 1, it is again fitting to refer to 
former SRSG Otunnu’s statement to the General Assembly some twelve 
years ago:  
 
The Special Representative believes that the time has come for the 
international community to redirect its attention and energies from the 
juridical task of the development of norms to the political project of 
ensuring their application and respect on the ground. An “era of 
application” must be launched. Words on paper cannot save children 
and women in peril. Such a project can be accomplished if the 
international community is prepared to employ its considerable 
collective influence to that end.19 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 ‘Promotion and protection of the rights of children: Protection of children affected by 
armed conflict Note by the Secretary-General’ A/54/430 (1 October 1999) para 165. 
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The two aspects of this short quote with which I agree wholeheartedly 
are, that the international community must redirect its focus from norm 
creation, to norm enforcement – indeed, this is the thesis of my study; 
and, that this goal is achievable if the international community employs its 
collective influence to that end. I disagree, however, that the task of 
developing norms is strictly “juridical”, and that the task of ensuring their 
application and respect, is purely “political”. The purpose of this study is 
not to restate Otunnu’s views. Rather the value this thesis adds to the 
knowledge on child soldier prevention is threefold: First, I conclude, after 
thorough analysis, that the positive law has developed to the extent that 
there is a body of international law that is capable of application. Second, 
I identify various entities, functionaries and mechanisms, the refinement 
of which will render international law more effective in preventing child 
soldiering. Concomitant to this, I draw specific conclusions in relation to 
how each of these entities, functionaries and mechanisms are to be 
refined. Finally, in analysing my findings in relation to each of these 
research questions, with the aim of addressing the central thesis, I 
conclude that the findings in this study are the next step in child soldier 
prevention, and a necessary component in eventually achieving broad-
based social change. Nevertheless, such broad-based social change will 
not be truly achieved during “an era of application”, but rather during an 
era in which application is not necessary.  
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